



Directorate of  
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**Africa Review**



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19 October 1984

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**Africa Review**

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [Redacted]*

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**Articles**

**Chad:  
Northern Dissidents Weakened** [Redacted]

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As France and Libya pull out of Chad, we believe that the country's Libyan-backed northern dissidents—who spearheaded a southward thrust in 1983 that was stopped only by French intervention—now pose a less serious threat to Chadian President Habre than do Libyan-backed dissidents in the south. The northern dissidents, grouped together under ex-Chadian President Goukouni's Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), are beset by ethnic and personal disputes, and have been weakened by defections and insufficient logistic support. If GUNT's forces elect to remain in northern Chad and are not directly supported by Libyan troops or aircraft, we believe they will not be able to offer much resistance when Habre begins his planned campaign to reoccupy the north. [Redacted]

enforced inactivity that followed the French intervention in August 1983. Numerous defectors and other sources have attested to the dissidents' poor morale, ethnic frictions, inadequate supplies, lack of discipline, and revolts against heavyhanded Libyan commanders. [Redacted]

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Habre's forces, on the other hand, have been upgraded somewhat over the past year and have no doubt reached their strongest level yet relative to GUNT's forces. As soon as the Libyan pullout is complete, [Redacted] the dissidents will be outgunned and outmanned by Habre's army. [Redacted]

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**GUNT's Disarray**

GUNT is little more than a paper government controlled by Libyan leader Qadhafi. He reconstructed it from remnants of the earlier Goukouni government—ousted by Habre in June 1982—in order to mount a military campaign aimed at installing a pliant regime in N'Djamena. GUNT has always been an uneasy amalgamation of widely diverse and traditionally antagonistic ethnic, regional, and religious groups united only by hostility to Habre and by hopes of sharing the spoils of governing Chad. Goukouni's removal last August of GUNT Defense Minister Achiek ibn Oumar, whose Democratic Revolutionary Council faction contributed the bulk of GUNT's combatants, is but the latest manifestation of GUNT's internal rivalries and tensions. [Redacted]

**What Next for GUNT?**

In our judgment, the northern dissidents' diverse factions and forces will break down further in the face of Habre's drive north after the Libyans pull back to the Aozou Strip, probably by mid-November. This disintegration is likely to involve:

- Rallying to Habre's side of up to several hundred new defectors as the protective Libyan umbrella is withdrawn.
- Melting away and returning home by perhaps another several hundred dissidents, who could pose a future threat to Habre depending on the strength of his hold in the north.
- Retreating to the Aozou Strip or to camps in Libya by the remaining diehard Habre opponents. We expect that Qadhafi will maintain these forces and refurbish them over time with new equipment, additional training, and fresh recruits. Rebuilding

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**Military Deterioration**

The capabilities of GUNT's estimated 3,500- to 4,000-man military arm, the National Liberation Army, have eroded during the 13-month period of

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the northern dissidents' military capabilities would provide Qadhafi with a non-Libyan force for hit-and-run guerrilla attacks in Chad. This would keep Habre's troops tied up in the north, giving more operating room to other Libyan-backed, anti-Habre dissidents in southern Chad.

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**Seychelles: Where Is the Coup?** [redacted]

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President Rene preempted a coup attempt on 30 September by arresting leaders of a civil demonstration that elements of the police and Army had intended to fan into a general uprising. Rene's initial response to this most recent threat to his regime has been low-key as he attempts to convince the country he is firmly in command. He is, however, badly shaken at the extent of popular opposition to his growing ties to the Soviet Union, one of the demonstrators' chief complaints. To assuage public fears, he will likely become more cautious in his relations with the Soviets and at least temporarily move more toward the West in a demonstration of nonalignment. Despite his public image of moderation, we believe that in the future Rene probably would not hesitate to move immediately and harshly to suppress opposition. [redacted]

Rene's suspicion of the West and concern over his personal vulnerability have heightened over the years with each unsuccessful effort to unseat him since he seized power in 1977. In November 1981, about 50 South African mercenaries attempted to enter Seychelles as tourists to overthrow Rene. Their discovery at the airport touched off a battle in which Tanzanian troops stationed in Seychelles to defend the regime put down the coup attempt. Less than a year later, the Tanzanians quashed a poorly organized Army mutiny led by disgruntled junior officers. Since then, Rene has called repeatedly for Soviet naval visits to bolster his regime during periods of tension. Characteristically, he also has sought to implicate the West—and the United States in particular—in these plots against him. [redacted]

**The September Plot**

Tensions have been high recently over economic grievances, the disappearance of an antiregime activist, and foreign press articles highlighting the growing Soviet presence in Seychelles. Influential church leaders, who have traditionally been outspoken opponents of Rene's socialist policies, delivered

sermons protesting "lawlessness" in the country during the week of the planned coup. According to US Embassy sources, as many as 2,000 women planned to march on downtown Victoria after the scheduled radiobroadcast of Sunday church services on 30 September. The Embassy reports that, as early as four days before the event, the Anglican archbishop learned from the daughter of police commissioner Pillay of a plan to seize the microphone during the church services and call for a change in government. [redacted]

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The demonstration, organized independently of the coup plot, was to serve as the catalyst for the uprising. Disgruntled junior Army officers and the 100-man police mobile unit, under the direct command of the police commissioner, planned to foment a general uprising once the marchers reached Victoria's downtown area, [redacted]

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By taking advantage of traffic congestion from the annual boating regatta and using buses to block major access routes to the city, the organizers reportedly planned to prevent the North Korean military advisers stationed at the airport and Rene's personal protection forces from reaching the scene. The plotters apparently believed that the Seychelles Army and police troops isolated in the city would not use force against their own people. According to Embassy reporting, the plotters then planned to arrest Rene and other government leaders, take control of the radio station, and appeal for "Western assistance" in toppling the government. [redacted]

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**Why the Plot Failed**

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In our judgment, the poorly organized plot was doomed from its inception. Above all, plans for exploiting the impending demonstrations were not kept secret. We believe that, while Rene probably did not have specific foreknowledge of the coup, he almost certainly was alerted to the potential for unrest at an

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early stage after his efficient security service detected the widespread rumors of the planned demonstrations. To defuse the situation, Rene informed church leaders on 29 September that there would be no radiobroadcast of Sunday services, placed a ban on all demonstrations, and had the leaders of the demonstrations arrested early Sunday morning. The plotters lacked an alternative plan for a coup attempt once the demonstrations were canceled. [redacted]

Rene's return to the country on 27 September from a monthlong trip abroad was not known to the general public until the day before the planned demonstrations. In our view, he had probably delayed announcing his presence in order to have time to assess the mood of the people, which was already uneasy when he left. We believe the plotters seriously underestimated the intimidating effect of Rene's presence on the willingness of the people to demonstrate. Most were cowed by Rene's well-known intolerance of dissent, the arrest of their leaders, and their uncertainty over the nature of possible government reprisals. [redacted]

The actual forces intending to stage the coup were probably quite small and hopelessly outgunned by Army and police units Rene stationed in Victoria as a precaution on Sunday. This show of force by Rene was sufficient to intimidate the plotters, particularly since many of their leaders probably were included among those detained hours before the planned event. [redacted]

The Embassy reports that no more than 100 people protested against the Soviet and North Korean presence on Sunday. The turnout was not large enough for those coup plotters still at large to exploit and they did not follow through with their plan. Police loyal to Rene, backed by Army troops stationed in the city, arrested 38 demonstrators. [redacted]

Even if the plotters had succeeded in arresting Rene and capturing the radio station, they apparently lacked any followup plan for action. We have no evidence to suggest they were likely to receive "Western assistance" once they made their appeal. Any likely leadership the plotters hoped to install was probably based in London—headquarters of the

dissident "Mouvement pour la Resistance"—and would not have been able to assume immediate and effective control of the government. [redacted]

#### Aftermath and Implications

Rene has probably long expected some opposition to him from elements of the military whose grievances he ignored following the Army mutiny in August 1982. In our judgment, however, he probably believed he had the full support of the people, and his subsequent actions indicate he was badly shaken at discovering the extent of public opposition to his tilt toward the left. He already appears to have begun to assuage popular fears of growing Soviet influence in Seychelles and to build up a credible public image of being nonaligned. For example, he has stated publicly that he would not allow any foreign power to establish a military base in Seychelles as long as he remains in power. [redacted]

Rene also reaffirmed his support for freedom of speech for church leaders to speak out against the government. He has initiated a dialogue with leading church activist Bishop Felix Paul, purportedly to stay informed on popular grievances. He must, however, work harder to convince the people of his sincerity; Embassy reporting indicates that many believe he has thus far failed to address their grievances substantively. [redacted]

Clearly, the coup attempt will increase Rene's suspicions of the military, as he recognizes the dependence of his fragile regime on its support. In particular, he will attempt to ensure the loyalty of Defense Minister Berlouis, a close supporter who Rene, nevertheless, fears could use his influence in the Army to rally disaffected troops against the government. Rene's dependence on the Army has increased since August with the withdrawal of the Tanzanian troops stationed in Seychelles from 1979. The Seychelles forces, however, are still supplemented by about 100 North Korean advisers, who began arriving in Seychelles in April 1983. [redacted]

Embassy reporting indicates that Rene has long believed that the West, and the United States in

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particular, has worked to undermine his regime. Soviet Ambassador Orlov has direct access to Rene and almost certainly continues to nurture those suspicions. The Soviets, again demonstrating their support, dispatched a Krivak-II-class frigate to the area in response to the 30 September crisis [redacted]

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Whatever his suspicions, however, we believe Rene has opted for a tactical shift of public policy toward improved relations with the West, at least in part because he realizes the Soviet Union will not provide the badly needed economic assistance that he now receives from the West. In addition, Rene does not wish to intimidate prospective tourists, or lose the approximately \$8 million in annual revenue from the US Air Force tracking station that has been in Seychelles since 1964. Nonetheless, we believe that Rene has no desire to reduce his ties to the Soviet Union and its allies, from whom he obtains vital military assistance. [redacted]

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**Burkina: Sankara One Year  
Later** [redacted]

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Burkinan Chief of State Thomas Sankara, a radical populist who seized power in August 1983, has used his first year in power to solidify his control and to project his impoverished Sahelian country as a "progressive" voice on the African scene. Sankara has ruthlessly suppressed or eliminated those elements of Burkinan society—the military, bureaucracy, civilian leftists, and labor—that posed a real or potential challenge to his preeminence. He also has established friendly ties with Cuba, the USSR, Libya, and an assortment of anti-Western Third World states. [redacted]

Embassy translates Faso as "Republic of" and Burkina as "Home of the Patriots"—represents the need to rid the country of all vestiges of colonialism. Assertive nationalism is the predominant theme in most of Sankara's speeches. [redacted]

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The strong revolutionary rhetoric that has characterized Sankara so far has not been translated into drastic social or economic restructuring at home. This cautious approach most likely reflects Sankara's need to avoid alienating France, other members of the European Community, and the World Bank—Burkina's major aid donors. Sankara's domestic pragmatism, however, does not mitigate his aim of keeping Burkina on a leftward course internationally or his propensity for radical slogans disquieting to Western donors. Burkinan positions and votes in the UN Security Council over the next year and a half probably will run sharply counter to US preferences. [redacted]

Sankara's readiness to put a personal stamp on every facet of Burkina's body politic is reflected in his use of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, citizen groups that have been set up around the country to serve as watchdog and political action units. They follow the lines of Cuban, Libyan, and Ghanaian models. The 59 neighborhood committees in Ouagadougou are the most influential ones, followed by those in the Army. [redacted]

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Sankara's dismissal last August of five leftist ministers from the Cabinet completed a yearlong series of moves against other centers of power. The ministers belonged to the League for Independence, Progress, and Democracy, a small group of Communist intellectuals that the US Embassy says numbers no more than 200 members. Some of the ministers were mentors of Sankara and his fellow coupmakers during their student days, indoctrinating them in the way of Marx and revolution. Leaguers played an influential role in the first months of Sankara's government, and attempted to steer the revolution along a course that would lead to their ascendancy. [redacted] they made the mistake—as have others—of underestimating Sankara and believing he could be manipulated. [redacted]

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**Sankara Consolidates Power**

Sankara has attained a dominant position in his military government by using repressive and often ruthless methods that contrast sharply with the forbearance and restraint practiced by previous regimes. Alleged coup plotters have been executed and opponents murdered at the instigation of the government, which also sends thugs into the streets to intimidate potential opponents. [redacted]

The Leaguers' overconfidence masked their lack of a solid power base, which was confined to the leftist Confederation of Voltan Trade Unions, heretofore the strongest of several previously powerful labor groupings. By last summer, Sankara had successfully muzzled all the unions. [redacted]

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On 4 August 1984, the first anniversary of his seizure of power, Sankara changed Upper Volta's name to Burkina Faso and proclaimed a new government purged of formerly influential civilian leftists. Sankara told the press that the name change—the US

Sankara's move against civilian leftists followed earlier purges of the military and the bureaucracy, eliminating those figures most likely to stage a coup. The purges, however, exacted a heavy price in reduced expertise and leadership, with particular impact on the government's ability to meet the country's growing economic crisis. [redacted]

### **The Faltering Economy**

So far Sankara has followed a moderate economic course aimed at reassuring Western donors and Burkina's neighbors that he will not institute a socialist economic system consonant with his radical populist rhetoric. Sankara's first priority, as expressed to the US Ambassador, is to make Burkina self-sufficient in food production. He has stated a preference for small-scale private-sector programs aimed at farmers and herdsmen, who comprise 90 percent of Burkinan society. Although our Ambassador believes the country has good agricultural potential, the prospect of continued drought will keep Burkina dependent on Western food aid for at least several years. In addition, we believe the government's lack of clear economic blueprints, trained administrators, and development funding will hobble Sankara's programs. [redacted]

Along with a drought-ravaged economy, the government faces a financial crunch that will increase further Burkina's dependence on Western donor countries and international financial institutions. The US Embassy reports that Sankara needs \$22.5 million by next January to pay Army and government salaries. France traditionally has provided the bulk of Burkina's budgetary support, but has made this year's contribution contingent on Sankara's reaching a standby agreement with the IMF that would require unpopular belt tightening. Libya and Algeria have provided some budgetary support recently, but have shown no readiness to replace France's largess. [redacted]

Burkina's economic need to maintain working relations with its Western-oriented coastal neighbors is another restraint on Sankara's radical tendencies. Landlocked Burkina relies on a railroad through the Ivory Coast and a highway through Togo to move virtually all its imports and exports. In addition, the remitted wages of a half-million Burkinans working in

Ivory Coast provide a significant portion of Burkina's foreign exchange earnings. Sankara would have little recourse if Ivory Coast expelled Burkinan workers, or if Ivory Coast or Togo closed its borders. [redacted]

### **Progressive Image Abroad**

Sankara has sought to cultivate a progressive image for himself and Burkina in a series of trips abroad, culminating in a visit to Cuba and an address before the UN General Assembly this October. Earlier trips took him to Eastern Europe, Libya, and to several radical African states. Underlying the hoopla is a sharp reorientation of Burkina's ideological leanings from West to East, symbolized by Sankara's embrace of African liberation movements, his acceptance of diplomatic representatives from the PLO and Polisario Front, and his boycott of the Olympic games. Deeper and somewhat more disquieting, however, are the increasingly close ties Sankara is forging with Cuba, the USSR, Libya, and other anti-Western states. [redacted]

**The Cuban Factor.** Burkina's links to Cuba have expanded rapidly, particularly in the military and intelligence areas. [redacted]

[redacted] mandatory Spanish-language study has been introduced for Burkina's officer cadets and for some 250 Burkinan military personnel who reportedly were about to depart for training in Cuba at midyear. [redacted]

[redacted] Cuban military instructors will provide advanced training in Burkina, but their numbers will be kept small to avoid upsetting Western aid donors. [redacted]

Cuba also is becoming involved with the fledgling Burkinan intelligence service. [redacted]

[redacted] Cuba has agreed to help establish a new Burkinan service charged with both internal security and intelligence collection. The service probably will be headed by Vincent Sigue, a Burkinan recently released after Sankara's vigorous intercession from a French jail where he was awaiting trial on murder charges. Sigue earlier had received terrorist training in Cuba, and has close ties with Libya as well. Putting him in

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charge of the new service will give Sankara another powerful tool to use to maintain internal control and open a wider door to Cuban influence. [ ]

In the economic sphere, an agreement signed last June calls for Cuba to provide some 100 specialists to assist the Burkinans in various fields ranging from agriculture and transportation to health and education. Some technicians have arrived in the last two months. [ ]

**Soviet Ties.** The USSR had been conspicuously circumspect until recently, apparently waiting to see if Sankara would be able to consolidate his position. Evidence suggests that Moscow has concluded Sankara probably is here to stay and now is sending limited amounts of military aid. Burkina's Minister of Defense visited Moscow last May, and we believe he asked for small arms and uniforms to outfit several thousand members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution who were being formed into paramilitary units. Burkina requested similar aid from the United States earlier and was turned down. US officials report that several Soviet IL-76 transport aircraft arrived in Ouagadougou last July and August with loads of boxes. Sankara's first anniversary parade on 4 August was attended by a Soviet delegation and featured newly outfitted Army troops and units from the Committees armed with AK-47 automatic rifles, according to a senior US official on the scene. [ ]

We do not expect the Soviets to play a major role in Burkina, leaving that to the Cubans, but they probably will send modest aid from time to time. Moscow, in return, no doubt will continue to receive Burkinan support in international forums, such as the United Nations. [ ]

**Fluctuating Libyan Influence.** Sankara's relations with Libya have blown hot and cold, and now appear on a warming trend. Earlier this year, Sankara withdrew as many as 45 Burkinan officer cadets from training in Libya because of the racism and poor living conditions they encountered there. The US Embassy in Ouagadougou reports that Sankara also resisted Libyan requests to send military technicians to Burkina and openly criticized Libya's "union" with

Morocco. Then, in September, Sankara made what appears to be a fence-mending visit to Tripoli, where he was the only foreign head of state present at Qadhafi's celebration of his seizure of power. [ ]

We expect that there will be continued swings in Libyan-Burkinan relations, but that over the long term Sankara will keep Qadhafi from getting too close. Sankara knows the French, Ivorians, and Togolese are watching closely because they fear Qadhafi might use Burkina as an entry point for mischiefmaking in West Africa. After some initial stumbles, Sankara has pursued a policy of good neighborliness toward Ivory Coast and Togo by stressing that Burkina will not become a center of subversion directed against the two moderate states. In return, Ivory Coast has at least been correct in its dealings with Sankara and shows no sign of allowing numerous Burkinan exiles to use the country as a base for anti-Sankara operations. Togo has been more forthcoming, reflecting what the US Embassy in Ouagadougou believes to be President Eyadema's strong commitment to keeping Burkina's Western options open. [ ]

**The French Connection.** The French have told US officials that they are not pleased with the turn Burkina has taken under Sankara, and are watching the situation closely. However, French officials indicate that Paris is willing to suffer Sankara's radical posturing so long as he does not pose a threat to regional stability, which is far and away France's overriding concern. There are few French economic interests in resource-poor Burkina. The French also have told US diplomats that Paris hopes to avoid any action that would push Sankara into a closer alliance with the Cubans and Libyans. [ ]

Sankara's attitude toward France is ambivalent. He knows Burkina cannot easily dispense with French bilateral aid or membership in French-backed regional organizations, particularly the Franc zone. At the same time, Sankara is a nationalist who strongly resents his country's past colonial masters. He worries that France might withdraw its economic support, and fears the French will engineer his ouster. [ ]

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**Implications for the United States**

Frequent anti-United States political rhetoric by Sankara and the government media has brought Burkinan-US relations to a low point. Last spring, for example, Sankara accused the United States of supporting an alleged coup plot. Following denials by our Ambassador, Sankara backed down and implied his charges were created for domestic political reasons. Sankara also said he hoped an official visit could be arranged for him in Washington. More recently, Burkina's official newspaper has carried articles equating President Reagan with Hitler and again accusing the US Ambassador of subversive activities. Sankara responded to our Ambassador's protests with a catalogue of perceived US snubs, including his failure to receive an invitation to the White House when he was in New York in early October, and with requests for more US economic aid. Sankara's typical juxtaposition of false accusations and the desire for high-level treatment exemplifies what successive US Ambassadors have termed "Sankara's political innocence," coupling intemperate verbal attacks with an unawareness of their effect on substantive relations.

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Despite the acrimony of recent US-Burkinan exchanges in Ouagadougou, the main arena for US-Burkinan confrontations over the next year and a half is likely to be the US Security Council, where Burkina holds a seat until January 1986. According to the US Embassy in Ouagadougou, the United States has relatively little leverage—other than verbal protest—to shift Sankara to a more moderate stance because our bilateral aid program is modest, and humanitarian considerations preclude a suspension of food aid.

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**Angola:  
Thwarted Rapprochement  
With Portugal** [redacted]

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Political relations between Portugal and Angola have foundered badly since Luanda's ardent courtship, which began in 1981, ended abruptly in early 1983 following Angolan charges that Lisbon harbors representatives of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Luanda and Lisbon recently have held two separate rounds of high-level talks designed to improve bilateral relations, but nothing of value apparently was accomplished. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Disagreement over UNITA continues to provide the basis for the chill in political relations. Lisbon refuses to take the repressive measures against UNITA dissidents on its soil that Luanda demands, although it still seeks closer ties. Luanda, for its part, still complains bitterly that Lisbon lends support to UNITA and has made the issue a litmus test for improved bilateral relations. [redacted]

The relationship progressed further the next month when Portuguese President Eanes was received warmly during a visit to Luanda. The two governments signed more cooperation agreements—on tourism, technical aid, university exchanges, and transportation—and [redacted] discussed limited military contacts. [redacted]

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**Blossoming Relations**

Angola began a determined effort to seek better relations with the West in late 1981. [redacted] Luanda was motivated by a strong desire to decrease its heavy dependence on Soviet and Cuban military and economic assistance. Moreover, it wanted increased Western trade and investment to buttress its sagging economy and enhanced Western political ties to reduce its diplomatic isolation. [redacted]

In May 1982, an Angolan delegation headed by economic czar Lopo do Nascimento visited Lisbon, where it discussed a possible Portuguese oil-exploration program in Angola, requested the Portuguese to provide mining technicians (an area then dominated by Soviet advisers), and discussed other programs for aid, [redacted] Nascimento also asked the Portuguese to assist in improving Angola's relations with members of the European Economic Community. By the end of the year, Portugal also had agreed to participate in still other economic projects, including the financing and construction of a dam expansion project on the Cuanza River. [redacted]

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Portugal was one of the first Western countries Luanda turned to for diplomatic support, investment capital, and technical advisers. The Angolans found the Portuguese receptive—lured, we believe, by the potential economic benefit, a lingering sense of responsibility toward its former colony, and the desire to resume the role of an international actor of consequence. In March 1982, the two sides signed an aid protocol in Luanda covering agreements in science, culture, health, agriculture, transportation, petroleum, and other areas of cooperation. [redacted]

Throughout 1982 and early 1983, the two countries discussed other ways to expand mutual cooperation and credit facilities. [redacted] the Angolans also pressed Lisbon for counterinsurgency training in Portugal and the dispatch of a military team to Angola. [redacted] some in the Portuguese military—encouraged by President Eanes—were considering sending a force to Angola to replace the Cubans. [redacted]

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**A Pall Sets In**

The first problems arose over rumors in the Portuguese press—which we believe were misinformation—that South Africa was plotting with Angolan dissidents in Lisbon and with the tacit approval of the Portuguese Government to overthrow the Angolan Government. Although the Portuguese adamantly denied the story, it cast a pall over the growing relationship. Bilateral ties began to deteriorate sharply, [redacted]

[redacted], when UNITA established a front organization in Lisbon in early 1983. In the wake of an escalating insurgency that was spreading into eastern Angola, Luanda seized on the opening of the UNITA front to begin attacking Lisbon in the press [redacted] for its “aid” to the insurgents. [redacted]

Other problems also began to beset the relationship. A socialist government came to power in Portugal in June 1983 headed by Mario Soares, who knew and was impressed by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, according to an Embassy reporting source. Prime Minister Soares soon seriously offended the Angolan Government by attempting to mediate between UNITA and the MPLA, according to a diplomatic report. Another problem may have been that President Eanes—who was at odds with the Soares government—had led the Angolans to believe they would receive more aid than Soares was willing to offer. Moreover, as one of Europe’s poorest countries, Portugal had only limited resources to invest in Angola regardless of the ambitions of the Portuguese Government. At the height of the courtship in mid-1982, Angolan imports from Portugal had declined significantly over the same period in 1981. [redacted]

Portugal also apparently had not provided as many technical advisers as had been anticipated at the height of the rapprochement. The chill over UNITA ties probably had been the main cause for the absence of more advisers, but Soviet and Cuban misinformation also may have had some effect. [redacted]

[redacted] the Portuguese believed that Moscow and Havana were attempting to undermine Lisbon’s position by claiming Portuguese advisers were US spies or agents of insurgents. [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets and Cubans complained vigorously to the Angolans about their opening to the West. [redacted]

By late 1983, Angola announced it would undertake “economic reprisals” against Portugal and formed a high-level committee to review all technical assistance agreements with Lisbon. Angolan enterprises were told to look elsewhere for purchases, and the Portuguese oil company PETROGAL was excluded from participation in Block 4 offshore oil development, contrary to previous promises. [redacted]

[redacted] the Angolans considered severing diplomatic relations and moving their Embassy from Lisbon to Madrid. They began to court Spain in mid-1983, apparently as an alternative source of Western aid and assistance and, we believe, to further pressure Lisbon. Plans to shift the Embassy apparently have been scrapped. [redacted]

**Partial Restoration**

[redacted] Lisbon was perplexed by Luanda’s volte-face. Portugal denied that it had any official contact with UNITA and, after a period of puzzling over how to react, began a sustained effort to revive relations. Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama traveled to Luanda in February 1984 where he was lectured by Angolan Foreign Minister Jorge for his country’s alleged support for UNITA, [redacted]

[redacted] While Gama reportedly denied that his government aided UNITA, he explained that Portugal could not throw law-abiding Angolan dissidents in jail. He also apparently assented to a request for a new line of credit. [redacted]

Relations seemed to improve briefly last spring. In April, a Portuguese official announced that Lisbon would increase its existing line of credit to Angola by \$60 million to finance consumer goods and that Portugal was negotiating a \$50 million increase in credit for the purchase of other goods. The offer of new aid apparently brought a brief respite in Angolan press attacks on Portugal. In May, however, dos Santos personally criticized the Soares government in a public interview, leaving Lisbon once again bewildered. [redacted]

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**Current Relations**

Recent high-level political exchanges have apparently been fruitless. A meeting in September between an Angolan Politburo member and Soares, according to a diplomatic report, provided an opportunity for Soares to stress again his interest in better ties as well as to make the point that his government would not muzzle the Portuguese press or abridge the rights of Portuguese citizens. President Eanes, without the approval of the Soares government, also sent an emissary to dos Santos in mid-September to express a desire for better relations, [redacted]

[redacted] Eanes's overture, however, was greeted with strong expressions of anger over Portuguese support for UNITA. [redacted]

Bilateral trade has improved. Portuguese exports to Angola during the first half of 1984 were four times higher than in the same period of 1982 and twice as high as in the same period of 1983. According to recent public statements by dos Santos, economic and trade relations are "normal." [redacted]

Discussions of Portuguese military aid to Angola that began in 1982 subsequently proved unproductive. While the Portuguese might have played a limited advisory role in training the Angolan Army, Lisbon did not, in our view, have the will or ability to take over the role of the Cubans. The only military assistance the Portuguese apparently provide is given unofficially by a group of some 60 to 80 retired leftwing military officers and mechanics who serve in Angola in a training capacity, [redacted]

The recent showing of a documentary on Portuguese television favorable to Savimbi is likely to be another stumblingblock in bilateral relations. Angola had strenuously opposed its showing, and, under pressure from the Portuguese Communist Party and the government, its airing had been delayed three times. Soares has publicly expressed his disapproval of the showing, but we doubt that his protest will lessen Angolan resentment. [redacted]

**Prospects**

Lisbon is likely to continue to seek closer ties with Luanda, but we do not believe that the Soares government will take any significant measures against

UNITA representatives in Portugal. Portuguese law prohibits the kind of repression of UNITA sympathizers—many of whom have dual Angolan-Portuguese citizenship—that Angola demands. The political cost of repressing UNITA through legal or extralegal means also is likely to prove greater than Soares is willing to pay. If he moves against UNITA, we believe he would face strident press criticism, strong attacks from the opposition Center Democrats, and complaints from his coalition partner, the Social Democrats. [redacted]

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We see little prospect that the rapprochement will develop as both sides had hoped in 1982. With UNITA representatives still operating freely in Portugal, we believe that Luanda will continue to maintain a chill in its relations with Lisbon. In the two years since UNITA began its dramatic expansion throughout three-fourths of Angola, the insurgents' isolation from external aid and refuge has become an even more important goal in Luanda's foreign policy. [redacted]

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We believe, however, that modest trade relations between Angola and Portugal are likely to continue growing despite the strained political ties. Aid ties are likely to remain limited both by political difficulties and, in the longer run, by Portugal's own resources. [redacted]

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**Zaire: Plans for a Civil Guard** [redacted]

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President Mobutu, spurred in part by Libyan-inspired terrorist bombings in Kinshasa earlier this year, is moving to create a new security organization called the Civil Guard. The Guard appears designed eventually to replace the National Gendarmerie—Zaire's ineffective, quasi-military police force. Mobutu reportedly envisions a 10,000-man Guard dominated by his fellow Ngbandi tribesmen, raising the possibility that he may use it as a private militia. We believe, however, that the new organization will exist largely on paper for the near term because of Mobutu's inability to find external funding for its creation. [redacted]

by at least keeping alive the threat of a competing organization which he can use to play against them. [redacted]

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**Mobutu's Motives**

We believe political and personal considerations, as well as a desire to enhance internal security, are behind Mobutu's recent decision to create the Civil Guard. Mobutu's distrust of the existing Gendarmerie, whose loyalty and indiscipline have long concerned him, appears to have been the principal factor in his decision, according to the US Embassy. The decree providing for the creation of the Guard assigns the new organization most if not all of the Gendarmerie's current functions, including border patrol, counterterrorism, counterespionage, and disaster relief. In addition, [redacted]

**Obstacles to Formation**

In our view, the primary obstacle to the formation of a Civil Guard is Zaire's lack of financial resources. We estimate that a national force with the capabilities Mobutu envisions would require a minimum of \$20 million to implement and \$1.5 million per month to maintain. Mobutu is unlikely to jeopardize Zaire's IMF-sponsored austerity program by diverting major public funds, so finding an external sponsor is critical for the new organization. [redacted]

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[redacted] Mobutu has directed that the Guard be staffed predominantly with men from his own Ngbandi tribe from Zaire's Equateur Region. [redacted]

Zaire has asked West Germany to fund and train the new unit, but, according to US Embassy reporting, Bonn has made no firm commitments so far. West Germany has provided Zaire with police training in the past [redacted]

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[redacted] The US Embassy reports that a commission of German experts sent to Zaire last April to study Mobutu's proposed Guard concluded that there were several barriers to its creation, including the prohibitive costs of training and equipping such a national force. Moreover, according to a US Embassy source, Bonn is hesitant to support an organization that likely would become involved in human rights abuses. To our knowledge, Mobutu has not approached any other country for assistance with this project. [redacted]

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We believe that Mobutu sees the Ngbandi-dominated Civil Guard, which unlike the present Gendarmerie would be under civilian control and report directly to him, as a private militia that would significantly increase his personal security, patronage ability, and control—particularly in the more remote regions of the country. Moreover, in our view, even if the Guard remains a paper entity or is reduced in scope, Mobutu will have increased his hold over Gendarmerie leaders

Mobutu's planned organization, according to US Embassy reports, faces strong opposition within the regular military and, [redacted] has created near panic among members of the Gendarmerie. [redacted] many

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Gendarmes in the Kinshasa area are reacting to Mobutu's plans by spending more time seeking support among their political and military patrons than performing their duties. [redacted]

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**Prospects**

In our judgment, the financial resources needed to fund the Guard will not be forthcoming from West Germany or any other external source. West Germany, however, may agree to train and equip a smaller police force for Kinshasa or a counterterrorist unit. Even if the Guard is reduced in scope and limited to Kinshasa, Mobutu probably would have enhanced his personal security and, perhaps more important, would have involved another Western country in responsibility for a key security unit. Other Western countries whose advisers command or closely work with key military units include Israel, Belgium, and France. The United States, although not taking as direct a role, also works closely with Zaire's military. [redacted]

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If West German training and equipment enabled Mobutu to establish a national force, we believe he would face determined opposition from within the military and the National Gendarmerie. Even a version of the Guard limited to the Kinshasa area might encounter some resistance from the elite Presidential Guard. Mobutu, however, has reorganized his security and military services several times in the past despite opposition, and we expect that he will have few problems in doing so again. Moreover, we believe Mobutu probably would not scrap the Gendarmerie but only reduce its scope, while incorporating many of the displaced Gendarmes into the Civil Guard. In any event, unless it is financed on a continued basis by West Germany and provided with foreign supervision at least at the brigade level, the Guard probably would soon resemble the current National Gendarmerie—underfunded, ill disciplined, and ineffective. [redacted]

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**Comoros:  
Abdallah's Second Term** [redacted]

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President Ahmed Abdallah, who was unchallenged in his bid for a second six-year term in the 30 September elections, now faces several challenges to his regime's stability. Although the staunchly pro-Western Abdallah is unlikely to deviate significantly from the moderate political course he has charted over the past six years, economic and nationalistic pressures may lead him to undertake foreign policy initiatives that could affect Western interests in the southwest Indian Ocean region. [redacted]

A second referendum on Mayotte is tentatively scheduled to be held in 1985. Spurred by growing domestic criticism over his failure to expedite the island's return, Abdallah is unwilling to accept another "no" vote on union with the Comoros. We believe, however, he would not sever relations with France, which has a defense agreement with Comoros and is the country's leading bilateral aid donor. He may ask the French to postpone the referendum, however, if he believes a "no" vote is likely. In the interim, he probably will continue to enlist diplomatic support for his position in international forums. [redacted]

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**The Mayotte Issue**

We believe Abdallah continues to view the integration of French-administered Mayotte into the Comoros as his most pressing foreign policy concern. Mayotte is the most prosperous of the four islands and bringing it under Comoran administration would dramatically boost the country's economy. Furthermore, Abdallah has been working to improve his reputation in the region as a nationalist leader, and believes that unification of the four islands would go far in legitimizing his mercenary-backed regime, both domestically and in other African countries. [redacted]

**Assuring Internal Stability**

Abdallah has enjoyed considerable popular support over the past six years, in spite of the taint of his mercenary-installed government. Comorans seemingly prefer this benign, authoritarian regime to that of the repressive Ali Soileh, whom he deposed. To assure continued stability in Comoros, we believe he must now successfully ameliorate concerns over his succession, the role of the mercenaries in the government, and sources of foreign economic assistance. His failure to resolve these problems could afford potential opponents an opportunity to destabilize the regime. [redacted]

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The Mayotte issue, however, is unlikely to be resolved soon. Mayotte's inhabitants voted to remain a French protectorate after Abdallah declared unilateral independence in 1975. They have since voted against integration, fearing their healthy economy would suffer after union with the other less developed islands. Abdallah's commitment to acquire Mayotte has long strained Comoros' otherwise good relations with France. He has accused the French of foot-dragging and insists that they should do more to persuade inhabitants of the island to opt for integration. He also is suspicious of French initiatives to install television and communication links between Mayotte and Reunion, thereby strengthening cultural ties to France among Mayottes' predominantly Creole population. [redacted]

**The Succession Issue**

[redacted] Should he die while in office, the constitution provides that government control passes to the pro-Western President of the National Assembly, Mohamed Taki. Taki would then organize new elections, that US Embassy officials say he would be likely to win. In our judgment, however, Abdallah's hostility to Taki, a longstanding political opponent, might lead Abdallah to groom as a loyal heir apparent a junior politician who has not yet established a [redacted]

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political base of support. We believe worsening health problems might then cause Abdallah to retire voluntarily and install his handpicked successor. If Abdallah does not clearly establish a successor in advance, US Embassy reporting indicates that the constitutional provisions for succession might well be ignored as a power struggle ensues with uncertain prospects for the pro-Western moderates. [redacted]

**The Mercenaries**

For security, Abdallah relies almost entirely on mercenaries, who returned him to power in 1978, and a 250-man Presidential Guard. He has dispersed the Comoran military and gendarmerie throughout the three islands to minimize the possibility of an internally based coup attempt. However, the loyalty of the mercenaries to Abdallah is questionable; many of them, under the leadership of Bob Denard, overthrew Abdallah's one-month-old government in 1975 and installed Ali Soileh as dictator. [redacted]

The ambitions of the approximately 50 mercenaries who train the President's personal protection unit pose a potential threat to Abdallah. According to Embassy reporting, some of the mercenaries are agitating for a greater behind-the-scenes role in determining foreign policy. Abdallah already has bent to their pressure as he initiated moves toward closer diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa. Despite the rising friction, Abdallah probably will continue to rely on the mercenaries and respond to their demands while at the same time attempting to disassociate himself from them publicly. [redacted]

**Search for Foreign Aid**

The Comoros, one of the world's least developed countries, is heavily dependent on foreign assistance for economic development. In the coming year, we expect Abdallah will try to expand on traditional sources of foreign economic development assistance, confined largely to France. He is actively seeking increased aid from moderate Arab countries. Because Abdallah believes Communism and Islam are incompatible, we believe it is unlikely he would accept substantial offers of foreign aid from Communist countries. He has long expressed his disappointment to Western officials over low levels of US and French economic assistance to his country, however, arguing

that in contrast to his left-leaning neighbors, his pro-Western leadership has not been rewarded. He probably chose to accept a token level of Soviet aid—the Soviet Ambassador's recent offer of scholarships for study in Moscow—to express mild displeasure with the West and demonstrate that he has alternatives to Western support. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Abdallah appears reasonably secure in his position for the near term, although we cannot exclude the possibility of a successful coup attempt. We know little about the external opposition to Abdallah's regime, but we believe that it is small, fragmented, and has little internal support. Nevertheless, Abdallah probably will continue to press the West—particularly the United States and France—to accept his longstanding offer to establish military facilities on the islands as he believes a sizable Western military presence would deter external coup plotting. [redacted]

According to the US Embassy, internal political opponents agree that Abdallah is the only leader with sufficient national stature to maintain internal stability at this time. His ability to remain in power over the longer term, however, rests on his success in resolving domestic difficulties and expanding military ties with the West. [redacted]

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**Malawi: Transport Problems  
Threaten Crops** [redacted]

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Malawi, which normally produces enough food to feed itself and export maize to its neighbors, now faces transportation problems that threaten farmers' ability to plant their crops. The new crops must be planted before the onset of rains—due in mid-October in the south and mid-November in central Malawi. [redacted]

trucks. Malawi would then export tea and tobacco on the backhaul, offsetting at least part of the cost of the transportation. Transport authorities, however, believe the new system will take at least two months to put into operation. [redacted]

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In early August, Zambia informed Malawi that the amount of oil which it normally supplies would be cut in half due to leaks in the Tanzanian/Zambian pipeline and a shortage of foreign currency to pay Tanzania. Malawi's efforts to obtain oil via other routes have been thwarted. Mozambican insurgents have closed the major rail lines leading to the ports of Beira and Nacala. In addition, a shortage of locomotives in Zambia has prevented Malawi from importing South African fuel. While Zimbabwean oil is close at hand, its price is some 25 percent higher than Zambia's. Moreover, the reluctance of truckers to travel dangerous routes from Zimbabwe through Mozambique's insurgent-infested Tete Province—even under Zimbabwean Army escort—also makes the regular purchase of Zimbabwean oil unlikely. [redacted]

Unless the transport crunch is eased, the smallholder farmers, primarily in outlying regions where diesel fuel has already run out, will be unable to obtain fertilizers or use gas-powered farm machinery. The shortage already has placed strains on the rest of the Malawian economy as fuel prices rose 20 percent in August, following a 14-percent increase only four months earlier. [redacted]

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As an interim measure, Zimbabwe agreed in early October to lend Malawi approximately 15,000 barrels of diesel fuel and 6,000 barrels of gasoline. Based on Malawi's average consumption, the gasoline will last about eight days and the diesel approximately 10 unless some form of rationing is imposed. Although Zimbabwe promised immediate delivery of the fuel, shipping may be hampered by the continuing transport difficulties. [redacted]

Over the longer term, the situation should be alleviated with the completion of a 50-kilometer road from northern Malawi to southwestern Tanzania that connects to other roadways leading to the port of Dar es Salaam. Until the road is completed—now scheduled for early 1985—Malawi will be forced to scramble for routes to transport oil and other imports in addition to any agricultural exports. [redacted]

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According to US Embassy reporting, a South African trucking firm also has tried to assist Malawi by donating rubberized bags which allow oil to be shipped from South Africa to Malawi on ordinary

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## Africa Briefs

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### Tanzania

#### Unrest in the Military [redacted]

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Despite President Nyerere's efforts since the aborted military coup in January 1983 to disarm opposition, discontent remains prevalent, particularly among the junior ranks. This is forcing Nyerere to deal cautiously with a military that was once solidly behind him:

- Treason trials for those arrested in connection with the coup plot last year—mostly low-ranking military personnel—have surfaced allegations that senior officers who are still in office were involved in the coup attempt.
- Widespread discontent among junior and noncommissioned officers has led to rumors of renewed coup plotting in the lower military ranks.
- The Chief of Defense Forces, a strong Nyerere supporter, has been severely criticized by the Minister of Defense for alleged "lack of discipline" in commanding the troops, [redacted]
- Tribal rivalries apparently have led to death threats against senior officers unless they step down, [redacted]

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Nyerere undoubtedly realizes the political importance of retaining the military's support. Consequently, he must carefully weigh the demands of senior officers for privileges traditionally accorded them against growing resentment over their treatment among lower ranking officers. The treason trials could serve as a catalyst for the same antiregime sentiments that led to the coup attempt last year.

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#### Support for the ANC [redacted]

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The Tanzanian People's Defense Force has agreed to provide a three-month training course in sabotage and explosives to African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas. [redacted] the first group of 50 trainees will begin the course in November. After completion, they are expected to infiltrate South Africa to carry out attacks. Senior Tanzanian military personnel have stipulated, however, that they will not train armed guerrillas or provide weapons to ANC members. In addition, Tanzanian President Nyerere traveled to Zimbabwe in August in an attempt to convince Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe to join him in providing military training for the ANC. Nyerere's actions are a followup to his acceptance of ANC guerrillas ousted from Mozambique following the signing of the Nkomati Accord. [redacted]

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Tanzania has traditionally provided military support to the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), while assisting the ANC in a nonmilitary capacity. The loss of

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Mozambican backing for the ANC, coupled with the realization that the PAC does not have the wherewithal to carry out an effective military campaign against the Pretoria regime, however, probably motivated Nyerere's decision to begin providing military support to the ANC. [redacted]

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**South Africa****Homeland Troops Serving in Namibia** [redacted]

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Approximately 150 soldiers returned from duty in northern Namibia to the black African "homeland" of Ciskei on 2 October 1984, according to the press and a source of the US Consulate in Cape Town. They probably are members of Ciskei's South African-trained counterinsurgency or paratrooper units. Another homeland, Venda, announced its intention to send troops to Namibia last year. Although such small contingents add little to the nearly 20,000 government troops in Namibia, Pretoria probably encourages the homelands to assign troops there because the counterinsurgency experience they receive in Namibia improves their capability to intercept guerrillas who pass through their territory en route to South Africa. [redacted]

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**First Black Military Officers** [redacted]

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Two South African blacks were commissioned as lieutenants on 5 October, making them the first black regular officers in the South African Defense Force, according to the US defense attache in Pretoria. They are members of the 21st Battalion, the first black unit in the Army's permanent (career) forces. This showcase battalion of blacks, mostly from urban areas according to the white commander, is based near the black township of Soweto and has served in Namibia. It frequently is displayed by Pretoria as evidence of reform and opportunity for blacks in the military. Pretoria has long had Colored and Asian officers in command of troops, but, according to an authoritative academic study, it has assigned its only two other black officers to serve as a public relations officer and a chaplain. The new lieutenants almost certainly will have no whites serving under them for fear of provoking a white backlash. [redacted]

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**Nigeria****Moves To Avert Student Confrontations** [redacted]

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The Buhari regime has delayed university openings, probably through the fall semester, to avoid possible confrontations with students unhappy over sharp hikes in boarding fees, according to the US Embassy. Lagos's determination to decrease its burgeoning federal budget deficit by ending costly university subsidies will push student food costs five times higher than last year's 65 cents a meal. Buhari is taking precautions to avoid a repeat of bloody student riots in 1978 triggered by an earlier military government's attempt to increase school fees. The US Embassy believes that for now student leaders are resigned to cost hikes and are not anxious to spark a violent protest for fear of government reprisals. Student attitudes could change, however, if the economy continues to decline and the government's image deteriorates still further. [redacted]

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**Liberia**

**Banking Reforms in Jeopardy** [redacted]

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The US Embassy reports Monrovia is circumventing recent banking reforms designed to shore up the country's dollar-based financial system. The Doe government has managed to skirt commercial bank restrictions on deficit spending—intended to keep the regime from consuming all available dollar assets—by issuing rubber checks to pay its bills. The government also may be preparing to issue unbacked Liberian coins to alleviate cash shortages when the initial phase of the reform program expires next month, [redacted]

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[redacted] Head of State Doe's major concern, according to the US Embassy, is to meet the government payroll. We believe he is unlikely to reduce public spending when he is counting on heavy voter turnout for his party in the upcoming 1985 elections. Despite Doe's actions, the banks probably will renew their arrangement with the government next month in the belief that the present monitoring system is better than nothing at all. [redacted]

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