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7 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: The Executive Director

SUBJECT: Semiannual Report on Implementation of Joint Study Group Recommendations on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

1. Enclosed is the recommended draft of the second semiannual report on status of implementation of Joint Study Group Recommendations, in response to the requirement levied on the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence by Mr. McGeorge Bundy on 30 August 1961.

2. It is recommended that the Coordination Staff be authorized to reproduce and distribute the enclosed report as indicated in the attached Recommended Distribution List. This would be consonant with the procedure followed in connection with the 1 March 1962 Semiannual Report.

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Acting Assistant for Coordination

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Semi-annual report
7 September 1962

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5 September 1962

RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION LIST
FOR REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF JSG
RECOMMENDATIONS - 31 August 1962

TS # 173294

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31 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Semiannual Report on Implementation of Joint Study Group Recommendations on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

REFERENCES :

- a. The Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government dated 15 December 1960
- b. Report on Implementation of Recommendations of Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government dated 1 May 1962
- c. Report by the Director of Central Intelligence on Implementation of Recommendations of Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government dated 21 August 1961
- d. Memorandum from Mr. McGeorge Bundy to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence dated 30 August 1961, requesting semiannual reports, beginning 1 March 1962, on the status of implementation of Joint Study Group Recommendations
- e. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, subject as above, dated 1 March 1962.

1. The status of actions taken to date in further implementing the recommendations of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government (reference a), as approved by the President on 18 January 1961, is reported in the attachment.

2. This is the second semiannual report requested in Reference d, updates Reference e, and was prepared by the Coordination Staff. The Departments of State and Defense are preparing separate reports on those recommendations which fall within their respective responsibilities. In the course of preparing these reports, cross-consultations were conducted by personnel of the Coordination Staff and the Departments of State and Defense.


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3. In continuation of the procedure in the first semiannual report, progress reports will be recommended for discontinuation in those instances in which it is apparent that only normal continuing action is indicated or that implementation is substantially completed, even though the Departments of State and Defense may continue to report on those for which they have action responsibility. As you will recall, 18 items were recommended for discontinuation in the 1 March 1962 progress report, and are not reported on in the attachment. Two additional Joint Study Group recommendations are submitted for similar discontinuation at this time, as follows:

Recommendation No. 14 - Review compartmentation of sensitive information to ensure adequate dissemination.

Recommendation No. 33 - Review of committee structure of United States Intelligence Board.

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Assistant for Coordination

Attachment

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Recommendation No. 3

Closer control of intelligence budgeting procedures by the Secretary of Defense.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The DOD Program System is contributing to clearer identification and delineation of anticipated intelligence costs, and management analysis techniques are working in the direction of improved budgetary control. The Combined Cryptologic Program was submitted to intense OSD review this year, and plans are being evolved to submit future years' programs to an equally intense but more systematic review. Planning and procedures for a similarly intensive and thorough review of the combined non-cryptologic intelligence program and budget are well advanced.

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Recommendation No. 4

Improvements in selection, training, and rank of personnel assigned to intelligence duties.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Actions are continuing under the responsibility assigned the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency in the field of training and career management within the DOD. The comprehensive proposal for DOD intelligence career selection and management which had been targeted for July 1962 is under study by the JCS. This comprehensive plan further refines the currently rigorous selection criteria for personnel inputs. DOD intelligence and language training is under revision with the Defense Intelligence School being developed through integration of Army and Navy schools in the Washington area. The school will offer courses on the strategic level tailored to varying requirements. Attache language qualifications and training have been intensified, attache wives' training is receiving further attention, and Army, having been given responsibility for overall foreign language training for the DOD, is developing plans for assumption of such responsibility. Recommendations for COMSEC, SIGINT, and cryptologic training improvement have been developed by NSA. Air Force has implementation plans developed to carry out assigned responsibilities for air intelligence training with DOD and for advanced training in PI and related sensor areas.

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Recommendation No. 5

Encourage the military services to maintain and develop clandestine collection capabilities.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The DIA has been charged with responsibility for policy guidance governing all DOD clandestine activities, including review, validation, coordination with the DCI and CIA at the Washington level, and ensuring that coordination proceeds at the field level. A DIA plan has been prepared relative to acquisition of necessary resources by transfer to DIA. Under DIA control and supervision, the Services (principally Army) and the commands will continue to conduct clandestine activities. Improved career personnel development will have a positive impact on the professionalism and capability of military clandestine resources.

Recommendation No. 6

Improve the SSO System.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Realignment of the Special Security Officer system will proceed on a planned basis as military intelligence relationships and command responsibilities and functions are altered and realigned.

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Recommendation No. 7

Re-examination of feasibility of placing more electronic intelligence resources of unified and specified commands under control of Director, National Security Agency (NSA).

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The Department of Defense review of this subject referred to in the status report of 1 March 1962 is still under way. The question of how to reach the optimum interaction between technical and command requirements in ELINT is receiving much attention in the Department of Defense. The consensus, when reached and approved, will be set forth in a new Department of Defense ELINT directive. Meanwhile, NSA and the military staffs have been developing a draft national ELINT plan.

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Recommendation No. 2

Reappraise adequacy of research and development for electronics intelligence.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. A comprehensive ELINT research and development review has been conducted by the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, supported by NSA, the Joint Staff, and the Services, and provides an interim basis for evaluation and coordination of ELINT research and development requirements. Final action on Recommendation No. 7 will bear directly on accomplishment of this objective.

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Recommendation No. 11

Greater emphasis on intelligence responsibilities in the indoctrination of State Department personnel.

Action Responsibility: State

Status. The Department of State is continuing to implement this recommendation through indoctrination in connection with courses at the Foreign Service Institute and through special briefings of Chiefs of Missions, other selected Foreign Service officers, and Foreign Service Inspectors. Personnel and budget stringencies within the Department continue to delay an increase in the existing program of indoctrination.

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Recommendation No. 12

Improved career management for intelligence personnel in military departments.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. This recommendation is interlocked with Recommendation No. 4 relative to selection and training of personnel, and plans for career management improvement are incorporated in the DIA study now under review in the Joint Staff. Reference is made to the status report under Recommendation No. 4, supra.

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Recommendation No. 14

Review compartmentation of sensitive information to insure adequate dissemination.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. On 4 April 1962, the United States Intelligence Board noted a report by the Security Committee in which the Security Committee found: (a) that community-wide systems of compartmentation are necessary and did not result in vital information being withheld from organizations or individuals with urgent national security responsibilities; (b) that security clearance practices in compartmented programs were generally uniform; (c) that, in certain instances, limitations on numbers of clearances resulted in an insufficient number of personnel to carry out programs using compartmented information. The USIB approved the Committee's recommendations: (a) that USIB departments and agencies review periodically compartmented systems and practices with respect to clearances; (b) that programs using compartmented intelligence be reviewed periodically to ensure that a sufficient number of individuals necessary to carry out effectively such programs have access to compartmented information; (c) that consideration be given to including within existing interdepartmental systems of compartmentation any proposed new such system.

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Recommendation No. 15

Determine the adequacy of staffing level of the National Indications Center, and ensure the committees access to necessary sensitive information.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. In addition to improvements in the staffing of the National Indications Center and provision of controlled and special clearances, USIB has approved revised terms of reference for the Watch Committee and its supporting staff, the National Indications Center, which clarify and more clearly define their respective functions.

It is noted, however, that all agencies have not as yet been able to fill their staffing complement at the NIC.

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Recommendation No. 18

Greater community attention to counterintelligence and security overseas.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. The United States Intelligence Board has approved for issuance, as recommended by its Security Committee, a policy statement on counterintelligence and security responsibilities, and a USIB Guide for Practices and Procedures for Counterintelligence and Security of Overseas Personnel and Installations. The Coordination Staff has been requested to prepare for USIB consideration a study and report on the question of establishing a Board committee on counterintelligence.

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Recommendations No. 21 and 22

Establishment of a central requirements facility.

Use of Central Intelligence Agency Office of Central Reference as a reference facility.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. As was reported in the semiannual report dated 1 March 1962, both DIA and CIA have established machine processing for recording requirements and have taken steps to insure that their two systems are compatible. Certain of the State Department's requirements are being forwarded to DIA and CIA for inclusion in their machine systems. On 25 July 1962 the United States Intelligence Board recommended that USIB members encourage and support the strengthening and improvement of the systems within member agencies and in the USIB committee structure for coordinating the development and processing of collection requirements, and agreed that such measures, coupled with those actions mentioned above, constitute the most feasible method of implementing Recommendations No. 21 and 22, under current circumstances.

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Recommendation No. 23

Integration of Collection requirements manuals, and creation of integrated country requirements guides.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. The Central Intelligence Agency has established a high level, intra-agency requirements coordination group which will serve as a focal point for discussions with the Defense Intelligence Agency on further implementation of this recommendation. In the meantime, the Department of State and CIA are considering possible ways of adjusting the existing CIA Periodic Reporting Lists so as to reflect the joint requirements of State and CIA. In the economic field, State and Defense, with the collaboration of the CIA, have agreed on new procedures for handling community-wide economic requirements and for coordinating economic reporting.

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Recommendation No. 24

Coordination of overt and clandestine requirements by chiefs of mission.

Action Responsibility: State, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies carrying on intelligence activities abroad.

Status. Progress continues to be made in implementing this recommendation. The Department of State, in briefing each chief of mission, stresses his responsibility to coordinate all his requirements. The chiefs of mission returning from overseas have indicated that, as a result of CIA's instruction of last August, they are being kept more fully advised by the station chief of clandestine collection activities that are being conducted in response to Washington requirements. Within Washington, the Department of State has recently charged the Director of Intelligence and Research with the responsibility for insuring that the Department itself is appropriately informed of the requirements levied on

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As was indicated in the semiannual report dated 1 March 1962, the majority of U. S. missions overseas have been made aware of this recommendation in connection with individual State Department instructions designed to provide guidance for intelligence collection in the particular area. However, no general State Department instruction has been sent to the field concerning this recommendation.

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Recommendation No. 25

Annual evaluation report to the National Security Council to pay specific attention to collection, and similar evaluations to be requested from each chief of mission and military commander.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. Although the requirement for annual evaluation reports no longer exists, the Coordination Staff has reviewed the evaluation systems in use in each agency to determine whether current practices can be related to or used as a basis for coordinated programming of future collection efforts. It has concluded that current practices are so closely oriented to the individual management and supervisory responsibilities of the agencies that they do not provide a practicable basis for an overall evaluation of intelligence collection. In cooperation with elements of CIA, the Coordination Staff is investigating in a single selected field the possibility of a different approach using machine record techniques to determine if it is feasible in this field to assemble and collate data sufficiently meaningful for evaluation purposes to warrant a broader community-wide effort aimed at coordinated collection programming.

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Recommendation No. 30

Reduction in membership of United States Intelligence Board phased with Defense reorganization.

Action Responsibility: Defense and Director of Central Intelligence

Status. Action on this recommendation is being deferred, pending further reorganization of military intelligence.

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Recommendation No. 33

Review of committee structure of United States Intelligence Board.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator)

Status. In recent actions, the United States Intelligence Board, after consideration of recommendations by the Coordination Staff concerning the committee structure of USIB, approved the disestablishment of the following USIB committees:

Critical Communications Committee
Committee on Exchanges
Committee on International Communism
Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications
Emergency Planning Steering Committee

In earlier actions, the USIB merged the Communications Intelligence Committee and the Electronics Intelligence Committee into the SIGINT Committee and disestablished the Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee.

Disestablishment of the following two committees is under consideration by USIB:

Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications
[redacted]

The following committees are being retained: Security Committee, SIGINT Committee, Committee on Documentation, Watch Committee, Economic Intelligence Committee, Scientific Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee, [redacted] and Critical Collection Problems Committee.

The Coordination Staff has developed draft revisions of pertinent Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) to reflect the actions noted above.

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Recommendation No. 34

Transmittal of intelligence guidance to unified commands through channels directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (except National Security Agency communications).

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Following the 1 December 1961 JCS proposals, the DIA has been designated the primary JCS agent for transmitting such intelligence guidance, and necessary organizational alignments have been made or are in process, together with necessary transfers of personnel and other assets. DOD collection guidance documents are also progressing.

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Recommendation No. 35

Control and command by Unified Commanders over intelligence activities of Component Commands.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Plans have been formulated which assign specific responsibilities to Unified and Specified Commands including control over Component Command intelligence activities such as intelligence production and clandestine collection. One Unified Command intelligence requirements center has been established, and another is about to come into being. Necessary personnel and resource shifts are under active, short-term deliberation.

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Recommendation No. 38

Determination as to activities which properly are foreign intelligence, and an improved system for utilizing dollar and manpower data in the entire U. S. foreign intelligence effort.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. The instructions to the United States Intelligence Board member agencies for reporting their Fiscal Year 1964 intelligence plans and programs contain a detailed list of activities deemed to be subject to Director of Central Intelligence and USIB coordination because of their foreign intelligence characteristics. Refinement and modification of this list in conjunction with the review of the community's Fiscal Year 1964 plans and programs, which is now in progress, should result in identifying those activities which properly are foreign intelligence. This should provide the necessary basis for the development of an improved system for utilizing dollar and manpower data.

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Recommendation No. 39

More effective coordination of research and development activities for intelligence purposes.

Action Responsibility: Defense and CIA.

Status. The Deputy Director for Research, recently created within CIA as a focal point for coordination of this activity, has established the necessary liaison and working arrangements with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The United States Intelligence Board now has under consideration as part of a larger study a recommendation of the Coordination Staff for providing community-wide assessment of the intelligence usefulness of proposed research and development projects intended to meet national intelligence needs.

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Recommendation No. 40

Monitoring the development of automatic data systems for storage and retrieval of intelligence information.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board

Status. The community-wide staff approved by USIB to examine in detail the information processing problems of the USIB agencies in the light of current and projected developments in the field of data handling has been established. This staff, consisting of 18 full-time and 4 part-time members, is now engaged in the first phase of its approved study plan.

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17 May 1962

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