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DRAFTED BY ARA/CEN: NSSMITH: SLP  
APPROVED BY S: SECRETARY  
ARA: LAMOTLEY (SUBS)  
S/S: O: BSTRATHEARN  
S: MBUTLER  
S/S: JPCOVEY

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O 081907Z OCT 84 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 298926

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XK

SUBJECT: MEMCON: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH CORE FOUR,  
OCTOBER 5, 1984 (S/S 8427791)

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SECRETARY OPENED BY NOTING THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT MOMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE CONTADORA DRAFT TREATY WAS GOOD BUT NEEDED FURTHER WORK. THIS WOULD REQUIRE CLOSE COORDINATION AND INTENSE EFFORT BY OUR FRIENDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF CONTADORA WERE VERY IMPORTANT. THE SAN JOSE MEETING HAD BEEN REASONABLY GOOD. EUROPE WAS SUPPORTIVE, EXCEPT FOR FRANCE. HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW MUCH SUCCESS THE CENTRAL AMERICANS HAD HAD IN SECURING MORE AID BUT HE HAD URGED THE EUROPEANS TO GO TO SAN JOSE WITH AN OPEN CHECK BOOK AND MORE OPEN MARKETS.

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SEVERAL OF THE DEFICIENCIES ON THE SECURITY SIDE. HE NOTED THAT OUR JOINT STRATEGY HAD FAILED WHEN NICARAGUA HAD ACCEPTED SIGNATURE OF THE ACT. FOREIGN MINISTER D'ESCOTO HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM ON SUNDAY THAT WHEN NICARAGUA HAD ACCEPTED CONTADORA IT ELIMINATED NEED FOR FURTHER MEETINGS WITH SHLAUDEMANN. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT IF NICARAGUA WANTED TO STOP THE TALKS, WE WOULD STOP THEM BUT THAT AS OF NOW THEY SEEMED TO WANT CONTINUED EXCHANGES.

5. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED OUR PUBLIC POSITION ON CONTADORA: THAT WE CONTINUE TO FAVOR IT; THAT IT HAD ACHIEVED A GREAT DEAL; THAT MORE WORK WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE IT OPERATIONAL; THAT THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES WOULD REVIEW CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMENTS AFTER OCTOBER 15; THAT HAVING COME THIS FAR IT WAS IMPORTANT TO COMPLETE THE JOB SUCCESSFULLY. THE WORST OUTCOME WOULD BE A TREATY THAT DID NOT WORK, WITH NICARAGUA CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR, WITH SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY

PERSONNEL STILL IN NICARAGUA AND WITH A CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS FLOW TO THAT COUNTRY. THAT OUTCOME WAS NOT NECESSARY WITH CONTINUATION OF OUR JOINT INTENSIFIED EFFORTS AND OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS.

6. IN OUR VIEW THERE WERE THREE CATEGORIES WHERE CHANGE WAS REQUIRED: (1) SIMULTANEITY OF SECURITY COMMITMENTS, (2) THE CONTENT OF SECURITY ISSUES SUCH AS ARMS FREEZE, CEILING LEVELS AND EXERCISES, AND (3) THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. THIS MEANT AT A MINIMUM VERIFICATION PROVISIONS THAT WERE CLEAR SO THAT OTHERS WOULD KNOW WHEN VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED, WITH AGREED PROCEDURES AND AUTHORITIES TO CARRY THEM OUT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH PAZ THAT WE HAD TO SEEK A WORKABLE AGREEMENT

SOON, NOT A PROLONGATION OF THE PROCESS. THE CREDIBILITY OF ALL WAS ON THE LINE. WE ALL HAD AN INTEREST IN

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GETTING A GOOD TREATY ON THE BOOKS.

7. FOREIGN MINISTER GUTIERREZ NOTED THAT COSTA RICA HAD ALREADY RESPONDED TO CONTADORA: THAT IT ACCEPTED THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TREATY AS WRITTEN, WITH EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION AND CONTROL OF POLITICAL COMMITMENTS; THEY HAD MADE SOME REFERENCE TO SECURITY PROVISIONS BUT THOSE WOULD BE HANDLED IN DETAIL BY EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS. HE HAD EXPLAINED COSTA RICA'S POSITION ON TV AND IT WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD THERE.

8. ANDRADE SAID GUATEMALA WOULD RESPOND AT THE LAST MINUTE. THE BEST STRATEGY WAS FRANKNESS. WE WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE AND SHOULD RECOGNIZE NATIONAL DIFFERENCES RATHER THAN CREATE AN IMAGE OF THE "CORE FOUR" WHICH COULD ONLY LOOK LIKE A FALSE UNITY. EVERYONE RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SIMULTANEITY OF SECURITY COMMITMENTS. THE BEST STRATEGY WAS FOR EL SALVADOR TO MAKE THE SECURITY POINTS. GUATEMALA WOULD ENDORSE THE DRAFT, NOTING ONLY "MINOR TECHNICAL REVISIONS". THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AMERICA HAD A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN POSITIONS AND DECIDE THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ANDRADE EXPRESSED FULL SOLIDARITY WITH EL SALVADOR BUT SAID THE BEST STRATEGY FOR HIS COUNTRY WAS TO NOTE MINOR RESERVATIONS NOW AND WORK LATER, BEHIND THE SCENES IN SUPPORT OF DUARTE. THE SPLIT IN CONTADORA WAS NOW SIGNIFICANT. VENEZUELA WOULD SOON BE JOINED BY PANAMA, AFTER OCTOBER 11, AND THOSE TWO COULD PREVENT MEXICO AND COLOMBIA FROM RUSHING THE PROCESS. THE RIO MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL HAD OPENED EVERYONE'S EYES ON THE SANDINISTAS. EVENTS WERE MOVING OUR WAY. WE HAD TO HANDLE PUBLIC RELATIONS WITH SUBTLETY, GETTING NICARAGUA'S FRIENDS TO PRESSURE IT.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA SAY EXPLICITLY AND IN PUBLIC THAT THEY

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DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN CONTADORA AFTER BARLETTA WAS SWORN IN, BECAUSE HE SAW A SPLIT CLEARLY DEVELOPING. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS STRATEGY WITH AMB SHLAUDEMAN SINCE HE, KIRKPATRICK AND MOTLEY HAD ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT. (AT THAT MEETING, THE OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE HONDURAN INVITATION AND PAZ AGREED TO CALL A MEETING FOR OCTOBER 19--IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTADORA REQUEST OF SEPTEMBER 7, THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICANS CREATE A MECHANISM OF CONSULTATION AMONG THEMSELVES. LATER

HOWEVER, ANDRADE INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ONLY IN PRINCIPLE.) THE SECRETARY UNDERLINED THAT ALL OF THEM HAD A MAJOR STAKE IN THE SUCCESS OF CONTADORA AND THEREFORE EACH COUNTRY SHOULD IN ITS OWN STATEMENTS GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD SUPPORTING THE OTHERS. WHILE THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCES OF NATIONAL INTEREST, THESE SHOULD BE PURSUED WITHIN A "WEB OF MUTUALITY." THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE US WAS NOT ONLY A GOOD FRIEND OF THE FOUR, IT HOPED TO BE A GOOD FRIEND OF EACH; RELATIONS WITH EACH COUNTRY WERE AT DIFFERENT STAGES BUT WE WANTED THEM ALL TO BE STRENGTHENED. WHILE THE PROBLEMS WERE OFTEN REGIONAL, WE HAD A STRONG COMMITMENT TO CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS AS WELL.

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