

POST-MORTEM OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

DD/I COMMENTS

11 MAR 1963

1. We have identified a number of points that need further study and action to improve the performance of the intelligence community in future crisis situations, and a brief description of them follows.
2. A large number of key people throughout the intelligence community, and in CIA specifically, were fully committed during the Cuban problem. They worked long hours seven days a week and had no time to devote to other problems. It would be highly desirable for the Agency to develop what amounts to a strategic reserve for use in times of crisis. For example, it might be possible to use JOT's to considerable advantage in such a situation. In any case each component should identify people of proven ability and experience who could be pulled off their normal work for the duration of major crises.
3. In a fast moving crisis situation, rapid distribution of highly sensitive information becomes terribly important and normal procedures to obtain the release of this information for dissemination or special attempts to restrict circulation of sensitive information cause disproportionate difficulties in the production of current intelligence. It probably would be advisable for us to develop pre-arranged procedures for crisis situations which could be put into effect by the Director on the advice of his principal deputies which would make possible a streamlining of our reporting and analytical activities. Such pre-arranged procedures might also take into account the need to shift personnel described in the preceding paragraph. Within the DD/I we will study this matter. The Deputy Director and Executive Director should do so in a broader context.
4. In addition to the need for streamlined procedures pointed out above, in a fast moving crisis situation there is a heightened need for senior officials to push information down through the organization. In other words, guidance has to move faster and more comprehensively through all levels of the organization in a crisis situation if intelligence production is to be faster and more comprehensive. A specific staff officer assignment should be made at each command level to insure appropriate debriefing and dissemination of information from key officers involved in the crisis.

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic

5. In some cases during a crisis it would be helpful to get periodic negative reports from the field. During the recent crisis, for example, it would have been helpful to get such periodic negative reports from US Embassy, Moscow. The lack of significant new developments there would have been of considerable interest. The Office of Current Intelligence should specifically request DD/P and perhaps State and Defense to lay this procedure on when it would be helpful.

6. During times of crisis a large volume of extremely important intelligence moves through the command channels of US military organizations. There is no simple established way by which such valuable information gets fed into the intelligence machinery. We managed to overcome this problem in large part by ad hoc measures during the Cuban crisis but believe that systematic measures should be developed to insure the availability of such information in a future crisis. We are working on this problem.

7. Many of the people involved in studying the problems of the Cuban crisis have been concerned with the problems that appear to be inherent in our existing system for the reporting and analysis of information from human sources. Witnesses are an extremely important source of evidence in our work. But just as the testimony of witnesses in a trial often conflicts, we find that the intelligence information obtained from human sources is also conflicting. In thinking about this problem, we believe that our existing system for reporting and analyzing information from human sources has changed relatively little from the early days of World War II. In the meantime, the intelligence community has acquired great sophistication in the collection and analysis of information from non-human sources. We believe that it might be advisable to take a new look at the basic philosophy and implementing procedures involved in the collecting and use of this human source material. Perhaps more systematic evaluation of raw intelligence from all sources by DD/I analysts would be helpful.

8. With respect to the estimates business, one of the main concerns in my mind post-Cuba, I should like to suggest the following steps which I believe would be constructive:

a. On major strategic problems involving crisis situations, estimative writing should, to an extent greater than commonly now true, be made to be:

(1) data-oriented and evidence-oriented rather than abstract and speculative (what the DCI calls "philosophical");

(2) focused on describing situations and identifying key factors influencing developments rather than purely predictive;

(3) attentive to the nature and consequences of various alternative lines of future developments, including "worst cases," rather than seemingly firm in identifying "most probable" developments when these are by their nature impossible to predict with much certainty.

b. To insure that the DCI is being supplied in timely fashion this kind of estimative writing, as well as current and basic research data he needs, the DD/I should produce balanced, broad-based CIA reports; the Office of National Estimates staff should contribute to this process, and this task should have as high a priority as drafting inter-agency reports for consideration of the Board of National Estimates and USIB.

c. It should be the responsibility of the DD/I within the Agency to establish the CIA substantive position on strategic intelligence matters of primary importance at the National Security Council level drawing on expert opinion in all of the DD/I offices, and coordinating with DD/P and DD/R as appropriate when CIA substantive assessments are required.

d. To insure close intellectual harmony between the researchers, evaluators and estimates officers, the DD/I should insist on close coordination among all DD/I office staffs, including ONE, and with DD/P and DD/R.

e. The Board of National Estimates might voluntarily or upon invitation contribute to or comment on CIA assessments, but their main task would be the review and approval of USIB papers based on CIA papers and other USIB agency contributions. The Board of National Estimates should as now report directly to the DCI on USIB papers, but the DD/I should advise the Board (and the DDCI or DCI when they consider these papers) of the relationship of USIB texts under consideration to related CIA assessments based on the work of all the offices of the DD/I complex, plus information available from DD/P, DD/R and policy levels of the Government.

9. Much of what I suggest herein is already standard procedure and in fact is what Agency Regulations call for. An improvement in what I have called the

"data-oriented and evidence-oriented" quality of estimates and CIA assessments will be sought by administrative and educational efforts by the DD/I.

10. The following comments were subscribed by Chester Cooper:

a. In assessing the lessons that we can draw from the Cuban developments, I think we should pay some attention to what may have been an important failure of the Soviet "Board of National Estimates." Regardless of how the Soviet decision to put missiles in Cuba was reached, and regardless of the Soviet machinery for providing "intelligence support" to policy makers, some evaluation must have been made of probable US reactions upon learning of the missile emplacement (if not, the intelligence failure was monstrous, indeed). Apparently, the line of thought which assessed that the US would probably not learn of this emplacement until after it was a fait accompli, and/or which gave relatively high odds to a type of US reaction which would not entail great risks for the Soviet Union won the day. It would be interesting to know whether a presentation was made as to the likelihood and consequences of the "worst case." Soviet action immediately following the President's broadcast would indicate that such a presentation was either not made or was totally ignored.

b. What would have been the "worst case?" It would have been one in which the US discovered the emplacement of the missiles before they were operational and would have been prepared to take military action to invade and/or destroy Cuba -- an act which the Soviet Union was powerless to prevent unless it wished to enlarge the conflict to an extent which would, for all practical purposes, amount to general war. We cannot assess what odds the Soviets should have placed on this "worst case" eventuating. Suffice to say, however remote it may have appeared (if indeed it had actually been conceived of), it happened.


c. The Lesson: In our own assessment of Soviet Bloc reactions to certain proposed US courses of action, we should, as SOP, examine the consequences of the "worst case." The policymaker should be apprised of our judgments of what may happen if everything that could go wrong does in fact go wrong no matter how unlikely we think that may be. There is a natural tendency to resist this type of analysis on the part of advocates of particular courses of action on the grounds that this might so frighten the decision makers that they are likely to turn down the proposal. However, the Soviet experience (and our own earlier experience) in Cuba would dictate the necessity of presenting the policymaker with a "worst case analysis."

DD/P COMMENTS

11. I have canvassed all components of the DD/P, including members of the senior staff, for comments on such deficiencies they may have observed during the Cuban crisis. For your convenience, I have summarized these comments in subsequent paragraphs.


12. Headquarters Emergency Relocation Plan. Considerable confusion exists regarding plans for the relocation of CIA headquarters in enemy-inspired emergency situations. Plans on this subject are dispersed in a variety of instructions of different classifications to different addressees: e. g. -

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b. "Guide for Civil Defense Action in the Washington Warning Area" (unclassified).

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
d. DD/S (secret) memorandum of 18 October 1960 to the Deputy Directors, subject: "Plan for the Relocation of the Headquarters of the CIA in Time of Emergency."

e. DD/S (secret) memorandum of 18 October 1960 to the Deputy Directors, subject: "Instructions for Deploying the Initial Emergency Relocation Force."

Recommendation: That the Executive Director's newly constituted Emergency Relocation Group, after re-examination of the problem, republish the Agency relocation plans in a single document with the lowest classification possible and make it available to all employees. Such re-examination should include the following points:

a. Practicality in the light of overall US Government plans in this era of ballistic missiles and megaton warheads. The primary consideration should be continuity of CIA's ability to function with the inherent need to safeguard personnel, communications and other facilities to achieve this objective. These considerations are particularly significant because of the, perhaps unavoidable, ambiguity in present plans as to

the timing of redeployment. If possible, employees should be told when and where to move themselves and dependents in clear, unequivocal language.



13. Need for a CIA (CONUS) War Plan. Related to the foregoing problems concerning Emergency Headquarters Relocation Plans, the Cuban crisis has highlighted additional unresolved problems which affect CIA's ability to serve effectively in time of war. Some of the more important of these concern our working relationships with other elements of the US Government, notably Defense, in wartime; the specific wartime functions of CIA headquarters, and the practical

aspects of support to our overseas elements during war, especially during the first 90 days. The need for guidance on these matters has been expressed by the DD/I; Senior War Planners, Europe and Pacific; elements of the DD/S, as well as of the DD/P.

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This gap should be filled by a CIA (CONUS) War Plan which would become the basis for the planning of all subordinate elements of CIA headquarters. The overall Plan would:

- a. Provide a basis for peacetime preparation for the Agency's wartime mission.
- b. Prescribe the wartime functions of Headquarters.
- c. Outline CIA headquarters' role in wartime and its relationships with other parts of the Government, such as the Presidential Staff and Departments of Defense and State.
- d. Assign missions to the subordinate elements of CIA.

Recommendation: Responsibility for the development of a CIA (CONUS) War Plan be assigned to an appropriate element of the Agency. Because of the background of experience in planning which exists within the War Plans Staff, DD/P, it is suggested that consideration be given to assigning this responsibility to DD/P with support from DD/I, DD/S, and DD/R.

14. Liaison with DOD/JCS. Inherent in the foregoing but perhaps deserving of special mention is the inadequacy of CIA liaison with DOD/JCS both with regard to contingency planning and to effective operational and, perhaps, intelligence coordination in emergency or wartime situations.

The Cuban crisis and the declaration of world-wide DEFCON-3 did result in increased liaison between the CIA and the Joint Staff, but it is questionable whether this liaison was sufficiently timely or at the appropriate levels to provide the needed guidance for CIA contingency planning and preparatory action. The liaison which was effected at different levels within DOD by various elements of CIA was inadequately coordinated and, therefore, inadequately exploited within the Agency. Agency contingency plans in support of US military plans must be written and preparatory actions

must be undertaken before the crisis is upon us.

Without this preliminary planning and preparation, CIA's record of support would have been a sorry one. Had the planning and preparatory actions been fully completed, the Agency response would have been even more satisfactory and rapid.

Current discussions of the adequacy in level and scope of CIA participation in Cuba planning indicate that a thorough review of CIA-Military relations during contingency planning and actual operations is in order. The DD/P is currently looking into this problem with respect to its responsibilities in this field.

In dealing with Defense, we have to think along at least four lines:

- a. Policy (CIA participation in pertinent DOD policy meetings in which Secretary of Defense and Chairman of JCS participate).
- b. Intelligence (USIB activities and DD/I liaison with JCS).
- c. Operational/action liaison with Secretary of Defense (Special Group(s) matters).
- d. War and contingency planning with JCS and military commands.

Recommendation: These factors be fully considered in the development of a CIA War Plan as recommended in paragraph 3 supra.

15. Significance of Intelligence Reports. It is clear in retrospect that the significance of the numerous reports on the arms buildup in Cuba was not generally recognized in the Intelligence Community until after the photographic confirmation. Whatever reasons may be cited for this, it is at least probable that these reports would have presented a sharper issue for consideration by the Community if their total volume and common drift had been succinctly emphasized to the USIB members in summary form, rather than entrusted entirely, on an individual basis, to the normal processes of intelligence methodology.

Obviously the chief contribution the Clandestine Service can make in the field of intelligence continues, as in the past, to be the collection and prompt dissemination, with suitable sourcing and appraisal, of spot information reports in response to requirements. Any effort to dictate Community procedures for sifting and weighing these reports would be both presumptuous and impracticable. Nevertheless, we believe the Clandestine Service can and should take steps to ensure that any persistent train of reporting, the acceptance of which would challenge

prevailing estimates on a matter vitally affecting US interests, is pointedly brought to the attention of those charged with producing the estimates.

Recommendation: On its own initiative, the [] produce timely summaries of possible significant, previously disseminated [] reports bearing on situations of vital national concern. These will not be analytical or estimative documents, nor will they present new information. Their aim will be to bring to the personal attention of USIB members and other appropriate officials, the essential content of various reports, previously disseminated over a period of time, to ensure that the cumulative significance of these reports is explicitly considered and evaluated.

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16. Miscellaneous Comments.

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Our Agency representatives posted to the various military commands reported that the intelligence traffic to the commands of situation summary material was largely duplicative in nature. The JCS Sitsum and the OCI summary particularly complemented each other. In view of the fact that the communications facilities were overloaded during this time, coordination of releases of this type from the military and other agencies should be fully studied to ensure minimal duplication of effort.


During the crisis, a number of Book Messages were sent to the field at times and with a precedence which prevented complete coordination. This resulted in a number of these cables being sent to [redacted] with limited communication facilities. To correct this, we have made arrangements with [redacted] whereby an automatic stop can be lifted on each specific occasion by the area division directly involved.


d. Secure Interdepartmental Telephone Communications: During the crisis the DD/P Operations Center was equipped with a gray phone. Offices in the Executive Office Building, the Departments of State and Defense and the USIA, with which the Operations Center had to deal, however, had no similar telephone installation. If possible, a secure interdepartmental telephone system capable of rapid expansion in emergency situations should be developed.

e. Operational Support: During the critical period, CIA elements directly concerned went on a 24-hour duty schedule; however, other elements that could render direct and/or indirect support were not readily available as they were not on a physical 24-hour duty status. Although there may not be any need for all elements of the Agency to go on 24-hour duty, a general alert message from the highest levels would serve to transmit a sense of urgency to the lower levels to provide reasonable support to the action elements directly involved. As a guide, DD/P found that prior briefings at the appropriate office head level, even if placed in an "if or maybe" category were invaluable in putting the office on notice as to possible actions expected during a crash period.

f. Transportation: There is difficulty in arranging for transportation after normal duty hours for DD/P personnel, particularly clerical, who work long, irregular hours. It must be remembered that the CIA building is an extremely difficult and expensive place to reach if one has to depend on public transportation after normal working hours. A suitable afterhours transportation system of some kind is required.

g. Vending Machines: The automatic vending machines which provided a major share of nourishment after hours and on weekends were poorly serviced during the crisis period. The vending rooms were not cleaned over the weekends and the accumulation of trash and discarded foods made for a very unhealthy and unsightly situation.

25X1 h. Reproduction Facilities: In planning for emergency facilities  the acquisition of a mobile reproduction unit that could be moved into the area when needed, has been recommended. Recent experience in the Cuban and Far East situations suggest that such a mobile unit would have been most useful at Langley. Too frequently the reproduction facility cannot meet the concurrent requirements for high priority work in spite of the best efforts of OL/PSD which, during the recent crisis, have been outstanding.



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25X1 j. Security: It was noted that the Office of Security was well prepared for the crisis. Extensive experience with the "Bay of Pigs" build-up plus the number of Security personnel previously associated with the whole Cuban project proved extremely helpful.



25X1 k. DD/I Support: Cooperation and coordination by the operating elements of the DD/I with DD/P were considered outstanding during the crisis period.

DD/S COMMENTS

Office of Communications

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17. The Office of Communications has been greatly affected by the events of the crisis weeks.



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19. The following discussion points out the major areas where deficiencies have been discovered. Further details and specific recommendations on each subject will be prepared if you desire:

- a. Personnel. Two main categories of personnel were required beyond our on-board strength, namely radio operators and technicians. Attempts were made during this period to obtain military personnel as operators and commercial Tech Rep personnel as technicians. In both instances we were only partially successful in that personnel thus obtained were not fully qualified and when obtained could not be put to immediate use as they were not cleared for CIA use. It is recommended that personnel ceilings be adjusted so that a reserve of qualified personnel that can be called on short notice be developed.

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20. In retrospect, the past few weeks illustrated that our basic system and organization can react to crisis situations if they are not too big and if they occur only one at a time. We do not have reserve capacity sufficient for simultaneous large crises or a hot war. The creation of the National Communications sub-committees absorbed practically the full time of seven of our senior people in committee meetings for three weeks. During this time we still had sufficient depth of staff officer personnel to carry on implementation actions on a world-wide basis. Our recommendations stemming from this period are made in terms of being prepared in the future to meet rapidly increasing requirements with available assets of equipment and personnel whether they occur simultaneously in several parts of the world and whether they occur at the beginning or the end of a given Fiscal Year.

Office of Security

21. This memorandum is divided into two Sections. Section I sets forth comments deemed to be of overall Agency importance, and Section II comments referring to Office of Security problems.

SECTION I: Agency Problems

A. During the week of crisis, substantial effort was exerted in planning against requirements and needs of the Agency. Difficulty was encountered in this important area by the lack of sufficient available information concerning the purpose, nature, and extent of the activities planned [redacted]. The same type of problem was encountered in planning for the protection and support of Agency [redacted].

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[redacted] It has always been assumed that substantial requirements for security protection and support would be levied by overseas stations and bases. Efforts to plan in this area were also rendered difficult by the lack of precise information. We are vitally concerned with Agency plans for regrouping of personnel and, at this time, we are not aware of where or how this will be accomplished.

B. Concern was developed about activities at the Headquarters Building during crisis. Present Agency policy requires a total evacuation of the building, and protection of it is the responsibility of the Office of Security. It is believed, depending on the degree of damage to the building, that the plan for total evacuation may meet with less than conformity, and that a substantial number of people from all components housed at Headquarters will see fit to remain as an informal stay-behind group. Even if this should not occur, the protection of

the building by the Office of Security will require a substantial number of Security personnel who will be assigned indefinitely to the building to guard against sabotage, penetration, and to protect against an onslaught of citizens seeking a haven. As of the present, there are no plans to house either the informal stay-behind group, which might develop, or the Security force. Most importantly, nothing has been done to provide accommodations affording protection against blast and fall-out for any extended period.

C. Great difficulty was encountered in an attempt to provide guidance to Office of Security personnel regarding their dependents. General reaction to the instructions currently available was that they are limited and not sufficiently complete. Questions concerning whether dependents can follow employees on an emergency assignment, and whether they can be housed near relocation sites were common. Further questions about communications with dependents, transport, medical care, and housing were also presented. It may well be that the present policy definition regarding this problem is all that can be done, but the general reaction of personnel has been such as to warrant further clarification.

25X1 D. The problems referred to in paragraphs A, B, and C, in the opinion of this Office, require revision of Agency policy and further study and planning. Regulatory issuances [redacted] and related documents will require review. It is recommended that consideration be given to adding to the administrative approach to emergency planning the establishment of an appropriate advisory board or council composed of senior officials representing major Agency components. This board should review current planning and policy in the areas cited and make appropriate recommendations based on the needs, operations, and requirements of all major Agency components. This board should also correlate Headquarters emergency plans with overseas wartime planning.

E. A vagueness was encountered as to the responsible office in the Agency to provide professional advice and guidance in the important area of nuclear effects, such as radiation, fall-out hazard, and blast hazard. It is recommended that the Medical Office be authorized to assume this responsibility and to achieve whatever degree of specialized information is necessary for it to adequately advise the Agency in connection with this problem.

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F. Survey of [] indicates a lack of protective facilities for personnel and vital records against atomic blast and fall-out. It is our understanding that a feasibility study has been made concerning the solution of this problem. It is recommended that this matter receive further exploration to the point of [] provide adequate protection.

SECTION II: Office of Security Problems

A. The Office of Security employees, during emergency, will be assigned to various rosters and duties, including the Security Patrol, Relocation Force, and Emergency Stand-by Team for overseas support. Duplication of assignments has been noted. A certain degree of indefiniteness exists as to functions and responsibilities. Accordingly, all emergency assignments of Office of Security personnel are being reviewed to avoid duplication and to provide clarification of functions and responsibilities within the limits of available information. In addition, as far as possible, all employees will be provided with instructions as to where to report and what they are expected to do.

B. The role of area and project Security Officers requires clarification and definition. These officers have been requested to furnish the Office information on their emergency assignments and plans. This will be analyzed for the purpose of obtaining complete knowledge as to the availability and function of these officers.

C. Recent experience has demonstrated the need for further orientation and training regarding emergency problems. Requirements for added equipment also became evident. Accordingly, a program has been instituted to hold periodic meetings of Office Relocation Forces, the Security Patrol, and the Emergency Stand-by Team. Plans are being formulated to provide for instruction in the use of the gas mask, complete familiarity with the physical features of Headquarters Building and relocation sites, fire fighting, radiation detection, and first aid. Surveys are current to determine the types and quantities of equipment necessary for training and for emergency operations.

D. Analysis of the Office of Security staff in terms of emergency requirements leads clearly to the conclusion that we are not staffed to meet all responsibilities. Accordingly, plans have been undertaken to assess our requirements and to request, through appropriate Agency channels, military assistance, particularly in the area of guarding and general protection responsibilities.

E. The lack of adequate communications facilities for the Security Patrol and the overall emergency operations of the Office appeared critical. Accordingly, a study has been undertaken to analyze our requirements to determine the necessary equipment and systems and to implement the study to the point of solution.

F. We have become aware of the need for mobility and transport which might arise during a catastrophe of serious proportions. This problem is being pursued with consideration being given to obtaining a better potential for the emergency use of various types of transport equipment and obtaining necessary passes and credentials from the Office of Civil Defense.

G. Further Security planning is necessary for each Agency relocation site and for all areas housing Agency personnel during an emergency. Present plans have been reviewed, and action has been taken to conduct real surveys designed to bring up to date the plans for these areas.

H. The adequacy of our vital storage materials program has been reviewed, and it has been concluded that this program must be intensified. This will be done.

Office of Logistics

22. In response to the request contained in paragraph 2 of the reference, the following paragraphs contain problems and deficiencies noted in recent weeks along with suggested course of corrective action.

23. Emergency Plans:

a. Problem: A review of the Headquarters Emergency Relocation Plans revealed that the plan pertaining to the Agency emergency relocation site [redacted] lacks required materiel support in place. It was also found that a support organization was needed.

b. Proposed Solution to Organization: A proposed concept of operation of the [redacted] facility has been developed and submitted to the Agency Emergency Planning Officer in include an organization structure to cover the essential services required.

25X1 c. Proposed Solution to Materiel Assets: Tables of Equipment
representing estimated austere survival requirements needed to sup-
port [redacted] have been prepared and forwarded to
the Agency Emergency Planning Officer. It was recommended that
25X1 action be taken to secure necessary funds to enable procurement and
prepositioning of these assets in [redacted] area. Estimated
25X1 cost of these assets was [redacted]. There will be additional require-
ments for operational equipment and supplies for the proposed sup-
port organization.

24. Supply Items:

a. Problem: During any emergency or prolonged period of tension requiring 24-hour a day coverage by offices, not ordinarily staffed for such action, a certain amount of cots, blankets, etc., is needed in the interests of minimal operational efficiency of the personnel concerned. This type of bedding is not available at the Headquarters building. In many cases the personnel who were required to remain on duty for 24-hour periods and longer had to find what rest they could on the tops of desks, tables, and in chairs.

b. Proposed Solution:

(1) Each major component of the Headquarters should determine the minimum number of cots, etc., that would be required for its personnel during periods when there must be 24-hour a day coverage of their operations.

(2) Once the bedding requirements have been determined and submitted to the Building Supply Office, then the necessary procurement and placement of these items in the Headquarters building and in other Agency buildings can be undertaken.

25. Procurement Priorities:

a. Problem: As policy is made at high levels (NSC, USIB, etc.), considerations must be given to those decisions which require urgent procurement of large amounts of scarce items in terms of setting up the necessary priorities to accomplish the desired objectives. Without the necessary accompanying priorities, the requested project is stalled and valuable time is lost while Logistics goes back through the channels to obtain the necessary data. This must be done when it is learned that the requested material is in competition with other

established projects. A recent example of this is the request laid on

[redacted]
system as requested by the Subcommittee on Communications of the National Security Council. Projects such as the one cited above will be competing with other established projects. Therefore, without an established priority, the project falls behind schedule and causes a great deal of unnecessary correspondence.

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b. Proposed Solution: That as a part of the planning process, any decision that results in an urgent request for large amounts of

25X1 scarce supplies, personnel or services should have [redacted] assigned because of possible conflict with established projects. A

25X1 [redacted] is used by Department of Defense only for a program that has been cleared by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) to be eligible for such priority. Present policy is that final approval is granted by OCDM for reference to the Secretary of Commerce only after National Security Council review and/or by direction of the President. Once the priority has been assigned, it should be sent along with the decision to insure the meeting of established suspense date(s) for this project.

26. With the exception of the items noted above, there were no major difficulties within the Office of Logistics. Judicious scheduling of personnel during the recent emergency allowed coverage on an extended basis. Requests placed upon the Office of Logistics for support were met within the time frame specified.

Office of Personnel

27. Control Procedures for Employee Military Reservists.

The trend toward rapid call up of reservists by the Military Departments as a strategic deterrent to subversive threats points up a definite need for refinement of the control procedures for Agency employee military reservists. This is particularly true in the case of those Army Reservists on duty outside the United States whose records are under the jurisdiction of the Army Field Commander.

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28. Requirements for Military Security Forces for Headquarters and Relocation Sites.

The close examination given to emergency relocation plans during the early days of the emergency and particularly the decision reached to move a percentage of the emergency force to the relocation site [redacted] revealed requirement for military security forces prior to mobilization to augment existing guard forces at Headquarters [redacted] as a precaution against possible sabotage. Military personnel requirements for these tasks have been accepted by the Military Departments and are included in the Mobilization Troop Basis but they would not be available prior to approximately M plus 30 days.

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ACTION - Department of the Army officials with whom preliminary discussions have been held recommend that our requirements be submitted to the Department of Defense (who will relay them to the Department of the Army). Information is now being assembled in coordination with the Offices of Security and Communications [redacted] preparatory to preparing a memorandum to the Department of Defense for the signature of the DDCI.

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29. Key Employee Military Reservists in CIA Category 2 (release to Military).

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Employee reservists have been permitted to belong to military reserve units [redacted] on the basis of a release signed by an appropriate official in individual offices, staffs and divisions. When the lists of approximately [redacted] Category 2 reservists were consolidated by major component, it became apparent that a number of "key" employees were in position to be lost in event of mobilization.

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[redacted]

31. Need for Dissemination of Information Regarding Control and Use of Employee Military Reservists.

In the course of analyzing the situation regarding employee military reservists it became apparent that information on this subject should be disseminated to the field, particularly that regarding action which was being taken to improve control procedures with the Military Departments.

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