

22 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: American Society of Industrial Security, 15th Annual Seminar,
16 - 18 September 1969

1. My main interest in attending the Tuesday session was the Communications Security lecture scheduled for 2:40 p.m. Not having been pre-registered, it was necessary to pay the one-day fee of \$25.00 and complete the registration at the desk. Time permitted a brief forenoon tour of the exhibits.

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2. The luncheon speaker, [REDACTED] Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, gave an interesting talk on "Extremism and the New Left," and warned of major disturbances expected in the near future.

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3. After a 20-minute break, the Communications Security Session commenced. Mr. Gene Barnes introduced the first speaker, [REDACTED] of the National Security Agency (NSA), who warmed up the audience a bit and then turned over the proceedings to the main speaker, [REDACTED] Chief of the Procedures Branch, NSA.

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4. Mr. [REDACTED] gave a rather broad-brush treatment to the subject of cryptography, transcending the times from the ancient Romans up to the present. The 45-minute talk was directed primarily to the industrial interests and commercial firms holding U. S. Government contracts and from our point of view, was rather elementary; however, it was well received by an appreciative audience.

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5. Mr. [REDACTED] read and re-read a definition of "Communications Security" and also stated NSA's responsibility in this field.

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6. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he was not related to the famous cryptanalyst, [REDACTED] of whom it has been said that, "everything he touches turns to plain text."

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7. With the aid of charts Mr. [REDACTED] illustrated cryptographic systems which were based upon monoalphabetic and polyalphabetic substitutions and emphasized their vulnerability to cryptanalytic attack. He also touched briefly upon the relative merits of book codes, transposition systems, various mechanical devices, and the advancement to the "one-time" systems. He said little about the present state of the art except that electronic computers are now being used.

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8. Next was the discussion on the major types of contracts; R & D, Production, and Testing, which have "COMSEC" implications. In addition, he mentioned the stringent security requirements which must be met when it becomes necessary to establish a secure communications link between a contractor and the U. S. Government Agency concerned.

9. He concluded by pointing out some security pitfalls encountered by contractors and cited the case of the firm that published, for advertising purposes in a popular magazine, a photograph and description of a machine which it had developed and produced in quantity for the U. S. Government under a classified contract.

10. The meeting was then thrown open to a question and answer session. A few examples follow:

Q. What is the relationship between DCA (Defense Communication Agency) and NSA (National Security Agency)?

A. DCA lays out the transmission paths and is responsible for the operations of the circuits. NSA is responsible for fulfilling security requirements if classified information is to be passed over these circuits.


Q. You stated that crypto devices, before being accepted for use in the protection of classified information of the U. S. Government, must meet the highest standards established by NSA. Why does NSA forbid U.S. manufacturers to mass produce crypto equipment for sale within the U. S. boundaries when these machines are in great demand by industry? It is foolish because similar equipment can be purchased overseas.

A. In accordance with the terms of its charter NSA is responsible for insuring the security of classified transmissions of the U.S. Government. If it is necessary to restrict production of certain mechanical devices in order to accomplish this, then it must be done.

Q. Does NSA provide a list containing the names of manufacturers of crypto equipment which could be used by commercial (non U. S. Government) interests? This list would be very helpful in obtaining the best equipment which we believe is necessary in order to protect proprietary information from the eyes of our competitors.

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A. NSA could not publish any such list. To do so could
easily be misconstrued as NSA endorsement of a product.



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(23 September 1969)