

Executive Registry  
75-9915/11

4 December 1978

NOTE FOR: DCI

I think that this is a useful report,  
although I have some problems with it. I have  
asked Jack Blake to send copies to the Deputy  
Directors for comment.

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[Redacted Signature]

Frank Carlucci

*Good report*

Attachment:  
Report of the Security  
Review Task Force

*My decisions annotated. Hold  
supplementation until you  
review Deputy's comments -*

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[Redacted Signature]

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9 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM:

Chairman, Security Review Task Force

SUBJECT: Security Review Task Force

- REFERENCES:
- (a) Memo for DD/A from the DDCI, dtd. 18 August 1978, Subject: Request for a Security Review and Assessment
  - (b) Memo for Chairman, Security Review Task Force from Director of Security, dtd. 21 August 1978, Subject: Request for a Security Review and Assessment
  - (c) Memo for DDCI from the DD/A, dtd. 31 August 1978, Subject: Security Review - Interim Report

1. In accordance with the references, the Security Review Task Force has completed its review of the Agency's security policies and procedures. The conclusions and recommendations contained in this summary report are well supported by the Task Force investigations. The investigations, as indicated in the Interim Report, were conducted by three separate segments, each addressing a general topical area, i.e., Personnel Security, Physical Security and Information Control Security. Remarkably, each segment independently reached the conclusions and shared in the principal recommendations of this report, specifically those pertaining to reemphasis of the principle that security in the Agency is a command responsibility; Area Security Officers, and Security Education.

2. The Task Force believes it is essential that all responsible recipients of this report comprehend the fact

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that regardless of the quality of the Agency's Personnel, Physical and Information Control Security, ~~there is no way to absolutely preclude another incident of espionage by an employee determined to violate his oath.~~ Put another way, we submit that ~~the deviate employee cannot be prevented from following his own will.~~

3. In conclusion, I want to assure you that the Task Force members approached their task with professionalism and integrity. Fourteen officers were assigned to the three segment organization, as follows:

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Personnel Segment

Physical Segment

Information Segment

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Their reports represent, in my opinion, an exceptionally dedicated effort in response to your direction.

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SECURITY REVIEW TASK FORCE  
REVIEW OF  
THE CIA SECURITY PROGRAM

PROLOGUE

What follows is a review of the current CIA Security Program and recommendations which, if approved, will improve that program.

When examining the contents of this report and contemplating the recommendations contained therein, the reader should bear in mind that in this Agency security is a command responsibility. He should consider the contents of this report with the idea in mind that unless there is a constant and conscious exercise of that responsibility by all employees, and particularly by supervisors and managers at all levels, no security program, no matter how well designed, can be successful.

There is only one reason for the existence of this organization and that is to provide information to the President on the intentions and actions of other nations of the world which could adversely affect the security of the United States. It follows that the sources and methods used to collect that information, as well as the information itself, must be protected from unauthorized disclosure if it is going to be of any benefit.

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It also follows that security is paramount in the accomplishment of the mission.

~~Supervisors and managers~~ involved in the accomplishment of the Agency's mission not only should, but ~~must~~ consider ~~every action that they take in terms of security~~. It does not matter what that action is. It could concern the management of a clandestine or technical operation. It could be a decision to be made on whether to hire a new applicant for staff employment. It could be a decision to be made on whether to retain the services of an employee who has married an alien. It could be a decision to be made on the elimination of Career Security Officers in operating components when there is a reduction of personnel in the Agency. In any situation, the first question the manager has to answer is: What effect will his decision have on the secure accomplishment of the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency? Unless managers exercise their security responsibility consciously, constantly, and in a responsible manner, the results of all their other efforts, no matter how well designed and managed, will be worthless.

The Task Force review included extensive documentary reviews, written surveys, and personal interviews within and external to the Agency. Several hundred personal interviews were conducted by the Task Force members. The Information Control Segment alone conducted 140 interviews during its

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fact finding. The internal investigations touched all Directorates, and the cooperation of those individuals contacted was gratifying. External discussions were carried out with representatives of NSA, DIA, DOD, the Department of State, and the industrial sector.

The Agency's Personnel Security program was found to be essentially sound, particularly in light of available resources. ~~We believe CIA investigative and clearance procedures are the best in government.~~ Indeed, one might have expected that conclusion, as the program has been tested and refined for thirty years. ~~Yet, the erosion of security discipline throughout the Agency was evident to the investigators.~~ We believe the erosion can be attributed in large part to the dramatic reduction, during the past decade, in the number of Career Security Officers assigned to operating components, and to the inadequacy of the Agency's Security Education Program. We believe a viable program restoring Career Security Officers to close proximity to the collectors and producers of intelligence is the only way to reverse the trend.

Similarly, ~~the Task Force found the Agency's Physical Security Program to be essentially sound.~~ The problems uncovered in this area are not new. The solutions to some equipment problems have been delayed by budgetary restrictions. ~~But the most prevalent shortcoming in this area is the failure~~

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~~of managers and supervisors to implement existing policies and procedures;~~ [ ] is a good example.

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The Task Force found that ~~information control, as applied to various types of material in varying situations, could only be characterized as ineffectual.~~ Again, that might have been expected because the Agency, as the rest of the government, has been overwhelmed by the information explosion resulting from technological advances in intelligence collection experienced over the past fifteen years. The information control recommendations necessarily represent drastic and far-reaching changes. We believe that for the first time the magnitude and complexity of the information control problem has been accurately, albeit not completely, described. The essential recommendation in this segment is the ~~need to review completely the classification and compartmentation criteria with the objective of providing extraordinary protection to only that information which truly is exceptionally sensitive.~~

This report represents a distillation of the findings of the Security Review Task Force. The recommendations are those which are essential to movement toward much-needed reforms in security practices and procedures throughout CIA and, where appropriate, the Intelligence Community.

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ACCOUNTABILITY AND SPOT INVENTORIES

Current Procedures:

An underlying factor in the three basic questions probed by the Task Force, as described at the beginning of the document control section, is the serious lack of inventories of accountable material. Within CIA, DIA, and NSA the only material afforded periodic inventory is TOP SECRET non-compartmented and Restricted Data. Among these agencies, the inventories vary from the first agency-wide TS non-compartmented inventory in CIA, to regular, semiannual inventories at NSA. The minute amount of Restricted Data furnished CIA allows one control officer to maintain accountability on a day-to-day basis. This is an example of the axiom of inverse relationship between volume and control at its best.

An example of this axiom at its worst is found in the control and accountability of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a generic term for all categories of formally compartmented intelligence, including SI, TK, and BYE. The three categories frequently receive community-wide dissemination based upon predetermined dissemination lists, accounted for only by document copy number. Accompanying document receipts forwarded to recipients by NFAC/PPG are executed only 85 percent of the time. Based upon 1977 figures for NFAC/PPG, the receipt of some 13,000 TS/SCI documents was never verified by the intended recipient.

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