

23 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Problems Raised Before the Special Study Group and Questions Raised by the Group

1. In response to a request from [] to Mr. Helms, the following broad problems, which have been discussed by and with the Study Group, are furnished as an aid for your meeting with the Group. In my opinion the Group has been very sympathetic to our problems and have not shown a critical attitude. They have frequently asked questions pertaining to our security, our organization and personnel, our training program and our long-range plans.

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a. Organization and General Administration:

- ✓ (1) Need for simplification of PRC procedures.
- ✓ (2) Need for a simplified program and budget procedure based on a maximum delegation of authority to DD/P within approved overall programs and budgets.
- (3) Need for a change in chain of command procedures --i.e.,
 - ✓ (a) Senior representatives in the field are not responsible to the Area Division Chiefs nor to DD/P. The DD/P Washington Headquarters is just one big staff for DCI.
 - ✓ (b) Headquarters officials going directly to the DCI and the DDCI, by-passing COP and DD/P.
- ✓ (4) Need for a central CIA building.

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(5) Need for an overall DD/P operations staff, plans staff, and support staff.

(6) Several speakers pointed out that we are merged at field level, at Desk and Branch level, at most Division levels and in the person of COP and DD/P. However, the PP and FI Staffs were not merged and this fact led to confusion, endless delays and inefficiency.

(7) The need for a strong administrative staff responsible to DD/P. The present Administrative Staff is in essence only a liaison shop with DD/A who also controls all personnel within DD/P who have an administrative career designation.

(8) Problem of our inability to conform with normal government requirements and procedures -- i. e. ,

(a) The need for a new leave legislation for CIA employees in the field.

(b) Existing vehicle regulations create problems in the field due to the use of quasi-personal vehicles.

(9) The need for improvement of security both at Headquarters and in the field.

b. Personnel and Related Subjects:

(1) The need for a separate integrated system for recruitment and personnel management to provide for long-term needs of DD/P. This system could be integrated into the overall CIA system but maintained on a separate basis.

(2) Need for a better Career Service System incorporating the necessary incentives to attract and hold high-caliber personnel.

(3) Difficulty in obtaining sufficient qualified personnel -i. e. , area specialists, linguistic ability, technical personnel (TSS).

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(4) Difficulty in retaining clerical help.

(5) The overall morale problem. There is a need for fringe benefits to offset the difficulties created by security requirements. Praise a job well done; discipline person doing one badly.

(6) The problem of rotation. There is a need for authority to order people to specific locations in accordance with the needs of the services.

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(8) Training Problems. Need for a fully integrated long-range program tied in with a personnel management program and related to future operational needs.

(9) The need for flexibility in personnel ceilings which would enable both the release of area people for training and the continuation of operational obligations.

(10) Non-utilization of existing training facilities.

c. Miscellaneous:


(1) Agreed Activities. A resolution of the status of CIA vis-a-vis other members of the intelligence community pertaining to the National Espionage and Counterespionage effort.

(2) Problems in dealing with State and Military Service personnel who are antagonistic toward CIA and its activities.

(3) The Army informed the Study Group that the relationship between CIC and CIA in the field was not good. Army indicated that there was overlapping and one attempting to penetrate the other.

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(6) [redacted] The Study Group again raised the question of [redacted] They have the impression that contrary to our successes in the [redacted] that the [redacted] was a failure.

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(7) The Study Group stated that CIA was organized to do today's job today and that it seems that it has not adequately prepared itself to do tomorrow's job better.

Does CIA have a long-range plan? For example, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years hence?

(8) The Study Group stated that inasmuch as CIA of necessity necessarily grew very rapidly, untrained personnel had to be utilized both in headquarters and in the field.

What plans does CIA have for training their present people? (Perhaps by reducing the number of tasks now undertaken, thereby making qualified people available for training or by increasing ceilings for the purpose of providing training slots.)

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(10) Potential in [Redacted] The Study Group was informed by the State Department that, due to the effectiveness of the [Redacted] that all resistance elements have been erased.

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What is the best long-range estimate of a resistance potential and the possibility of its organization in [Redacted] [Redacted]? Have we exploited the potential sufficiently?

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(11) The Study Group feels that the close association of CIA with [Redacted] is detrimental to CIA operations because of the animosity that [Redacted]

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What are the plans concerning a new approach in [Redacted] a view of getting closer [Redacted]?

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(12) Command Relationships:

What mechanism has been set at headquarters and in the field to insure that during wartime, necessary information will continue to be forwarded to headquarters promptly, thus making it available to the Government?

What is the status of CIA's Plan for War indicating the scope and magnitude thereof?

(13) The Study Group was concerned at what seems to be the excessively long waiting period to obtain security clearance before joining CIA.

(14) The Group seemed apprehensive regarding the effectiveness of our counterespionage effort.

FOR THE ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR/PLANS:

[Redacted Signature]

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