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## US Nuclear Export and Nonproliferation Policy

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Background: Halting the spread of nuclear weapons and guiding nuclear development exclusively toward peaceful ends have been central concerns of successive US administrations since 1945. We have been willing to share our developments in the civil uses of nuclear energy, in exchange for international commitments limiting the application of nuclear technology to peaceful purposes.

On July 16, 1981, President Reagan outlined his Administration's approach to international nuclear cooperation and reaffirmed the US commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. He stated the US will:

- Seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective;
- Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by improving regional and global stability and promoting understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states;
- Continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by countries that have not accepted those treaties;
- View a violation of those treaties or an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and US bilateral relations and view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapons state with grave concern;
- Strongly support and work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system;
- Work with other nations to combat the risks of proliferation;
- Continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands, and to seek agreement requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapons states as a condition for any new nuclear supply commitment.

Place of nuclear exports in US nonproliferation policy: US ability to influence the direction of world nuclear development is related to the size of our role in international nuclear cooperation. In his July 16, 1981 statement, the President announced the US would not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear power programs where it did not constitute a proliferation risk. In addition, he initiated an intensive interagency review of the policies under which the US exercises its consent rights over reprocessing of US-origin fuel and plutonium use in other countries. As a result of the review, the President offered

to work out procedures with Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) for advance long-term consent to retransfers, reprocessing, and use of nuclear material over which the US has consent rights in programs that meet statutory criteria. The US would also provide a statement of our intention to approve such activities in future programs when it is determined that they meet the necessary criteria.

These offers require new or amended nuclear cooperation agreements, subject to congressional review. Approvals would be valid only as long as the conditions stated in the agreement continue to be met. They would also be subject to strong commitments by these countries to nonproliferation efforts and to more effective controls over plutonium. We are also prepared to consider consent arrangements for countries, other than Japan and those in EURATOM, for the transfer of US-origin spent nuclear fuel to the UK and France for reprocessing. The Administration will maintain its case-by-case approach to US consent in more proliferation-sensitive regions.

NPT and the role of IAEA: Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, countries seeking US nuclear cooperation or exports must accept IAEA safeguards inspections of all their peaceful nuclear activities--so-called "full-scope safeguards." President Reagan has reaffirmed that adherence and agreement to the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and supplier agreement to full-scope safeguards, as a condition for significant nuclear cooperation, are prime elements of our nonproliferation policy. IAEA safeguards serve as a deterrent to diversion of nuclear material for weapons use and as evidence to countries that their neighbors are not building nuclear weapons. More than 100 countries have joined the NPT. Non-nuclear-weapons states party to the treaty accept safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. Our goal is to extend this system to all countries.

The IAEA provides the only viable system of insuring that nuclear materials and equipment are used only for peaceful purposes. We have sought to support the IAEA both by providing major contributions of financial and technical aid and by insisting the IAEA not be diverted from its task by extraneous political activities. In September 1982, the US initiated a reassessment of its participation in the IAEA in response to an illegal challenge to Israel's credentials at the IAEA General Conference. After several months of intensive review, the US decided to resume participation in the IAEA in February 1983.

Supplier restraint in transfers of sensitive exports: The US continues to play a major role in consultations with other supplier countries in order to develop a common line of restraint for the export of sensitive nuclear technology. Guidelines for nuclear supply may need to be tightened, especially for regions of tension.

Security concerns and nuclear proliferation: Denial of nuclear technology can delay the spread of nuclear explosives; only political decisions can permanently prevent their spread. Therefore, a fundamental objective of US policy is to address the local and regional security concerns that may impel a government to seek to develop or acquire nuclear explosives.

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