



Directorate of  
Intelligence

**MASTER FILE COPY**  
**DO NOT GIVE OUT  
OR MARK ON**

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

**Near East and  
South Asia Review**



25X1

**Supplement  
26 April 1985**

~~Top Secret~~

*NESA NESAR 85-010JX*

*26 April 1985*

*Copy 257*

25X1

**Page Denied**

Top Secret



25X1

**Near East and South Asia Review**

25X1

**Supplement**

26 April 1985

Page

**Articles**

**Saudi Arabia-Egypt: Dragging Feet on Diplomatic Ties**

1


25X1



25X1

Saudi Arabia remains reluctant to expand or normalize ties with Egypt, despite the gradual Egyptian reintegration into the Arab world, as the Saudis fear that renewed relations with Egypt would further isolate and anger Syria as well as shatter already slim prospects for an Arab consensus on key regional issues.

25X1



25X1

**Afghanistan: Soviet Efforts To Reduce Insurgent Infiltration**

7

25X1



25X1

Changes in Soviet forces, equipment, and tactics probably will cause increasing difficulties for guerrillas resupplying their forces in Afghanistan over the coming months, but, without a dramatic increase in Soviet forces in Afghanistan and an end to Pakistani and Iranian aid to the insurgents, heavy cross-border flows will continue.

25X1

**Afghanistan in March**

11

25X1



25X1

The insurgents demonstrated a high level of proficiency in operations against the Soviets in March, but Soviet and regime forces continued to press the insurgents in the Kabul area and in the eastern provinces.

25X1

*Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors.*

25X1



Top Secret

NESA NESAR 85-010JX

26 April 1985

25X1

25X1

Top Secret





25X1

Articles


25X1


**Saudi Arabia-Egypt:  
Dragging Feet on  
Diplomatic Ties** 

Saudi Arabia remains reluctant to expand or normalize ties with Egypt, despite the gradual Egyptian reintegration into the Arab world. The Saudis fear that renewed relations with Egypt would further isolate and anger Syria as well as shatter already slim prospects for an Arab consensus on key regional issues. Riyadh insists that the Arab League must move first to reinstate Egypt, but the Saudis are pessimistic that an Arab League summit will be convened any time soon. 

Egypt's independent and highly visible foreign policy, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Saudi leaders, who had distrusted Nasir, found that relations with Sadat steadily worsened as he pursued a separate peace with Israel and publicly berated the Saudis for their lack of support. The Saudis believed that his rapprochement with Israel would impede an overall settlement and damage Arab interests. 

25X1


Riyadh acknowledges the importance of a stable pro-Western government in Cairo and has felt the loss of Egypt as a moderate participant in the Arab dialogue. In addition, the Saudis are more comfortable with President Mubarak, after their troubled relations with Presidents Nasir and Sadat. The two governments maintain high-level but low-key contacts, and US officials judge that Riyadh gradually has taken a warmer approach toward Cairo 


Tensions eased significantly after Mubarak became President and began to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, according to Embassy reporting. Riyadh continues to believe, however, that Cairo will go its own way. The Saudis probably recognize that Mubarak will not back away from the Camp David accords and will make no significant concessions to win reentry to the Arab League. 

25X1

25X1

**Historical Irritants**



The Saudi view of Egypt traditionally has been marked by leadership rivalry, political and cultural differences, and even personal hostility. Riyadh has long recognized Egypt's military and political weight in the region but resents Cairo's often dismissive attitude toward Saudi concerns. 


Riyadh's ties to Egypt, moreover, have complicated its longstanding relationship with Syria. The Saudis have been unable to ease the hostility between these two major Arab powers and are reluctant to anger Syria. The Saudis recognize that they have limited influence with both countries and do not want to choose sides. 

25X1

25X1

**Shared Concerns**


 the Egyptians make no secret of their contempt for perceived Saudi weakness and indecisiveness, while Riyadh has long been frustrated by what it sees as insufficient Egyptian gratitude for Saudi aid as well as Egypt's inefficiency and waste. 

Despite what Riyadh often sees as a troubled relationship, the Saudis recognize their foreign policy goals are similar to those of Egypt. Both have close ties to Washington—which link them closely but can occasionally intensify their rivalry. Both countries have actively supported Iraq in the war with Iran, and 

25X1

25X1

25X1

More important, US officials believe that the cautious Saudis, who are more comfortable operating behind the scenes and within a regional consensus, dislike 

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 85-010JX

26 April 1985

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

they are groping for ways to strengthen political stability in Sudan and Somalia. Both have supported Yasir Arafat and moderate elements in the PLO. Riyadh also shares Egypt's hostility to Libyan President Qadhafi, as well as distaste for Syrian hardline radicalism and fear of Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism. [Redacted]

Iraq and Syria—if large-scale US aid is significantly curtailed. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

**De Facto Diplomacy**

Despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, Riyadh and Cairo maintain close, high-level contacts. We believe that King Fahd and Mubarak communicate frequently through trusted intermediaries. Embassy officials speculate that the two may talk directly on some key issues. [Redacted]

**Little Diplomatic Support**

Riyadh has provided little open diplomatic support to Cairo, but Saudi officials have played a behind-the-scenes role in trying to reduce gradually Egypt's isolation without worsening inter-Arab rivalries. Saudi leaders have probed repeatedly and unsuccessfully for some way to convene the long-postponed Arab League summit, which could consider Egyptian reentry into the Arab fold. In December, Saudi Arabia abstained on the vote challenging Egypt's earlier readmission to the Islamic Conference Organization, defending its vote as a way to avoid further angering and isolating Syria. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The two countries maintain interest sections in both capitals [Redacted]

High-level visits are rare, however, and the Saudis have avoided linking them to bilateral relations. Mubarak attended the funeral of King Khalid in June 1982, [Redacted]

The Saudis only mildly criticized Jordan for acting outside the Arab League framework when it renewed ties with Egypt in September 1984, according to Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan met Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazala in Paris in mid-1983. Petroleum Minister Yamani visited Egypt in October 1984—the only Cabinet-level minister to visit since the Camp David accords—but publicly cautioned that he was there only on OPEC business. [Redacted]

[Redacted] King Fahd told US officials in October 1984 that he was in fact urging Iraq to normalize ties with Egypt. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Tight Pursestrings**

Once generous Saudi aid to Egypt—approximately \$1 billion annually before the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty—remains largely cut off. Indirect financial assistance continues—principally through funding for Egyptian weapons sales to Iraq and Somalia. Wealthy Saudis continue to keep money in Egyptian banks, and more than 500,000 Egyptian workers in Saudi Arabia are a source of valuable remittances. Mubarak probably has appealed to the Saudis for financial assistance, but we have no evidence that the Saudis have provided government-to-government aid. [Redacted]

The Saudis, however, have opposed Egyptian moves that would position Cairo to pursue a more aggressive diplomacy. They have privately criticized Mubarak's recent efforts to push the Israeli-Jordanian dialogue, to the exasperation of Cairo, according to US officials. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud told US officials in mid-March that Mubarak's efforts were an embarrassment. The Saudis also opposed initially Egypt's efforts to win a seat on the UN Security Council in fall 1983, only backing off under pressure from other delegates, including the United States, according to US officials. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Prospects**

Saudi willingness to renew formal ties with Egypt will depend largely on Riyadh's ability to resolve major disagreements with Cairo over Egypt's relations with

The Saudis may be willing to provide increased aid—although not at pre-Camp David levels, given their reduced oil revenues and sizable aid commitments to

Top Secret


[Redacted]

25X1


Top Secret




25X1

Israel. The Saudis continue to believe that the Camp David accords are an inadequate basis for a comprehensive peace. They argue that Egypt has failed to win more flexible Israeli or US approaches on key issues like the occupied territories or the Palestine Liberation Organization. They point to Lebanon as an example of how bilateral dealings with Israel are nonproductive. They were sharply critical of Egypt's failure to influence Israel during the collapse of Lebanon and its unwillingness to offer more support to displaced PLO fighters. More important, they see little prospect that Egypt's tactics can mute Syrian opposition to the peace process, which the Saudis judge as the major obstacle to a comprehensive settlement. 

25X1

According to US officials, both the Saudis and Egyptians believe that Riyadh holds the key to Egypt's reintegration into the Arab world. Until the Saudis are assured that reintegration can take place without disrupting the fragile balance between Arab radicals and moderates or further isolating Syria, we judge Riyadh will be willing to live with the status quo. 

25X1


If the Arab League convenes and approves Egypt's return, the Saudis are likely to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt and to cede to Cairo a major leadership role among Arab moderates. They remain opposed, however, to bilateral negotiations with Israel outside a comprehensive peace settlement, and Cairo's ties to Tel Aviv as well as its independent approach to the peace process will continue to bedevil Saudi-Egyptian relations. 

25X1

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret



25X1

**Afghanistan: Soviet Efforts To Reduce Insurgent Infiltration**



25X1

Changes in Soviet forces, equipment, and tactics probably will cause increasing difficulties for guerrillas resupplying their forces in Afghanistan over the coming months. The Soviets have attempted since their invasion in 1979 to curtail insurgent infiltration of men and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran. They stepped up pressure on resistance supply lines in 1984, in part because Moscow realizes that resistance activity inside Afghanistan depends on arms flows across the borders. So far, Soviet and Afghan operations have generally been unsuccessful in reducing cross-border traffic, and the Soviets' reluctance to dramatically increase their forces in Afghanistan and the likelihood that Pakistan and Iran will continue to help the insurgents point to continued heavy cross-border flows.

These and other Soviet efforts have failed. Guerrilla infiltration of men and supplies has declined only temporarily following large military operations and during periods of bad weather, although Soviet measures have made the process more difficult.



25X1

**If at First You Don't Succeed . . .**



25X1

Rather than dramatic changes, however, the Soviets and Afghans seem to be making gradual adjustments in their capabilities in border areas. They probably hope that a combination of small improvements in their forces and increased political pressure on Pakistan and Iran will produce slow progress in curtailing infiltration.



25X1

25X1

25X1

**Early Efforts**

Soviet 40th Army officials realized as early as 1980 that sealing the borders would require many times the number of forces Moscow was willing to commit to the war. Still they engaged in large block-and-sweep operations and in the eastern provinces extensively mined border areas and used explosives to seal some mountain passes.



**Tactical Changes**

The Soviets and Afghans are implementing various tactical changes to improve their effectiveness in the border regions. They continue to try to stem infiltration into Afghanistan mainly with large block-and-sweep operations, but they are conducting them more frequently. The Soviets also are increasing their use of small-unit tactics and heliborne assaults to trap insurgent caravans:

25X1


25X1

- Unlike in the past when Soviet and Afghan attacks dropped sharply in the winter, fighting has continued in border areas with little interruption since last summer. A sweep around Ali Khel in Paktia Province late last year—one of the largest operations of the war in a border area—briefly hindered the insurgents' ability to use one of their

25X1

25X1

In the first two years following the invasion, the Soviets conducted most border security duties because Afghan border forces could not function effectively. By 1982, however, the Soviets were attempting to reorganize and improve the performance of the regime's border forces and to share more of the responsibility with them.



Top Secret

NESA NESAR 85-010JX

26 April 1985

25X1



Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

major infiltration routes and probably forced them to switch to alternative trails. After Soviet forces left the area, however, the guerrillas resumed their normal traffic patterns.

- [Redacted] Soviet heliborne assaults and ambushes of insurgent caravans have increased over the past year. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Soviet Spetsnaz operations—many of which are staged at night to catch the guerrillas off balance—have proved effective. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Force Augmentations**

Recent increases in Soviet manpower in border provinces will improve their capabilities against insurgent infiltration, but the number of forces is still far too small to significantly improve border security.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

- [Redacted] the Soviets began using mobile ambush teams in southwestern Afghanistan in late 1983. Helicopter-supplied teams of some 30 troops operate for two to 20 days to monitor insurgent movements and conduct ambushes in a given area. The teams are well concealed and change locations frequently to maintain the advantage of surprise. [Redacted]

[Redacted] these measures have made travel through the southwest much more hazardous than before and forced the resistance to switch from using trucks and trails to traveling by camel across stretches of desert.

[Redacted]

**Equipment Improvements**

The Soviets probably hope new equipment will also improve their capabilities [Redacted] the Soviets have positioned BM-27 multiple rocket launchers in some areas of high infiltration, [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The use of the BM-27—in addition to helicopters—will greatly enhance the Soviets' ability to quickly sow antipersonnel mines in areas of suspected insurgent infiltration from long range. The Soviets, however, will be unable to mine all insurgent trails, and the guerrillas probably will devise tactics to avoid the mines. Self-propelled artillery brought into Afghanistan over approximately the past 18 months also will improve the Soviets' maneuverability in sweep operations in the border areas. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

- Late last year Afghan units renewed their efforts to halt guerrilla traffic on roads into Afghanistan by garrisoning a series of posts and temporary camps in the eastern provinces. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1

**Pressure on Pakistan and Iran**

Concern about increasing flows of resistance arms supplies into Afghanistan probably is prompting Moscow to intensify political and military pressure on Pakistan and Iran to modify their Afghan policies. Over the past year Soviet and Afghan press reports have heightened their criticism of Iranian and Pakistani aid to the resistance.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The geography of Afghanistan's borders remains a major disadvantage to Soviet and regime forces.

[Redacted]

25X1

Resistance forces, however, probably use thousands of small trails to enter the country, and they would switch to alternative routes if the Soviets succeeded in closing the main passes. Guerrilla movements across the long Iranian frontier also are difficult to monitor because the Soviets have too few aircraft and troops to conduct frequent air and ground patrols.

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Soviet and Regime Problems**

Despite recent improvements, Soviet and Afghan forces are frequently unable to effectively implement their efforts to curtail infiltration:

[Redacted]

The success of Moscow's interdiction efforts is also limited by the insurgents' ability to adapt rapidly to changes in Soviet and Afghan tactics:

- To avoid ambushes, the insurgents alter their routes and travel in small groups.
- When a caravan is attacked, guerrillas usually scatter, take defensive positions, and hold their fire to avoid Soviet and Afghan counterfire.
- In Qandahar Province several insurgent leaders have instructed their men to aggressively patrol areas known to be favorite drop zones for Soviet heliborne troops.

25X1

- [Redacted] in some areas villagers provide the insurgents with information on movements of Soviet and regime forces, enabling the insurgents to deploy counterambush teams.

25X1

- Many regime units in border areas are hard pressed to hold their posts against guerrilla assaults, much less to conduct the necessary patrolling that would make them an effective force.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

**Outlook**

Moscow's increased efforts to counter an increased insurgent supply infiltration effort probably will lead to heavier insurgent personnel and supply losses. But with Moscow reluctant to dramatically increase its forces and Iran and Pakistan unlikely to bend to Soviet pressure to drastically reduce their support for the resistance, we expect insurgent arms holdings to increase over the next year.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1


Top Secret




25X1

**Afghanistan in March** 

25X1


The insurgents demonstrated a high level of proficiency in operations against the Soviets in March, but Soviet and regime forces continued to press the insurgents in the Kabul area and in the eastern provinces. On the diplomatic front, senior Pakistani officials said they expect Soviet leader Gorbachev to pursue Moscow's current policy in Afghanistan with more vigor. 



**The Kabul Area**



25X1

**Resistance Activities**




Air activity in March at Kabul Airport was at its highest level so far in 1985; on one day, more than 60 MI-24 helicopters flew missions, according to the US Embassy. The Soviets also moved 24 SU-25 attack planes from Qandahar to Bagram Airbase to support their operations  


25X1

25X1



25X1

Kabul continued to be generally quiet, with only a few notable exceptions. Insurgent bombs exploded at the Ministry of Agriculture, a KHAD office, a government newspaper, and in the Soviet diplomatic area, causing moderate damage and killing between five and 10 people. The insurgents also fired several rockets that caused little damage and casualties. Soviet authorities tightened security somewhat after Soviet President Chernenko's death. 

25X1

Kabul's main bazaars continued to be well stocked with food; fruit and vegetables were trucked in from Jalalabad, according to the US Embassy. Prices remained stable thanks in part to Soviet subsidies. No fuel shortages or lines were visible at the city's 11 fuel pumps. The electrical situation continued to improve, although power outages still occurred regularly. 

25X1

The insurgents suffered a setback, however, when the Pakistani border town of Teri Mangal was almost totally destroyed by a fire in early March. The fire broke out in a bazaar area and burned for several days, destroying 300 shops and several insurgent ammunition depots.  The extent of insurgent losses cannot be determined, and the cause of the fire is unknown; sabotage cannot be ruled out. 

**The Afghan-Pakistani Border Area**

Soviet and Afghan forces conducted extensive operations in the Konar River valley between Asmar

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

NECA-NECAP 85-010JX

26 April 1985

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

and Barikowt to relieve Afghan outposts under siege.

[Redacted]

airspace. Other Pakistani officials also expect more Soviet meddling inside Pakistan—largely through KHAD, the Afghan intelligence agency. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Several airstrikes against Pakistani territory probably were in support of the operation to relieve the border post at Barikowt.

[Redacted]

**Outlook**

We expect the level of fighting to increase during the spring and early summer as both insurgents and Soviets take advantage of the better weather. The Soviets will probably step up operations in the eastern provinces to block the increased flow of insurgent arms and tighten security along the Salang highway.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Afghan Army troops initiated a brief firefight with Pakistani border forces on 16 March after insurgents seized three Afghan observation posts near the Khyber Pass border crossing. A senior Pakistani Army source told the US Embassy that the incident ended after the insurgents withdrew. There were no casualties. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

**More Pressure on Pakistan**

Senior Pakistani officials told US Under Secretary Armacost they had concluded from the March meeting between President Zia and General Secretary Gorbachev that Gorbachev will pursue present Soviet foreign policy lines with more vigor. They expect increased military pressure along Pakistan's western border and additional Soviet intrusions into Pakistani


**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1



**Top Secret**