

8 December 1954

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL CLARK

General Clark called to see me this morning and we had a half hour's conversation covering the progress of his committee. In reply to my inquiry, he indicated that his people were entirely satisfied with the cooperation they were receiving here. I told him that I was in constant touch with General Christiansen, as well as with various members of his working group. I had impressed upon General Christiansen that I wished to be informed directly if his people ran into any roadblocks. General Clark indicated that he had heard of nothing of that nature. He indicated that he had been in touch with Colonel Lane on the covert side and was to be kept currently informed by Colonel Lane of what the latter was doing.

General Clark said that he expected to send representatives to both the European and Far Eastern theaters to have a look at the overseas intelligence setup. Admiral Conolly, he said, would be in charge of one of these groups. Consequently he said it was important to arrange that Conolly might have such access to the covert side as was necessary for him to do his work effectively on the overt side, and also to make this trip abroad. He said that he supposed this would require the approval of the President. I told the General I thought this request was reasonable; that I had the greatest confidence in Admiral Conolly, and that if he preferred I would be glad to take it up myself with Sherman Adams.

General Clark remarked that he felt that our National Estimates, as being the end product of all our intelligence work here, were of great importance and that key members of the Task Force should see certain of these Estimates of recent date. I told him there was no objection to this and that I would lay before him all of the Estimates which the intelligence community (IAC) had produced during 1954 and he could select from this list those that he would like to see.

I assumed that the number of persons seeing the Estimates would be carefully limited. I pointed out that in addition to the Estimates there was a great deal of intelligence work done which was reflected in the Estimates but which was also of great value to the policy makers and to our other intelligence agencies. I felt that he should also have a look at specimens of this type of intelligence as well as the Estimates.

General Clark asked whether we had a general charter for work in the cold war field, and inquired whether the direction we received from the National Security Council was adequate. I told him we had such a charter, namely NSC 5412, which I would give him to read on an eyes only basis as I did not feel that anyone, rpt. anyone, else on his committee should see this. I said it was one of the most carefully guarded papers in the entire government. I told him that we received from the National Security Council general policy guidance but that specific operations of a major character in the cold war field were cleared through the OCB, and I explained the general workings of the OCB. I said I thought that in general there was adequate machinery to give us both the policy guidance and the operation approvals needed.

General Clark said that he expected to talk with a number of people who wished to see him and mentioned specifically General [redacted] I told him that I welcomed this as I realized he would see a certain number of disgruntled people whom we had dismissed as well as some crackpots. He said he realized this and thought he could handle this situation. I asked him whether the [redacted] report had come to his attention and he said he thought it had not. I said that I would wish this report to be seen by someone on his committee as it had been circulated by [redacted] in high quarters of the government and I thought it was quite likely that it was in McCarthy's hands.

I asked General Clark whether McCarthy had turned over any of his papers to him. He indicated he had not and said that he had not yet seen McCarthy. He had planned to see him on this trip to Washington but for reasons that were quite understood, he had cancelled out these plans and expected to see him quite a bit later.

I said that he would find a certain number of critics who objected to the idea of having the analysis and production of intelligence in the same organization as the collection of covert intelligence, and others who would object to having operations associated in any way with an intelligence organization. I told him that I had given a good deal of thought to this problem and would like an opportunity to discuss it with him thoroughly before he submitted his report. The General replied that he was aware of this problem and that his thinking as of the moment was that there was no serious objection to the combination of these different functions as he was opposed to having too many separate organizations working in this delicate field. He indicated he would give me a full opportunity to go into this with him at a later date. I did, however, refer to my Swiss experience and the value, as I saw it, of having an overt intelligence umbrella to cover covert intelligence and covert operations.

General Clark adverted to the fact that he could not understand why the United States gave out so much information about what we were doing and pointed to the front page of the Washington Post (December 8) giving a first photo of our Washington Nike protection. I told him that this was a hobby of mine and I had done everything I could to stir up this issue publicly and in the intelligence community. I thought we were making it far too easy for the Russians and seriously harming ourselves. I suggested that the answer to this might lie in the field of public opinion. If the public got stirred up about it they would bring pressure on the press to stop printing things which affected American security. I showed him a copy of my article in US News and World Report on "We Tell Russia Too Much," and in passing adverted to the fact that the publicity problem as regards CIA was a difficult one and that I regretted the nature of publicity received through the recent Saturday Evening Post articles.

General Clark then withdrew and spent about twenty minutes reading over NSC 5412 and the conclusions of the Doolittle report. He indicated a desire at a later date to read the full report. I said I would make it available to him at any time and added that the President had indicated that he was willing that the report be read by ex-President Hoover if the latter wished to see it. General Clark agreed to pass this message on to Mr. Hoover.

In conclusion General Clark said he had three requests. He would like at some time to get together his Task Force together with General Christiansen and let the Task Force put to me any questions they might have. If the questions got into highly classified matters, he would quite understand if they were handled without disclosing information that the full Task Force should not have.

Second, he wanted to be in as good a position as possible to answer any charges as to Communist infiltration into the CIA and asked for suggestions as to how we could satisfy him on that point. I told him that his people would have a chance for a thorough look over our security organization and to study the protections we set up against Communist infiltration. I told him that obviously with an organization as large as ours and working in such a sensitive field, it was inevitable that the Communists would try to infiltrate it and we believed that we had caught up with at least two such efforts. We had to be continually on our guard. After checking with Mr. Kirkpatrick, I told him that both Lane and Miller were going through the security office early in January. If after they had completed this survey, he or they had any questions, I should be glad to try to answer them.

Third, he said he had run across from time to time persons who claimed some affiliation with us and who, after the announcement of the functions of his Task Force, had come up to him and told him of their CIA affiliations. He said he thought this was unfortunate to which I fully agreed and said it was unauthorized but possibly human.

I told him about our general system of outside consultants incident to the responsibilities we had in running certain cover organizations and in dealing with the scientific and technical field. I said we would be glad to go over with him our whole procedure, including security measures in the consultant field, and he indicated that he would like to do this personally.

The conversation was cordial and friendly. General Clark indicated a desire to be constructive. I handed him a copy of my letter dated 8 December 1954, containing suggestions in the field of legislation which I thought his Task Force might wish to consider. I said that there would be further memoranda of this nature that we would give him from time to time, and I had a brief discussion with him on the "Watch-dog Committee" proposals.

I also mentioned the urgent need for legislation to give further fringe benefits to our overseas personnel, and the need for a new building.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: IG