



Intelligence

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Africa Review

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8 March 1985

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Africa Review

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		<i>Page</i>	
Articles	Ethiopia and Sudan: Political Ramifications of Emergency Aid	1	25X1
			25X1
	Donor nations and relief agencies that are providing humanitarian aid for drought-afflicted people in Ethiopia and Sudan are demanding a commitment of resources from the Ethiopian and Sudanese Governments that the two countries sometimes believe is not in their best interests or is impossible to deliver.		25X1
	Mozambique: Tensions Within FRELIMO	5	25X1
			25X1
	Divisions within the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique apparently have become more pronounced since the signing of the Nkomati nonaggression pact with South Africa one year ago.		25X1
	Angola: Economic Problems Produce Political Woes	9	25X1
			25X1
	Economic belt-tightening caused by declining oil prices and slack demand for Angolan crude threatens to force Luanda to press its socialist allies for increased economic aid, undercut its ability to pay for Soviet and Cuban military support, and undermine the regime's popular support.		25X1
	Cuban Aid Programs in Africa: Incompetent Internationalism	11	25X1
			25X1
	Cuba's civilian and technical aid programs have backfired in several cases when the assistance has been provided without sufficient planning or regard for the needs of the recipient country.		25X1
	Nigeria: Expanded Libyan Presence	15	25X1
			25X1
	Lagos's agreement to allow Libya to open an Islamic religious studies center in northern Nigeria will afford Tripoli better opportunities to establish a more effective foothold among Nigeria's Muslim community.		25X1

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Congo: Limited Move Westward

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Growing economic problems and irritation at the lack of Soviet development aid have caused President Sassou-Nguesso's government to turn to the West for more aid, but several factors, including the need to maintain access to Soviet arms, are working to limit Congo's drift toward the West. [Redacted]

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Briefs	Cameroon: Ethnic Discontent	[Redacted]	21
	Uganda: Fallout From US Human Rights Report	[Redacted]	22
	Angola: Way Cleared To Sign Lome Convention	[Redacted]	22
	Tanzania: Salim Liberalizes Detention Act	[Redacted]	22

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Articles

Ethiopia and Sudan: Political Ramifications of Emergency Aid

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Humanitarian aid for drought-afflicted people in Ethiopia and Sudan is linked with complex political considerations for the governments of those countries, aid donor nations, and international and nongovernmental relief organizations. Donors and relief agencies demand a commitment of resources from Ethiopia and Sudan that those countries sometimes believe is not in their best interest or is impossible to deliver. In the current crisis atmosphere, where communications between the numerous players range between difficult and nonexistent, competing national directives and interests have caused stressful and divisive exchanges between the parties in spite of a mutually held goal of staving off starvation for millions of people.

Dimensions of the Tragedy

An estimated 7.5 million to possibly 9 million people are threatened by famine in Ethiopia, of which some 2 to 3 million are out of reach of most aid donors in the contested northern provinces. An additional 525,000 to 575,000 Ethiopian drought victims are refugees in eastern Sudan, according to estimates by the US Embassy in Khartoum. Observers projected early in 1985 that 250,000 to 300,000 more refugees would cross the Sudanese border by July; by late February some were speculating that the numbers could be as high as 500,000 or more.

At the same time that Ethiopians are seeking refuge in Sudan, drought there also has reached crisis proportions, with the possibility that 4 million Sudanese will be affected by next summer, according to a January report from the US Embassy in Khartoum. Large numbers of Sudanese already have left their traditional homes and grazing areas, some

entering the refugee camps along with the Ethiopians in the east and the Chadian refugees in western Sudan, others clustered around population centers looking for food. Near the end of January, relief workers estimated that there already were 300,000 to 400,000 homeless and needy people in western Sudan alone, of whom about 80 percent were Sudanese and 20 percent were Chadian refugees.

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As more people are engulfed in the growing crisis, estimates of food deficits undoubtedly will be reassessed and revised upward. Currently, the estimated Ethiopian food shortfall for December 1984 to December 1985 is 1.2 million metric tons of grain and 100,000 metric tons of supplementary foods, according to an FAO assessment. The Sudanese foodgrain deficit is between 1.4 million and 2 million metric tons, as assessed by a multidonor mission and by USAID officials. An additional 160,000 metric tons is required at a minimum to support the refugee population in Sudan.

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Ethiopia and the Famine Relief Situation

The Ethiopians have insisted for many months, and restated recently in briefings to states friendly to them, that they are distributing as much emergency food assistance as possible to alleviate immediate starvation, and are moving ahead with a resettlement program designed to move people from the drought-stricken north to southern areas that offer the possibility of immediate agricultural production. Although all agree that the first priority is to deliver food to the starving, there is widespread concern

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among donors that Ethiopia is not reaching all possible recipients with relief goods. Many charge that the government is as much an impediment to successful food distribution as are the physical constraints of insufficient port capacity, poor transport, and difficult terrain. Ethiopia, according to reporting from the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, has boarded at least three ships in its ports and seized relief shipments destined for the cross-border effort in Sudan; it has given priority to the unloading of arms from Soviet ships over the unloading of foodstuffs; and it has held up in-country travel permits for bilateral and international relief staffs, making it difficult to monitor food distributions and to assess growing needs. [redacted]

The issue of perhaps most pressing concern is the inability of either the Ethiopian Government or relief organizations to deliver the quantity of food needed by the 2 to 3 million people at risk in the contested areas of the north. Not nearly enough food and relief assistance are available in regions outside government control to stop the spread of starvation, as attested to by the increasing flow of severely malnourished refugees to Sudan. Inside Ethiopia, the needy either must depend on the relatively small amounts of food that are distributed from Sudan through the cross-border feeding programs or go to the government feeding centers in major towns and along main roads in government-controlled areas. So far, both donor countries and the United Nations have been unable either to arrange safe passage for scheduled relief convoys and flights to the north or to assure the safety of refugee movements. Ethiopian officials have insisted to various international relief officials that they are delivering enough food to feed the needy in the north and that they will not negotiate safe passage or allow relief organizations to operate in contested areas. The Ethiopians fear such actions would tacitly recognize the legitimacy of the rebels and strengthen the insurgency. [redacted]

In February, a US official observing conditions in Eritrea was told by Ethiopian relief agency spokesmen that, out of a population of 2.6 million, about one-half are drought affected, nearly half a million more persons than that agency reported as drought affected last December. Furthermore, the Ethiopians said that

almost all wells in the region were dry, and that local foods were almost nonexistent. While feeding and food distribution at the 25 government food centers appeared to be adequate, US officials believe that the extensive areas not under government control are receiving little aid. [redacted]

Feeding operations across the border from Sudan are one of the few options available to increase food supplies in contested areas, according to US officials. While an integral part of the present US program, some donors, citing the increasingly vehement objections of the Ethiopians, believe the risks in increasing this effort are too high for Sudan, donors, relief organizations, and for the refugees. Given the enormity of the overall problem, these donors believe reaching even some 80 percent of the needy population in the north, which they say can be done without cross-border feeding, may be an acceptable goal at this time. An international organization active in the cross-border endeavor estimates that in the face of difficult logistic problems only about 500,000 can be helped by cross-border feeding—but, without the program, hundreds of thousands might not receive any aid at all. [redacted]

A further stress on the relief effort is the Ethiopian resettlement policy, which is proving to be highly divisive in the donor community. Ethiopia characterizes resettlement as moving people away from overpopulated, unproductive, desertified land, and settling them in sparsely populated, fertile areas that offer the possibility of immediate agricultural development. We believe, however, that the government also views resettlement as a means to undercut the dissident support base and advance agricultural collectivization. Addis Ababa, with Soviet assistance, has met its initial goal of resettling several hundred thousand persons in the south and has publicly announced plans to resettle a total of 1.5 million this year. The Australians and some European donors, according to US Embassy reporting, are inclined to support resettlement, seeing it as one possible answer to Ethiopia's seemingly intractable agricultural problems. Moreover, if resettlement goes

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forward, they recognize that humanitarian assistance will be required until the settlements become productive. The United States has told other donors and the Ethiopians that it will not assist resettlement efforts as part of the drought crisis effort, believing the program siphons off governmental energies that should be devoted to ameliorating starvation. It also charges that the program is politically motivated and that it is not voluntary. [redacted]

Sudanese Drought and Refugee Crisis

While Ethiopian famine was the focus of initial attention from the media and aid donors, Sudan's food and refugee conditions have emerged as an equally serious problem. Early this year the Sudanese Government declared the needs of drought-afflicted Sudanese in the western provinces as its first priority and solicited US and other donor support. US emergency food currently is being distributed in the west both to Sudanese displaced populations and Chadian refugees alike. According to relief officials, the needy populations are frequently found in very remote areas that are inaccessible by most roads or by air. The delivery of relief supplies is complicated further by the great distance of these areas from the ports of entry of relief goods and by the limited transportation and communications networks. Coordination among donors is extremely difficult and increasingly inefficient as the crisis grows on Sudan's western and eastern borders. [redacted]

Contributions to fill Sudan's food deficit of 1.4 million metric tons estimated by a multidonor assessment team under UN auspices are underpledged by 601,000 metric tons. By early February the United States had committed 748,000 metric tons; and other donors, 76,000 metric tons of the total need. A good share of the food will have to be pre-positioned near the at-risk population concentrations before May rains make the roads impassable. The need for water, shelter, health care, and sanitation provisions in addition to food aid is straining the capabilities of already overburdened and harassed donors. [redacted]

Sudan is further beset by the presence of well over half a million Ethiopian refugees, serious economic problems, and an insurgency—factors the US Embassy in Khartoum believes puts the Ethiopian

refugee problem low on Sudan's list of priorities. Sudan has indicated, according to the Embassy and UN observers, that its responsibility for the Ethiopian refugees is discharged by allowing entry to Sudan and providing some relief coordination through the Sudanese national relief agency. Beyond that, according to the Sudanese, refugee care should be financed by the international donor community and managed so as to minimize any negative impact on Sudanese living standards and to preclude antagonisms between the Sudanese and the refugees. While sympathetic to the Sudanese dilemma, donors have urged a more efficient and quick response from the Sudanese relief managers. [redacted]

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Despite the risk of further tensions in bilateral relations with Ethiopia, the Sudanese have supported cross-border feeding operations into northern Ethiopia in an effort at least to slow the refugee flow into Sudan. The Ethiopian Government argues that these operations benefit the insurgents and has threatened to attack cross-border relief efforts into rebel-held areas. Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan are increasingly tense, according to the US Embassy in Khartoum. [redacted]

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Outlook

The magnitude of the drought-induced disaster, in our judgment, is just emerging. The Ethiopian refugees are not likely to leave the comparative safety of the Sudanese camps without some assurance that crops can be planted in Ethiopia; that they will be sustained in their home areas with food, implements, and seeds; and that they will not be threatened by civil disorder or government retaliation. For both Ethiopians and displaced Sudanese, the rains in April and May in their home areas will determine the start of any movement to leave the camps. The Embassy reports that the Sudanese Government expects most of the refugees to stay in the camps through 1985, or at least until any crops that might be planted this spring show promise of an adequate harvest late next fall. Therefore, their presence in Sudan probably will require the continued efforts of the aid donor groups at present or higher levels at least through 1985. Only

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a skillful handling of food and water shortages within Sudan will maintain a semblance of stability in the relationships between the refugees and the indigenous population. [redacted]

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We expect the donor nations and organizations to improve coordination of relief efforts. Experience gleaned from working their way through these first chaotic months of emergency operations should help to put in place a more efficient operation in both Ethiopia and Sudan. The scope of the disaster is only now being perceived, however, and a heightened effort in health care, shelter, and a larger and more varied food ration for what almost certainly will be a larger refugee population will stretch the economic and physical limits of all donors. [redacted]

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Allegations that emergency humanitarian programs are being used for political goals already strain relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, and differences are likely to worsen as the crisis grows. Both countries suspect that refugee populations have been infiltrated with subversives, that camps are used as rebel sanctuaries, and that relief goods are used to further antiregime activities. [redacted]

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The cross-border feeding program is at the center of the controversy and is likely to remain so. Ethiopia accuses Sudan and the aid donors, especially the United States, of violating its territorial integrity and of delivering aid to antiregime factions in the north. Donors counter that the operation is humanitarian and would not be attempted if aid could reach northern Ethiopians in any other way. In the face of Ethiopia's insistence that the program be discontinued and the belief by donors that hundreds of thousands will die if it were stopped or curtailed, the cross-border program—among the many that are under the international aid umbrella—is potentially the most dangerous for all participating parties. Based on Mengistu's public statements and numerous diplomatic demarches, we believe that Ethiopia is prepared to use military force to disrupt the flow of supplies into the northern provinces, endangering the lives of the international relief corps as well as Ethiopian recipients. [redacted]

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**Mozambique: Tensions Within
FRELIMO** [redacted]

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Declining economic prospects, the RENAMO insurgency, and the Nkomati nonaggression pact with South Africa signed one year ago probably have intensified dissension within the senior levels of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO),¹ the ruling party in Mozambique since the country gained independence from Portugal in 1975.² Although our knowledge of FRELIMO is sketchy, studies by academics and journalists and US Embassy reporting indicate that fissures in the Politburo and Central Committee, which first appeared at the Fourth Party Congress in early 1983, have become more pronounced since the signing of the Nkomati accord. While most evidence indicates that President Machel continues to command the support of the Army and security services, [redacted]

[redacted] five of the 12 Politburo members probably do not support his economic and security policies. [redacted]

The greatest danger to Machel's hold on Mozambique, however, may not come from disaffected members of the party leadership.

[redacted] middle-grade Army officers, frustrated with FRELIMO's inability to cope with the insurgency, may present a greater danger to Machel and his supporters. [redacted]

Origins of Divisions

The leadership of FRELIMO remained stable from the First Party Congress in 1970 until 1983. Analysis of the FRELIMO leadership shows that, while the

¹ FRELIMO, a vanguard Marxist-Leninist Party, has a membership of approximately 120,000. According to party statute, the 128-man Central Committee is the de jure ruling body, but in reality the 12-man Politburo is the senior decisionmaking forum. [redacted]
² FRELIMO, like other Marxist-Leninist parties, guards its internal politics zealously. The state-controlled media contains little about divisions within the party, and only a few academics have made an effort at Mozambican "Kremlinology." While Embassy reporting is generally good, access of Embassy officers to many party leaders is restricted. [redacted]

ruling party has avoided the bloody purges that marred the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the price of political stability has been the isolation of the ruling elite. On several occasions since 1981, Machel has publicly commented on the party's isolation, noting that many leaders of the guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese have lost contact with their roots. [redacted]

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The facade of a united FRELIMO leadership shattered at the Fourth Party Congress in March 1983. The expanding RENAMO insurgency and the collapse of the agricultural sector prompted Machel to make the first significant changes in the state and party apparatus since independence, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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In his speeches to the congress, Machel singled out for blame ideologues who supported a Soviet-style collectivization policy ("big project line") at the expense of the peasant farmer, claiming that this had led to a decline in food production and a loss of support for FRELIMO in the countryside. Following the conference, the two senior advocates of collectivization—Politburo members dos Santos and Machungo—were relieved of their responsibilities and made provincial governors. [redacted]

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In the year following the Fourth Party Congress, Machel apparently moved to strengthen the hold of pro-Western technocrats within the party. Jacinto Veloso was made a member of the Politburo and Minister of State for Economic Affairs for the Presidency—effectively making him the country's economic czar. It appears likely that Machel's inability to attract additional economic assistance during his visits to Eastern Europe in late 1983 may have further convinced him to isolate party ideologues like dos Santos and Machungo who favored Soviet-style economic policies. [redacted]

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The Breach Widens

The next breach came only two months after the signing of the Nkomati accord, in which each country pledged noninterference in the other's internal affairs. The suspension of official South African military assistance to RENAMO did not halt the spread of the insurgency, and Maputo's drastic counterinsurgency measures, including summary executions and public floggings, increased popular discontent and indirectly benefited the insurgents. [redacted]

In May 1984, Machel condemned Politburo members responsible for the counterinsurgency operations and replaced them with close associates. Speaking in central Mozambique, Machel accused the security services of greatly overstepping their authority. "In all our cities," the President claimed, "the police are worse than the colonial police." The next week, in a public rally in Maputo, Machel condemned the three Politburo members with security portfolios: Minister of Interior Guebuza, Minister of Security Matsinhe, and Deputy Minister of Defense Mabote. He said: "This here is Guebuza. He is the one who arrests many people and leaves them there. And this here is Matsinhe. He detains many people and forgets them. Mabote's men create secret prisons. They detain people and don't know what to do with them." [redacted]

Following his dismissal of Matsinhe and Guebuza, Machel appointed Sergio Vieira as Minister of Security and Oscar Monteiro as Minister of Justice, thereby strengthening his control over the police and security services. (Both Vieira and Monteiro are Goans of mixed Portuguese and Asian descent without a political base in the country or the party, who served on Machel's personal staff during the war against the Portuguese.) Machel also appointed a young officer, Lieutenant Colonel Honwana, as chief of the civilian intelligence service. [redacted]

[redacted] Machel at this time also selectively replaced the cadre of the country's counterinsurgency school with military subordinates personally close to him. [redacted]

The Present Balance

We believe, [redacted] that Machel continues to control the Politburo as well as the armed forces and security services. According to US

diplomatic reporting, seven of the 12 Politburo members support Machel's policy of accommodation with Pretoria and his program of limited economic reform. These include the two senior officers of the armed forces, the Ministers of Security and Justice, and the country's senior economic planner Jacinto Veloso, a former Portuguese Air Force officer who has been a close associate of Machel since the late 1960s. [redacted]

Machel's potential opponents in the Politburo have been removed from key positions in the defense and security ministries. Three are serving as provincial governors several hundred kilometers from Maputo. We believe their authority has been diminished by their distance from the political center. [redacted]

Machel has taken steps, however, to mend fences with some of his more influential opponents in the FRELIMO hierarchy. Guebuza, castigated for human rights abuses, was recently made Minister of State in the president's office. Machel also has acted to co-opt his old friend dos Santos, naming him last November as chief of an intraprovincial committee to combat the RENAMO insurgency in the key central Provinces of Manica, Tete, Sofala, and Zambezia. [redacted]

[redacted]

Foreign Minister Chissano, a black with good contacts with all factions, is the second-most important figure in FRELIMO, in our view, and would, [redacted] be the most likely successor to succeed Machel. Machel has used Chissano for high-level talks with both Western and Cuban delegations, [redacted]

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FRELIMO Politburo

Name	Position	Race, Tribe, and Region
Favors New Government Policies		
Samora Machel	President of FRELIMO President of Mozambique	Shangan, southern
Joaquim Chissano	Foreign Minister	Shangan, southern
Alberto Chipande	Governor of Cabo Delgado Minister of Defense	Makonde, northern
Sebastiao Mabote	Deputy Minister of Defense	Shangan, southern
Jacinto Veloso	Minister of State for Economic Affairs for the Presidency	White
Sergio Vieira	Minister of Security	Goan, Mestico
Oscar Monteiro	Minister of Justice	Goan, Mestico
Opposed to Present Course		
Marcelino dos Santos	Governor of Sofala	Mestico
Armando Guebuza	Minister of State	Macua, northern
Jorge Rebelo	Maputo Party Secretary	Mestico
Mariano Matsinhe	Governor of Niassa	Shangan, southern
Mario Machungo	Governor of Zambesia	Northern (?)

[Redacted]

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and in late January it was Chissano that broached the possibility of Cuban assistance for Mozambique should the Nkomati accord collapse, according to US diplomatic reporting. Chissano, who was Prime Minister of the transitional government in 1974-75, is extremely active in the party and many areas of the government affairs, according to US Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

Outlook

Machel has shown an ability to manage the Politburo and Central Committee since assuming the leadership of FRELIMO 15 years ago and to govern through consensus since Mozambique gained its independence. Even though Machel has castigated opponents publicly, no member of the Politburo has been purged from his party post since independence. We would agree with US Embassy reporting that despite the strains Machel is in control of the leadership and his supporters now dominate the national security decisionmaking apparatus. [Redacted]

[Redacted] we believe that Guebuza is Machel's principal opponent in the leadership. Guebuza, a former Political Commissar of the armed forces has support within the military, according to reporting from the US Embassy [Redacted]

[Redacted] Machel's appointment of Guebuza to a position in the office of the presidency indicates to us his interest in co-opting this talented officer, or at least keeping him under close control. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Should military opposition to Machel grow, it may crystallize around Deputy Defense Minister Mabote. Although current US Embassy reporting indicates that Mabote has remained in Machel's camp, he would be the natural leader of a coup given his popularity in the Army and the fact that he is the senior officer resident in the capital. [Redacted]

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**Angola: Economic Problems
Produce Political Woes** [redacted]

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In the event of a continued drop in oil prices and slack demand for Angolan crude—both likely in our view—Luanda will have to revise its budget by mid-1985 and curtail spending, [redacted]

[redacted] This economic belt-tightening probably would force Luanda to press its socialist allies for more economic assistance, undercut its ability to pay Moscow and Havana for vital military support, and further undermine the regime's popular support. [redacted]

[redacted]

Much of Angola's current economic problems are directly attributable to UNITA's strategy of hitting civilian economic targets. In a recent interview in *Die Welt*, a senior UNITA official reaffirmed the insurgents' intention to continue striking at such targets. Moreover, he indicated that the heretofore relatively safe petroleum industry would no longer be spared. He cited, in particular, Western oil companies in Cabinda who currently provide 80 percent of the ruling party's budget. [redacted]

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Background

The Angolan economy—with the exception of the petroleum industry—has yet to regain performance levels that were attained prior to independence in 1975. Extensive petroleum deposits so far have earned Angola enough hard currency to support the war effort. The domestic economy, however, is in a shambles. Agriculture has reverted to the subsistence level, there are reports of widespread malnutrition, shortages of spare parts are endemic, and industrial production is down from 20 to 60 percent of the pre-1975 level. [redacted]

The sharp decline in world demand for petroleum—which provides 90 percent of Angola's hard currency earnings—has hit Angola hard. Despite a significant increase in production from some 150,000 b/d in 1980 to some 200,000 b/d in 1984, revenue has only increased from \$1.45 billion to \$1.6 billion during the same period. This modest improvement has been insufficient to offset the sharp decline in hard currency earnings from diamonds and coffee. Total hard currency earnings from these two sources was approximately \$420 million in 1980, but dropped to about \$130 million in 1984. In the case of coffee, a combination of poor management and the civil war have completely shut down most plantations, nearly eliminating that source of revenue. In late 1984, the success of UNITA operations against major diamond mining centers such as Cafunfo threatened continuing production. [redacted]

New Problems for Moscow?

Declining oil revenue almost certainly would cause dos Santos to ask Moscow to relax its demands for payment for Soviet Bloc military and economic assistance. As of mid-1984, Angola was committed to pay 50 percent of its crude oil production to the USSR and Eastern Europe to meet this debt. In addition, we estimate Cuba receives approximately \$120 million annually as reimbursement for its troops stationed in Angola. Moscow apparently already is feeling the pinch of its commitment to the Angolans and will ask the East Europeans at an upcoming Warsaw Pact meeting to pick up more of the tab for Angola, [redacted]

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Effect on the Leadership

Angola's growing economic problems probably will strengthen the hand of Lopo do Nascimento, the Minister of Planning. [redacted] the day-to-day running of the economy is in his hands. Do Nascimento is a pragmatist and oil company officials indicate that much of the success in counteracting Angola's unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracy is due to his personal intervention. Although there is a strong hardline faction in the leadership that espouses a tightly controlled centralized economy and opposes

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economic flexibility and experimentation, the economic deterioration is discrediting such policies as do Nascimento's influence continues to rise. We would expect do Nascimento to introduce more market socialism in an effort to get the Angolan economy on its feet. [redacted]

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Outlook

Economic themes played a major role at the ruling party conference in mid-January.¹ Increased production was one of three major goals spelled out at that time, and two of five commissions created at the conference are aimed at improving the country's poor economic performance. [redacted]

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Both at the party conference and in subsequent speeches, President dos Santos has voiced open concern about the economy and warned of dire consequences, if the situation is not rectified. Dos Santos and his colleagues apparently are worried about their ability to retain at least passive popular support if they cannot provide minimal, regular food supplies. The concern in Luanda over the country's economic problems has heightened in the face of UNITA's intensified efforts to isolate the cities. As the regime grapples with the economy, dos Santos may be tempted to look for scapegoats and some of those in the leadership who oppose any deviation from Marxist economic principles could be shunted aside or ousted. [redacted]

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Cuban Aid Programs in Africa:
Incompetent Internationalism [redacted]

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Cuba has made a concerted effort since the early 1960s to foster ties with Third World countries—with a special focus on Africa beginning in the early 1970s—by providing them with a variety of civilian and technical aid programs. Although Havana claims that such efforts are examples of selfless commitment to “international proletarianism,” the primary goal is to strengthen Cuban influence with these countries. The efforts to promote “revolutionary solidarity” have backfired in several cases when aid has been provided without sufficient planning or regard for the needs of the recipient country. Moreover, some countries have complained about the quality and cost of Cuban assistance programs. [redacted]

The Programs

The aid programs—most in the form of civilian advisory assistance—involve approximately 13,000 Cuban civilians serving in some 20 African countries. Havana traditionally has gained a foothold in these countries by providing medical and educational aid, as well as assistance in construction, agriculture, and other technical areas. The Castro regime also has capitalized on the instability of new regimes by offering military and security advisers and intelligence training. [redacted]

In addition to the goal of achieving greater international influence and enhancing Castro’s image as a Third World leader, the aid programs are designed to bring other benefits to Cuba. Chief among these is the regime’s intention to maintain a sense of revolutionary mission among young people who did not participate in Cuba’s guerrilla struggle by sending them on “internationalist” missions. [redacted]

The programs provide economic benefits to Cuba. Exporting workers relieves domestic unemployment and allows the personnel, particularly military advisers, to gain experience. Moreover, some of the assistance programs provide desperately needed hard

currency. Algeria and Libya, for example, are charged for Cuban assistance—we estimate between \$7,200 and \$12,000 per person a year. In some cases, the host country has reportedly paid for the workers’ equipment, airfare, and lodging as well as personal spending money. [redacted]

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Although the aid programs are generally successful, there have been problems. Several recipients have complained about the quality and cost of the assistance, and have claimed that Cuba fails to address adequately the real development needs of their countries. Cuban behavior has also been a source of friction, with charges of assaults by Cuban cooperants upon local women and livestock. [redacted]

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[redacted] Havana apparently has sent ill prepared and unequipped personnel to work in Africa and, at times, has attempted to control the day-to-day running of the aid programs. Moreover, host country complaints indicate that the Cubans often fail to consider cultural differences. [redacted]

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III-Prepared Medical Teams

The eagerness to send large numbers of medical personnel overseas has led to some failures in meeting the specific needs of the recipient country. Officials in Mali, for example, have complained about Cuba’s medical assistance. [redacted]

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[redacted] Cuba sent a team of 11 medical personnel—three general practitioners and eight nurses and technicians—to Mali, but was unwilling to satisfy Mali’s request for badly needed specialized medical aid in the outlying provinces. [redacted]

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[redacted] Burundi officials also have been dissatisfied with the quality of Cuban medical assistance and Havana’s failure to provide needed specialists. When the first medical team arrived there in 1980, the Cuban

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Cuban and Guinea-Bissauan officials sign cooperation agreement paving the way for Cuban internationalists' presence. International Cuba ©

Ambassador insisted that the doctors and nurses be placed in pairs because they had not served outside Cuba before. The training and experience of doctors and nurses were often incompatible, however, which severely diminished the quality of their work. Burundi apparently was not satisfied with the program, as the last medical team left in early 1984 and has not been replaced.

Castro's emphasis on increasing the number of medical graduates has resulted in a government policy in which quantity takes precedence over quality in medical training. Havana's emphasis on the mass production of doctors has led to lower examination standards, and, as of mid-1984, medical students needed only a 70-percent average on their tests to graduate as a general practitioner. at least one of the medical teams sent to Burundi was made up solely of students. Moreover, the Cuban Embassy did not provide the Burundi Government with the promised curriculum vitae in advance on each of the workers to verify his qualifications.

Cuban "internationalists" often are handicapped by their inability to speak the host country's language, making the advisers' task impossible. In Seychelles three Cuban doctors were asked to leave within two months of their arrival because they could speak neither French nor English,

In another instance, Cuban technical and

medical personnel stationed in Burundi spoke no French, according to US Embassy reporting. Moreover, just as the doctors were becoming proficient in the language, they were replaced by a new group with no capability in the host country's language.

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Havana's Pressure Tactics

Havana also has created frictions with African nations by attempting to use aid programs as a mechanism for influencing the host country's internal politics.

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while Angolan officials favored private-sector involvement in agriculture, Havana pressed Luanda to assume complete state control of agricultural production—a concept supported by Cuban advisers working in the Angolan agricultural sector. Moreover, Cuban officials pressed the Angolans to permit them to assume direct management of the entire Angolan sugar industry. The Angolans—mindful of the time in the late 1970s when Cuban workers in the Angolan sugar industry were asked to leave and stripped two sugar mills of equipment and fixtures on their way out—firmly rejected Havana's proposal. The Angolans said they would accept Cuban technicians only on the condition that they be supervised by Angolan managers, and the Cubans eventually agreed to this limitation. The Cubans were also pushing the Angolans into accepting their offer to provide paramilitary training to peasants and arming agricultural workers to improve security in Angola's agricultural zones.

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Cuban interference led the Angola Government in 1980 to begin letting specific contracts lapse as they expired. When this became obvious to Castro, the Cuban leader sent a message to President dos Santos announcing that henceforth all Cuban assistance was to be paid for in US currency. Castro threatened to remove "all Cubans" from Angola if this demand was not met. Apparently, differences were resolved; we have not observed any significant decline in Cuban economic

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Cuban doctors in Ethiopia

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offers of aid. In 1984, Burkina, for example, according to Embassy reporting, planned to utilize Cuban security advisers in restructuring the internal security and intelligence collection service and in training military personnel. Other Cuban inroads in Africa in the last 18 months included expanded cooperation with Burkina and Ghana and new agreements with Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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Nevertheless, Castro's assistance programs in Africa probably will continue to encounter problems, in part because of the wide scope of Havana's efforts. Those countries such as Burundi and Mali that have experienced difficulties probably will look elsewhere for help. Others may limit Cuban aid for fear of alienating Western sources of financial assistance.

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assistance to Angola and dos Santos recently publicly claimed that Cuban civilians are provided free

Moreover, some African recipients, wary of Havana's meddling in their internal politics, will try to limit the Cuban presence in their country. Angola, however,

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Another example of Cuban pressure tactics occurred in Mali,

will have difficulty controlling Cuban activities because of its heavy dependence on Cuban military support. For its part, Havana, confined by its own severe economic constraints and unable to provide substantial material or economic assistance, will continue to rely on sending personnel rather than giving financial or material aid.

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When the government hesitated to accept a Cuban medical contingent, Cuba maneuvered events so that the Malian Government did not have a choice. Just prior to closing time on a Friday, a Cuban Embassy officer verbally informed Malian officials that a special Air Cubana flight with the medical contingent on board would arrive the following Monday, a Malian holiday. The Government of Mali was thus denied an opportunity to respond to the notification and had the Cuban aid forced upon it.

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Outlook

Despite some failures in its international assistance programs, Cuba will continue to probe for new opportunities to gain influence in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. Its aid is particularly appealing to those countries where young, leftist governments look to Cuba as an example of a successful revolution and as source of badly needed free or inexpensive assistance. These nations view Cuba's experience as a developing country as having more relevance to their problems than the sophisticated "high-technology" societies of the West. Therefore, despite the problems experienced by some nations, many countries still gladly accept Cuban

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Nigeria: Expanded Libyan Presence [redacted]

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General Buhari's northern Muslim-based military government has acceded to a Libyan request to open an Islamic religious studies center in Kano, [redacted]

[redacted] The city, in the heart of Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north, has a long-established community of Libyan traders and has been the site in recent years of frequent doctrinal disputes and clashes between rival Islamic sects. We believe the new center will afford Libya better opportunities to exploit local Islamic rivalries, develop contacts with young Islamic student radicals, and facilitate Tripoli's efforts to recruit and assist anti-Habre Chadian dissidents located in Nigeria's northeastern Borno State. [redacted]

Nigeria evidently is willing to gamble on an expanded Libyan presence in the north, perhaps in part because Buhari may be under pressure from radical elements in the Muslim community. Lagos may also hope that Tripoli will breathe life into an agreement signed last year that calls for the establishment of a joint bank and holding company, thereby providing Nigeria with badly needed financial aid. [redacted]

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The Libyan Ambassador in Lagos, Abdulkadir Sharaf Al-Din, has been mentioned by local observers as the center's future director. Sharaf Ad-Din came to Kano in the early 1960s to work as an engineer and independent contractor, became fluent in the local Hausa language, and married a Lebanese woman from an influential Kano business family. He has been Tripoli's Ambassador in Lagos for nearly 10 years and, [redacted] considers Kano his home. Sharaf Al-Din has developed close ties with a number of prominent Nigerians, including former armed forces Chief of Staff Yar-Adua. [redacted] Dr. Ahmed Said Fituri will be the new Libyan ambassador in Lagos, despite some Nigerian officials' concern over his background in the subversive Libyan Peoples' Bureau organization in Tripoli. [redacted]

Nevertheless, we believe Nigeria remains alert to the possibility of Libyan mischiefmaking in the Islamic community, and probably will try to limit Tripoli's influence. The US Embassy reports that Lagos continues to suspect Libyan involvement in violent rioting by extremist Muslim groups in the north during the past five years. Even so, Sharaf Al-Din's long-established connections with Nigerian Muslims probably will make it difficult for Lagos to prevent him from establishing a more effective Libyan foothold in the Muslim community. [redacted]

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Congo: Limited Move Westward []

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Growing French Economic Role. In recent years, according to the US Embassy, Congo has further strengthened commercial ties with France, traditionally its chief economic partner and benefactor. In our judgment, the coming to power of French socialists gave the French a political boost in Congo and facilitated closer economic collaboration. Sassou has met with French President Mitterrand four times since the latter's election in 1981. France and other European Community states supply over two-thirds of Congo's imports and purchase 20 percent of its exports, as well as providing almost all of Brazzaville's development assistance. Since 1981, the Embassy reports that France alone has provided no less than 54 percent of Congo's total annual imports. In addition to 7,000 private French citizens who work in Congo, there are some 500 French "co-operants" in technical positions throughout the Congolese Government. []

Congo counts on French investment in light industry, agriculture, commerce, and, above all, petroleum, to keep its economy afloat, according to the US Embassy. French expatriates and multinationals dominate the private sector. The French-owned ELF-Congo is the major petroleum producer and is responsible for marketing most of the country's crude oil. []

Improved Relations With the United States. Congo's trade with the United States, consisting largely of Congolese crude oil and petroleum products purchased by American oil companies, has increased significantly under Sassou's tenure. The United States has become Brazzaville's leading trading partner overall, and Congo is the third-largest US

trading partner in black Africa. Although the expansion of trade ties so far has not been accompanied by a surge of American investment or of official bilateral development aid, the US Embassy reports that Brazzaville, nonetheless, remains enthusiastic about budding relations with the United States. Congo recently agreed to accept modest food assistance and military educational training for Congolese officers that supplement US development aid, which the US Embassy reports has averaged \$2 million a year since 1981. American investment in Congo totals approximately \$4 million, and Brazzaville decided last year to award two contracts worth \$70 million to American companies. []

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In our view, diplomatic ties have also grown closer since relations were reestablished at Brazzaville's behest in 1977. According to the US Embassy, US officials recently have been given greater access to the media and senior Congolese officials, leading to a greater exchange of views on mutually important issues such as Chad. In addition to unprecedented treatment accorded a new US Ambassador last summer, Sassou has appointed a resident Ambassador to Washington for the first time, and senior Congolese officials made an unusual number of visits to Washington last year. []

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Cooler Relations With the USSR. Signs of a cooling trend in relations with the Soviets include reports that senior Congolese officials on a number of recent occasions have publicly noted the lack of Soviet support for the country's economic development. []

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[] Congo recently asked the Soviet Union to build a new embassy on a smaller plot of land because a French oil company would like to construct a new building on part of the present Soviet compound. Although Sassou reluctantly attended Brezhnev's funeral, he chose to

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ALA AR 85-006
8 March 1985

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be represented at Andropov's burial by Congo's Foreign Minister. According to the Embassy, a group of Soviet technicians recently departed Congo without having completed scheduled aircraft maintenance because Brazzaville refused a Soviet request for a 100-percent salary increase. The Embassy also reports that many educational scholarships for study in the Soviet Union recently have gone unfilled, and that last year the Soviets reduced by half the number of scholarships offered Brazzaville. [redacted]

Greater Concern for Nonalignment. Brazzaville's attempts to present a more balanced foreign policy has been most notable in the government-run media, in our view. For example, Congo printed a US response to Soviet disinformation over responsibility for the Korean airline shutdown incident and a positive article on President Reagan's recent criticism of apartheid. Other examples include Congo's participation in the Los Angeles Olympics despite Soviet pressure to join the boycott, Brazzaville's hosting of a reconciliation conference between the pro-Western Chadian Government and Libyan-backed dissidents, recent efforts to cooperate with Kinshasa to deter Zairian dissidents, and an offer to serve as a channel of communication between the United States and Angola. [redacted]

Despite moderation in some areas, Congo's actions in international forums have continued to demonstrate close alignment with the Soviet Bloc and radical African countries. According to the US Embassy, Congo voted against or abstained on every issue of importance to the United States at the United Nations in 1984. In addition, Congo's new Foreign Minister in his speech before the last UN General Assembly used traditional harsh anti-imperialist rhetoric and indirectly attacked the United States on apartheid, Israel, and Nicaragua. [redacted]

Limits to Westward Drift

Although Congo clearly wants to ease some socialist impediments to development and to foster more intimate economic relations with the West, we believe a number of factors will impact on the regime's ability to do so. In our view, future movement is likely to be slow and incremental, and will not entail any fundamental abandonment of Congo's self-styled

"revolutionary" ideology. The pace and direction of the country's trend toward moderation and its turn to the West will be influenced by Sassou's need to stay on reasonably cooperative terms with domestic leftists, the Soviets, and the Libyans, as well as by Western responsiveness to Congo's economic aid and investment needs. [redacted]

Political. Although the President's political position appears secure for now, his power play at last year's party congress and associated purges probably has created some powerful enemies. In our view, Sassou's moderate policies provide a potential rallying point which opponents could exploit, particularly if the economic benefits of his policies do not measure up to popular expectations. [redacted]

Economic. Congo's economic recession already has resulted in increased urban unemployment and business failures. We believe such developments could threaten Sassou's position because he has used promises of new projects to curry favors and help control ethnic and regional tensions. In our view, Sassou recognizes that further Western assistance and investment could help limit the economic and political fallout of more austere policies that the regime is likely to have to resort to over at least the next two years. From our perspective, the recession probably will place constraints on significant reform of the state enterprise system because it provides employment for a large number of Congolese. [redacted]

Western Aid Levels. In our judgment, Sassou probably harbors unrealistic expectations for European and US aid and investment over the next year or so and he could become disillusioned about the benefits of closer relations with the West. We believe France, the key country in furthering Congo's Westward drift, is unprepared to provide additional aid because of its own budgetary constraints and its other more important commitments in Africa. In fact, the US Embassy reports that France has recently taken a hard line to pressure Brazzaville into negotiating an IMF program and to reschedule its debt through the Paris Club to prevent a further

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deterioration in the economy. According to the Embassy, French tactics include continued refusal to reschedule bilateral debts, demand for cash payments on military deliveries, and the recent cutoff of some economic assistance. [redacted]

The Soviets. In our view, Western reluctance to provide major military hardware and to offer terms competitive with the USSR leaves Brazzaville little choice but to preserve ties to Moscow and access to Soviet arms, a critical element in ensuring Army support. Moreover, we believe Sassou has to be wary of the many Soviet- and Cuban-trained Congolese who hold government and security positions and can be instrumental in spreading Soviet disinformation and trying to block Western initiatives. In addition, Sassou undoubtedly worries that Moscow could support dissident elements should its interests be seriously threatened by Brazzaville's flirtation with the West. [redacted]

Although the Soviets probably are confident that internal political constraints will limit Sassou's initiatives toward the West, they have begun to show a higher profile toward Congo. The US Embassy reports that the USSR gave exceptionally positive coverage to Congo's last party congress and shortly thereafter delivered previously ordered military equipment, including at least four MIG-21 fighter aircraft and a dozen ZSU-23/4 anti-aircraft systems. According to the Embassy, the Soviet Union and Congo also have signed a number of limited economic agreements. [redacted]

The Libyans. We believe that the Congolese—well aware of Libyan leader Qadhafi's proclivity for trying to subvert his opponents in black Africa—will wish to avoid giving offense to Tripoli. In our view, the increased Libyan presence that began with the opening of a People's Bureau in Brazzaville in 1982 reflects a decision by Qadhafi to use Congo as a base of operations against Chad and other moderate central African regimes. The US Embassy estimates the Libyan presence to be at least 50, substantially more than needed to administer its small bilateral aid program. [redacted]

Qadhafi recently has sought to increase his leverage with Brazzaville by offering military and economic aid. [redacted] during a visit by Sassou to Tripoli in 1983, the Libyans signed an agreement to train Congolese Army and security forces in Libya and to provide financial and logistic aid to the armed forces. In 1982, [redacted] Libya offered \$35 million in loans for unspecified projects. The US Embassy reports that Libya and Congo are proceeding to develop a joint forestry project. Although nine Libyans were assigned to security and military positions as of October 1983, [redacted] we are unaware of any significant Libyan deliveries of military or economic aid to date. [redacted]

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Outlook

In our view, Congo's recent Westward moves have stopped short of fundamental political change or significant economic reform. Our analysis suggests that the Soviets are prepared to tolerate a certain amount of movement toward the West, while focusing efforts to retain influence in the military and security apparatus. We believe Congo's importance would increase significantly, however, if the Soviets lost access to Luanda. In such a case, we would expect Moscow to expend substantially more resources to encourage the emergence of a more radical regime in Brazzaville in hopes of gaining military access, particularly if no alternative were available elsewhere in the region. Barring such a development, we believe the most likely scenario is for Sassou to remain in power and for Congo's Westward drift to continue but within definite limits. [redacted]

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Limited Westward Drift Continues. In our judgment, Sassou genuinely wants good relations with the West but probably cannot do much more to move significantly closer to the United States. [redacted]

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Africa Briefs

Cameroon
Ethnic Discontent

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Dissatisfaction with President Biya's regime apparently is growing among the Bamileke, the largest of Cameroon's 200 or so tribes, which dominates the country's agricultural and commercial sectors. the Bamileke—who inhabit the western highlands—claim that Biya consistently favors his fellow Beti tribesmen in east central Cameroon. Many Bamileke reportedly believe that government efforts to crack down on corruption are directed primarily at reducing their share of the economy. Furthermore, the Bamileke complain that military assignments and promotions favor Beti officers and enlisted men, and they have been angered by repeated searches of the residence of the most senior Bamileke officer, Brig. Gen. Jean Nganso-Sunji, Chief of the Cameroonian Air Force. The government was pursuing allegations, which proved groundless, that the General was storing arms for a coup attempt.

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The Bamileke have a history of sporadic violence against the government that predated independence in 1960 and continued into the early 1970s. Bamileke strongholds in the western highlands still remain under a state of emergency directed against bandit remnants of a largely moribund dissident group called the Cameroon Peoples Union. Former President Ahidjo, a northern Muslim, maintained power by balancing Cameroon's ethnic groups and relying heavily on the support of northerners and Bamileke businessmen. Although the Bamileke were not implicated in the April 1984 coup attempt against Biya by northern military supporters of Ahidjo, there have been several recent allegations of antigovernment plotting by Bamileke military and civilians, in league with other northerners and western Cameroon anglophone tribesmen displeased over what they perceive as government favoritism toward the Beti. Although the President has attempted to reduce Bamileke discontent by appointing a prominent Bamileke businessman to his inner circle of advisers and by annulling some controversial military promotions, we believe tribal discontent will continue to threaten the stability of Biya's regime.

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 ALA AR 85-006
 8 March 1985

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Uganda

Fallout From US Human Rights Report [redacted]

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US criticism of Uganda's human rights report has deeply stung President Obote. Obote and some of his key cabinet members strongly expressed their displeasure with the report in a confrontational meeting with the Ambassador late last month. Since then Kampala canceled the US military training program, postponed a US-funded family planning conference, and briefly detained two Ugandan employees of the US Embassy last week, according to recent US Embassy reporting. We doubt that Obote has approved a coordinated campaign of harassment against US personnel—particularly at a time when Uganda's negotiations with the IMF are at a critical stage—but low-level officials may on their own initiative continue to demonstrate their hostility toward the United States. [redacted]

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Angola

Way Cleared To Sign Lome Convention [redacted]

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Angola is expected to join the Lome Convention soon, thereby making it eligible to receive badly needed development aid from the European Community, [redacted] Luanda's refusal to accept a clause linking West Berlin to the convention had prevented Angola's accession up until now. Angola's Soviet and East European allies flatly reject the clause and apparently had warned the dos Santos regime against signing any agreement containing even an implied reference to West Berlin. [redacted]

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Under a compromise solution proposed by West Germany, Angola will sign the convention without making specific reference to Berlin. Once the agreement is signed, Bonn will send a note to Luanda stating that West Germany understands that Angola recognizes the clause. Bonn does not expect Angola to reply. [redacted]

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Tanzania

Salim Liberalizes Detention Act [redacted]

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Prime Minister Salim, the likely successor to President Nyerere, recently engineered some moderating amendments to Tanzania's draconian Preventive Detention Act, according to Embassy reports. The President retains authority to detain persons without formal charge, but must inform them of the cause for detention within 15 days and submit a detainment order to an advisory committee within 90 days. Detainees also gained the right to judicial review. [redacted]

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The Detention Act will apply to Zanzibar for the first time, superseding provisions of the new Zanzibari state constitution specifying that detainees must be brought before a court within 24 hours and released unless charged. [redacted]

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[redacted] Zanzibari Attorney General Bakari has made an official protest, voicing displeasure among Zanzibaris with laws weakening Zanzibar's previous autonomy. Dissidents almost certainly will use the issue to further incite separatists' sentiment on the island, especially during the upcoming Tanzanian presidential election. Salim, a Zanzibari, may draw political fire from fellow islanders for undermining their constitutional freedoms. [redacted]

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