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Department of State

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NOD988

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/CEN: NSSMITH: SLP

APPROVED BY S: SECRETARY

ARA: LAMOTLEY (SUBS)

S/S: O: BSTRATHEARN

S: MBUTLER

S/S: JPCOVEY

O 8819872 OCT 84 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 298926

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS:

PREL, XK

SUBJECT: MEMCON: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH CORE FOUR,

OCTOBER 5, 1984 (S/S 8427791)

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SECRETARY OPENED BY NOTING THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT MOMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE CONTADORA DRAFT TREATY WAS GOOD BUT NEEDED FURTHER WORK. THIS WOULD REQUIRE CLOSE COORDINATION AND INTENSE EFFORT BY OUR FRIENDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF CONTADORA WERE VERY IMPORTANT. THE SAN JOSE MEETING HAD BEEN REASONABLY GOOD. EUROPE WAS SUPPORTIVE, EXCEPT FOR FRANCE. HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW MUCH SUCCESS THE CENTRAL AMERICANS HAD HAD IN SECURING MORE AID BUT HE HAD URGED THE EUROPEANS TO GO TO SAN JOSE WITH AN OPEN CHECK BOOK AND MORE OPEN MARKETS.

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3. ON MANZANILLO, THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO DIALOGUE. THIS WAS GENUINE; WE WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON

IMPORTANT ISSUES. WE WERE TRYING TO SUPPORT CONTADORA AND REINFORCE THE EFFORTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICANS. MOTLEY AND AMB SHLAUDEMAN HAD MET WITH COMMANDANTE ORTEGA THAT WEEK AT HIS REQUEST TO DEMONSTRATE FURTHER OUR WILLINGNESS TO TALK. NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAD OCCURRED. ORTEGA HAD TAKEN A TOUGH POSITION. THE SECRETARY HAD REITERATED OUR CONCERNS TO SEPULIEDA AND WOULD UNDERLINE THEM AGAIN NEXT WEEK IN PANAMA AND IN MEXICO CITY. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO RESIST STRENUOUSLY EFFORTS TO MOVE CONTADORA ISSUES INTO THE UN. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO TAKE THE FOCUS OFF CENTRAL AMERICA AND FOR THEIR UN REPRESENTATIVES TO WORK CLOSELY WITH AMB KIRKPATRICK. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRADE OF GUATEMALA NOTED THAT A SPLIT WAS DEVELOPING WITHIN CONTADORA AND THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHARED THE VIEW THAT DEBATE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE AVOIDED. AMB KIRKPATRICK SAID THE IDEAL SOLUTION UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SIMPLY REPORT ON CONTADORA TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SHE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE CENTRAL AMERICANS SHOULD TABLE A RESOLUTION TO PREEMPT NICARAGUA.

4. PAZ BARNICA REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF CONTADORA AND PROGRESS ACHIEVED. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOW NOT TO WASTE THE ENORMOUS EFFORT ACHIEVED, THAT COULD ONLY LOSE CREDIBILITY FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICANS IN EUROPE. HE NOTED THAT THE OCTOBER 15 DATE WAS ONLY FOR COMMENTS. NOT FOR SIGNATURE. AS NOW DRAFTED, TIMING PROVISIONS FAVORED

NICARAGUA. EACH OF THE CORE FOUR AGREED IN COSTA RICA TO EMPHASIZE CERTIAN ASPECTS OF CONTADORA. PAZ REVIEWED

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PAGE 04 OF 07 STATE 298926 C06/17 005541 NOD988 SEVERAL OF THE DEFICIENCIES ON THE SECURITY SIDE. HE NOTED THAT OUR JOINT STRATEGY HAD FAILED WHEN NICARAGUA HAD ACCEPTED SIGNATURE OF THE ACT. FOREIGN MINISTER D'ESCOTO HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM ON SUNDAY THAT WHEN NICARAGUA HAD ACCEPTED CONTADORA IT ELIMINATED NEED FOR FURTHER MEETINGS WITH SHLAUDEMAN. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT IF NICARAGUA WANTED TO STOP THE TALKS, WE WOULD STOP THEM BUT THAT AS OF NOW THEY SEEMED TO WANT CONTINUED EXCHANGES.

5. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED OUR PUBLIC POSITION ON CONTADORA: THAT WE CONTINUE TO FAVOR IT; THAT IT HAD ACHIEVED A GREAT DEAL; THAT MORE WORK WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE IT OPERATIONAL; THAT THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES WOULD REVIEW CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMENTS AFTER OCTOBER 15; THAT HAVING COME THIS FAR IT WAS IMPORTANT TO COMPLETE THE JOB SUCCESSFULLY. THE WORST OUTCOME WOULD BE A TREATY THAT DID NOT WORK, WITH NICARAGUA CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR, WITH SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY

PERSONNEL STILL IN NICARAGUA AND WITH A CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS FLOW TO THAT COUNTRY. THAT OUTCOME WAS NOT NECESSARY WITH CONTINUATION OF OUR JOINT INTENSIFIED EFFORTS AND OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS.

6. IN OUR VIEW THERE WERE THREE CATEGORIES WHERE CHANGE WAS REQUIRED: (1) SIMULTANIETY OF SECURITY COMMITMENTS, (2) THE CONTENT OF SECURITY ISSUES SUCH AS ARMS FREEZE, CEILING LEVELS AND EXERCISES, AND (3) THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. THIS MEANT AT A MINIMUM VERIFICATION PROVISIONS THAT WERE CLEAR SO THAT OTHERS WOULD KNOW WHEN VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED, WITH AGREED PROCEDURES AND AUTHORITIES TO CARRY THEM OUT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH PAZ THAT WE HAD TO SEEK A WORKABLE AGREEMENT

SOON, NOT A PROLONGATION OF THE PROCESS. THE CREDIBILITY OF ALL WAS ON THE LINE. WE ALL HAD AN INTEREST IN

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PAGE 05 OF 07 STATE 298926 GETTING A GOOD TREATY ON THE BOOKS.

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- 7. FOREIGN MINISTER GUTIERREZ NOTED THAT COSTA RICA HAD ALREADY RESPONDED TO CONTADORA: THAT IT ACCEPTED THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TREATY AS WRITTEN, WITH EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION AND CONTROL OF POLITHCAL COMMITMENTS; THEY HAD MADE SOME REFERENCE TO SECURITY PROVISIONS BUT THOSE WOULD BE HANDLED IN DETAIL BY EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS. HE HAD EXPLAINED COSTA RICA'S POSITION ON TV AND IT WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD THERE.
- 8. ANDRADE SAID GUATEMALA WOULD RESPOND AT THE LAST MINUTE. THE BEST STRATEGY WAS FRANKNESS. WE WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE AND SHOULD RECOGNIZE NATIONAL DIFFERENCES RATHER THAN CREATE AN IMAGE OF THE "CORE FOUR" WHICH COULD ONLY LOOK LIKE A FALSE UNITY. EVERYONE RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SIMULTANIETY OF SECURITY COMMITMENTS. THE BEST STRATEGY WAS FOR EL SALVADOR TO MAKE THE SECURITY POINTS. GUATEMALA WOULD ENDORSE THE DRAFT, NOTING ONLY "MINOR TECHNICAL REVISIONS". THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AMERICA HAD A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN POSITIONS AND DECIDE THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ANDRADE EXPRESSED FULL SOLIDARITY WITH EL SALVADOR BUT SAID THE BEST STRATEGY FOR HIS COUNTRY WAS TO NOTE MINOR RESERVATIONS NOW AND WORK LATER. BEHIND THE SCENES IN SUPPORT OF DUARTE. THE SPLIT IN CONTADORA WAS NOW SIGNIFICANT. VENEZUELA WOULD SOON BE JOINED BY PANAMA, AFTER OCTOBER 11, AND THOSE TWO COULD PREVENT MEXICO AND COLOMBIA FROM RUSHING THE PROCESS. THE RIO MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL HAD OPENED EVERYONE'S EYES ON THE SANDINISTAS. EVENTS WERE MOVING OUR WAY. WE HAD TO

HANDLE PUBLIC RELATIONS WITH SUBTLETY, GETTING NICARAGUA'S FRIENDS TO PRESSURE IT.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA SAY EXPLICITLY AND IN PUBLIC THAT THEY

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PAGE 06 OF 07 STATE 298926 C06/17 005541 NOD988 SUPPORT THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF EL SALVADOR AND NOT LEAVE PRESIDENT DUARTE ALONE IN PUBLIC. SILENCE OR VAGUENESS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL NOW. AMB KIRKPATRICK NOTED THAT COUNTRIES STANDING TOGETHER HAD A STRONGER VOICE. THERE WAS NO STIGMA ATTACHED TO THE "FRONT LINE STATES" OR THE "CONTACT GROUP" ON AFRICAN ISSUES OR "ASEAN" ON KAMPUCHEA OR FOR THAT MATTER CONTADORA OR THE EC-10. NOBODY APPRECIATED IT WHEN BELGIUM OR ZAMBIA TOOK POSITION SEPARATE FROM THEIR GROUPS.

- 10. FOREIGN MINISTER TENORIO SAID THAT EL SALVADOR WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH THE PRESENT DRAFT. THAT WAS THE MAIN REASON DUARTE WAS GOING TO THE UN. THE RISKS FOR EL SALVADOR OF THE CURRENT SECURITY PROVISIONS WERE ENORMOUS. IT WOULD NOT HELP END EL SALVADOR'S INTERNAL CONFLICT. EL SALVADOR DID NOT SEE THE SLIGHTEST BIT OF SINCERITY FROM NICARAGUA AND THEREFORE INSISTED UPON STRICT VERIFICATION AND NO FREEZE ON ITS OWN WEAPONS PROCUREMENT. DUARTE WOULD EXPLAIN THIS POSITION AT THE UN IN GENERAL TERMS. ON THE 15TH EL SALVADOR WOULD PRESENT A DETAILED CRITIQUE. THE SECRETARY AGREED SAYING THAT EL SALVADOR OBVIOUSLY HAD NO INTEREST IN PRESERVING A STATUS OUO ON INTERNAL CONFLICT: PRESIDENT DUARTE'S POSITION WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED.
- 11. PAZ BARNICA SUGGESTED THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES RETAKE THE INITIATIVE FROM THE CONTADORA FOUR BY CALLING A MEETING AMONG ALL FIVE CENTRAL AMERICANS, INCLUDING NICARAGUA, IMMEDIATELY AFTER OCTOBER 15 COMMENTS WERE SUBMITTED. HE WAS WILLING TO HOST SUCH A MEETING. IF NICARAGUA REFUSED, THE OTHER FOUR SHOULD

OFFER TO MEET IN MANAGUA. SUCH A MEETING WOULD GIVE THEM CONTROL OVER THE CONTENT AND PACE OF EVENTS. TAKING AWAY THE PLAY FROM THE CONTADORA FOUR COUNTRIES. THE SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT THAT WAS AN EXCELLENT IDEA. ANDRADE NOTED THAT SUCH A DECISION SHOULD AWAIT FURTHER

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DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN CONTADORA AFTER BARLETTA WAS SWORN
IN, BECAUSE HE SAW A SPLIT CLEARLY DEVELOPING. THE
SECRETARY SUGGESTED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS
STRATEGY WITH AMB SHLAUDEMAN SINCE HE, KIRKPATRICK AND
MOTLEY HAD ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT. (AT THAT MEETING, THE
OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE
HONDURAN INVITATION AND PAZ AGREED TO CALL A MEETING FOR
OCTOBER 19--IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTADORA REQUEST OF
SEPTEMBER 7, THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICANS CREATE A
MECHANISM OF CONSULTATION AMONG THEMSELVES. LATER

HOWEVER. ANDRADE INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ONLY IN PRINCIPLE.) THE SECRETARY UNDERLINED THAT ALL OF THEM HAD A MAJOR STAKE IN THE SUCCESS OF CONTADORA AND THEREFORE EACH COUNTRY SHOULD IN ITS OWN STATEMENTS GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD SUPPORTING THE OTHERS. WHILE THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCES OF NATIONAL INTEREST, THESE SHOULD BE PURSUED WITHIN A "WEB OF MUTUALITY." THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE US WAS NOT ONLY A GOOD FRIEND OF THE FOUR, IT HOPED TO BE A GOOD FRIEND OF EACH; RELATIONS WITH EACH COUNTRY WERE AT DIFFERENT STAGES BUT WE WANTED THEM ALL TO BE STRENGTHENED. WHILE THE PROBLEMS WERE OFTEN REGIONAL, WE HAD A STRONG COMMITMENT TO CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS AS WELL. SHULTZ