

2 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Preview of Report of the Joint Study Group

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1. Inasmuch as the draft of our report as of today is still in fairly rough form, I think it would best serve your purpose if I briefly summarize some of the items that have been under consideration and on which the Group would very much like to have an expression of your views on Monday afternoon. I would note that you are the last of the heads of the intelligence agencies to be heard, and that following our meeting with you we have only to meet with Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Stans, Secretary Gates and Secretary Herter. Thus, during our last two weeks of work we will have met with the principals and also we will have met with the heads of all of the intelligence agencies. Finally, before summarizing some of the views of the Study Group, I would mention that there are only a few major areas in which there is still strong disagreement within the Study Group itself. I will point these out in the course of my notes.

2. Perhaps more time has been spent by the Study Group on its own discussions and more questions asked of the people who have appeared before us on the subject of coordination of intelligence activities and how this should be achieved. I believe that the final report will comment on this somewhat along the following lines.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

First, that coordination on the national level be under the Director of Central Intelligence, and that to achieve this he should separate his present coordination staff from the rest of CIA and add to the staff senior personnel detailed from other agencies. This staff would actively participate in coordination both in Washington and in 25X1 the field, while station chiefs in the larger areas [redacted] would be relieved of coordination responsibilities. Further, that the DCI should also effect coordination in the various embassies through the greater use of ambassadors and that he should send instructions to ambassadors through the Secretary of State. Second, that the coordination in the embassies should be achieved under the direct supervision of the ambassadors and perhaps through the use 25X1 of coordinators. [redacted]

I would note here that the Group

feels that where the ambassador uses the CIA chief to coordinate overt as well as clandestine activities, he places CIA in a difficult position, particularly vis-a-vis the military services. Third, that in areas of unified commands, e.g., CINCPAC in the Pacific and EUCOM in Europe, coordination should be under the direction of the Unified commander, which should include communications from

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Group will recommend that the Army be encouraged to develop its clandestine collection of Order of Battle and other tactical intelligence. We were told quite strongly by CIA representatives in the field that this was a form of low-level collection in which they did not wish to engage. We feel that the Army military intelligence units, who in combat will be concerned with the same type of tactical collection, should have the benefit of peacetime experience to assist their work. We do not believe that any theater G-2 would ever surrender his responsibility for protecting the command to another agency unless or until he received such complete information from that agency that he no longer felt any necessity for further collection. In encouraging the Army to engage in clandestine Order of Battle collection we believe that the CIA should give them every assistance

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We further feel that ultimately, after there has

been a reasonable period for the development of good will between the agencies, the proper way to handle this would be by complete integration of all clandestine collectors operating under the guidance of CIA.

4. Possibly this would be the appropriate time to report that there is very strong feeling not only on the part of the Army but also on the part of other military services--the Air Force least of all--that CIA wants to take over all clandestine operations and that

the new DCIDs are so designed as to force all other agencies out of business. I should note that this feeling is also present in the intelligence production field where the depth of feeling in the Department of State concerning CIA as competitors was far deeper than even I had previously imagined.

5. The Joint Study Group has spent a considerable amount of time on the exceedingly complicated problem of requirements for intelligence collection. In this area I should point out that the Department of State does not feel that there is as serious a problem as the rest of the Study Group does. In simplest terms, a tremendous amount of effort is devoted in the intelligence community to preparing basic handbooks as guides to collectors, to preparing series of guides for collection on current subjects of interest, and to issuing spot requests for collection. One of the particular problems in this area is that whereas the subcommittees of the USIB do a very creditable job on handling requirements either by subject area, e. g., economic or scientific, or by method of collection, e. g., COMINT or clandestine, there is nowhere in the intelligence community where all requirements are known and all resources are known. For example, clandestine collection could be used for obtaining something that might be obtainable overtly or, conceivably, could already be available in current files in Washington. The Joint Staff has just


completed, by direction from General Erskine's office, a monumental study of requirements in the military area. The Joint Study Group will probably recommend that there be some central system established where all requirements could be correlated with all resources-- duplication eliminated and all files searched--before action is sent to the field. We will also suggest a much greater pooling of requirements in the various embassies and commands for the same reason as quoted above.

6. In the collection field, we believe that certain added emphasis should be given to those sources of collection currently available which are productive. For example, we will undoubtedly urge greater overhead reconnaissance at the earliest possible time, while priority be given for equipment for ELINT and COMINT and peripheral photography. In this connection, the Study Group will probably propose that the CIA be the national center for photographic interpretation, but will also probably propose that some system of monitoring the extent of this work be established. It is rather disturbing to note that a great deal of our planning and that of the Air Force has gone on separately, with little coordination, and we feel that this particular type of "arms race" should be slowed down or stopped.

7. The Study Group has discussed at some length the structure and organization of the United States Intelligence Board. We are particularly interested in whether this board would be more effective or efficient if it consisted only of the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the Secretary of Defense, a representative of the Joint Staff, and a representative of the Department of State. Under this arrangement, the Defense representative, or the Joint Staff representative, would be supported by the chiefs of the three military intelligence services. The Director of NSA would also be included on the Board because of its importance to the Intelligence Community. We have discovered some feeling in the Intelligence Community that it would be very useful if the Defense Department reconciled some of its differences prior to USIB meetings. This would not preclude individual services from presenting dissenting viewpoints, but would save the time of other intelligence services by having the matters thrashed out in advance. We have also heard some views to the effect that the USIB should devote more time and attention to the work of its subcommittees. Recognizing that the members of the USIB are extremely busy individuals, we have thought about the creation of an executive committee for the USIB which would review in advance, where possible, material coming to the USIB, particularly material of

a management nature. This executive committee would not review the National Estimates inasmuch as everybody is unanimous in expressing the view that the estimate procedure and system today is eminently satisfactory.

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9. A tremendous portion of the effort of the Intelligence Community is going into air targeting work. We examined this subject quite closely in Washington, with SAC, with ATIC, and with U.S. Air Forces, Europe. I believe it is the consensus that the creation of the new Strategic Targeting Unit at Omaha will help to correct the situation but we found to a certain degree a lack of correlation between SAC targeting, USAFE targeting, and Navy

targeting. A slight approximation of the size of this problem
25X1 is that there are some [] targets of which we understand some
25X1 [] constitute strategic targets.

10. In the cost field, we have not tried to duplicate the
work of the USIB Committee on cost and our report will probably
be along the lines that this effort be continued and refined over the
years, urging the military services particularly to try to identify
more precisely what is actually attributable to intelligence. It is
my view, at least, that under the present system it is extremely
difficult to estimate to any degree what our intelligence effort
costs the US Government. You are aware, of course, that the
USIB report suggests that the cost is in the neighborhood of
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25X1 [] employing approximately [] persons. On the
other hand, General Erskine has in his office a summary which
25X1 indicates that Defense alone may be spending []
dollars for the intelligence effort. I would simply note here that a
tremendous part of the problem is deciding what to charge to
intelligence.

11. There has been considerable discussion of whether
there should be one focal point in the Department of Defense on
intelligence matters, and there seems to be a fairly strong opinion
in support of this. Part of the argument behind this falls back on

the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the evolution that they may have started in favor of a stronger Joint Staff as is distinct from distributing responsibilities between individual services. General Erskine seems to feel quite strongly that his office should at least be a monitoring organization for the relations of other agencies with Defense.

12. Related to the subject above, of course, is the requirement of the Joint Study Group to thoroughly review the military intelligence set-up, which we have done at great length. The Group is divided on this subject but I believe that the majority is strongly in favor of no diminution of the strength and effectiveness of the respective military intelligence services. On the other hand, I believe that the Group feels that any increase in Joint Staff responsibilities be made only if certain decreases are made in the individual military intelligence service responsibilities. For example, perhaps the Joint Staff could produce certain intelligence periodicals by having assigned to them representatives of the individual services; but this would be useful only if some publications were given up by the individual services. I believe the Group strongly feels that the production of publications exclusively of interest to one service, e.g., ground Order of Battle for the Army, should remain the exclusive responsibility of that service. The Group will possibly make some recommendations

in this regard for the consideration of the Secretary of Defense, particularly along the line of insuring that if the Joint Staffs and unified commands are developed it not be done with a loss of expertise on the part of the individual services. The Group appears to be strongly opposed, with possibly one exception, to a single military intelligence service.

13. Related to the above and also to many of the problems which we have observed in the Intelligence Community, is the definition of what constitutes departmental intelligence. As you know the law states that the creation of CIA in no way interferes with the right of each department to collect and produce departmental intelligence. This is further emphasized in the directives. The result is that each department can decide that any intelligence is of departmental interest and thus we find such duplication as attaches reporting on political events, etc. The Group will possibly make a recommendation that there be a more precise delineation of what each department can collect and produce, including of course, safeguards to insure that if the only political intelligence they can get is from State by their attaches, they would be enabled to present a differing interpretation if they so desired.

14. The Study Group has also discussed the feasibility of a country intelligence plan as an adjunct or supplement to the OCB

country plans. This document would simply further define what each agency did and be a tool and guidance document for each ambassador. The general thinking is that it would be prepared on the desk level in Washington, reviewed prior to final approval in the field, with the USIB as the final authority.

15. There is some thinking in the Group as to whether there shouldn't be a general over-all review of who performs what services of common concern. This is still a matter of some discussion and there does not seem to be any precise view at the moment. It is related, however, to our general concern over the implementation of intelligence directives and also that there are some activities under which there are no intelligence directives, e. g., photographic intelligence, It is my personal feeling, which I believe is shared to some degree by the Group, that perhaps intelligence directives are not so much in need as specific written understandings by the various departments and agencies. In conclusion I would note that there is rather a striking lack of information on what is coordinated and how it is coordinated and that it is fairly obvious we should expand our mutual indoctrination of each other in the Intelligence Community.

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(Dictated, not read)
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

cc: DDCI

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Signatures of the Joint Study Group. (Copies distributed had reproduced signatures.)

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Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency
Representing the Director of Central Intelligence

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Allan Evans
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General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations
Representing the Secretary of Defense

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[Redacted Signature]

Robert M. Macy
Chief of the International Division, Bureau of the Budget
Representing the Director, Bureau of the Budget

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James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Representing the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

28 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Interim Report of Joint Study Group

1. The President, on 21 September, indicated to Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, an interest in the progress of the work of the Joint Study Group. The following is a status report of our work. Each member of the Study Group has shown this report to his principal and it has been approved for use in briefing the President.

2. The Joint Study Group has held meetings every day since July 11 when the Terms of Reference were approved, with the exception of two days in September when the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities was meeting. These meetings of the Group have lasted a minimum of two hours and during the week when the Group visited the Air Force Security Service at San Antonio, the Strategic Air Command at Omaha, and the Air Technical Intelligence Center at Dayton, lasted all day.

3. Approximately the first month of our work was devoted to detailed briefings by each of the intelligence agencies on their organization, mission and operations. The second phase of our work was

devoted to round-table discussions with knowledgeable individuals in the field of those subjects which we were directed by our Terms of Reference to examine in depth; namely: intelligence requirements, intelligence collection and processing, intelligence costs, and intelligence research and development. This phase of our work also occupied approximately a month.

4. We are currently in a third phase of study which can most accurately be described as a follow-up in those areas where we felt additional study necessary: for example, Automatic Data Processing, where we are interested in determining whether the various systems being planned by the different intelligence agencies are compatible; intelligence procedures in air targeting; priorities for collection; mechanical translation; the work of the National Indications Center; COMINT-ELINT collection and processing; photo interpretation; and the intelligence potential of reconnaissance satellites.

5. The first week in October we will start the fourth phase of our work which will be an on-the-spot examination of the activities of the various intelligence agencies in selected posts abroad. The Study Group believes that this trip is essential in order to fully appreciate the scope of overseas activities of the various intelligence services and to obtain a field reaction to some of our tentative conclusions. A copy of the trip itinerary is attached. Upon our return the second

week in November we will devote our full attention to the final preparation of the report and by that time we hope to have in at least a preliminary draft.

6. We are certain that there will be many follow-up discussions required in the latter part of November, particularly to discuss our findings with the various heads of the intelligence agencies. We will have the report completed for submission to you by our deadline of December 15.

7. We feel that it would be inadvisable at this time to comment on any specific problems other than to say that in each of the areas which we have been directed to study we believe we can make some helpful recommendations for improvement, including greater integration of the intelligence activities and the elimination of unnecessary duplication in the Government. We are aware of the problems created by the size and complexity of the intelligence community. We are particularly concerned about the outlook for the future when it is conceivable there may be a flood of information from reconnaissance satellites. We are already of a mind that the future demands for more manpower, more money, better communications etc., must be balanced by tighter integration.

8. We wish to advise you that the cooperation which we have received from all of the intelligence agencies has been of the highest order

and that the senior officers have given to us freely of their time in order to further our work. I would also mention that the members of the Study Group have been extremely faithful in attending all of the meetings with absences occasioned only by unavoidable conflicts with other responsibilities and the necessity for some leave.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Chairman
Joint Study Group

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you
Please add these to the file I gave/on the
Joint Study Group report. I think there was one tab
on the left marked "miscellaneous" and these can be
added under ~~that~~ that tab.

If the 26 Sept memo is already on file there,
pls destroy this copy

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