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Executive Registry
60-5083

28 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Sprague Committee

1. This memorandum is for the information of the DCI.
2. Meetings of the Sprague Committee are scheduled for July 11 and the morning of July 12, July 18 and the morning of July 19. Mr. Sprague hopes that these will be the last meetings of the Committee to consider working papers and that a final draft of the Committee's report will be completed by the end of July.
3. I am attaching summaries of the discussion that took place at the meetings of the Committee on June 6, 20 and 21. I have not attempted to do anything more than indicate the substance of the discussion as full minutes are kept by the Committee. Also attached are copies of the papers discussed at these meetings.

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Attachments - 12
2 Memo for Record dtd 22 June
10 Sprague Committee papers

cc: DDCI wo/atts.

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Executive Registry

22 June 1960

60-5084

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**SUBJECT: Sprague Committee Meeting of 6 June 1960**

1. The first paper considered by the Sprague Committee at this meeting concerned "American Labor in International Affairs". A separate memorandum covering the discussion and action taken on this paper was circulated on 7 June. Subsequently, at a meeting attended by Ambassador Hare and Mr. Scott of the State Department and Messrs. Meyer and Bross, it was agreed that the paper as originally presented with relatively minor modifications would be acceptable to both the State Department and CIA (see Mr. Meyer's memorandum for the record dated 14 June 1960). Mr. Nielsen of the Sprague Committee was notified to this effect (see letter from Mr. Bross to Mr. Nielsen dated 16 June 1960).

2. Papers concerning the following subjects were considered and accepted without substantial modification:

- a. American Business Abroad
- b. International Travel
- c. International Flow of News

3. A paper on "International Television" was also discussed after an introductory statement from Mr. Nielsen concerning the importance of television as a medium of communication during the course of which he stressed the significance of the effect which global TV will have on intercontinental communication. With the advent of instantaneous audio and visual communication between the most distant countries of the world tremendous opportunities for influencing public opinion will unquestionably develop. A corollary to this opportunity will be the immense technological, administrative and legal problems presented by the necessity for controlling and allocating times and frequencies for telecasts.

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4. The paper on 'The Problems of U. S. Public Understanding of International Affairs' provoked considerable discussion, some of it somewhat adverse to the paper. The consensus of the Committee was opposed to making the President's press secretary responsible for coordinating the development and presentation of public information as suggested at the top of page 13 of the paper. Otherwise, there were no very specific suggestions for improvements in the recommendations in the paper and the problem was recognized as an important one.

5. During an executive session after lunch, Mr. Sprague reverted to the question of a possible review of the handling of the public relations aspects of the U-2 incident. The discussion followed more or less identically the lines of the discussion which had taken place at the Committee meeting on May 23rd. Messrs. Jackson and Sprague reiterated orally at this meeting the statements which had been communicated on their behalf during the course of the meeting on May 23rd. In substance they disclaimed any interest in reviewing the policy decision concerning overflights or the assumption of responsibility for the program by the President. They both insisted that the importance of the incident and various announcements identified with the incident as a factor in world opinion warranted a review of the procedures invoked or followed in formulating these announcements beginning with the first announcement of the missing U-2 on the third of May. What Mr. Jackson and Mr. Sprague were both arguing in effect was that USIA should have been consulted prior to the issuance of any public announcements on this matter.

6. Mr. Sprague indicated his own belief that the President's desires on the subject should be solicited. This was the suggestion originally made by Gordon Gray at the meeting of May 23rd. It was agreed by all that no re-examination of the matter could be made without the President's agreement. All of the official representatives of the Committee with the exception of USIA voted against an approach to the President on the issue on the grounds that the decision involved had been made by the President and the Secretary of State personally, that therefore a review would be unlikely to serve any constructive purpose and that the incident was pretty much sui generis and most unlikely to recur. Considerable emphasis was put on the sensitivity of the subject matter, many of the aspects of which are still highly classified. It was recognized, as the DCI had made clear at the meeting on 23 May, that none of the principals involved in the

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incident would be at liberty to testify about any of the decisions taken including the decision with respect to the assumption of responsibility or release of statements connected therewith in the absence of express Presidential authority. It was generally recognized, I think, that, in view of the strong feelings of the two public members of the Committee, the Chairman had little alternative than to present the proposal to the President and seek specific guidance. This in effect was the course suggested by Mr. Gray at the meeting of May 23rd.



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60-5085

22 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Sprague Committee Meetings on 20 and 21 June 1960

1. The meeting on 20 June opened with an executive session at which the Chairman reported on developments in the proposal to review the U-2 matter. He said that due to a business commitment he had been obliged to cancel the appointment which had been made to discuss this matter with the President but that Gen. Goodpaster had submitted the question and transmitted the general sense of the President's views. These were to the effect that the Committee should not review the handling of the U-2 incident specifically. On the other hand, it was suggested that if the Committee envisages recommendations pertaining to the informational aspects of future projects involving special arrangements outside of the normal machinery of Government, the President would be glad to see them.

2. Mr. Gray stated his understanding of the President's views to be that no review of the U-2 incident, certainly in terms of a blow-by-blow review of the incident itself, and the decisions resulting from it, was desirable or permissible. On the other hand, the President would welcome recommendations as to how to handle informational aspects of matters which for security reasons or otherwise are handled outside of the NSC or other appropriate mechanisms of the Government. Mr. Nielsen argued that this category was larger than was generally recognized. He suggested that various decisions involving the President's trip and other similar matters appear to have been handled outside the regular machinery of Government. Accordingly, he felt that an examination of the procedures governing the informational and public relations aspects of this type of decision would be desirable. I suggested that in formulating any recommendations the Committee should distinguish very carefully between matters which were handled outside the machinery of Government for security reasons, such as the U-2, and matters which were handled outside the normal machinery of Government because of their political

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implications or their failure to conform to any conventional pattern. Obviously, the procedures pertaining to very high security activities, including intelligence operations, should be different from those pertaining to certain other decisions because of the security clearances involved, etc. The Chairman said that he recognized this distinction and would see that it was observed.

3. The Committee then discussed some procedural matters concerning the publication of its report. Meetings of the Committee have been scheduled for July 11, 12, 13 and 19. It is hoped that these will be the last regular meetings to consider Committee papers and that the first draft of the Committee's report will be completed by the end of July. Some discussion ensued as to the desirability of having submission of the report coincide with the elections. There was also discussion as to the desirability of some interim recommendations in the event that the main body of the report is withheld until about the time of the elections. In general it was agreed that an interim report should be prepared to go to the President covering matters on which he can take or might wish to take immediate executive action. The balance of the report, which in effect is designed to constitute a legacy to the next President, should be completed for submission in two versions around the time of the elections. One version would be available for public release and the other would be classified.

4. The Committee is losing some members of its staff in the reasonably near future as Mr. Boerner returns to Italy and Col. Coffey to the Army. However, the Chairman hopes to complete the report with the present staff. Conceivably he may call upon the agencies and departments represented on the Committee for some assistance in completing the final draft of the report. Mr. Reed stressed the necessity of pressing on with the work of the Committee with a view to completing it as expeditiously as possible irrespective of any decision as to the appropriate date for submission of the report to the President or release to the public. Mr. Sprague agreed that the Committee should press on with the completion of the report as quickly as possible. (At lunch he confirmed that he hopes to have all subsidiary papers completed and at least a final draft of the Committee report prior to the first of August.) It was also agreed that the proposal for foreign inspection trips by members of the Committee and the staff would be abandoned.

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5. The Committee then addressed itself to the very comprehensive paper prepared by Col. Coffey in consultation with representatives of all agencies and departments of the Government concerned on the subject of "The Impact of Achievements in Science and Technology Upon the Image Abroad of the United States". This paper summarizes the attitude of foreign and domestic opinion on the relative status of the United States and the USSR in the fields of science and technology. It concludes that U. S. achievements and capabilities in these fields exceed, on balance, those of Soviet Russia. With the advent of Sputnik, however, it concludes that world opinion generally has undergone a substantial change and that the preponderance of public opinion now regards Soviet Russia as either already ahead of the United States or as developing a competence which will make Soviet Russia pre-eminent in these fields within foreseeable future. The report attaches a number of assessments based on public opinion polls to substantiate these conclusions. It identifies the problem as one of improving the machinery and facilities for informing public opinion at home and abroad about U. S. programs and accomplishments in science and technology. The problems of better coordination in the dissemination of relevant information are analyzed in terms of various audiences including the scientific elite, the general elite and the general public in various areas. Stress is laid on the necessity for developing better general comprehension of Soviet projects in terms of their true scientific significance. This includes a responsibility for debunking some of the more extravagant Soviet claims. Broader dissemination of the CIA Scientific Intelligence Digest is recommended as one method of developing better understanding of the real significance of the Soviet programs amongst the Government community.

6. The paper also enumerates a number of specific projects which are calculated to impress world opinion and which, if successfully completed, would have a favorable impact on attitudes toward the United States. There has been disagreement and some criticism of some of the specific projects recommended as worthy of development because of their potential effect on public opinion. The ones criticized include proposals to work on an anti-gravity project, a project to develop the potentialities of controlled nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (the development of harbors, etc.) and project

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practicality or usefulness of the latter two projects and opposed to consideration of anti-gravity research as unrealistic science fiction. The Committee will eliminate the anti-gravity project as an illustrative suggestion and may also eliminate references to the other two projects. All of the other projects are listed purely for the purpose of suggesting types of projects on which resources could be concentrated with beneficial effect in the public relations field. They include project MERCURY (aimed at putting a man into space or into orbit), the MOHOLE (a project for drilling through the earth's crust), a cure for cancer, the development of a feasible air car or rocket transport, drugs for repairing radiation damage, particle beams (a disintegrator beam), etc. Projects not listed in the report but mentioned during the course of the Committee's deliberations included the development of a nuclear-powered aircraft (which is not thought to have military value but may have commercial value), anti-missile missiles and a project for lighting up substantial parts of the atmosphere which would have the effect of eliminating darkness over large parts of the globe for substantial periods of time.

7. The Committee received Dr. Alan R. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation. His presentation was largely concerned with the degree to which it is practical or desirable to establish guidance over the objectives of scientific research. He attempted to distinguish between science and technology. He agreed that in technology it is proper to identify specific goals and to effect a concentration of technical effort on specific projects which are determined to be particularly useful from either a practical or public opinion standpoint. He was opposed to proposals which would result in attempts to specify the objectives or goals of basic pure research maintaining that many of the most remarkable and important scientific discoveries had resulted coincidentally or as a by-product to the primary purposes of research. The argument was largely that pure research scientists should be protected from the demands and importunities of specific practical programs and that basic research should be encouraged as an end in itself. He maintains that there is already a considerable amount of guided research both in industry and Government anyway. He emphasized the importance of the traditional conventions amongst scientists as regards meticulous reporting of discoveries and developments in science, feeling more perhaps can be done to shame the Soviet and bloc scientists generally into publishing and recording their achievements.

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8. Dr. Waterman was followed by Dr. Kistiakowsky's assistant, Dr. Beckler, who was rather closely questioned on the adequacy of existing Government procedures for coordinating scientific programs, for promoting projects calculated to impress world opinion and for exploiting and disseminating information about favorable developments.

9. Considerable discussion ensued as to practical measures to ensure that the so-called "P" factor is considered in connection with decisions to promote particular scientific and technical projects and programs. It was generally agreed that the OCB should play a more important role in this connection. It was recognized that the OCB already plays an effective part in ensuring appropriate publicity for and dissemination of information about developments and achievements. The Committee was inclined to the view that the OCB or some other appropriate interdepartmental committee should be given greater responsibility for contributing to decisions as to which projects should be undertaken or promoted.


10. The Committee next considered a paper on the "Psychological Informational Aspects of Foreign Aid". After some discussion it was agreed that this paper would be given further consideration, particularly with ICA. Mr. Berding felt that the paper may have exaggerated the extent and effectiveness of Soviet aid. It was recognized that an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of Soviet activities in this field was difficult but that facilities for gathering and evaluating information on this subject have been greatly improved.

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12. The Committee reconvened at ten o'clock on Tuesday, June 21, and considered the paper on "Disarmament and the Factor of Public Opinion". [redacted] had reviewed this paper for CIA and expressed general agreement with it. As in the case of the paper on [redacted] this paper also takes the position that the United States should adopt a more flexible posture in disarmament negotiations and formulate proposals with more concern for their impact on public opinion. The paper criticizes in somewhat general terms the rigidity of U. S. negotiating positions on the general subject of disarmament and the time which it has normally taken the United States to develop or to change its position on various issues related to disarmament. The author of the paper, Mr. Gullion, said that he had considered submitting a bill of particulars to support criticism of United States efforts in the disarmament field in the past but had concluded that such a bill of particulars would serve no particularly useful purpose.

13. In general, the Committee was sympathetic to the contents as well as the conclusions of this paper. Mention was made of the difficulties created by the lack of continuity of direction of disarmament matters in the United States Government. Not only have a relatively large number of individuals (from Baruch to Fred Eaton) been given temporarily the chief responsibility for negotiations in this field but the State Department staff responsible for these matters has also experienced constant turnover with the result that there is no individual at the policy level and few, if any, individuals at the staff level who have followed the disarmament problem for an appreciable period of time. The point was made that the Defense Department has actually paid more attention to this question than has the State Department. Not only are there officers in the Pentagon who have followed disarmament developments for substantial periods of time but also the Defense Department has engaged in a very substantial research program to support its views and contentions in this field.

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14. Mr. Gray reported that the President had decided to set up a disarmament office in the State Department at a very high level. The Secretary of State is now looking for someone of the calibre of Mr. John McCloy to head up this office. There has been considerable debate as to whether such an office is properly located in the Department of State or whether it should report directly to the President. The chief difficulty at the moment is to find somebody of national stature who is qualified and prepared to take the job. There is also a question as to whether it is practical to attempt to recruit somebody of appropriate calibre and reputation at the very end of an administration.

15. As regards the paper itself, no specific objections were voiced. Arguments similar to those raised in connection with the [redacted] paper appeared applicable to the present paper concerning the danger of developing a disarmament position which is exclusively or even primarily designed for propaganda purposes. It was agreed, however, that the paper was not intended to suggest that the United States should develop proposals in the disarmament field, purely for public opinion purposes which it is not really prepared to live with. (I believe that [redacted] would go quite far in the direction of advocating that the United States adopt or sponsor proposals which are attractive to world opinion even though they may run counter to U. S. national policy interests where it is reasonably clear that the Soviets themselves will oppose them. I doubt that the Committee was prepared to go quite this far.) The relative impact and value of slogans was the subject of some discussion. The paper emphasizes the success which the concept of control has had upon public opinion generally and it was suggested that efforts should be concentrated on the identification of the United States with the concept of "open societies". The point was also made that while additional efforts to identify the United States with positive proposals were desirable it was also desirable to increase our efforts to combat and refute Soviet slogans and campaigns such as those which are calculated to ascribe to the United States responsibility for the threat of atomic warfare and identify the United States with "atom death".

16. The only other paper discussed at this session of the Committee was "The Financial Flexibility of the U. S. Apparatus". This paper generally takes the view that present financial procedures for dealing with unforeseeable contingencies are adequate, although it is possible that Congress may impose further restrictions on State

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Department contingency funds which might considerably impair its ability to meet contingencies. Criticisms of undue rigidity levied against the Government are mostly concentrated on the foreign aid programs. Here the problem does not seem to be so much a lack of access to contingency funds as the complexity and rigidity of the procedures governing the formulation of substantive programs themselves. Thus it was stated at the meeting that the Government has had comparatively little difficulty in developing a satisfactory program for Chilean relief and reconstruction on short notice. On the other hand the complexity of the process of developing regional programs of one sort or another from student exchange to irrigation projects is such as to impose delays in their accomplishment and create an impression of considerable rigidity. The language in the paper concerning use of the CIA contingency fund was reviewed and concurred in by Messrs. Barnes, [redacted] and Bross. It was agreed that the title of the paper should be amended to eliminate the word "apparatus" which has undesirable connotations.

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