

26 May 1948

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Mathias F. Correa

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

SUBJECT: Executive for Administration and Management

I have talked with the Executive for A & M, his Deputy and the Chiefs of his various Branches. I have also examined comments on and criticisms of A & M from sources outside of A & M. It is difficult to make a fair estimate of such an organization and its personnel without delving much more deeply into its services and reaction of the customers served. I will set forth below, however, a short summary including composition, a somewhat snap judgment of key personnel, general criticism leveled at A & M, and points that might possibly warrant remedial action.

1. Composition

A & M is a fairly large unit consisting of [] personnel. It has the following five branches:

- (a) Budget and Finance Branch -- []
- (b) Services Branch -- []
- (c) Personnel Branch - []
- * (d) Reference Center - []
- (e) Management Branch []

*--Strictly speaking, Reference Center no longer belongs to A & M. Through some administrative legerdemain, the Office of Collection and Dissemination, with the majority of its functions and personnel, was merged with Reference Center. This having been done, the combined OCD-Reference Center has itself disappeared and has been reconstituted as a new Office of Collection and Dissemination on the Old Office level.

2. Key Personnel

(a) From having talked with him only twice, I would judge that [] Executive for A & M, is very possibly a capable administrative officer who is enjoying a position as one of the inner council. I believe that CIA revolves around A & M, and that [] enjoys the feeling of power and authority. If returned to his normal position of servicing the operating offices, he would probably do a capable job and not incur the criticism which is presently leveled at him.

(b) [] Deputy, has made no very clear impression on me. He seems to be imbued with the spirit of A & M, as the crown prince should.

(c) Saunders is Chief of Budget and Finance Branch. He appears to be a mild man, perhaps slightly lacking in force. He has had a long budgetary and accounting background, is enthusiastic about his job, and, I believe, knows his business. [] tells me his relations with the Bureau of the Budget and GAO are excellent.

SECRET

25X1 () Chief of the Services Branch, seems forceful and efficient. He has a background of Government service and OSS.

(e) Kelly, Chief of Personnel Branch, is a young man of 30 years. At college he majored in Public Administration and has eight years of personnel background in various departments of Washington. He does not appear very forceful but is more outspoken than most of those in A & M. I believe he is aware of the difficulties of recruiting and keeping personnel and is trying to tap every source. He appears enthusiastic and hard working and, in general, made a favorable impression.

(f) Dr. Andrews, the Chief of Reference Center, is a professional anthropologist and a former assistant to Professor Hooten at Harvard. He is intelligent, enthusiastic and drives himself hard. He has unquestioned ability in his own field. I believe his trained research mind will prove of value in Reference Center.

25X1 (g) (), who is Chief of the Management Branch, is young and fired
25X1 with great zeal. He appears to be third in the A & M hierarchy behind ()
25X1 and (). I always have the feeling that a management branch must con-
25X1 tinually over-manage to justify its existence, but I think () approaches
his job as moderately as possible.

All the Chiefs of the A & M Branches "talk a good ^{game} line", but it is difficult to check their assertions without a much more comprehensive investigation. From a superficial contact, they appear to be doing a good job and I think are probably capable.

3. Criticism of A & M, mostly from inside CIA, is generally as follows:

25X1 (a) Excessive authority wielded by () an administrative officer. (See no. 4).

(b) Administrative (almost impenetrable) strata between Director and Assistant Directors for Operating Offices. (See No. 4).

(c) Predominance of Service and State personnel in high brackets. Replacement from outside and consequent difficulty in promotion. (See No. 4).

25X1 (e) Personnel procurement. (See No. 4).

(f) Difficulty in requesting promotions, etc. This is a normal and usual complaint. Kelly says that Personnel Branch only checks promotions on the basis of available slots, time and grade, etc. He says that about 90% go through on the recommendation of Branch Chiefs. I think he makes it sound slightly too easy.

SECRET

SECRET

There have been many sarcastic remarks about the elimination and subsequent reconstitution of OCD. This is described as typically A & M and rather idiotic.

4. Points that may warrant further study.

(a) Criticism under 3(a) and 3(b) seems valid. The whole question of staff levels appears to me wrong. Whereas in theory the Executives and the Assistant Directors are on the same level, in practice this is not so. Whether by chance, progressive encroachment or deliberate usurpation of prerogatives and power, the Executive for A & M has become the most powerful staff member, and the Assistant Directors find themselves on a lower level. To my mind, the Assistant Directors of the Operating Offices (ORE, OO, and OSO) should form a close working group with, perhaps, the Executive Director. As Chiefs of Operations they should conduct their operations and operational planning under the close and constant advice of the Director ~~or~~ Executive or ~~as~~ Deputy. They should be the advisors to the Director and the Executive for A & M should be returned to his normal position of serving the Operating Offices. At present I have the feeling that A & M bars the way to close association between the Director and the Operating Chiefs. This I consider poor policy.

(b) Criticism ^{under} ~~on the~~ 3(c) is also valid. At present key slots are reserved for approximately 20 representatives of each of the Services and 15 from State. These Service and State personnel are not on CIA pay roll. This is a policy of the front office, and I am not sure that I like it. The Service and State personnel consider their assignment to CIA as a two-year tour of duty. [redacted] claims that this constant change brings in new personnel with fresh and enthusiastic ideas. I believe that it must destroy continuity. It also means that too often replacements in these reserved slots are made by selection of a Service or State representative with too little consideration of the fact that there may be better qualified civilian personnel available. When replacement is made from outside and not through promotion, it tends to discourage CIA personnel who begin to see no future. [redacted] tells me that gradually more replacements will be made through promotion and pointed out that Mr. Carey will become Assistant Director of the Office of Operations, succeeding General Sibert. [redacted] also claims that gradually the number of these Service slots will be whittled down so that eventually it will be under 50. Unquestionably, there should be Service and State personnel in CIA, but there is a question in my mind as to whether the present number is not too large and the general brackets reserved for them too high.

(c) Personnel recruiting and turnover. At the moment, CIA is below ceiling strength, and due to delay in security clearances there is no immediate prospect of improvement. Kelly, Personnel Officer, is doing his best but he has a number of problems. Clerical personnel at the moment presents great difficulty and there seems to be considerable competition between present Government departments and agencies and newly established agencies such as ECA. This is the level in which there is the greatest turnover. It is also difficult for Kelly to recruit for ORE, OO, and OSO as requirements are specialized. For instance, OO in the Foreign Documents and FBIB Branches require a great


SECRET

~~SECRET~~

number of people with two or more language backgrounds, some intelligence experience, and, in many cases, considerable area knowledge. As many of these people are foreign born, the security question is quite acute. I believe that given time and working closer with the Operating Offices the recruiting program will show improvement, as I think Kelly is competent and hard working. The turnover figures are not as bad as I had expected. For the period 1 February 1947 through 30 April 1948, there were a total of 265 separations. This figure does not include OSO. During this same period, CIA added to its rolls people through recruiting and the absorption of such outside units as the Map Division of ORE. This figure is also ExOSO.

25X1

25X1



JL:kb

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY~~

Dear General Lorne:

This is somewhat of a rush job. Will be ready next week in more detail. Are there any points in A or B or C or D that you would like a more complete check on, let me know. Obviously O.C.D. needs further study.

25X1