




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**Latin America  
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**Article**

**Libya-Caribbean: Qadhafi's New Activism** [Redacted]

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Libya's determination to expand its influence in the Caribbean recently has resulted in new ties to the military regime in Suriname and to proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean departments. [Redacted]

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [Redacted]*

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
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Article

Libya-Caribbean:  
Qadhafi's New Activism



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Libya's determination to expand its influence in the Caribbean recently has resulted in new ties to the military regime in Suriname and to proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean departments. Libyan support probably would improve improve the capabilities of French Caribbean separatists for militant action and provide opportunities for Tripoli to try to establish a limited regional base of operations in Paramaribo. On the other hand, the rejection by English-speaking Caribbean leftists of Libyan calls for violence in pursuit of political objectives will continue to undermine Tripoli's policies.

Background

Libyan leader Qadhafi's immediate objectives are to undermine US and French interests in the region. Qadhafi regards the United States and, to a lesser extent, France as the principal impediment to achieving his broader leadership aims in the Third World, including the Caribbean.

At the root of Qadhafi's involvement lies his increasing determination to undermine US policies in what he refers to as Washington's "backyard." In a major policy speech last September, Qadhafi explicitly linked Libya's aggressive posture in Latin America to what he claims are threats to his regime from US naval operations in the central Mediterranean.

Qadhafi is targeting French interests in the Caribbean because he is bitter over what he regards as France's continuing "imperialism" in Africa.

Libya's new activism in the region was presaged by Qadhafi's decision last fall to put Musa Kusa—one of his most radical advisers—in charge of Libya's Latin American activities. Kusa heads the Libyan International Center for Revolution (ICR), an

organization created by Qadhafi in late 1983 to spread his personal philosophies of revolution abroad, promote cooperation among radical groups worldwide as well as Libya's influence in radical circles, and coordinate Libyan financial aid and paramilitary and terrorist training support for regional dissidents. The ICR subsumes the organization traditionally charged with maintaining contacts with Caribbean leftists—Libya's "Third World Center for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, and Reaction," founded in 1982.

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Libyan Tactics

Kusa's ICR has developed a Caribbean program combining intelligence gathering; use of financial aid, intimidation, indoctrination, and propaganda; exploitation of regional Muslims; and economic involvement as tools of political influence:

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- Kusa and his principal deputy, Mukhtar Qannas, have met with key Eastern Caribbean leftist leaders at least twice since fall. The Libyans reportedly have been impatient with leftist leaders using local electoral processes to achieve political objectives. Instead, Tripoli has urged them to adopt a militant approach.

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- The Libyans are urging Caribbean leftists to adopt Qadhafi's revolutionary philosophies as blueprints for action. senior Libyan officials demanded last year that regional leftists undergo ideological training as a way to expand their political consciousness and gain

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7 June 1985

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### Targets of Libyan Influence in the Eastern Caribbean



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power. Libya also is working to create local political organizations modeled after Qadhafi's revolutionary system in Libya. The Libyan People's Bureau in Caracas last year promoted the establishment of five small "peoples congresses" in Venezuela.

- Libya is trying to broaden its contacts and is tasking regional leftists with assessing local political developments, [Redacted] [Redacted] Tripoli reportedly is focusing, in part, on acquiring information on Trinidad and Barbados and is interested in evaluating the prospects for rebuilding leftists in Grenada.

- Tripoli is working to gain influence among Caribbean Muslims to promote its anti-Western policies. [Redacted] Libya arranged and funded the Third Caribbean Islamic Conference in Curacao in April. Libyan participants pushed for a public condemnation of Western influence in the region, according to the US Consul General in Curacao. Tripoli recently also established a branch of the Libyan Islamic Call Society in Curacao and wants to set up an Islamic Call Society office in Suriname. We believe Tripoli intends to use Islamic Call societies in the region as channels for financial handouts to dissidents and to identify and recruit subversives.

- [Redacted] Libya is interested in establishing a Caribbean newspaper to spread its radical views and attack US and French policies.

- Libya is considering expanding its economic activity in the area. Libyan officials reportedly inquired about purchasing a recently closed oil refinery in the Netherlands Antilles, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Tripoli also wants to open a bank in the Caribbean [Redacted]

Libya's aggressive activities are accompanied by an effort to establish regional bases of operation. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Libyan officials already are using Panama City to host meetings and as a disbursing center for aid and political support to

**Libya-Suriname: Expanding Relations**

*The opening of a Libyan People's Bureau in Paramaribo last February marked the beginning of growing ties between the two countries. Surinamese Army Commander Desire Bouterse and senior government officials reportedly signed economic cooperation agreements during their visit to Tripoli in March that could eventually total \$100 million. Tripoli agreed to buy Surinamese agricultural products and to consider oil exploration and industrial development projects.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Bouterse and Qadhafi also have agreed to religious, cultural, educational, media, and political exchanges. Libya reportedly has provided Surinamese Muslims with funds to increase and broaden their domestic activities. About 50 Surinamese students reportedly will be accepted for study in Libyan academic institutions next year. The Libyans also have agreed to provide training and organizational assistance to Bouterse's embryonic political party, the 25 February Movement. [Redacted]

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Caribbean leftist leaders, [Redacted]

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We believe senior Libyan officials are making some tactical compromises in their dealings with English-speaking leftists because they recognize that increased pressure to adopt a militant approach would further alienate them. [Redacted]

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Tripoli is temporarily toning down its calls for violent action in order to concentrate on building its assets in the region. [Redacted]

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Despite its broad economic and military promises, Tripoli anticipates expanding relations slowly in order to test Surinamese leader Bouterse's commitment to revolution. [Redacted]

senior Libyan officials view Bouterse as an opportunist who would sacrifice radical causes for personal gain. [Redacted]

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Bouterse, in turn, is suspicious of Qadhafi, partly because he fears that foreign activities in Suriname could help local radicals to threaten his power. In addition, Bouterse's key military advisers reportedly oppose Libyan military assistance, and even Bouterse probably is wary of directly antagonizing Washington. Still, we believe the Surinamese leader probably would cooperate with the Libyans in nonviolent regional activities in return for sufficient financial inducements. Bouterse, therefore, is likely to continue courting Tripoli until he finds other potential sources of foreign assistance to alleviate Suriname's financial problems. [Redacted]

We believe the failure of the Libyans to persuade English-speaking leftists to adopt militant tactics has fueled Qadhafi's determination to make contact with proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean departments over the last several months. Radical groups in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana have demonstrated a willingness to use violence to pursue their political objectives. Moreover, the French separatists appear to have the political commitment, organization, capability, weapons, and terrorist knowledge lacking among English-speaking leftists in the region. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Libyans are courting the Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG), the most active non-Marxist proindependence group in the Caribbean departments. Despite public condemnation by the UPLG of several terrorist bombings over the last two years, local authorities believe that the terrorists belong to a clandestine wing of the Union. [Redacted]

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**The Regional Threat**

[Redacted] Qadhafi so far has made only limited progress in expanding his regional influence. Libya's traditional clients—leftist leaders from the English-speaking islands of St. Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua—are opportunists only willing to pay lipservice to Qadhafi's ideology to gain financial handouts. These leftists have resisted Libyan demands for violent actions because of concerns that such activities would damage their political standing and risk government retaliation. Moreover, many English-speaking Caribbean leftists are trying to broaden their mass appeal by playing down radical rhetoric and forming alliances with political moderates. [Redacted]

Shortly after meeting with senior Libyan officials in Tripoli last March, UPLG leaders held a conference in Guadeloupe of groups seeking independence from France. [Redacted] Libya funded the meeting to bring together separatist groups from French territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Tripoli reportedly offered military-related training and agreed to finance an information and liaison center in Paris for future meetings. [Redacted]

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Since the conference in Guadeloupe, UPLG leaders have visited Barbados in an effort to improve contacts with several groups, including leftists, students, labor, and ruling party leaders, [redacted]



[redacted] Libyan officials, during talks with Caribbean leftists in Tripoli last March, accused Castro of selling out regional leftists to the United States. [redacted]

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Libya's rivalry with Cuba is causing it to consider expanding ties only with Caribbean extremists not dependent on Cuba. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Libya's aggressive policies in the Caribbean will continue to meet with mixed results, in our view. Potential Libyan supporters almost certainly will continue to be alienated by heavyhanded Libyan efforts to impose Qadhafi's radical ideology. In addition, Libyan influence will continue to be constrained by geographic distance and cultural insensitivity toward the region. Tripoli also is likely to encounter continued local government opposition in trying to expand economic and cultural activities in the Caribbean. [redacted]

Libya has better prospects for inciting violence in the French-speaking areas. We believe Qadhafi increasingly will focus attention on radical French Caribbean groups because of their willingness to use more militant tactics. Moreover, Qadhafi perhaps believes that successful terrorist operations by proindependence French-speaking radicals will encourage English-speaking leftists in the Caribbean to use similar tactics. [redacted]

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We believe that Libyan frustration with the English-speaking leftists' continuing poor electoral prospects almost certainly will prompt renewed calls by Tripoli for more militant action. A resumption of heavyhanded Libyan pressure will antagonize English-speaking leftists and strain relations. [redacted]

Because French separatists have little hope of achieving independence through the political process, their increasing desperation may drive some to use more militant action. Libyan support would amplify the separatists' capabilities for violence and further undermine stability, but it probably would not force an early solution to the independence issue. Most French Antilleans oppose independence, and only a few local leftists openly support terrorist tactics. Moreover, increasing evidence of Libyan efforts to destabilize the French departments is likely to prompt a crackdown by French security authorities.

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A less likely scenario is that Qadhafi and his advisers will continue to soft-pedal their calls for increased militancy by English-speaking leftists. Libya's diminished pressure on English-speaking leftists for violent actions would encourage them to continue providing Tripoli with regional assessments and information as well as entree to local leftists. [redacted]

According to [redacted] the US Embassy in Paramaribo, Western governments, including the French, are particularly concerned that Libyan involvement in Suriname will lead to military support for radical separatists in French Guiana. [redacted]

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
Moreover, Tripoli's tactical shift, if sustained, would reduce some strains in its relations with Havana. Cuba's advice to English-speaking leftists to pursue moderation, which is intended to help strengthen their popular support, until recently conflicted with Libyan calls for increased militancy. More compatible policies, however, are unlikely to prompt coordination by the two sides of their support for regional leftists. Qadhafi's and Castro's personal rivalry and disdain for each other's revolutionary philosophies lies at the root of longstanding mutual suspicions. [redacted]



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