


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The Inspector General's Survey

*December
1966*

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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

1. CIA is collecting too much information--more than it can use properly, probably far more than the Government needs. Like the rest of the intelligence community it makes up for not collecting enough of the right kind of information on the most important targets by flooding the system with secondary matter.

2. The quantity of information is degrading the quality of our finished intelligence.

3. The Information Explosion has already gotten out of hand, yet CIA and the community are developing ways to intensify it. Its deleterious effects will certainly intensify as well, unless it is brought under rigorous control.

4. We find that these excesses are a direct consequence of our several independent requirements systems, whose defects have these principal causes:

a. No one has ever defined what the Government truly needs from the intelligence community, either as to fundamental requirements for U.S. policy or as to what can be put to best use by the producers and readers of finished intelligence. The closest thing to a definition has been the Priority National Intelligence Objectives, a lamentably defective document which amounts to a ritual justification of every kind of activity anybody believes to be desirable. The community and CIA make their own assumptions as to what is needed, and then do not challenge these assumptions sufficiently.

b. CIA's requirements for collection of information are a catalogue of all the subjects individual consumers all over the community have said they would like to know about. They are an indiscriminated mixture of crucial and trivial, appropriate and irrelevant, and are altogether too numerous for effective action, either of collection or of production.

c. Management at all levels has allowed this proliferation of requirements to go almost wholly unchecked.

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d. Resources for collection, especially technical collection, greatly outweigh resources for production.

e. There is too little useful communication between originators of requirements and those whose function it is to satisfy them.

f. The community has just begun to rationalize requirements, collection, and production as between various systems.

5. At the same time we find that a number of efforts in the field of collection guidance show encouraging signs of progress. These include especially the work of the Collection Guidance Staff, and comprise not only collection guidance as narrowly defined, but operational support by the production analysts to the collectors and recent improvements in evaluations. We find the gradually growing ability of CIA to tailor such guidance to the capabilities of human sources to be far more valuable than any aspect of the formal requirements process as currently managed. In the quantitatively more productive fields of technical collection, however, the community must first learn to tailor its requirements to its capabilities for exploitation, and then devise means for limiting both to what the U. S. Government truly needs.

6. Wherever possible we have made precise recommendations, as for a complete overhaul of the IPC List, which is supposed to govern the collection of information by the Clandestine Services, and for the handling of ad hoc "numbered" requirements for collection by human sources generally. Elsewhere we have had to be less specific, as in suggesting means by which CIA could lead the community into a drastic revision of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives--means which ought to involve the collective managerial judgment of CIA in determining what we are in business for.

7. But the most important problem of all- the insatiable appetite which has caused the Information Explosion--would be beyond the capacity of any team of three inspectors to solve even if they were polymaths. We are unable to judge which or how many among all the thousands of collection requirements are valid; we can only observe the effects of unbridled excess. The disease is gluttony, and a hundred bureaucratic pills to relieve the Agency's chronic indigestion would not cure it. The will power will have to be supplied by Agency management in a long series of individual decisions, many of them now unforeseeable, at many levels and probably over several years. We have nowhere recommended spending more money, hiring more

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people, or giving away Agency functions; even if these become necessary it is first essential to reduce requirements.

8. The necessity for restraint is unlikely to be imposed on the community from above, except in gross terms of budgets and ceilings. It is unlikely to be recognized by the intelligence community outside CIA, for the military habit of compiling encyclopedic requirements is too deeply ingrained. (But we argue at several points that the potential influence of CIA on the community's requirements as a whole is considerably greater than it has yet attempted to exert.) It is unlikely to come from inside CIA below the upper levels, because the analysts who originate requirements are long since habituated to asking for too much and are not themselves in a position to make the hard managerial choices which the general excess requires.

9. The excesses of the requirements systems and some of their more important consequences are documented in great detail in our study, sometimes almost to the point of stupefaction. Our best hope is that the necessity for restraint will gradually percolate downward and outward over time. To that end we solicit the earnest attention of the Deputy Directors and their principal subordinates, both line and staff, to the evidence we have compiled. Specific or general, our study and recommendations argue for the adoption, at all appropriate levels of CIA, of the following guidelines for action on requirements for collection of information:

Define what we, as an Agency, believe the Government needs from the intelligence community.

Challenge the community's and our own past assumptions as to what is needed.

Identify the most important gaps that can be realistically stated in terms of collection requirements and production goals.

Arrange these gaps in terms of collection and production priorities.

Reduce the volume of requirements in order to gain more effective collection and production action.

Train the analysts to write fewer and better requirements.

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Discriminate between the important and the trivial.

Adjust requirements on the several collection systems so that they complement and support each other.

Record requirements that are levied orally.

Do not allow collection requirements to exceed the capabilities of the processors and the analysts.

Make validation and coordination of requirements systematic.

Review outstanding requirements periodically.

Improve feedback from collectors to analysts and vice versa.

Systematize operational support.

Analyze the problem thoroughly--in terms of needs, priorities, and capabilities for processing and analysis--before committing the Agency to a new collection effort.

Improve guidance by evaluating what has already been collected.

Stop trying to cover the whole world comprehensively and superficially.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the American intelligence effort the word requirements is surrounded by confusion, artificial complexity, and bureaucratic bumbling. It could be defined to encompass all needs for all types of activity, of collection, analysis, and production, of CIA and of the whole community. In order to concentrate on those aspects where study might most fruitfully lead to recommendations for improvement, we have defined the subject narrowly as requirements levied on or by CIA for collection of information. In the case of SIGINT and overhead reconnaissance, however, the strong impact of community action on CIA has caused us to discuss requirements in these fields in a community context.

2. Even within the narrow definition the word requirements contains elements of at least five distinct types of relationship between those who express needs for information and those whose job it is to satisfy them. We distinguish these five as priorities, "requirements," collection guidance, operational support, and evaluations. These relationships vary widely with the means and difficulty of collection. The first two we consider mostly sterile formalities, but we regard the last three together as demonstrating that the Agency is beginning to make real progress in tailoring its needs and capabilities to one another, and as holding out high hope for future progress. In the study which follows we shall discuss these five elements of the problem in detail as they apply to the various types of collection.

3. First, both chronologically and in intended importance, is the problem of priorities. Does DCID No. 1/3, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," satisfy the community's need to assure itself and higher authority that we are all working on the most important problems, rather than dissipating much of our effort on what is merely interesting and fairly useful? We believe it does not. We also believe that no other device serves this purpose, that the word priorities has long since lost all meaning, and that it is up to management to restore that meaning. Efforts by committees, compilations, mechanical approaches, have repeatedly degenerated into horse-trading designed to keep everybody happy by making everything look like Priority A-1. What does provide some assurance of concentrating on the true priorities of collection, within limits and inevitably with some time lag, is the accumulating experience of the collectors, combining a trained sense of what is important with a pragmatic knowledge of what will work. Where this asset may go astray, out of habit or narrowness of vision, it is

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only executive decision which can define priorities and make them stick. Such definition needs more analysis and support by the production elements of CIA than it has traditionally received.

4. In Chapter II we recommend that CIA managers, beginning with the chiefs of the substantive divisions and offices, formulate their views on the proper content of DCID No. 1/2 ("Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives") and DCID No. 1/3 (the PNIOs) to the end that CIA can develop an Agency position on them and then take the lead in persuading USIB to revise them. We also recommend that the PNIOs be limited to questions affecting our national survival and be explicitly so defined, so that all other valid intelligence questions, of whatever local or temporary importance, will be recognized as aspects of our normal work.

5. In its narrowest sense of specific needs for acquiring information, the word requirements has at least six meanings, often contradictory and always confusing. Its indiscriminate use over many years has created a false impression of system and order, with elaborate machine records and other bookkeeping devices which have the effect of emphasizing quantity at the expense of quality and of concealing the absence of creative managerial supervision. The bulk of the work of handling requirements is left to staffs which inevitably have more influence over the mechanics of the system than over its content, and to committees in which every member inevitably has an ax to grind; ultimately it depends on the widely varying work habits of hundreds of individual analysts. The result is a haphazard agglomeration of things people would like to know. Each specific requirement is allowed to seem equally important with all others except those few to which management has deliberately given a special push. Almost all lack directive force, since they originate outside the chain of command, so that the most basic meaning of the word--an obligation to act--is not among the six in common usage. For most types of requirements there is no satisfactory method of confirming that the question was worth asking, nor for validating the appropriateness of collecting information to answer it by this or that specific means. We are still in the earliest stages of an ability to correlate requirements among all the different systems of collection. Requirements officers have worked earnestly for years to make the disconnected systems run smoothly, and have made some progress in reducing redundancy, triviality, and busy work, but until management itself takes a strong hand in identifying, refining, validating, and enforcing requirements the system will consist to a disquieting degree of requirements officers talking to each other. The dialogue we need to develop, far beyond what we now have, is between producers and collectors.

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6. We have found no evidence that any intelligence failure could be attributed to lack of requirements. We believe on the contrary that some deficiencies in intelligence arise from asking too many questions too often, diffusing the effort of both collectors and producers, and foundering in the ocean of information that results. The post-mortem on the missile crisis of 1962 pointed clearly to this conclusion. The shrill urgency of requirements on the Soviet military build-up produced a flood of low-level reporting on Cuba, almost all of it unsatisfactory, that diverted attention from the few reports which later on turned out to have been good. The multiplicity of requirements reinforces the numbers racket, our natural weakness for measuring our effectiveness by the number of reports produced.

7. The six distinct usages of the word requirements are:

a. The encyclopedic. Ever since World War II, when requirements were called "Essential Elements of Information," the military approach to the problem has been to ask for everything about everything. It is best exemplified by the current DIA Manual, which, after devoting one thick volume to the bureaucratic rules for collecting and reporting, devotes another to a catalogue of requirements on all the countries in the world, and then fills volumes of collection guides with scores of chapters which spell out the details desired. The manual is designed with extreme military thoroughness for use by people who have had little intelligence training or experience, so that they can report information literally by the numbers--i.e., keyed both to the Intelligence Subject Code and to a specified structure of priorities combining three levels of importance with three levels of urgency of response, 1A through 3C. (It used to be 5 x 5, 1A through 5E.) It does not discriminate among the vastly different systems of collection. And though the collection guides are impressive handbooks on what we already know, a prudent Defense attache will take the requirements volume as an instruction to report everything. For CIA, which receives numerous copies, the manual is a catalogue of requests, not requirements, but its existence is a powerful stimulus to the belief that once you have codified every need, the problem is mostly solved; all that remains is for everybody to carry out orders. The encyclopedic approach puts both judgment and gumption in a straitjacket.

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b. Formal long-term guidance. This differs only in scale and time span from the encyclopedic.

(1) The most conspicuous example inside CIA is the IPC List published by USIB's Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) to govern the collection of the Clandestine Services. Its comprehensiveness long ago extinguished all meaning from the word priority along with its intended relevance to the PNIOs. It blurs or ignores the distinction between what we know and what we still lack, and the importance of its subjects varies wildly among the hundreds of questions which fill a thick book. It is always under revision but large sections are out of date for months or years, and the effort to confine it to subjects appropriate only for clandestine collection, as required by DCID No. 5/5, has never been successful. In Chapter III we recommend a revision of the DCID, and a complete overhaul of the IPC List. Meanwhile, the DDP does have his own generally effective instrument for formal long-term guidance--effective because it is usually tailored to reality, has directive force, and excludes the trivial. This is the Related Mission Directive to each station.

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(3) The long-term objectives for the Agency's use of overhead reconnaissance are fixed basically by the capabilities designed into the vehicles and by guidance provided

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by USIB in its review of the recommendations of its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR). Requirements for collection by this means receive elaborate and detailed managerial scrutiny; we find, however, that the community achieves vast and efficient collection at the expense of optimum exploitation. Even more important, for some years neither collection nor exploitation has, in our view, been subjected to sufficiently rigorous examination and limitation in terms of the Government's irreducible requirements for information from overhead reconnaissance.

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c. The third type of specific requirements is the kind levied by individual analysts anywhere in the community. Along with the three remaining types it is managed by a formal ad hoc numbered requirements system; in the absence of strong executive control here are some of its principal characteristics:

(1) The number of specific requirements on the books for collection by the Clandestine Services as supplements to the IPC Lists and other devices, runs well over 900, though analysts have levied hundreds more informally without registering them with the Collection Guidance Staff (CGS) or the requirements officers of the FI Staff. The effort to keep track of them requires several systems of bookkeeping and machine runs, only partially compatible; long debates whether a given requirement duplicates something in the IPC List or some other requirement; Aesopian language about

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"acceptance" or "rejection"; bureaucratic fiddling with expiration dates and renewals, and much pompous and sterile correspondence. In short it takes so much bureaucratic formalism to keep the numbered-requirements system working smoothly that it is fatally easy to lose sight of what it is for: to improve collection. And all this despite the observable fact that hard-working and intelligent requirements officers, especially in CGS, the FI Staff, and some of the area divisions of the Clandestine Services, have brought more judgment and order into the system year by year.

(2) The system also produces tiresome controversy whether one customer is favored over another (e.g., the Air Force over OSI), derogatory comparisons between collectors [redacted] and much puerile grousing about the other fellow's lack of cooperation and understanding, along with building of paper records to prove it. In general it perpetuates the anachronistic tribal divisions within CIA which in other respects we have all gone a long way to overcome. Two of our recommendations concern resolving the anomalous position of CGS as a spokesman for both the DDI and the DDS&T, and rotation of officers between CGS and FI. Both these recommendations can be expected to arouse strong opposition; the stronger it is the more it will verify our conclusion that something needs doing soon to correct the tribal situation-- if not by the means we propose, then by some other. If for example CGS and its opposite numbers in FI cannot air their differences frankly and adjust what each finds so irritating in the other, then their supervisors ought to do it for them. No one can claim that CGS and FI get along well now, or that it doesn't matter; the situation not only damages the whole formal requirements system but hampers the development of fruitful collection guidance, which is far more important. The same is true to a lesser degree of the tribal division between CGS and the offices of the DDS&T, and of the tendency of the area divisions to bypass the FI Staff.

(3) What goes into the system is governed much more by the work habits of analysts and even of whole organizations than by rational determination of the Government's

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needs for information. This is proved by the sharp contrast between the Pentagon, which recently had 316 requirements outstanding against CIA collection, and the Department of State, which had only 39. Within CIA, OSI levies many more specific requirements than all the offices of the DDI put together. One OSI analyst wrote 52 requirements in 1965; hundreds of analysts in other offices wrote none.

Many of those who levy requirements could not prove that the information they desire is not already available, because filling out a form asking a collector to collect is often easier than hard digging in the files and in libraries; it also passes the buck. The apparent motive for some requirements is self-protection: to build an impressive record exculpating the analyst from any responsibility for failure by proving that he has asked all the right questions over and over again. At the other extreme there is no way of telling whether the analysts who write no requirements do not need to do so or are neglecting one of their possible functions out of ignorance.

Most written requirements are simple requests for information, without explanation why or discrimination as to relative importance or urgency among the items requested.

Most are submitted without validation at any level above the author, so that there is no confirmation that the need is real and no basis for comparing one need with another.

Altogether the number and nature of requirements bear no relation either to the importance of the subject or to the size of the gaps in our information about it.

All this argues for much closer managerial supervision of requirements. We recommend in Chapter VIII that the chief of every substantive division under the DDI and the DDS&T be made responsible for regularly reviewing all the requirements levied by his division and still current, and for validating each one submitted henceforth; that the chief of every substantive office make himself generally familiar with the stated requirements of his divisions, with special attention to the proper identification of priorities and gaps.

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We also recommend that each office make sure its analysts are trained in the proper preparation of requirements, proper use of the facilities and skills of the Collection Guidance Staff, and development of useful contacts with the collectors through these facilities.

d. The fourth type of specific requirement is that produced in response to the NIP, or Notice of Intelligence Potential. This is a highly effective instrument [redacted] for alerting any appropriate element of the community that a specific collection opportunity exists. It has its counterparts in the Defector Committee's formal notices about the knowledgeability of newly acquired defectors, and in the highly selective informal solicitation of briefs for certain agents and other operations of the Clandestine Services. The system works smoothly, and the Agency has developed considerable skill in reacting quickly to such opportunities. There could and ought to be considerably more solicitation of briefs by the Clandestine Services against known collection capabilities, but otherwise this type of requirement needs little supervision because it involves no large outlay of time and money for uncertain results of doubtful value. In this respect the solicited requirement is far superior to the other elements of the ad hoc, numbered-requirement system with which it is lumped together. Accordingly we recommend strong concentration upon the solicited requirement as the best kind for improving collection, and far less reliance on the other kinds whose stale formalities clog the system.

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e. A fifth type of paper work called requirements is in fact a request to process information already collected. It ought to be removed from the numbered-requirements system and called by another name. Here the typical case concerns specific types of readout by NPIC and the Imagery Analysis Division (IAD). The managerial problem concerns both the question whether a given job is worth doing and the adjustment of available man-hours to the work load requested. In passing we note that the Clandestine Services place a greater number of specific "support" requirements on various elements subordinate to the DDI (especially IAD) and the DDS&T, for the processing of information already collected, than the other two place on them for collection of information.

f. The sixth type of request called a requirement is in reality a kind of work order, for example for IAD to produce duplicates of photographs, make up briefing boards, etc.--a function which

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amounts to 15% of its work load. Handling such actions in the numbered-requirements system, as if they were comparable in nature and difficulty with requirements for espionage, illustrates why elaborate statistics on requirements and actions to satisfy them are likely to conceal the true gravity of the collection-requirements problem.

8. Characteristic of all these methods of stating needs for information is the fact that simply asking the question is never enough. It must be presented in a certain way, different for each type of collection, which permits the collector to figure out what action on his part might answer it. The clearest demonstration of the point is in SIGINT: an ELINT collection officer must translate a requirement for the characteristics of a type of radar, say, into a tasking order which sends a particular airplane with specified equipment and an appropriately trained operator aboard to a specific spot on the globe. Target lists for overhead reconnaissance are no better than waste-paper until orbits, camera-on-time, and other operational details are computed. So much is obvious, but what is not generally recognized is that the same principle applies to collection by human beings. The IPC List, which sets the tone and pattern for all such requirements, tells the collector for example that we need "design specifications and performance data" on a wide variety of Soviet weapons and delivery vehicles. This is a completely futile statement until it is broken down into what we know and what we don't, what gaps are crucial, and how and where the answers might be found. To learn these things the collector needs all the help he can get, especially in the technical field, and this means drastically increased communication with the experts for whose use he is collecting the information. Without such help in all those fields in which the collector is not himself a past master, formal requirements are lifeless, self-deceiving hypocrisies.

9. Another characteristic of the requirements process as it applies to all collection systems is that it is necessary to become accustomed to several varieties of group patois. In moving from one area of inquiry to another one crosses an isogloss; the dialects on either side of the line have large areas of mutual unintelligibility. For this report we have tried to find a linguistic common denominator, though some stubborn granules of jargon are bound to remain. We have tried to concentrate on generally understood meaning, rather than rigid definition, and have resisted (not always successfully) the temptation to impose arbitrary definitions of our own. If we have thus walked away from the semantics problem we have done so by design, believing that efforts to legislate language are bound to fail.

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10. Still another problem of formulating requirements is that the community has not mastered the art, and necessity, of generalizing. The tendency to ask for everything possibly relevant is even more pronounced in general requirements than in the specific ones; this is an inadvertent but natural result of trying to make each general requirement brief. One simply raises the level of abstraction, and the collector is allowed to believe that every report or document or intercept or photograph which bears even remotely on the subject will be of value. The extremely high level of abstraction which characterizes the IPC List is one of its most serious defects, especially on military matters. But even overhead imagery, for which the collection requirements are so carefully tailored, is subjected to the same difficulty in the exploitation phase.

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Here in a nutshell is an essential element of the whole requirements problem: sensible communication between the analyst and those who must supply him with information, founded in a true understanding of their interacting problems. Our study persuades us that careful management and training can bring the Agency much closer to that ideal.

11. After this generally melancholy recital of the defects of priorities and formal requirements, it is a pleasure to turn to more cheerful subjects. The Agency's record with respect to the other types of relationship between collectors and their customers is far brighter and more hopeful. A good thing too, because it is by developing our skills at collection guidance, operational support, and evaluations (all treated in our Chapter IV) that we can best improve collection.

12. All three of these subjects are related aspects of the same function: the application of the expert's insight, imagination, and initiative to the problems of the collector. What is usually distinguished as collection guidance is well exemplified by the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL), which is published by CGS in seven volumes, each of about a hundred pages, covering one area of the world and revised every four months. It is by all odds the most widely used material of its kind that we know of. Our stations overseas consult and respect it, and Foreign Service officers point out that they receive no such comprehensive but

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explicit compilation of questions of interest from the Department of State. It is the best over-all guidance available [redacted]

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13. Unfortunately its compilation is rather haphazard, because of the difficulty of cajoling contributions from analysts, and its presentation is mechanical and repetitious because of the pressure of deadlines. But in the CIRL the Collection Guidance Staff is clearly onto a good thing. More cooperation from analysts, more or better background information in many cases, less recital of questions to which the answers are either essentially unknowable or should be sought in research rather than collection, and the product would be unbeatable.

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of collection for that isolated fact it is uniquely equipped to acquire, an integration of the tribes, and a joint fixing of focus. That would be a far cry from reliance on the stereotyped one-to-one correlation between operations and large general needs which still appears to govern much of our thinking, especially about clandestine operations.

20. Our fifth type of relationship is evaluations. By this is generally meant assessment of raw information produced by human sources on a given subject or area in terms of its relationship to the facts, and to needs, priorities, and requirements. Its logical result is improved guidance to the collector. Unfortunately the necessity for critical, intensive evaluation of SIGINT has been recognized only during the past few years, partly because by its nature SIGINT was assumed to be accurate information and therefore valuable, while other information was relegated to a lower status by being called "collateral." At any rate rising costs, declining readability, technical change, and an inexorable need to choose among alternatives have all made it clear that we must intensify our critical evaluation of SIGINT, and the community has set about devising a method. It has not yet faced the roughly similar necessity for evaluating the total product of overhead reconnaissance, or of any important large aspect of it. Any ability to evaluate all our collection together, even on a single subject, is still far beyond us, but it begins to look as if the development of techniques for applying standards of cost-effectiveness will come to have a steadily larger place in our planning.

21. CIA has no system for evaluation as the DIA does. Assessments are performed in independent isolation throughout the Agency and at various levels. Since 1959 the FI Staff, for example, has produced some 87 studies of reporting from or about individual countries. Recent studies show a high degree of skill which must make them among the DDP's most effective tools for improving field collection and reporting. Within his area divisions, down to the country desk, similar assessment is a daily function, spanning the range from the product of a single project to that of an entire division.

22. The CGS has made a promising beginning on an evaluation program, and is finding useful ways to combine its machine-records facilities and its links with production offices in this field. We believe that the CGS has learned some lessons about the evaluation process which would be of value even to the experienced old hands of the Clandestine Services, and we have recommended closer relations between CGS and FI Staff's Requirements and Evaluations Branch which should produce a fruitful interchange of experience and skills. Throughout this study we argue for strong managerial attention to priorities and requirements; an essential adjunct to this attention is the development in CGS of steadily more informative

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correlations between these priorities and requirements and what is actually collected to satisfy them. Such a development will require not only more and more skill in blending machine records and human judgments, but in particular more skill in correlating the yields from all the different modes of collection--human and technical, written and oral, overt and clandestine. We believe that CGS can help CIA management determine what is redundant, marginal, or inappropriate in the requirements it levies upon these widely disparate systems. At the same time it will go on being necessary for the collectors to evaluate their own products so long as the guidance now reaching them from outside their own ranks is so imperfectly tailored to operational realities. We believe that evaluation programs must be improved wherever the skill and will exist, but that CGS should be generally cognizant of all such programs in the Agency, both to maximize their value and to prevent the analysts from being unnecessarily burdened with uncoordinated and repetitive requests.

23. Throughout the processes for formulating requirements and collection guidance we have seen a need for greatly increased and more systematic feedback from the collectors to the analysts. Lack of feedback is a principal reason that requirements, especially for the Clandestine Services, are unreal and impractical; we propose a kind of dialogue which will both give the analyst the information he deserves as to the chances his needs will be met, and lessen pointless pressures on the collector. Similarly, we believe that if the FI Staff made available to its CIA customers, through CGS, sanitized versions of its own evaluations, as showing which collection gaps have relevance for Clandestine Services operations, it could gradually train the analysts to express their needs with some degree of practical realism. Here as elsewhere the trick will be to (a) foster greatly increased communication at all levels and by all means formal and informal, (b) keep sufficient track of this communication to focus and manage it, and yet (c) at the same time not discourage gumption and imaginative initiative. That is a tall order, but not trying to fill it will mean floundering in a constantly more expensive diffusion of effort.

24. All the relationships we have been discussing have a long history; each has been looked at separately many times in the past. One of the negative virtues of this study is that we have spared the reader many pages of history by throwing out great chunks of earlier drafts, but reminding him of two earlier studies may help to emphasize the point that mere diagnosis and good intentions will get us nowhere:

- a. In 1960 the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government devoted about a sixth

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of its long report to cataloguing the deficiencies of the community's requirements systems and to recommending sweeping changes. The criticisms are for the most part still valid today.

b. In 1962 the Requirements Facility Study Group, operating out of OCR, published a report which was influential in the creation of the Collection Guidance Staff under the DDI. It identified and concentrated on six problems with requirements: overlap and duplication, security barriers, lack of adequate collection analysis and planning, misuse of priorities, unrealistic and duplicative collection guides, and a weak and ineffective system for evaluating information reports. It does not detract from the many achievements of CGS and others to say that most of these problems are still with us and have been joined by others which reflect the growing complexity and size of U. S. intelligence.

25. Such historical notes inspire caution: No one should look to this present study for instant remedies to age-old problems. The best to be hoped is that its recommendations, suggestions, and challenges to old assumptions will gradually over time encourage useful new approaches. In particular we hope that this study will cause its readers to challenge and then reshape the assumption which underlay the CIA Long Range Plan of 1965: that CIA "must be allowed to grow to meet ever increasing demands from the Government for intelligence on a world that becomes constantly more complex," and that "if the Government reaches a conscious decision that the Agency should not expand to the degree that we propose, then it must relieve the Agency of some of these responsibilities."

26. What we argue for is not expansion but redefinition and refinement of our functions. It is to this conclusion that a survey of collection requirements leads. CIA's conception of its job causes it to require too much, then to collect too much, publish too much, try to read too much--and end by understanding too little. It is clear that the community has too many collection requirements so long as there is no restraint imposed by workable standards of validation, but there is a larger cause for anxiety. The constant emphasis on quantity of collection, most noticeable in the most expensive modes of collection where the quantity of material collected appears to justify the outlandish cost, is in our view certain to degrade the quality of our finished intelligence. Our discussion of the Information Explosion treats it gloomily as a phenomenon already much larger than a man's hand, and argues for the judgment that it is already making our finished intelligence steadily more superficial.

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27. It is for that reason that this study has what is probably an unusually cantankerous tone. It would be unwarranted and regrettable if any reader interpreted any of our many criticisms as an attack on any person or group or an imputation of negligence, incompetence, or stupidity. Some of the fervor of the criticisms reflects a high opinion of CIA's ability to improve, but mostly it reflects the gloom induced by this, the Agency's first effort to look at all its collection requirements as a single enormous whole. Our analyses and recommendations reject much of the traditional wisdom and attitudes, but we are not saying that our own wisdom is superior or that we would have avoided the excesses we criticize. What we are saying is that our look at all collection requirements together causes us to argue for considerable change, greater than any of the many earlier studies of isolated aspects of the problem have proposed.

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29. In the end our study boils down to two hopes: that the working level of CIA can achieve much closer communication across the tribal boundaries, and that management--especially at the level of division and office--can exert much closer control and influence upon the content and the mechanics of the requirements system. But underlying these hopes is the conviction that CIA must, in the interest of U. S. security, redefine its own job, narrowly enough to focus all our collectively great abilities upon quality of intelligence, not quantity. We believe that the best definition of the function of CIA and American intelligence can only come from the senior American intelligence officer and his immediate lieutenants, and hope that this analysis of one aspect of it can somewhat clarify the problem.

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II. THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITIES

1. In the intelligence vocabulary the most abused and perverted word, and therefore the least respected, is the word priority. Through the years thousands of man-hours have gone into defining, listing, and revising priorities in one document after another. We believe this study will demonstrate that the effort to establish priorities has not only failed to achieve its professed purpose but in many ways has positively damaged American intelligence.

2. The word priority has kept some meaning when it has been applied to a specific activity by managers responsible for that activity, as in tasking a single overhead reconnaissance mission or instructing a station chief by means of the Related Mission Directive. But the effort to set priorities has been a conspicuous failure when it has purported to govern the activity of the community as a whole, as in DCID No. 1/3 (Priority National Intelligence Objectives--PNIOs), or to speak for the community, as in the IPC List intended to guide the collection activities of the Clandestine Services. We have uncovered no convincing evidence that a single man-hour or dollar would have been spent differently on collection if that kind of effort had never been made.

3. The very concept of priority, as forcing a choice among alternatives, has been meaningless for years. USIB's directive on the subject has no directive force, and the only use anyone makes of it is to cite some phrase to prove that his own activity is crucial to the national security. The language of the directive makes this very easy for nearly everybody to do.

4. It was not always so. The DCI's obligation to establish and publish national intelligence objectives, both comprehensive and priority, has been explicit in the NSCIDs since 1947. The first list of seven PNIOs, issued in September 1950, rigorously excluded all subjects (even the Korean War) which did not bear directly on the overriding, long-range question of Soviet capabilities and intentions against the U.S.--in short, on our national survival. In 1952 the same list of seven items was reissued with no change except that "Soviet" became "the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China)." An eighth was added in 1953, but it too concerned the survival of the U.S. All these lists conveyed a sense not of priority merely, but of real urgency.

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5. In 1954 the dam broke. The single page of Objectives was expanded to four, with three levels of priority and 38 items. From then on the lists got longer and longer, by descending to such matters as "anti-American sentiment in Iceland." In 1962 the list contained 51 Objectives, which strung together hundreds of individual questions by semicolons and blanket allusions to "European Satellites," "international Communist front organizations," "Latin American governments and peoples," "the situation in Asia," etc. There were now four levels of priority, requiring four specified degrees of effort: maximum, intensive, major, and, at the bottom, priority. ("When I use a word," said Humpty Dumpty, "it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.") By themselves the nine items in the first two categories would have amounted to a statement of real and defensible priorities. But the third and fourth contained 42 Objectives embodying hundreds of individual questions in specific references to 48 countries by name and blanket allusions to most others.

6. Acting on its ad hoc committee's report entitled "Revitalization of the PNIOs," USIB in 1963 boiled down these 51 Objectives to ten, by combining eight or nine in some cases into one, and by retreating into even larger generalities. The annual list for 1965 directed priority attention to all Communist countries, all the countries of Latin America and Africa and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and all non-Bloc countries interested in nuclear energy and advanced weapons. It identified "for priority treatment" some 25 countries by name, plus the Arab states, "Communist parties throughout the world," etc., and even so found room for four specific allusions to Cuba.

7. Meanwhile, the ad hoc committee had pointed out that USIB had no mechanism for implementing its directive. The PNIOs of 1963-65 were therefore prefaced with what amounted to an elaborate disavowal of responsibility, beginning:

"... This Directive is but a first step toward determination of the priority, if any, to be accorded to particular collection requirements by particular systems of collection."

The real job of determining what needs collecting was assigned to unspecified "research personnel," who were admonished to take four specific further steps towards the establishment of priority requirements for collection. To the best of our knowledge this admonition has never been heeded by anybody in any way which would give DCID No. 1/3 directive force. And the decision what priority to give to collecting against these requirements was bucked to "responsible collection authorities."

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8. One of the many defects of this format was its advertisement of USIB's inability to enforce action on its own priorities, though NSCID No. 1 requires only that a DCID identify PNIOs and that they be issued "for general intelligence guidance." Another defect was the almost exclusive emphasis on collection, the most decentralized function of the community, rather than on production, which USIB is in a better position to influence. The most centralized function of all, and most responsive to the demands of USIB, is that of National Estimates; yet, as Mr. Cross pointed out in a memorandum two years ago, any correlation between the PNIOs and USIB's scheduling of most estimates is so tenuous as to be coincidental. Thus not even USIB takes the PNIOs seriously except when they are presented for the periodic ritual revision. The fact that on 1 July 1966 USIB excised two of their worst defects and deleted four Objectives which had gone unchallenged for years, in an action which took about thirty seconds, points at least as much to lack of interest as to conviction that the changes were improvements.

9. Do the PNIOs serve any useful purpose at all? Two are sometimes alleged, and unconvincingly: that they do in fact influence action, and that, even if they don't, they at least forestall criticism.

10. On the first score, of all the many senior officers of CIA who have had repeatedly to work on the PNIOs, we have found none who claims for them either validity or utility. Long or short, specific or hopelessly general, the PNIOs have always been the product of haggling among the conflicting vested interests of the community, and since 1954 have always had the effect of ratifying those interests by including something for everybody.

11. In this connection it is important to note that the lists have not expressed the unhampered judgment of the Board of National Estimates, which, except in 1963 when the ad hoc committee fixed the recent format, has been responsible for drafting and coordinating them. It is safe to say that any list which did represent the Board's judgment would not be acceptable to USIB, as not giving sufficient emphasis to some interest of one or more members. Four times a year the Board is torn between an urge to improve the PNIOs and the necessity to get them through USIB. Since it must quickly turn its attention to many other matters where its judgments make more difference, the Board has naturally given far less critical attention to what looks like a pointless mechanical exercise than it gives to any estimate however minor. USIB in turn gives only perfunctory attention to the PNIOs except when someone feels his vested interest has been slighted.

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12. The two best evidences that the PNIOs make no practical difference are found in the community's actions on Communist China and on Soviet research and development. The PNIOs have given Communist China all but equal top-billing with the Soviet Union ever since 1954. Of the 51 Objectives of 1962, no fewer than 25 relate to China equally with the Soviet Union, or to China exclusively, or to China's relations with other named countries and areas down to and including Albania. But neither the size, the scope, nor the intensity of the American intelligence effort against China has ever reflected this degree of emphasis. General Reynolds's "Report on China Intelligence," dated 14 October 1965, makes clear how little has been accomplished towards solving the China problem by the mere declaration of priorities and proliferation of requirements, and how much more depends on managerial action with respect to allocation of resources. money, slots, recruitment, training, etc.

13. Even so, one of General Reynolds's interesting findings is that the community has collected more information [redacted] on some important subjects, [redacted] [redacted] than it has resources with which to exploit it. To us this is a consequence of the community's persistent tendency to regard priorities and requirements as primarily problems of collection, with far less regard for the ultimate utility of the material collected. Thus until collection and production are brought into balance, collection is allowed to seem an end in itself. Another of General Reynolds's findings is that if the community hired all the Sinologists emerging from the universities for the next several years, it would still not have enough to do all the jobs it has identified as essential. So remote from reality have our priorities been allowed to become.

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14. Similarly, Soviet research and development have received great emphasis in the PNIOs for many years. In the days when the PNIOs had three or four levels of priority, R&D always appeared in the top level and elsewhere; the lists are replete with references to future Soviet capabilities in nuclear energy, advanced weapons, space, biological and chemical warfare, etc. Specific requirements likewise have been so familiar for years that when Admiral Raborn asked each military service to list its needs for information on Soviet R&D, nothing new emerged. Yet the effort to concentrate attention on R&D for priority collection action, as requiring special emphasis over and above our general effort on the Soviet Union's current capabilities, is of only recent date.

15. Until they are drastically reformed, the PNIOs will remain a dead letter, a means of evading the necessity for hard thought and hard

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choices, and a reproach to the common sense of the community. It is precisely the lack of interest by management, at several levels both inside and outside CIA, which allowed the PNIOs to degenerate into vacuity, and it will take the interest of management to give them any force and effect.

16. Meanwhile the PNIOs will go on being cited as justification for continuing or expanding any and all activities, though never for diminishing or abolishing them when their priority declines. (Any proposal for deleting an Objective does raise fears among a few upper-middle officers--as happened again only recently--that it will bring a cut in their budgets, but the record suggests that their fears are unfounded.)

17. This citation of the PNIOs to ratify some activity appears to rest on the untenable assumption that the existence of some Objective, however worthy in itself, guarantees the appropriateness of the means proposed for achieving it. The "Planning Assumptions, Goals, and Objectives," issued in January 1966 by the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting, contain some twenty references to priorities and more to requirements, as if they had been properly identified, tested, and validated. Only two of these references mention the PNIOs as such, but most other references to "priority national intelligence requirements" and similar phrases assume that the fundamental intelligence needs of the U.S. Government have been defined and agreed and are beyond challenge. They have not been, and they are not.

18. It is true, however, that one of the Goals is "to define priority intelligence needs" with respect to production of intelligence. This is a way of saying that the PNIOs have never fulfilled the function emphatically assigned to them by NSCID No. 1:

"...the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof."
(Underlining supplied.)

19. Some priorities and requirements have indeed been defined and agreed up to a certain level of authority--by USIB itself with respect to certain aspects of the technical collection methods considered as single isolated systems, and separately by committees like JAEIC and GMAIC within their respective fields. But many of the decisions are left to committees and subcommittees and groups of specialists who naturally feel

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that their own interests are of overriding importance, and who inevitably push for expansion of programs to satisfy them. The community has achieved only the primitive beginnings of a capability to correlate one system of collection with another, so that each can concentrate on filling the crucial gaps it is uniquely equipped to fill, and it has not even begun to distinguish between what is essential and what is merely desirable. The net product of our present approach to collection is an emphasis on quantity for quantity's sake. Hence the Information Explosion, and the failure of exploitation to keep pace with collection.

20. This study will present several recommendations designed to involve responsible authority at appropriate levels in fixing priorities, validating requirements, identifying and concentrating on gaps in collection, and narrowing the disparity between collection and production. We believe that these are inalienable functions of management, not to be delegated to standing committees of necessarily narrow purview or to staffs which must necessarily devote more attention to the workings of the requirements system than to its content. Since the PNIOs are the fountainhead from which many actions are expected or assumed to flow, we believe that making them effective will be a start towards the other reforms needed.

21. Another justification usually given for the PNIOs is equally remote from reality: that they serve the strictly political, prudential purpose of assuring higher authority and interested outsiders that the community knows what the most important problems are.

22. The PNIOs have always purported to be valid for planning purposes for a long period into the future; recently they have specified five years. Yet their record for predicting future U.S. intelligence interests is dismal. They have consistently failed to identify in advance those local problems which in the event commanded overriding attention from the community. Here are some examples:

a. The PNIOs published on 30 September 1958 contained 48 Priority Objectives of which only these two, among the 16 labeled Third Priority, mentioned Latin America:

"m. Militant nationalism in Latin America, including the European dependencies and the West Indies Federation, with particular respect to anti-U.S. sentiment, Communist exploitation of that sentiment, and Bloc political and economic penetration; the availability to the U.S. of strategic materials.

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"n. The stability and policies of the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Venezuela."

At that moment the Cuban revolution was in high gear and Castro was within three months of controlling the country. We did begin to catch up with the headlines in the next version, when Castro had been in power for 17 months, by mentioning him in the last of 11 Third Priority Objectives of 24 May 1960:

"k. Political disturbances and social unrest affecting the stability of the governments of the Caribbean area, with particular reference to the stability, internal policy, and international activities of the Castro regime in Cuba."

From then on Castro moved steadily upward in the lists, especially after he proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist in December 1961. By early 1964 the PNIOs contained five references to Cuba and Castro (plus two in the concurrent quarterly supplement), and only this reference to all the rest of Latin America:

"7. The reactions of Latin American governments and peoples to developments in and with respect to Cuba; the vulnerabilities of particular countries /which countries?/ to subversion and to Communist political penetration."

This was the priority in effect at the time of the revolution in Brazil. As recently as June 1966 we were operating under PNIOs which mentioned "Cuban strategic military forces" in the same breath with those of the USSR and Communist China.

b. If it were possible to be usefully specific in advance, the PNIOs of August 1963 would have contained some reference to the internal political situation in South Vietnam, which had been deteriorating since the disturbances in Hue on 8 May and was to lead to the assassination of Diem and his brother in November. Instead, the PNIOs sandwiched a vague allusion to Southeast Asia in between other vague allusions to Latin America and the Arab States, and the accompanying quarterly supplement defined the special interest in Southeast Asia over the next six months in these words:

"4. Southeast Asia. The situation in Laos is already the object of intense intelligence interest.

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Within that context, the relative influence of the USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam on that situation and the intentions of each are matters of critical current importance. A critical situation may also develop, within the next six months, regarding the establishment of Malaysia and Indonesian opposition thereto."

The PNIOs of 1956-62 were more emphatic with respect to North Vietnam than any PNIOs since.

c. The PNIOs of 1962, which found room for 48 countries including Nepal and Albania, do not mention the Dominican Republic. Neither do those of 1963 or 1964, nor the quarterly supplements of January and March 1965. But after the Marines landed, ZOWIE!

d. Every issue of the PNIOs from 1954 through 1965 warned people to watch out for Arab-Israeli hostilities. This was a useful prediction in 1956, so it went on being repeated. The version of June 1965 repeated it--but did not warn of trouble between Pakistan and India, where war broke out a few weeks later. This omission was remedied in the next quarterly supplement, by which time the war was over. Such subjects were removed from the annual PNIOs of 1966; both the July and the September supplements call attention to the Yemen rather than to the Arab-Israeli problem.

e. In 1958 USIB appended detailed annexes to the PNIOs which were formulated by its special committees and covered economics, scientific and technical targets, atomic energy, guided missiles, and international Communism, all with three levels of priority. The one on atomic energy showed interest in the possible development of nuclear weapons [redacted] but did not mention China. The one on international Communism listed the Communist parties of West Germany and Japan under Priority II, dealt with the Viet Minh under Priority III but at greater length, and foresaw no threat to Cuba or to any part of Africa south of the Maghreb. The effort of USIB committees to draft special annexes to the PNIOs was then abandoned as unprofitable.

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23. It is nevertheless clear that all these failures to anticipate intelligence interests correctly have made as little difference in self-protection as in affecting action. The reason is not surprising: The policy-makers

have always had so many other and more effective means of exerting their influence on intelligence policy, and the community has so many better ways of responding to that influence, that the PNIOs long ago got lost in the shuffle. Even those who must study the practices of the community and recommend improvements have found attention to a host of other subjects more worthwhile. The PNIOs do not even come close to reflecting the actual attention paid by the community to potential crisis situations, often far in advance, but nobody seems to have noticed the discrepancy. Accordingly we ought to get over the notion that the PNIOs serve a crudely prudential purpose.

24. One more point before we suggest improvements: A grave defect of the PNIOs has been their unwillingness to face the certainty of change. They constantly look backward, not forward. They have encouraged the community to assume that the threat of world domination by international Communism is of the same kind, and can be expressed in the same language, as it was a decade ago, and have accepted only slow and grudging recognition of the vast diversity and multiplicity of developments in Asia, Latin America, and Africa since 1960. The continuing effort to link almost all our concerns to the single subject of Communism has distorted our understanding of events which the Communists have been no more able, and in many cases less able, to influence than we have. The PNIOs have always treated the countries of Eastern Europe as if they were all alike and equally subject to the domination of Moscow into the indefinite future, as they were 10 and 15 years ago. The PNIOs first acknowledged the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1962, when it had been under way for years, and the rather patronizing allusion to it survives unchanged in 1966.

25. Similarly, the PNIOs reacted to the missile crisis of 1962 by harping on the way Castro threatened the security of the United States, long after his power to do us harm had visibly diminished. They usually express our interest in the stability of various governments in terms of their susceptibility to take-over by the Communists; three of the four Objectives recently deleted, on Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, all had this simplistic purpose. This stock Cold-War approach hinders objective study of non-Communist events such as the recent revolutions of Brazil, Algeria, Nigeria, and Argentina, and produces simple amazement when anti-Communist events redound to our advantage, as in Ghana and Indonesia. Of course the PNIOs did not invent this paranoid view of history, but they help perpetuate it, along with a petrification of attitudes and a high cost to American foreign policy.

26. Proper PNIOs addressed to the gut questions of national survival, together with imaginative, forward-looking requirements stated elsewhere

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on all other important subjects, would help us broaden our world view past the notion that all our troubles are caused by Communist ideology and conspiracy. We could then intensify our study of other important questions--such as great-power politics, anticolonial nationalism in Africa, anti-American nationalism in Latin America, the problems of population and food and economic development in all the backward countries--on their own merits, not merely as skirmishes in the Cold War. In short, we need to inculcate in the community a sense of history and the process of historical change, and the PNIOs impede such an effort.

27. We have telegraphed our punch: The PNIOs should concern themselves exclusively with national survival, as they did until 1954, and should be explicitly so defined. Such PNIOs would be obvious statements which define the prime function of all the foreign intelligence systems that have ever existed. Their value would lie in their emphatic exclusiveness; they would not teach anybody anything he didn't already know, but would remind us all of the fundamental reason for our existence, by forcing a distinction between the enduring questions of national security and those matters which, however important at a given moment, are nevertheless transitory, local, and secondary. The list should be short, specific, and unequivocal. It should not be exclusively military, but discussions of politics, economics, and technology should be cast in terms of Real-politik not ideology.

28. Such a list might, if mishandled, perpetuate the Cold-War approach we are anxious to get rid of. To prevent this, two other actions are needed:

a. Revising and strengthening DCID No. 1/2, "Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives," a vague, feeble document to which no one has paid any serious attention for twelve years. (The current version, dated 1958, repeated verbatim the text of 1954.) A good revision would give some meaning to the now largely ritual preamble to the PNIOs:

"This listing of priority objectives presupposes that the bulk of the intelligence required for the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal intelligence collection and research in response to the list of Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives set forth in DCID No. 1/2."

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The mere action of forcing the community to review DCID No. 1/2 would be a salutary reminder of its intended place in the scheme of things.

b. Developing a CIA position on the proper content of both 1/2 and 1/3, and on CIA policy with respect to their use. The process should include submission of draft proposals by the individual offices of the DDI and the DDS&T and by the FI Staff of the DDP; production of a single draft of each DCID by an ad hoc CIA committee chaired by the Deputy Director for Intelligence; and formal proposal of the results by CIA to USIB for coordination and adoption. Thenceforth the Board of National Estimates might be made responsible for future revisions as needed, as it is for the PNIOs at present. Or the function might be assigned to the DCI's Deputy for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE), who has a far closer connection with the use to which the PNIOs should be put. In either case it is important to involve the whole Agency at least once in the process of revision, to the end that CIA management can thereby bring into more practical, realistic focus the requirements systems which ultimately derive from these DCIDs. It is also important to establish an Agency position before relegating the subject to consideration by any instrument of USIB.

It is recommended that:

No. 1

(a) The Deputy Director for Intelligence chair an ad hoc committee of senior representatives of the production and collection components of CIA to develop a firm, authoritative CIA position with respect to the proper content of DCID No. 1/2, "Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives," and DCID No. 1/3, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives."

(b) This committee prepare a revision of DCID No. 1/3, for proposal by CIA to USIB, which will contain a short list of specific, unequivocal Objectives defined as those questions upon which our national survival depends.

(c) The committee prepare such a revision of DCID No. 1/2, for proposal by CIA to USIB, as will appropriately cover other subjects of proper concern to intelligence which do not affect our national survival.

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29. The Agency will need to take a position on two questions respecting the issuance and format of the PNIOs:

a. How often should they be revised? NSCID No. 1 says only "from time to time and on a current basis." In 1963 USIB interpreted the first phrase to mean annually, and the second to justify adding a quarterly supplement looking only some six months into the future. If the list were confined to questions of national survival it would by its nature not be subject to frequent change; USIB might be persuaded to return to its earlier more flexible rule that the PNIOs would be revised "annually or on the request" of any of its members. Abandoning a strict schedule would not only save many man-hours, especially among super-grades, but would guarantee far more attention at various levels whenever a revision did take place; there would be nothing perfunctory or mechanical in the process.

b. Do the extremely short-range quarterly supplements serve any useful purpose? We believe they do not. They are not a revision of the PNIOs "on a current basis" because they address only potential changes in various situations, "which may justify some augmentation of effort," rather than any inherent importance or priority. They still try to predict the future, and are as certain to fail as the PNIOs have always been. This effort to predict is surely unnecessary, since there is no sign that the supplements have the slightest effect on the community's actions. (One recent case showed that including an item in the supplement brought no results whatever; this was an item in January 1966 on potential resistance to Communism in the Far East, in connection with a USIB request for an estimate on the subject. Both PNIOs and world-wide requirements by various agencies did not together produce a single item of usable information, and USIB withdrew the request.) They are also still too broad; the supplement of July 1966 alludes to 28 countries by name. It would take some doing, but USIB might be persuaded that these supplements are not useful, or that at least they should be produced at greater intervals, say semiannually.

30. It might be objected that the supplements are a useful place to ask questions of special current interest. A recent supplement added two such questions at the urgent request of General Carroll and Ambassador Harriman; they concerned U.S. prisoners in enemy hands in Indochina and

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We would argue that such questions would be better handled, and receive far more special attention, if they were made the subjects of separate action by USIB rather than buried in the supplements.

It is recommended that:

No. 2

The Agency position include, for presentation to USIB, proposals that USIB rescind its requirement for a strict annual schedule for revising DCID No. 1/3, and that USIB abolish the quarterly supplements to DCID No. 1/3 as serving no necessary or even useful purpose.

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
It is recommended that:

No. 9

The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Plans, arrange for the regular exchange of officers between the Requirements and Evaluation Branch of the Intelligence Group of the Foreign Intelligence Staff and the Human Resources Group of the Collection Guidance Staff.

B. The Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL)

7. One of the better known activities of CGS is preparation and issuance of the CIRL. After some initial skepticism we have come to consider the CIRL the most useful single medium of collection guidance produced in the community. It has faults, but most of them can be corrected. It is distributed throughout the community in the U.S. and abroad. It is issued in regional editions, each of which is revised every four months and published in approximately this number of copies:



8. Each issue has around 100 pages. The CIRL's content and purpose are described in the following excerpts from its "Foreword":

"It includes contributions by country desk officers and other intelligence analysts of CIA. Contributions to the CIRL by analysts in other agencies of the Washington intelligence community are invited and may be submitted orally or in writing.

"The CIRL is designed to point up specific information needed on significant intelligence problems of current concern (during the 4-month time period of each CIRL). The requirements and background paragraphs are based upon the situation prevailing as of the middle of the month preceding the date of publication. Consideration is given to the need for revision of CIRL sections where emergency situations arise which affect the needs for intelligence information on specific countries or areas between the scheduled dates for production of the CIRL."

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"The CIRL contents reflect the intelligence objectives stated in the Quarterly Supplement to the Priority National Intelligence Objectives and the major intelligence deficiencies noted in Post-Mortems of appropriate National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's). The information needs expressed by the CIRL reflect, as a whole, intelligence interests beyond the capability of any single collection facility. The collectors themselves are best suited to determine which of these information needs can be fulfilled by their respective reporting capabilities. The List is intended as a guide to reporting and is a complement to specific instructions levied on collectors through their own channels."

That last sentence is a correct description of the CIRL's function; but it is inaccurate to speak of "requirements" in connection with the CIRL except in the loosest sense of the term. CIRL items are not requirements for action. Nor are they usually expressions of intelligence needs whose fulfillment is vital to U.S. security. Rather, the CIRL is a collection of questions of current interest to individual intelligence analysts and for which answers are requested if a means already exists for acquiring them. This is an important and useful function, and the CIRL is the only medium in the community which performs it.

9. Yet the CIRL has no official status in the community or even in CIA. It is issued solely under the authority of the CGS, under its charter for the management of collection guidance programs. It has no official sponsorship by directorate or other higher authority. As a staff, the CGS is empowered only to request, not to require, the submission of contributions from analytical offices. Before CGS was formed, OCI published a Periodic Reporting List; the CGS inherited this activity, first making it representative of all analytical units under the DDI and later broadening its content to include S&T contributions.

10. The CGS attempts to make the CIRL a comprehensive and current statement of the information needs of the analytical offices. The items chosen often partly duplicate ad hoc requirements. CGS considers this practice useful because it gives added publicity to the analyst's needs and increases the chances that they may be fulfilled, but it runs counter to the even more useful concept expressed by CGS officers that the CIRL can and should decrease the number of ad hoc requirements.

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11. We consider the following types of requests inappropriate for the CIRL:

- a. Questions directed to a known reporting source, whether stimulated by a current report or in response to a Notice of Intelligence Potential (NIP).
- b. Detailed guidance that is more appropriate for a separate handbook.
- c. Questions on broad, general subjects such as, for example, insurgency in Communist countries.
- d. Continuing requirements, answers to which cannot reasonably be expected within a period of months and which might be more appropriate for inclusion in, for example, an IPC List.

But these are not hard and fast rules for exclusion. A question addressed to a known source might sometimes be properly included in the CIRL in the hope of getting confirmatory or supplementary information or of finding a new source. It is not easy to draw the line on continuing requirements: to balance, for example, the Agency's continuing interest in the health of Haile Selassie or General Franco against the utility of repeating the point in issue after issue.

12. In some quarters the CIRL is regarded with derision because it devotes much space to very hard intelligence questions

To the casehardened operator, it was a wish book or a letter to Santa Claus. Very few such questions will ever get answered by being printed in the CIRL, and they must compete for readership with more diverting literature. Much of the work that goes into them is probably fruitless. We suggest that the editors could inject more reality into the CIRL and make it more respected if they would throw out all the impossible questions, or at least boil them down to brief statements of areas of interest. It has been suggested that CGS eliminate the denied-area sections altogether. We do not agree, as we have found good evidence that they are useful in the field. But we think the difficult, long-range questions might be better handled in collection guides of the kind we discuss later on. The CIRL might then confine itself to references to such guides, to new background information, and to questions which have arisen since the guides were published.

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13. The CIRL attempts to be all things to all human collectors by asking for every bit of information which could conceivably be of interest to anyone in the intelligence business. Its sheer bulk dismays some analysts, who fear that their questions will be buried. This bulk may not be so apparent, however, to the field collector who receives only sections which his headquarters considers pertinent to his area and mission. Nevertheless, the CIRL is far too voluminous. This is partly because CGS, in order to placate the analysts on whom it must depend for voluntary contributions, obligingly lists the same questions about country after country instead of putting the recurring questions for a given subject or area in one place where they belong. If questions applicable to more than one country were assembled in general sections about well defined geographic areas, the individual country listings could concentrate on specific matters and thus become more persuasive to the collector. This is a simple editorial defect and one easily corrected in the interests of consolidation and general tidiness.

14. The CIRL has been criticized for including obvious questions which insult the intelligence of the experienced collector. The publishers reply that it is intended to guide not only the experienced field operator but also the newly arrived military attache with no previous exposure either to the area or to intelligence collection. They also cite the analyst's fear that if the obvious questions are not asked the reports he needs will not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, there appears to be no need for items of this type: "Report indications of unrest or the likelihood of a coup."

15. The CIRL makes no attempt to assign priorities, though occasionally such expressions of analyst concern as "urgently needed" or "highest priority" are allowed to remain in the text. It would be impractical to try to indicate priorities among so many hundreds of questions. Furthermore, the CGS must rely on persuasion to induce analysts to contribute, and to keep them happy it refrains from assigning a higher degree of importance to one contribution than to another. Thus a question about "the principal modes of artistic expression and entertainment" among the inhabitants of Costa Rica receives the same kind of billing as one about Soviet weaponry.

16. In spite of attempts to keep it current, many questions and background items appear unchanged in issue after issue. This is not necessarily bad. A question may be none the less current or valid for having been unanswered for a long time, unless changing circumstances have made it out of date. But the mingling of old and new material reduces the novelty and freshness of a collection guide which is supposed to be current and probably makes it less attractive and even less useful to the collector.

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17. The CGS has recognized this and has recently begun to use asterisks to show the number of CIRL issues in which an item has previously appeared. Many items have five asterisks. By this device the CGS hopes to do two things:

- a. Draw the analyst's attention to items which might be eliminated or restated in current terms.
- b. Distinguish, for the collector's benefit, between long-standing information gaps and those more recently apparent.

18. It is too early to judge the success of this device, though the CGS has already had some favorable comment from field collectors. If its usefulness is proved, a logical next step would be to separate the long-lived questions from the fresh ones, either in the CIRL itself or in a separate semiannual or annual publication. In the latter case a question might be automatically transferred to the new publication after appearing in two successive CIRL issues.

19. Minor editorial defects in the CIRL could be detailed at length. They would mainly concern clarity, organization, and balance. Some imperfections and inconsistencies are bound to appear in a document which is rapidly pieced together by a small editorial staff from many unrelated contributions, and they probably detract little from its usefulness. The publishers of the CIRL are competent to improve it and are constantly seeking ways to do so.

20. CGS has trouble wheedling contributions out of OCI analysts, but OCI's input to the CIRL bulks larger than that of any other office and is kept more up to date. (OCI makes little use of the ad hoc numbered requirements system.) The S&T Directorate has increased its contributions in recent months, mainly to the issues covering denied areas

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21. Lacking formal recognition by CIA or by the directorate which pays its bills, the CIRL naturally has no status in the intelligence community except what it can achieve on its own merits. CGS regularly goes through the motions of requesting contributions from the Defense and State Departments but with little success. Nevertheless CGS has been able to stimulate DIA interest in the CIRL by using it as a medium for wider dissemination of some of the ad hoc requirements levied by DIA on CIA collectors. It has also persuaded DIA to increase its distribution of the CIRL to military attaches and to cite the CIRL in some of its reporting. The State Department also distributes the CIRL widely but has declined to take part in

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producing it. In October 1966 CGS was much encouraged, however, when it received a contribution and critique from a deputy assistant secretary in State's Bureau of African Affairs. The latest CIRL for Africa was already at the printer's, and CGS called it back for revision.

22. The question naturally arises whether such a voluminous guidance document, lacking any executive sanction or directive force, has any effect on field collection action. We questioned Clandestine Services officers recently returned from field stations. They were all familiar with the CIRL and had found it useful in various ways:

a. At small stations and bases it serves as an indicator of the range of intelligence interests current in Washington.




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f. It is useful for area familiarization.

g. It supplements guidance received through the chain of command, especially on economic, scientific, and technical questions. Recent emphasis on science and technology in Communist countries has been especially valuable.

23. A senior officer of extensive field experience, who is now the FI chief of an area division, said the CIRL was more helpful to the working level in the field than any other guidance document.

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25. The reports and requirements chief of an area division said that some parts of the CIRL were excellent and that he customarily called these to the attention of field stations. He also said the CIRL's utility for the Clandestine Services depended "on many factors, including suitability of individual points for clandestine exploitation, availability of information through other media, and, last but not least, the outlook of the contributing analyst."


26. "The outlook of the contributing analyst" comes through loud and clear in the CIRL, mostly undiluted by coordination or committee action, as CIRL items are usually not coordinated above the analytic branch. This can be a vice or a virtue, or both, depending on whether one thinks in terms of systematic arrangement, analyst enthusiasm, or the effect on the collector.

27. For systematic arrangement it is a vice. An ORR question with strong political overtones (e.g., trade relations between a South American country and the Bloc) may not be coordinated with the OCI desk concerned with that country's political affairs, and therefore different aspects of the same problem may be pointlessly scattered under separate CIRL headings.

28. From the standpoint of analyst enthusiasm it is a virtue. There is no other printed medium through which the analyst can speak directly to the collector, outside the chain of command, and enlist his interest and sympathy in helping him to solve his problems.

29. To the collector it is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the CIRL widens his horizons beyond the collection responsibilities imposed by his chain of command and stimulates his imagination. On the other hand, he must interpret the parochial view of the analyst in terms of his own mission and operational environment.

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31. The Foreign Documents Division (FDD) of OCR makes extensive use of the CIRL in assigning reading and translating tasks. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) sends it to all field bureaus, where it is read for background and for guidance to monitors. It is, in fact, the principal vehicle through which CGS provides guidance to the FDD and the FBIS.

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32. The evidence is persuasive that the CIRL is extensively used and appreciated by collectors. Especially notable is the fact that, although it is primarily addressed to overt collectors, divisions and stations of the Clandestine Services are finding it an effective tool. There is no doubt that the CIRL is playing an important role in collection guidance.

33. This role could be made even more effective if the DDI and the DDS&T would state what the CIRL is for and why it exists--that it is the authoritative CIA listing of current interests in the kind of information believed to be obtainable from human sources, publications, and broadcasts. Such a definition should increase the analysts' respect for the medium and induce them to submit better and more regular contributions, especially if they are made to understand that this is the only appropriate means for making their interests known to a variety of sources. It should arouse the collectors to respond more readily to the CIRL. It should also provide the impetus for editorial improvements and for more aggressive use of the CIRL in the elimination of some requirements now issued individually.

It is recommended that:

No. 10

The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, issue a notice explaining the status and use of the CIRL.

34. Coordination of all CIRL items above the branch level is probably impractical because there are so many of them. But if the CIRL is to merit the kind of recognition we have just proposed the most important items should be coordinated. First they have to be selected, and this brings up again the vexing problem of priorities.

35. We believe it should be possible for directorates, or at least offices, to select, for publication in each issue of the CIRL, the ten or fifteen most important current needs that fall within their respective purviews. And we believe that such selection and emphasis would be a positive stimulus to collectors.

It is recommended that:

No. 11

The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, direct the preparation for each issue of the CIRL of a preface identifying the most important needs listed therein.

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36. The background statements are important to collectors. They should be coordinated with special care, and should be given particular attention by management in OCI in order to ensure that they are accurate and up-to-date presentations of the intelligence base on a given country or problem. In some cases National Intelligence Surveys might well be used or adapted for this purpose, or at least cited. The background statements offer an excellent opportunity, especially for OCI, to inform the collector directly of the Washington customer's viewpoint on field situations. We believe that CGS should not be obliged to write the background statements, as is now generally the case, but that they should be made a regular responsibility of OCI management and that a regular program should be set up for their production.

It is recommended that:

No. 12

The Deputy Director for Intelligence direct the Director of Current Intelligence to assume responsibility for the regular production of background statements for the CIRL.

37. Because the CIRL is not often cited in reporting, the considerable use made of it in the field may not be sufficiently known to contributing analysts. We do not suggest imposing this duty on field reporters, but the analysts need and deserve feedback from their CIRL input. Through its machine records the CGS is devising new methods of comparing reporting with requirements. Possibly ways can be developed for using these techniques to demonstrate to the analysts that their CIRL contributions are inspiring collection action.

38. As we saw in Chapter III, it is not always possible to draw a fine line between the guidance media sent, respectively, to overt and clandestine collectors. Hence there is a good deal of overlap between the CIRL and the IPC List. The latter is more general than the CIRL, is intended to be valid for a longer period, and is community-coordinated guidance for the planning of clandestine collection operations. In many instances the CIRL supplies useful current background and guidance that supplements the IPC List, and some of this is being noted and used by Clandestine Services divisions and stations. Although the CIRL is mainly directed to overt collectors, the CGS might well exploit the subject overlap and the Clandestine Services' readiness to make use of the CIRL by doing the following:

- a. Correlate each new CIRL with corresponding IPC listings with a view to supplementing the latter with specific current guidance.

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b. Prepare for the Clandestine Services a key to each new CIRL indicating new guidance that may be helpful in working against IPC targets.

39. We avoid making specific recommendations about the editorial content and format of the CIRL, but we sum up our suggestions as follows:

- a. Eliminate the obvious questions.
- b. Eliminate the impossible questions.
- c. Enhance the document's freshness and currency by separating the long-standing questions from the new ones.
- d. Group together the questions that apply to many countries; prune and consolidate.
- e. For the benefit of the Clandestine Services, correlate the CIRL with the IPC List.

40. The CIRL needs and deserves to have more work done on it both in CGS and in the analytic offices. We believe that the latter will quickly devote more attention to it as soon as it is accorded the status of directorate recognition and its usefulness to collectors is made known to analysts and their supervisors. For CGS it is a matter of allotting the necessary man-hours, perhaps even at the expense of other tasks. We believe this should be done.

C. Collection Guides

41. The kind of document we discuss here has been variously called guide, brief, handbook, manual, or aid. We favor no one of these terms and use "guide" merely for convenience. The category could be interpreted to include almost any documents, available to collectors, which indicate gaps on which collection is desired. CGS has scores of collection guides on file. Most of them are out of date and merely taking up space. But one

42. The bulk of the assemblage, however, consists of the old encyclopedic type of guide, characteristic of the traditional military approach to intelligence collection and formerly produced in large numbers by CIA.

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These have now gone out of fashion here, and for good reasons. They tended to be subject-oriented and analyst-oriented. Instead of pointing out the important gaps and suggesting where the answers might be found, they asked every possible question. For this reason the labor necessary to produce them was vast and the effort required to keep them up to date was comparable to the maintenance of a National Intelligence Survey. Furthermore, they were little used and typically ended up in bottom safe-drawers all over the world.

43. This dismal history has damaged the collection-guide concept. Guides are generally unwanted, little used, and seldom produced. There is no regularly managed program for their issuance. They just happen, when somebody gets a bright idea or when the need for one becomes unmistakable.

44. We believe that a collection-guide program is needed to round out the requirements system, as a complement to the CIRL and the ad hoc requirements. Guides should be oriented to intelligence problems or to collection opportunities rather than to subjects. They should provide the collector with analytical advice rather than an analyst's shopping list. They should be confined to a few important subjects--whether a dozen or fifty--carefully chosen by the substantive offices. Such a program should involve both analysts and collectors, working together as a team, with CGS as a catalyst.

45. Unfortunately, CGS more often plays the lonely role of missionary. Recent attempts at getting out collection guides have been somewhat discouraging. The example which follows illustrates the roadblocks that have to be surmounted. It also shows how the need for a collection guide became only slowly and painfully apparent because none of the people responsible for generating requirements were thinking in those terms.

46. During our survey we found that requirements on the SA-2 missile had proliferated over a long time without much coordination and without taking into account what had already been learned about the SA-2 from

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96. Among the criteria for evaluating reporting are: relevance to intelligence needs as expressed in current guidance, reliability, completeness, and timeliness. In seeking evaluations the collector must identify the analyst most competent to tell him these things in much the same way as the analyst, in writing a requirement, must identify the collector best able to answer his question. This is simple enough if a single evaluation is sought and the report in question cites a requirement number. It is less simple when evaluation is sought of Clandestine Services reports, most of which do not cite requirement numbers, or of groups of reports from any collector on a given area or on a given subject. In such cases the lack of a coordinated program, linking analyst and collector in a regular fashion, makes it difficult to track down the persons most able to give the needed answers.

97. There is no regular way of ensuring that all the right analysts are brought into the process. There is no managed way to keep the analyst from being assailed by a series of uncoordinated, ad hoc requests from individual collectors, and such repeated demands on the analyst's time may produce hostility or indifference and dilute the effectiveness of evaluations.

98. The CGS recently set a task force to studying this problem. Its report states:

"...the problem of evaluation may be viewed as the reverse side of the coin of the collection guidance process. Virtually all of our efforts in collection guidance are directed toward bringing some order to the business of validating and expressing the intelligence information needs of production analysts to the collector. It is possible that similar efforts are in order to validate and express the evaluation needs of the collectors (and others) to the production analyst in order that these needs, also, be serviced in an orderly and meaningful fashion."

99. Although duplication of effort is reasonably well managed in the requirements field, there is no mechanism to avoid it in the evaluation process, such as a regular method of covering several related collector problems in one request. Also there is no way to ensure that the product of an evaluation effort requested by one collector is shared with others who might find it useful. A central repository of evaluation requests and a central file of analyst evaluations would bring some order into this disarray, and we believe this to be a proper function of the CGS Registry.

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100. The evaluation process is further complicated by subjective factors, among them: (a) the semantic problem of intergroup communication, of asking the right questions in the right context and of correctly interpreting the answers; (b) the reluctance of some evaluators to give a frank appraisal for fear of impairing a potentially useful channel.

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103. There is no formal provision for the establishment of an evaluation function in the substantive directorates of CIA, although CGS is directed to "assess the effectiveness of collection systems." (See Annex A.) Initiative mainly devolves upon the collector. We see nothing improper in this. But when collection guidance develops from evaluation and is not coordinated with the management of substantive directorates, as the ultimate fountain of collection requirements, there is danger that collection activity will get out of phase with intelligence production programming.

104. The machine-controlled data on collection requirements and reporting which CGS has been accumulating in the last few years give much promise for use in evaluation studies. They will be even more useful as CGS finds ways to include evaluations themselves in its machine listings. It is already possible to relate any desired grouping of reports to outstanding

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requirements, and vice versa. In a series of interesting pilot projects CGS is beginning to find ways to answer such questions as these: (a) How does a given group of reports--whether by area, subject, time span, or source--stack up against existing recorded guidance? (b) How well is a given group of requirements answered by current reporting?

105. Two approaches are being explored. One of these concerns the evaluation of all raw information pertaining to a subject or area in order to (a) identify aspects in which reporting was deficient, (b) identify needs which could have been satisfied by open literature, and (c) identify needs which are being satisfied by reporting. The other concerns evaluation of all reporting from a particular collector or system during a given period in order to bring out the collector's strengths and weaknesses and to identify marginal or worthless reporting.

106. CGS is attempting to develop a systematic program for applying sampling techniques to groups of reports selected on the basis of priority. As it gains experience, CGS hopes to be able to maintain current evaluations for individual collectors and also to provide assessments of the effectiveness of major components of information collection. This effort is in its infancy and needs nourishment, but its progress is promising. It is one of the most encouraging developments we have noted in our study of the collection guidance process.

107. The CGS task force report cited earlier lists three modest goals which should be achieved by a systematic evaluation program:

- a. Reduction of the time and energy expended by analysts in answering uncoordinated, ad hoc requests;
- b. Enhancement of the usefulness, timeliness, and significance of evaluations;
- c. Provision for more complete exploitation of evaluations.

108. We believe that the systematic, machine-supported program which the CGS Registry is now developing will help achieve these goals, and we believe that this program should have the enthusiastic support of management.

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
VII. THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION

1. The Long Range Plan of 1965 is based on the unquestioned assumption that CIA "must be allowed to grow to meet ever increasing demands from the Government for intelligence on a world that becomes constantly more complex." This proposition is repeated in a dozen ways which all add up to endorsement of the belief that the more facts we collect the better we do our job of safeguarding American security. It could be distilled into an Orwellian slogan: MORE IS BETTER.

2. We have first to recognize that a bias in favor of amassing indefinitely expanding quantities of information characterizes American society far more than any other that ever existed. We are hypnotized by statistics of every conceivable degree of trustworthiness, relevance, and importance. Nowhere outside America is there so great a tyranny of information over all the other factors affecting judgment--the tyranny of the public opinion poll, market research, television ratings. Never mind aberrations like the election of 1948 and the Edsel automobile; these merely prove that what we needed was more facts.

3. Given its brief, intense history, it was inevitable that the intelligence community would embody this American bias in its most extreme form. In particular, two important factors have intensified our search for more and more facts. One is the course of events during the decade after World War II, in which our ignorance of many fundamental foreign problems encouraged a kind of national paranoia that persists into the present. The other is the way in which the two dominant segments of the intelligence community--the military and the academic--reinforce each other's lifelong practice of treating the amassing of information as more important than theory, speculation, or hard-thought analysis. Thus MORE IS BETTER has been an article of faith with us from the beginning.

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


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5. In our view the assumption that MORE IS BETTER is now a dangerous anachronism, and ought to receive the community's most rigorous and skeptical analysis. The reason is the Information Explosion. The Long Range Plan of 1965 correctly says: "It is abundantly clear at this time that our ability to process and analyze raw information has not kept pace with our collection capability." The Plan alludes to needs for increases in CIA personnel


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It points out that these figures require further study, but the implication that an increase of this magnitude would enable CIA to use properly what is now being collected impresses us as unduly optimistic.

6. At the same time the community goes on making plans for ever larger explosions. A current study of one single aspect of the intelligence function--early warning--holds out the hope, or threat, of the following expansions of our ability to acquire raw data:

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


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


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7. It is clear that these and other developments can produce better information on some specific problems than we now have, and the need for this is not questioned. The bone of contention is quantity, and the problem whether we can control it in such a way as to recognize and isolate and correctly interpret (particularly with respect to enemy intentions) the crucial items  would provide. The community's record with respect to the exploitation of current collection inspires anxiety that we are creating worse problems than we are solving; not merely of finding the manpower to read out the new information, in itself a great problem no matter how much we automate, but of developing the judgment and discrimination to sift out the crucial facts and assess them correctly. Automation and other technical improvements will bring the handling of data under progressively better control (as to quantity) at the working levels of the intelligence process, but the total product of these and other quantum-jump systems can only increase the work load of policy-makers from the President down who are already overworked. We must move quickly to bring that product under control.

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8. After several pages of describing future prospects for quantum jumps in collection, the study just cited has only this to say about their effects on analysis, estimative judgments, and determination of policy on the basis of the information collected:

"One clear conclusion is inescapable: the investments  will require comparable investments in means of exploitation and analysis. The technical revolution in information collection, epitomized

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* Citations and quotations are from the third draft of the study on early warning.

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10. The passage quoted above says that the technical revolution in information collection is only just beginning to be felt. It is our conviction, and the source of our anxiety, that the Information Explosion has been with us for years and that our patchwork efforts to cope with it have concealed the true disparity between collection and end use. The community already holds warehouses full of unexploited SIGINT tapes and miles of photographic film only superficially examined, though both are known to contain useful

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information on our two top targets.

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[REDACTED] The explosion in written communications was under way long before we were born; it is tempting to date bureaucracy's affinity for it from the Franco-Prussian War, when during the siege of Paris a Frenchman escaped to Tours by balloon and

"... set up the first microphotography unit ever to be employed in war. Government dispatches in Tours were reduced to a minute size, printed on feathery collodion membranes, then rolled into a pellicle; so that one pigeon could carry up to 40,000 dispatches.... On reaching Paris, the dispatches were projected by magic lantern and transcribed by a battery of clerks. Sometimes one pigeon-load alone would require a whole week to decipher and distribute."*

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11. Even during World War II Winston Churchill complained repeatedly, and in vain, that the Information Explosion--i.e., the quantity of cable traffic--had become an intolerable burden and sometimes even a positive hindrance to prosecution of the war.** Later we ourselves used to try to keep down the volume to save money, but Churchill's objection

* Alistair Horne, The Fall of Paris, New York, 1965, P. 128.


** For example, a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary, "I feel that this is an evil which ought to be checked. Ministers and Ambassadors abroad seem to think that the bigger the volume of their reports home, the better is their task discharged. I try to read all these telegrams, and I think the volume grows from day to day." (The Second World War, III, 723.) To General Ismay and others: "I see no need for these long and pointless telegrams, and it is becoming quite impossible to conduct military operations when everything has to be spread about the Departments and around the world like this." (Ibid., p. 724.) And again to the Foreign Secretary: "The telegrams seem to be growing longer and longer....I quite understand they all want to help the war by increasing their output. In fact, they clog and hamper." (Ibid., IV, 864.)

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was more to the point: The greatest cost of our cable traffic is the time it takes thousands of people to keep abreast of it. Yet in response to perpetual demand for more and quicker communication, impressive technical advances have brought this increase in the cable traffic processed by CIA Headquarters Signal Center over the years:

1950
1955
1960
1965



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
12. In this context the phrase "Information Explosion" has little to do with exploitable raw intelligence data, because the number of published CS reports has changed remarkably little over the years and in 1965 amounted to [redacted]. But it has everything to do with the way intelligence officers at all levels spend their time, hours which cannot be expanded with the expansion of reading matter. Some of this increase in Commo capabilities must have improved the quality and speed of our reporting and that of other agencies, and in particular improved the responsiveness of our operations; much of the time spent working on [redacted] cables at both ends must formerly have been spent on pouched dispatches. But we doubt that these changes explain the 28-fold expansion of the system.

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13. The greatest jump in our cable traffic, almost [redacted] from 1960 to 1965, illustrates how a system, developed to meet some important need, acquires a life of its own whether the urgency persists or not. For

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* "Work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion." Parkinson illustrated his discovery by some statistics drawn from the British Navy and Colonial Office. Between 1914 and 1928 the Admiralty (continued next page)

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14. And now our Cable Secretariat, the National Military Command Center, and others are looking for ways to cope with what the early-warning study calls

"...the sizeable increases expected in both message volumes and numbers of electrical transmissions over the next few years--perhaps as much as 8 to 10% a year. They are also experimenting with remote print-out of the messages at the analysts' locations and with electronic storage for extended periods and retrieval by cathode ray tube display as well as hard copy. As communications centers expand in capacity, message handling down the line to the analyst will come under heavy pressure to go automatic too."

But the capacity of each recipient of all those cables will remain exactly what it was before: what he can read and absorb and act on in a day. Unless, of course, he has to spend more time looking at pictures. The total capacity of all recipients together has theoretically increased by some of the few percentage points which reflect CIA personnel increases (outside NPIC) since 1950, but any effort to prove this would have to take into account the facts that cables go to many more readers than the pouches used to, that we must read increasing numbers of State and Defense cables in addition to our own, and that cables must compete increasingly with the products of other compilations of material.

*(continued from Page VII - 6)

bureaucracy grew 78.45% while the number of capital ships in commission declined by 67.74% and the number of officers and men declined by 31.5%. Between 1935 and 1954, while Great Britain was losing most of the colonies it had accumulated over the past two centuries, the Colonial Office grew from 372 bodies to 1661. It should be emphasized that the parallel suggested here reflects not upon Commc but upon the work habits of its users. Something of the same point could be made with respect to the way we sought out things for the U-2 to do after May 1960, when it was no longer usable to meet the urgent need for which it had been created.

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15. The effect of overhead reconnaissance on the collective work load is impossible to measure, so that more attention is naturally paid to backlogs and shortages of manpower in NPIC than to the ability of the substantive producers to use the NPIC product adequately. We can only concur in a recent general description of the problem which points out that the explosion affects the processors, producers, and consumers of photographic intelligence and cites these reasons:


"...the increased use of our ever-improving reconnaissance capabilities, and increased dependency on photography as other sources of intelligence become relatively less productive, and a general widening of interests into areas previously neglected or ignored by intelligence."*
(Emphasis added.)

In consequence,

"Volumes currently processed are many times the 1960 volumes. For example, during fiscal year 1965 an excess of  of film was exposed over Cuba and Vietnam alone."

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16. The impact of SIGINT traffic on collective work load is also incalculable,



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
17. We are now receiving open literature at the rate of 1,600,000 items a year (114,500 copies of books, 270,600 of journals, and the remainder of newspapers). "This a threefold increase over 1950. By 1970 the figure will be two million." In the fields of science and technology and "sociology," the figure rose from 16,000 individual titles in 1950 to 46,000 in 1966. According to the Foreign Documents

* Quotations and most statistics in paragraphs 15-24 are from Paul Borel's Controlling Intelligence Information, written for presentation to the Intelligence Methods Conference in London in September 1966. The opinions based on them here are far more pessimistic than Borel's.

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


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Division (FDD), the number of pages it screened annually rose from 28,000,000 in 1961 to above 38,000,000 in 1965, and the resultant production of new reading matter rose from 210,000 pages to 760,000. Much of the take is abstracted and compressed:

"Information of intelligence value is selected by these analysts and prepared in the form of extract translations for publication in daily and weekly area and topic reports. This service goes a long way toward shielding the user from the flood of available open source materials which bear on his area of assignment. In one daily issue, FDD's current report on Eastern Europe may alone contain as many as 70 sources in eight languages. To gain greater timeliness in this service, we are experimenting with direct on-site press exploitation at overseas points." (Emphasis added.)

Or in other words, we are looking for ways to speed up the flood we must be shielded from. Meanwhile the USIB Committee on Documentation



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19. Even so, CIA has been working on schemes to increase the quantity of such material many times. One project, which still has bugs

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in it, will some day make it possible for the processing of overt materials from publications and broadcasts to be limited only by the speed with which translators can dictate their translations onto tapes, because other stages ending with computer printout will be automated. If automatic machine translation ever becomes practicable, our ability to process overt foreign information--i. e., put it on paper in English--will jump from millions of words per day to hundreds of millions. If we apply analogous techniques to "exploiting" all foreign television, a medium we shall have to take steadily more into account, we shall create the opportunity for another quantum jump. By that time, for any evidence we can see to the contrary, new projects for enormous expansion of technical collection of information of all kinds will have required more and more warehouses for the storage of more and more miles of tapes and films.

20. Meanwhile, Borel says "our total receipts of raw and finished intelligence documents have shown little variation over the years. The high water mark was reached in 1963 with a receipt figure of [REDACTED] individual documents." Two factors make this high figure weigh especially heavily in the collection work load. One is the special way these documents compete with each other and with all unclassified material for attention. Analysts must not only read as much raw information as possible but must also read one another's finished products. It can be argued indeed that they are one another's best customers, rather than the policy-makers who cannot conceivably keep up with the flow. And the other factor, obviously related to the first, is the way the number of copies of our classified documents keeps growing. Cables are often published in from 35 to 50 copies, sometimes in more than 100, and many of these copies are circulated to dozens or scores of readers. In addition, the prevalence of office copying-machines "has encouraged secondary reproduction by recipient offices to absurd proportions"--not just of cables, and no matter what security restraints we put on this practice.

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21. The most vivid illustration of all this proliferation is afforded by the Office of Current Intelligence. With almost the same number of authorized personnel as in 1955, OCI in 1965 succeeded in handling more than twice as many incoming items, and in producing 2-1/2 times as many of its own. But the total effect on all its customers' IN-boxes together was much greater: Measured in "impressions" (number of pages x number of copies per page), OCI annual production jumped in those ten years more than 400%, [REDACTED] Much of this flow is accounted for by publishing the OCI Weekly Summary, which averages 28 pages in a press run of 1570 copies of the Secret version and of 545 copies of the code-word version called Weekly Review. OCI Special Reports go to 1646

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of the recipients of these two weeklies; thus, on 28 October 1966, a productivity of 16,460 impressions was achieved by an essay, ten pages long counting the cover and a full-page map, which was entitled "Trends in the Lesser Antilles."*

22. Whatever the eventual benefits of automation, it is bound to increase the need for discipline. So far, in some ways, it has made the problem worse: "We see instances where basic input data is replicated, reformatted, resorted, to the point where the output volume exceeds input by perhaps 100 times." This is an excess which experience will no doubt correct. Yet in all that we have heard of the prospects for automating the intelligence community, there is still overwhelming emphasis on quantity and speed and far too little on the more important factors of quality and relevance.**

* After pages of travelogue ("St. Lucia... in 1962 opened its first luxury beach hotel"), this report delivers the message that the mayor of a town in Martinique was a Communist until the late 1940s, the mayor of a town in Guadeloupe still is, and in certain unlikely circumstances the Communists might reverse the steady decline they have been undergoing for nearly 20 years. We are informed that this and two other recent Special Reports were published because the DCI had told OCI to keep an eye on the West Indies. But we would argue that there is an important difference between keeping track of a subject and publishing a pointless essay in many hundreds of copies.

OCI publications are not usually so pointless. But managers throughout CIA justify a good many such pieces of research and publication on the ground that they keep up the analyst's morale, especially if his area is quiet and dull. The same excuse is given by the Clandestine Services for publishing raw reports known to be of marginal value or none. We consider this excuse unworthy of a serious effort to produce good national intelligence, and an important cause of the Information Explosion.

** Note the criteria implicit in the following progress report by USIB's Committee on Documentation: "Significant advances in the products and services provided by the DIA ADPS Center were again made in FY-66. For example, the Automated Intelligence File (AIF), a worldwide data base of finished installations intelligence, continued to grow very rapidly.

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entities described in the AIF. From the AIF are derived such important products as the Target Data Inventory, Basic Encyclopedia (B. E.), Contingency Planning Facilities Lists (CPFL), Airplane and Seaplane
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
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23. This defect cannot be remedied by the automators; they are in any case so devoted to hardware that they have invented a subtle denigration, probably unintentional, of the programming (and by extension the thought that precedes programming) which determines the use to which the hardware will be put. In their jargon this is software. The remedy will have to be supplied by management: a workable definition of the function of U.S. intelligence.*

24. Otherwise automation will accomplish the instant retrieval of everything, no matter what, and infinite permutations of googols of binary bits, no matter how trivial. One of the many functions of CHIVE will be to "search the literature" and produce all the books, documents, reports, etc., on a given subject. What does the analyst do when the truckload is delivered at the door? Or when it is automated into another truckload of electronic printout? That is his worry. Some electronics people obscure this crucial limitation upon the system with another jargon phrase, "individual channel capacity," and change the subject. Yet there is no

* Our views on this point are influenced by the development of  for the Clandestine Services years ago. It became clear that great technological advances in storage and retrieval would have done more harm than good if we had not first insisted upon drastically higher standards for what was to be stored and retrieved. Automation therefore began with a new and more rigorous definition of the purposes the information was to serve, a severe purge of accumulated irrelevancies, and a program of education and regulation throughout the Clandestine Services designed to acquaint all users of information both with the advantages of automation and with the necessity for self-discipline which these advantages imposed. The problem the whole community now faces of what to automate is many times more difficult than the one attacked by  because it means redefining the function of U.S. intelligence altogether, and the need for rigorous standards of quality and relevance is correspondingly greater.

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**(continued from Page VII - 11)

Stations of the World (ASSOTW), Sino-Soviet Missile Order of Battle (MOB), Future Strategic Target Lists (FSTL), and Priority Reconnaissance Objective Lists (PROL). On 4 February 1966, USIB adopted the identification procedures used in the AIF as a standard installation identification system for the entire U.S. Intelligence Community, with DIA acting as executive agent for the system." (CODIB Eighth Annual Report to USIB, 17 October 1966, Appendix C, pp. 2f.) In short, the function of automation is evidently to justify and intensify the kind of excesses of collection which we have analysed in Chapter VI and elsewhere.

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doubt that if its function is properly defined, automation can accomplish many more marvels of the kind which caused a Soviet planning official to say that CIA understood the Soviet economy better than the Soviet government did. The biggest problem is managerial "software."

25. Given all these grisly statistics we would go far beyond Borel's comment: "All in all a significant part of the information problem is of our own creation." He draws this conclusion only with respect to our manufacture and distribution of classified documents, themselves only a fraction of the "20 thousand individual series, in ten million issues, published in 150 million copies," which a survey of information inventories and flows estimated that the community produces or handles every year. In our view this problem is almost entirely of the community's own creation, not imposed from outside, and is a product of the way it has allowed its own "requirements," both for collection and for production, to proliferate unchecked. There would be a rough justice in blaming the analysts for their own plight, because collectively they have stated requirements for everything under the sun. But it is more to the point to emphasize that management has allowed this to happen.

26. We believe that the sum total of all our requirements, and the Information Explosion they have caused to be created, are severely detrimental to the American intelligence effort. In the long run it is not the crude question of work load which matters most, nor even the point that each item uses up customers' time and attention which cannot be given to any other item, so that each of our products must receive steadily less. What matters most is the question whether this quantity of information is degrading the quality of all our work. It is the earnest conviction of those of us who have studied CIA's requirements systems as a whole, and thought of their effect on our work, that this is already happening, and can only grow worse with each large new accretion. It is impossible to prove or disprove this thesis, least of all by our customary reliance on statistics. It has probably applied least where in the past it has mattered most--for example, the community could hardly have given more intense attention to Soviet military capabilities. But in many other important matters we believe that the community's attention is becoming steadily more superficial: that we cannot apply to the available information the depth of analysis it requires for accurate judgments. In addition to those we have suggested elsewhere, we offer these further indications, of course debatable but worth considering:

- a. The quantity of information on the Sino-Soviet dispute, especially of official statements from both sides published by

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and the Sovietologists are equally swamped in the flood of broadcast and other information on the USSR, and it is far beyond the capacity of either to study in depth the behavior of the two governments together. One solution is hiring more people, since we are especially short of Chinese experts. Another is transferring people away from attention to problems like "any indications, however indirect, of Somali involvement in Eritrean dissidence" (an IPC target), and onto important matters. But surely the quickest practical change would be even greater selectivity as to what we read and publish. The Sino-Soviet dispute has developed so slowly, with such infinite repetition of arguments, that we would be better occupied studying its underlying causes than in looking for Byzantine subtleties in the latest several thousand words of diatribe. Our compartmented, current-events approach kept many people from even acknowledging the seriousness of the dispute until it had been going on for several years. Of course somebody must skim and screen as much as possible, but our current handling of available reading matter makes skimmers of us all.

b. As for China itself,

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] foreshadowed the current internal upheaval in China months before events drew our attention to it. Perhaps greater selectivity would have passed over these indications, perhaps not; at any rate turning analysts into skimmers produced the same result as if the indications had not been published. When we get down to discussing the meaning of this upheaval, our preoccupation with current events can only bolster the view that, since Communists and their governments are pretty much alike, this must be a Communist phenomenon to which some past power struggle in Russia probably offers a reliable basis for judgment. The extent to which it must also be a peculiarly Chinese phenomenon gets lost in the welter of headlines and daily bulletins.

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
Board of National Estimates and USIB. Yet when the Communist roof caved in three weeks later, events uncovered counterforces so vast and violent that their nature ought to have been suspected. The massacre of hundreds of thousands of Communists must have had a motivation, a basis in a peculiarly Indonesian mixture of politics and economics and religion and social institutions, which our preoccupation with surface facts and current events kept us from even imagining.

d. So with our approach to the Communist threat throughout the underdeveloped world. Each group of experts is so busy keeping up with quantities of current information on its own field that there is no time for deeper study and comparison. When we consider the Communist threat to, say, black Africa we can only bring together experts on Africa, experts on international Communism, and experts on Russia and China, none of whom can be deeply enough versed in the fields of the others, and add up their anxieties instead of discriminating among them. When we do this in turn to each potential Communist threat around the world, we end up with a worst-case view of total Communist capabilities which is greatly at variance with observable developments over the past ten years.

e. For lack of deeper study we deceive ourselves by applying the narrowly economic concept of "underdeveloped countries" to forms of society which have been highly developed for centuries, but along lines too alien to our own for us to understand. We therefore apply much the same standards of intelligence interest to most "underdeveloped countries" as if they were all pretty much alike, at least in their susceptibility to the attractions of Communism; as if where the Communists try hardest they are most certain to succeed. This neglects the emotional impact of concepts like colonialism, nationalism, various forms of xenophobia, racial and tribal animosities, and the search for a national identity; some of these concepts we ignore as empty slogans in the Cold War, and some we fail to see as obstacles to any foreign ideology. In particular this approach neglects the social force of ancient religions. We usually mention in passing the impact of Islam or Buddhism, which varies widely from country to country, as no doubt interesting but not crucial. We are alarmed by the intense effort the Communists have been putting for years into subverting the Muslim world, but we never seem to ask ourselves why they have so little to show for it.


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And for a long time we treated the Buddhist leaders of South Vietnam as merely a set of particularly devious politicians. Yet when Muslims run amok in Java and Hindus in Bali, and Buddhist monks and nuns immolate themselves in South Vietnam, these oriental religions must have more political and social force than our Cold-War simplifications take into account. The history and nature of religion in China might help explain why China is now Communist and southern Asia is not--just as in Russia the Communists subverted to their own purposes the xenophobia, messianic zeal, and autocracy inculcated for centuries by Russian Orthodoxy, but have had no such advantage elsewhere in Europe.* At any rate our black-and-white simplicities have been much too simple.


f. A more specific example of damaging superficiality concerns one aspect of the Vietnamese War. Faced month after month with a lack of hard information from the scene, our experts had to develop alternative bases for judgment, and these came inevitably to include more and more statistics and extrapolations, unreliable as these were known to be. One consequence was that our estimate of the daily logistic requirements of the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong was extrapolated from American logistic requirements with adjustments according to various untestable assumptions. A



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So far have our work load and work habits, reinforcing each other, led us away from using what the collectors are in business to collect.

g. Meanwhile, in our effort to treat intelligence and policy as two quite separate entities, we pay too little attention to the way in which our own intelligence views affect the events themselves: the question, for example, whether American policy based on our view of the Communist threat does not increase the appeal of Communism and thereby intensify the threat. In the cases of

* See The Icon and the Axe, a brilliant new analysis of the effect of Russian history upon Russian ideology, by James H. Billington, 


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Indonesia and Ghana we were fortunate, because the peoples rose up and checked the threat for reasons of their own, not ours. But what about Cuba? Did American policy, based on a worst-case view expressed repeatedly by the intelligence community from 1959 on, cause Castro, with little effective help from Cuban Communists or even (until later) from the Soviet Union, to convert Cuba to a communist state?

27. To some readers these observations will seem remote from the subject of collection requirements, but we believe that they are closely connected. What we characterize here as superficialities are an amalgam of preconceptions, simplifications, and work load which are dominated by the belief that we must try to cover the whole world. The Long Range Plan does not question its own explicit assumption that the "security interests of the United States have expanded to include virtually every inhabited spot on earth." The whole range of our stated requirements from the PNIOs down to the most trivial item has justified such an assumption and made our superficiality inevitable. But it is absolutely essential that we do question it from now on. In the meantime we must recognize that we do not understand the Asians and Africans and Latin Americans; so long as our study is given largely to the surface events of the moment, understanding them will be an unduly long, slow, expensive process. This is an urgent reason for bringing the Information Explosion under control and freeing time for deeper study of fewer subjects.

28. None of this highly negative recital should be read as ridiculing our spectacular technical achievements, or denying that they have provided crucial answers to some crucial questions, or arguing that we do not need better information. But it does point to the necessity for the most earnest consideration of the following propositions:

a. We are already collecting far more information than we can satisfactorily use. What makes this alarming is not the quantity of photographic film that receives only superficial scanning or of SIGINT tapes that are not exploited at all; this kind of waste might be tolerable, even unavoidable, if only we could be confident that what we do use we use to the best of our collectively great abilities. The real cause for concern is the danger to the quality of our finished intelligence.

b. It is not the proper function of this Agency to know everything about everything, even about all locally important developments in politics, economics, military affairs, and technology

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around the world. The same problem which faces us in converting mountains of data into finished intelligence also faces the Executive Branch in putting our finished intelligence to proper use--time to study it, competition from other claims to attention, varied habits of thought and work. But a further inhibition operates against full use of our finished intelligence however perfectly we analyze and interpret the data. We devote much attention to problems on which the Executive Branch knows it is either unable or unwilling to take action. Both Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk, the former with particularly persuasive force, have recently emphasized that the U.S. cannot reform and police the whole world; this means to us that much of our intelligence might as well not have been produced for any practical difference it made. Yet we tell ourselves to act as if every collectible scrap of information and finished intelligence on all foreign developments were essential to the national interest. This is to multiply the Pearl Harbor syndrome by the jigsaw theory (that little scrap might be the missing piece) and get mediocrity. It will take changing a great many attitudes inside the intelligence community to bring it about, but we would like to hope for a time when we can be more sure of ourselves, and right, about a few important matters of which Indonesia is one example, and less anxious about beating the newspapers to one more coup in Syria or some other non-country.

c. As the only alternative to indefinite expansion, the Long Range Plan says that "if the Government reaches a conscious decision that the Agency should not expand to the degree that we propose, then it must relieve the Agency of some of these responsibilities." The implication that everything we do is the result of some specific responsibility laid on us by higher authority is dubious. We would argue rather that the size and multiplicity of our work are to a considerable degree a result of our own interpretation of broad and vague guidelines, and that much of what we consider our specific responsibilities is either self-imposed or responsive to no higher authority than the management of the intelligence community itself--the U.S. Intelligence Board. Witness the PNIOs, which originally were to receive executive scrutiny by the National Security Council but did not to any effective degree, and long ago came to represent the community talking to itself. In this way traditions arising out of our own past reactions to events take on the deceptive appearance of fundamental imperatives.

d. Thus one of our most important functions is educating the policy-makers to ask the right questions and to know what useful

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answers they can rightfully expect from intelligence. Not that our judgment of what is important is superior to theirs, but that it is an important ingredient of their own capacity to make judgments, and that our view of what it is practical for us to do to help them is better based in operational and analytical experience.

e. It follows that it is up to us to redefine our own jobs. Keenly aware that the community and CIA have habituated the Executive Branch to certain high expectations, and that it would take diplomatic skill and assiduity of a high order to revise them, we nevertheless believe that the effort is worth making. Its first aim would be to educate the policy-makers to an understanding that we would serve their own interest better if we could concentrate our effort on the crucial problems rather than try to cover the whole world comprehensively--and superficially--in the way that has been assumed to be essential ever since the Bogotazo of 1948. There could be two improvements: better judgments, and less competition of secondary matters for attention. Its second aim would be to educate management within the intelligence community to the necessity for concentrating on the fundamentals and letting the incidentals go. Without such education no possible combination of regulations, USIB resolutions, systems analyses, and deliberations of boards, panels, and committees will bring the Information Explosion under adequate control.

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VIII. RESPONSIBILITIES OF MANAGEMENT

1. In large measure, the threat of the Information Explosion and the mischief it is already working are results of deficiencies in the requirements process which have been detailed in earlier chapters. Some of these problems we have been able to attack with specific recommendations. Others will yield only to continuous vigilance by the management of substantive offices and divisions. Let us briefly sum up these deficiencies:

a. Validation is haphazard and unsystematic.

b. Coordination is imperfect.

c. There is too little communication between analyst and collector in terms of (1) tailoring the requirement to a specific collection capability; (2) informing the analyst of the status of his requirement; (3) providing the collector with an evaluation of his response; and (4) furnishing him with regular operational support.

d. Requirements are issued without due regard for processing and analytical capabilities.

e. Large numbers of informal requirements and informal evaluation requests elude the attention of management and are unavailable to serve as bases for its judgment or decision.

f. Requirements are not systematically and regularly reviewed in relation to intelligence production programs.

g. Analysts are not well informed about the requirements process.

h. The crucial intelligence gaps are not systematically identified and arranged in accordance with definite collection and production priorities. The system is cluttered with incidentals and trivialities which detract attention from the important matters and degrade the quality of our product.

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2. We conclude that the chief of each substantive division should be assigned the following responsibilities:

a. He should validate all requirements coming from his division, certifying that the information is needed to fill a gap in the national intelligence, is not already available, and is not likely to be collected by a mechanism other than the one to which the requirement is addressed.

b. He should stimulate personal communication between his analysts and representatives of appropriate collection mechanisms both before and after a requirement is written and delivered in order that: (1) analysts may learn better how to word their requirements in a manner appropriate to the mechanism; (2) analysts may supply prompt and efficient operational support; and (3) analyst and collector may work together as a team, with prompt feedback from the latter and prompt evaluation from the former.

c. He should be prepared to certify that the analytical resources of his division are sufficient to deal with the foreseeable answers to all questions being asked by it at any one time and to produce useful finished intelligence therefrom.

d. He should ensure that informal requirements and evaluation requests are recorded as soon as possible for purposes of managerial control.

e. He should review all requirements issued by the division at least twice a year to ensure that they are up to date, that they concentrate on the most important gaps in the division's information, and that they are receiving attention in accordance with the relative priorities among the various subjects within the division's competence.

f. He should ensure that analysts are fully informed about all elements of the collection requirements system, how they relate to one another, and how they are related to the division's work.

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It is recommended that:

No. 24

The Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Science and Technology instruct the chiefs of their substantive divisions to assume the responsibilities described above.

3. We conclude that the director of each substantive office should be assigned the following responsibilities:

a. He should keep himself generally aware of all the requirements levied by his office, as to type, quantity, appropriateness to the various collection mechanisms, and expected effects upon the work loads and production schedules of his office.

b. He should set priorities among the gaps in information which most affect the work of his office and discuss these priorities with representatives of the various collection mechanisms.

c. He should keep sufficient watch on the requirements of his office, as expressed either by his divisions or by USIB committees, to be able to assure himself and higher authority that his most important gaps have been clearly identified and expressed in practical terms to the collectors. Among other things this means assuring himself that methods appropriate to his office have been devised for screening out the trivial, the impractical, and the inappropriate.

d. He should compile, not less often than twice a year, an extremely brief list of the most important gaps so identified, and arranged in order of their importance to his office. This list could serve the double purpose of keeping top management systematically informed and of forcing the chain of command below it to give hard thought to hard subjects now often sloughed off onto committees and into catch-all catalogues.

e. He should use the knowledge of gaps thus acquired to develop the ability of his office to cooperate with the collectors in the fields of collection guidance and operational support, as

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distinct from the mere listing of requirements or gaps. This would especially mean encouraging subordinates to propose practical suggestions for acquiring the information desired.

It is recommended that:

No. 25

The Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Science and Technology instruct the directors of their substantive offices to assume the responsibilities outlined above.

4. We have tried to show that the management of collection guidance for human sources is rather disorderly. We doubt that setting up a USIB committee, along the lines of those governing technical collection, would reduce the confusion. The establishment of CGS has provided a helpful centralizing force within CIA, and subsequent experience has shown the value of central supervision. Before its creation there existed no group of people with intimate knowledge of what had been asked for, let alone what had already been collected. We believe that CGS should be given strong CIA support in its dual role as manager of requirements and as broker for both the requesters and those who do the collecting. It needs to have enough cognizance of what is going on among the various collectors so that no two of them are asked to do precisely the same job without good reason.

5. CGS already has a wealth of experience and people who personally know both the requesters and the collectors. In addition, it is already engaged in the following activities in the human-source field which have a community impact:

a. Its Human Resources Group (HRG) participates in the State Department's Current Economic Reporting Program.

b. HRG furnishes the Washington coordinator for the Travel Folder Program.

c. HRG briefs military attaches and evaluates much of their reporting.

d. CGS furnishes the CIA member and alternate for the IPC. The alternate is chief of HRG.

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e. HRG publishes the Current Intelligence Reporting List, which is used throughout the community.

f. CGS furnishes the secretariat for the Critical Collection Problems Committee and can advise that committee on the human-source collection role in critical problems.

g. CGS can ensure that human-source requirements do not duplicate those for technical collection and that the several systems complement and support each other.

h. CGS has a store of machine data on requirements which is getting better all the time and is already giving excellent support to the generators of requirements, the substantive offices and the USIB committees, as well as to collectors.

6. There are limits to what CGS can accomplish. It cannot change overnight the military habit of writing requirements on anything and everything and sending them to everybody. But the force of example and gentle evangelism may do some good in time. Meanwhile CGS is already doing a great deal to create a more orderly system. With the Information Explosion threatening to bury us all in an increasing proliferation of questions and answers, and with some elements of the community and of the Agency apparently viewing this dull prospect with resignation rather than dismay, we believe CGS can and should be doing much more.

7. We have found a great deal of healthy self-examination already going on in the technical collection fields, especially SIGINT. Similar scrutiny is being applied only in piecemeal fashion to human-source collection. We believe that CGS is uniquely equipped to apply it--with some authority in CIA and by persuasion and example in the rest of the community--but it will need strong executive backing to do the job. Now more than ever before there is a pressing need for a central requirements control mechanism. We conclude that the upper management of CIA should do everything possible to fortify this function. Although several of our other recommendations have touched on this matter, we believe a further general one is in order.

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It is recommended that:

No. 26

The Deputy Director for Intelligence furnish all necessary support to the Collection Guidance Staff in its efforts to:

a. Mitigate the deleterious effects of the Information Explosion that are already being felt.

b. Apply strict selective criteria to all foreign intelligence requirements in order to prevent the Information Explosion from getting completely out of hand.

c. Introduce progressively more order and system into human-source requirements.

8. We believe that the conclusions and recommendations of this study, insofar as they are approved and adopted, will have a quicker and more beneficial effect on the requirements system if they are brought directly to the attention of analysts, not only through the chain of command, but in briefings by CGS officers with the assistance of representatives of the Clandestine Services. The briefings should include an explanation of the proper use of each element in the requirements system and of the inter-related functions and responsibilities of the CGS, the analysts, and the collectors.

It is recommended that:

No. 27

The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Deputy Director for Plans, arrange briefings on the collection guidance system for analysts in the Agency's intelligence production offices.

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JOHN A. MCCONE

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ANNEX A

CHARTER OF THE COLLECTION GUIDANCE STAFF

DD/I NOTICE
No. 1-130-20

C O P Y
DD/I N-1-130-20
6 May 1964

THE COLLECTION GUIDANCE STAFF
OF THE DD/I*

Mission: The Collection Guidance Staff (CGS) is the central mechanism for coordinating all-source information requirements and levying them on collectors in support of the DD/I's mission to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security.

Functions:

1. CGS will collaborate with DD/I production analysts in identifying information gaps and translating these identifications into substantive all-source collection guidance, acting on request for DD/S&T as well.**
2. CSG will be the channel for processing and passing to collectors all requirements related to national intelligence production, assigning proper priorities, eliminating duplication and avoiding competition for collection resources among production offices.
3. CGS will review progress in collection for DD/I substantive needs and assess the effectiveness of collection systems.
4. CGS will maintain the Agency's central registry for recording and retrieving all requirements for substantive information and other tasking requests or program requirements placed by Agency components on collectors which might affect collection priorities.

*This statement of the mission and functions of the Collection Guidance Staff in the Directorate of Intelligence is an extension of portions of DDI N 1-130-16 (10 June 1963), and specifically supersedes para 2 thereof.

**Special relationship of CGS to DDS&T is set forth in an Annex (dated 6 May 1964) to DDCI's directive of 30 Oct. 1963: Relationships between DDI and DDS&T.

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5. CGS will provide staff support for the DD/I, and on request for other components, in developing and coordinating Agency positions on collection problems, and will appear at USIB and other interdepartmental committees where collection guidance is to be discussed.

6. CGS will maintain an Operations Center* to support the DCI with salient intelligence and U.S. operational intentions and capabilities with regard to situations of concern to the Agency. To this end, CSG will maintain Agency representation at NMCC and the State Operations Center and will insure coordination on this role with DD/P and other Agency components.

/s/ Ray. S. Cline

RAY S. CLINE

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

* The Operations Center was placed under the executive direction of AD/CI effective November 1964.

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C O P Y
6 May 1964SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE
DDI COLLECTION GUIDANCE STAFF
TO THE DDS&T*Mission

The Collection Guidance Staff will be the central registry of all requirements for the collection of intelligence information (as distinct from tasking or programming) and will assist analysts as requested in preparing and levying requirements on collection media, and collectors in clarifying requirements from analysts. In carrying out this mission the Collection Guidance Staff will not interfere with direct analyst-collector contacts on technical matters.

Functions

1. CGS will maintain the central registry of all requirements including those served on Agency collection offices. It will also serve as a repository for other tasking requests for program requirements placed by Agency components on collectors which might affect current collection priorities.
2. CGS will be responsible for processing (as distinct from tasking or programming) Agency requirements on collection media of other agencies and departments. It will review all such requirements to insure that undesirable duplication does not exist, and where such duplication is found, will take appropriate steps to unify the particular requirements.
3. As requested CGS will provide staff support to analytical elements on requirement matters.
4. CGS will provide Agency representation at NMCC and State Operations Center, and will insure coordination in this context with DDP and other Agency components.
5. CGS will maintain an operations center to support the DCI with salient intelligence on situations of concern to the Agency and related U.S. military operational deployment plans and intentions.

* This Annex to the DDCI's directive of 30 October 1963, Relationships between DDI and DDS&T, supplements the role of CGS in the DDI as set forth in DDI Notice N 1-130-20, dated 6 May 1964: The Collection Guidance Staff of the DDI.

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