



Directorate of Intelligence

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**Africa Review**



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**25 May 1984**

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25 May 1984

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**Africa Review** [Redacted]

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.  
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Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [Redacted]*

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Articles


**Zaire-Angola:  
Ramifications of Kinshasa's  
Support for UNITA** 


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There is a growing body of evidence that strongly suggests Zaire is again supporting the insurgency of the South African-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Luanda seems to be aware of at least some of Kinshasa's efforts on behalf of the insurgents and appears to be trying to arrange a high-level meeting to calm the situation. If such efforts fail, Luanda could retaliate by renewing support for rebels opposed to the Mobutu regime. 


**Fundamental Differences**

Zaire and Angola have for years been part of the larger East-West struggle in central Africa. Each country's relationship with and dependence on rival big powers is, in our judgment, a key element in the undercurrent of mutual distrust and bilateral disharmony that ebbs and flows. 

Angolan and Zairian views appear to be diametrically opposed on most African problems and international issues. Angola is widely regarded as one of Africa's leading "radical" states, while Zaire is considered one of the continent's most conservative. We doubt that the basic differences between them will be resolved any time soon. 

Of the nine countries that surround Zaire, Kinshasa regards Angola as potentially the most dangerous. President Mobutu's almost paranoid fear of Communism and of what he refers to as the "red belt" around Zaire is fueled by the pervasive Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola and by Luanda's own avowed commitment to Marxism-Leninism. Luanda's frequent verbal attacks on Zaire's major Western backers underscore Mobutu's worries. 


**Roots of Conflict**

The conflict between Angola and Zaire is rooted in the past, particularly in the turbulent period just before and after Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975. Mobutu supported the two more moderate factions that vied for ascendancy in Angola, Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. When a third group—the leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—came to power with Soviet and Cuban support, Mobutu's gamble to influence the outcome of the Angolan civil war was lost. Zaire's association with the MPLA's rivals and the deep ideological differences between Mobutu and Angola's then President Neto ensured that the highly antagonistic relationship would endure. 


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Angola's collusion with and support for the abortive invasions of Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978 by the anti-Mobutu Front for the National Liberation of Congo (FLNC) provided a basis, in turn, for Kinshasa's wariness of Luanda. Since then, the continuing presence in Angola of 4,000 to 6,000 FLNC rebels has been a source of serious concern to Mobutu. 

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Although relations between the two countries have improved somewhat in recent years, either capital probably would welcome a change of regime in the other. In our view, however, the type of regime change that is most likely to occur in either country would do little to lessen the differences that separate them. 

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**Mirror Images**

Notwithstanding these differences and mutual antagonism, in some respects Zaire and Angola are surprisingly similar. [redacted]

- Ethnic cleavages dominate the political setting in each country.
- Each has large numbers of residents who are either opposed to the government or who simply do not actively support it. Alienation of the vast majority of the population is the norm.
- Both countries suffer from deteriorating economic and social conditions that by any impartial standard would suggest that conditions are ripe for a coup attempt or at least civil disorder.
- Large numbers of refugees and armed rebels from each country are resident in the other.
- Both countries have armed forces that are unprofessional and unreliable. Their failures and shortcomings are well known.
- Both governments are basically weak and need to be shored up by outside powers. Each would need the help of foreign military forces to cope with an internal uprising or an invasion by externally based rebels. [redacted]

**Uneasy Rapprochement Since 1978**

Bilateral relations were fairly good for five years after the end of the second Shaba invasion in 1978, although underlying suspicions and distrust did not dissipate. A rapprochement developed that was based essentially on a mutual agreement not to support each other's dissidents. Both countries seemed to make an effort to live up to the agreement, at least until last year. Even now, each continues to stress publicly a good neighbor policy and a commitment to nonintervention in the internal affairs of the other. [redacted]

Moreover, Kinshasa and Luanda have cooperated effectively on a variety of other issues. They have worked with UN officials in caring for refugees along

their common border. Local officials from both countries also meet occasionally along the frontier to work out problems such as smuggling and the release of prisoners. Last July they cooperated with the Red Cross in obtaining the release of European captives held by UNITA in Angola. When an Angolan military aircraft transporting Soviet Bloc personnel inadvertently strayed across the border in late 1982 and landed inside Zaire, the incident seemed to be resolved without much difficulty. In our view, such cooperation would have been unthinkable just a few years before. [redacted]

We believe one of the primary reasons the rapprochement has worked reasonably well until now has been the MPLA regime's preoccupation with its war against UNITA and deteriorating economic and social conditions in Angola. Luanda would probably have a difficult time coping with the additional complications that would accompany renewed activity by the FLNC rebels residing in Angola. [redacted]

**Luanda's Growing Suspicions**

The rapprochement is threatened by Angola's growing conviction that Zaire is again supporting UNITA's guerrilla army. According to diplomatic reporting from Luanda, the MPLA has become increasingly preoccupied with the idea that the Western powers may be using Zaire as a conduit for aid to the rebels. [redacted]

Luanda has come to believe that Zaire has renewed substantially its assistance to Savimbi largely because of the spread of UNITA's insurgency over the past several months into the northeastern part of Angola that adjoins Zaire and Zambia. UNITA has been active in Angola's Moxico Province since 1982 and now largely controls the Cazombo salient close to Zaire. We believe that the rebels' prospects for continued military success in northeastern Angola are good, given Angola's military problems and the MPLA's past inability to halt UNITA's advances. [redacted]

Angola's suspicions have been heightened by Soviet disinformation efforts that link Zaire and UNITA to

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alleged US, South African, and Israeli efforts to undermine the Luanda regime.

[Redacted]

Mobutu told the US Ambassador in Kinshasa earlier this year that Zaire's military relationship with Israel had worsened Angolan suspicions with regard to UNITA.

[Redacted]

Luanda may believe that a principal purpose in establishing an Israeli military advisory mission in Zaire has been to support UNITA. Luanda claimed publicly in February that three captives taken at Luao during fighting with UNITA stated that they had been trained by Israeli instructors in Zaire. The Portuguese Embassy in Kinshasa told US officials in March that the MPLA regime is gathering "proof" of Israeli training of UNITA in Zaire's Shaba Region.

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

[Large Redacted Block]

We believe that Mobutu intends to continue his support for UNITA despite his vigorous assurances to Luanda that UNITA is not active in Zaire. Mobutu may feel more secure now about providing such support because he appears to believe that the MPLA's economic and security problems would not enable Luanda to retaliate.

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**The Effects of UNITA's Operations**

We believe hostilities between Angolan and Zairian forces could result if UNITA continues expanding its operations in northern Angola. In our view, an unintentional confrontation could develop from Angolan troops fleeing into Zaire or from their crossing the border in pursuit of rebel forces. Angolans could also come into conflict with Zairian forces if they were to attempt to destroy transportation facilities on the border—such as bridges—in an effort to sever suspected UNITA resupply lines. Patrols could also blunder into battle

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because of mistaken identity or panic. Thus, UNITA's continued operations in northern Angola could cause Angolan-Zairian relations to deteriorate even if Luanda never gets "hard" proof of Zaire's increased support. [redacted]

to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. He even claims to have offered helicopters to enable Angola to investigate the alleged presence of UNITA bases inside Zaire. [redacted]

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Despite attempts by local officials to calm border problems, numerous incidents continue to occur. The Zairian armed forces increased patrols along the border last November in the expectation that Angolan refugees, troops, and FLNC soldiers would be entering Zaire to escape the fighting with UNITA. Troops from both countries frequently cross the border in search of rebels or food. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] When Zairian Foreign Minister Uamba visited Luanda last November to attend celebrations marking the eighth anniversary of Angolan independence, MPLA officials expressed heightened concern about Zaire's dealings with UNITA, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge also raised the issue with his Zairian counterpart during bilateral meetings last November. Other sessions failed because dos Santos had poisoned the atmosphere at preliminary meetings with the Zairian Foreign Minister by accusing Mobutu of collusion with Savimbi. The Angolans also charged Zaire with allowing the rebels to operate training camps in Zaire. [redacted]

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Both Zairian and Angolan civilians living in the border region have suffered because of the fighting in northern Angola. Villages on both sides of the border have been victimized by patrolling troops. Landmines planted by Angolan forces to inhibit rebel movements have also caused hundreds of civilian deaths and casualties, according to diplomatic reporting. [redacted]

[redacted]

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The steady expansion of UNITA's operations has also caused shifts in the Angolan population living along the border with Shaba. According to a Zairian official, some 3,000 Angolan refugees moved across the border to the area near Dilolo during February; by the end of March, the total had reached 10,000. Even before the new influx, about 200,000 Angolan refugees resided in Zaire—the vast majority of them in Shaba, according to UN officials. FLNC rebels in the area have also moved to avoid the fighting. In addition, Angola's mobilization of some FLNC soldiers probably has been responsible for the rumors of another Shaba invasion that occur from time to time. [redacted]

Although Kinshasa and Luanda established consulates, respectively, in Luena, Angola, and Lubumbashi, Zaire, two years ago in an effort to build mutual trust, even this raised mutual security concerns. Zairian security officials have feared that the Angolan Consulate could be used to recruit members of the Angolan community in Zaire to engage in subversive activities against Mobutu. Other Zairian officials have also expressed concern that the Angolan Consulate will monitor UNITA's activities in Shaba and in northeastern Angola. [redacted]

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**Troubled Official Contacts**


At the official level, Zaire and Angola are attempting to maintain the outward appearance of good relations and to tend to problems before they get out of hand. Mobutu professes to be concerned about Angola's conviction that Zaire is assisting UNITA, according

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Angolan officials have been negotiating in Kinshasa with FNLA leaders over the past two years to entice them to return and join the MPLA. Although a few FNLA personnel may have returned to Luanda, a rapprochement with the FNLA as a group is unlikely, in our judgment. [redacted]

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The FNLA poses no real threat to the Luanda regime. Although FNLA rebels may make occasional, isolated hit-and-run raids against Angolan forces, the rebels are weak, poorly armed, and divided into several competing factions. [redacted]

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**FLEC.** There apparently have been few Angolan-Zairian frictions in Angola's Cabinda area, where the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) is based. [redacted]

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FLEC leaders periodically have threatened to attack Gulf Oil Corporation's installations at Cabinda. Although the rebels may have the capacity to engage in some small-scale sabotage, their forces are divided, weak, poorly armed, and ill trained and pose no danger to the government in Luanda. FLEC personnel move freely across the border into Zaire, but we do not believe that the Zairian Government is assisting them. [redacted]

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**The Problem of Angolan Dissidents in Zaire**

**The FNLA (or COMIRA).** Although Angola's main concern is UNITA, Luanda may also suspect Mobutu of supporting the FNLA. This group reorganized in 1980 under the name The Military Committee of the Resistance in Angola (COMIRA) and expelled its longtime leader, Holden Roberto. Angola complained last spring to Zaire that FNLA forces were active in the Bandundu-Malange border region. [redacted]

Over the past two or three years, Zaire has attempted to deflect Angolan attention away from its support for UNITA by acting aggressively against FNLA cadre in Kinshasa. [redacted]

**Zairian Rebels in Angola: Tit for Tat?**

In our judgment, Luanda is not now interested in adding to its woes by mobilizing Angolan-based, anti-Mobutu rebels. If Angolan suspicions of Kinshasa's support for UNITA continue to grow, however, Luanda could decide to activate the FLNC once again. Furthermore, a power struggle in Luanda—a genuine possibility given the fragility of the dos Santos government—could result in a new Angolan leadership that might be more willing to support Mobutu's enemies. [redacted]

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Angola has kept the FLNC effectively reined in since the group's last abortive invasion of Shaba from Angola in 1978, despite the existence of several major FLNC bases and other camps in northern Angola. Although the MPLA regime does not appear to be supporting or even encouraging the dissidents, the FLNC has been useful to Luanda as insurance against obvious interference by Zaire. [redacted]

Luanda has disarmed some of the rebels and sent some to southern Angola to assist in fighting UNITA. In addition, since the late 1970s, the rebels' internal problems have made them less of a threat to Zaire,

[redacted]

[redacted]

In our view, the FLNC could not undertake a major military incursion into Zaire without Luanda's encouragement and substantial support from outside forces such as Moscow, Havana, or Tripoli. [redacted]

We believe, however, that the FLNC could easily engage in sabotage or terrorism in Shaba Region—even with only limited resources. In our view, such actions would be highly effective and destabilizing in Shaba—the principal source of Zaire's wealth—especially if the large expatriate community and mining infrastructure were threatened. Zaire's leaders are also aware that their armed forces lack the capacity to protect the country's vulnerable infrastructure from sabotage. [redacted]

**In Sum**

In our judgment, Zaire and Angola will continue to believe the worst of each other. As long as there is a Soviet Bloc presence in Angola, Mobutu will fear that Luanda is the hub of anti-Zairian subversion. For their part, the Angolans almost certainly will suspect Mobutu of supporting UNITA as an agent of the West. [redacted]

We doubt that Kinshasa will be able to expand its support for UNITA substantially without Luanda's knowledge. If Luanda gets solid evidence of significant Zairian assistance to UNITA, this would increase the likelihood of Angolan retaliation. In any event, continued UNITA activity along the Zairian border will put pressure on Luanda to retaliate. And, if Luanda renews its support for anti-Mobutu rebels, central Africa would again become highly unstable.

[redacted]

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### Congo-Libya: Trying To Keep Tripoli at Arm's Length

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Brazzaville's relations with Libya illustrate many of the difficulties African governments experience in attempting to deal with Tripoli. The Congolese find Libyan promises to assist in their economic development tempting, but are wary of Libya's meddling in their internal affairs and using their country as a base for subverting neighboring regimes. As long as President Sassou-Nguesso remains in control, Congo is likely to continue a cooperative but cautious relationship with Tripoli.



Congo President Sassou-Nguesso Camera Press ©

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
#### False Starts

Libya has only recently sought to develop a presence in Congo, even though it has long had formal diplomatic relations with the country. Tripoli sent two diplomats to Brazzaville in July 1981 to open an embassy, but it did not inform the Congolese, according to the US Embassy. This diplomatic gaffe caused Congo to delay approval for a Libyan diplomatic mission until October 1981. Libya finally opened a People's Bureau in February 1982 with an official staff of six, which has since increased to 24.

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We believe Colonel Qadhafi may be using Congo as a base of operations against moderate central African regimes. He has tried to increase his leverage with Brazzaville by offering military aid, knowing that Congo is displeased with shoddy equipment supplied by the Soviets.




Libya has sought to increase its influence with economic assistance as well.



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Libyan leader Qadhafi


Sygma ©

[redacted] Last January, Tripoli agreed to aid forestry production in northern Sangha region. [redacted]

**Why Are They There?**

In addition to the personnel officially attached to the People's Bureau, 25 others who arrived in Brazzaville last February make for a current presence of at least 49 Libyans. [redacted] the figure may be closer at 125. [redacted]

Libya hardly needs so many staffers to administer bilateral aid programs, and it probably uses the surplus to run regional intelligence operations from Brazzaville. Neighboring African regimes fear that their dissidents, with Libyan assistance, use Congo as a base for destabilization efforts. [redacted]



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**Does Congo Approve?**

We believe that Sassou does not want to antagonize Congo's moderate neighbors or Western aid donors by condoning Libyan destabilization efforts. Congo's good neighbor policy has ended a cycle of mutual coup attempts that Kinshasa and Brazzaville

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sponsored in the 1970s and has given the country the political stability it needs to diversify and improve the economy. [redacted]

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Sassou has a number of reasons to tolerate a certain amount of Libyan adventurism. France, traditionally Congo's largest source of economic aid, faces continued budgetary constraints, and Sassou probably feels he cannot jeopardize possible Libyan aid by questioning Qadhafi's actions. In addition, Sassou is pressed on the left by radicals who question his revolutionary zeal. Moreover, the government lacks enough security personnel to monitor fully Libya's actions. [redacted]

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Sassou, nonetheless, is aware of Libya's meddling in the affairs of Congo's neighbors. He may also worry that regional and tribal tensions in Congo could be exploited by Qadhafi. But for the foreseeable future, we believe Sassou will continue his uneasy relationship with Tripoli—hands extended in supplication, but eyes open for danger. [redacted]

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**Sudan: The Southern Insurgency** [redacted]

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The Nimeiri regime faces its most serious insurgent threat since the conclusion of the Sudanese civil war in 1972. Southern rebels under the command of John Garang, a former Sudanese Army officer, are conducting increasingly sophisticated assaults on military garrisons and police posts, foreign economic projects, and the southern transportation network. Their successes have eroded morale in the Sudanese military. President Nimeiri appears unwilling to make political concessions to stem the rebellion, even though his forces cannot contain what probably will be a major insurgent offensive during the next few months. [redacted]

Insurgent capabilities have dramatically improved over the last year, largely for three reasons:

- The mutiny of some 500 southern Sudanese military and police personnel in May 1983 brought into the insurgent movement an experienced military cadre that is familiar with the southern region and with the organization and operations of the Sudanese Army.
- Ethiopia continues to provide the guerrillas a secure base area that permits them to train and operate from Ethiopian territory.
- Ethiopian, Soviet, and Libyan support to Garang has at least temporarily unified the insurgents under his leadership and guaranteed them access to modern arms. [redacted]

There are sharp tribal and ideological differences among the dissidents, however, and Garang's leadership is only grudgingly accepted by some of them. A clash between Garang's Dinka tribe and Nuer supporters of Samuel Gaitut in early April in an Ethiopian border area demonstrated the fragility of Garang's coalition. [redacted]

**Insurgent Strategy and Tactics**

Garang has approximately 6,000 men in his Sudanese People's Liberation Army. His strategy has been to apply military and economic pressure on Nimeiri through limited operations during the dry season while preparing for a larger offensive in the rainy season that is about to begin. The group's operations since November 1983 have been aimed at shutting down vital oil and water projects and attacking foreign workers to gain international attention and demonstrate the weakness of the Sudanese military. [redacted]

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Rebel attacks on transportation already have led to serious shortages of food, fuel, and ammunition. Recent US Embassy reporting indicates the local populace blames the government and not the insurgents for the shortages. [redacted]

Assaults during February and March demonstrate that the insurgents are capable of battalion-size operations and understand how to support their assaults with directed fire and heavy mortar barrages.

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[redacted] We believe the insurgents have had portable SAM-7 missiles for some time, although Sudanese aircraft losses to date have been due to the insurgents' use of heavy machineguns. The guerrillas' effective use of machineguns against Sudanese helicopters and their reported possession of SAM-7 missiles have helped offset the government's advantage in airpower. [redacted]

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**Government Forces**

The Nimeiri regime has responded by increasing the number of ground force units in the south from 12 to 16 battalions. Airborne units are rotated into the

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region to support anti-insurgent sweep operations, and smaller armor, artillery, and anti-aircraft units have been sent south to shore up weak garrisons. [redacted]

The Sudanese Air Force has been barely able to keep the southern garrisons supplied. The Air Force's only flyable fixed-wing transports are five C-130s and three DHC-5 Buffalos. Continued heavy use and inadequate maintenance may soon take some of these aircraft out of service. [redacted]

Supply shortages will increase when the rainy season further curtails ground transportation. Most of the military's small arms are worn out, its ammunition is outdated and defective, and the lack of spare parts has idled many of the Army's vehicles. The Army's relations with the local population, moreover, will deteriorate if it begins to confiscate already scarce civilian food supplies. [redacted]

These problems and continuing insurgent successes have demoralized government forces. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Stalled Reconciliation Efforts**

The US Embassy reports that attempts to reach a political settlement with the south have made no progress since Nimeiri made a conciliatory speech in early March. Insurgent leaders have ignored Nimeiri's offer of amnesty and rebuffed his attempts to establish contacts with their representatives abroad. [redacted]

The President and his advisers have focused much of their attention on more immediate concerns, such as the Libyan airstrike in March and labor unrest in Khartoum. The US Embassy notes that Nimeiri appears reluctant to risk the support of the Muslim Brotherhood by offering concessions to the non-Muslim south. Moreover, the recent worsening of Nimeiri's health has made it even less likely that he will adopt bold new measures to solve the southern problem. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Significant insurgent operations probably will take place before the height of the rainy season in July and August, even though the guerrillas' recent infighting has delayed their preparations for a major offensive. The insurgents are likely to attempt to occupy a garrison, consolidate their support bases in Upper Nile, and establish new bases in the southwest before moving against a strategic provincial capital. [redacted]

Government forces probably will be unable to withstand a sustained insurgent offensive during the rainy season or conduct significant offensive operations of their own. Khartoum's likely strategy of minimizing engagements with the insurgents by defending only the most important garrisons probably will not forestall a major government defeat in the south. [redacted]

Despite the bleak military prospects, Nimeiri probably will continue to resist pressure from Western governments and Egypt to make major concessions to southern interests, such as relaxing the application of Islamic law. He may believe that the foreign military aid he has received since the Libyan airstrike will enable him to subdue the insurgents or at least to negotiate a more favorable settlement later. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**Senegal:  
Facing the Economic Crisis** [redacted]

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Over the past year, President Abdou Diouf has gained personal control of the ruling party and now is in a better position to turn to efforts to arrest Senegal's downward economic spiral. We believe Diouf has the will to stick with the stringent long-term fiscal measures and major structural reforms needed to right the economy. Senegal, however, will continue to require generous aid from its Western and moderate Arab donors. [redacted]

Diouf faces no major threats from domestic interest groups or from external forces, but he will have to cope with several minor problems that will be aggravated by economic difficulties. These irritants, if not attended to, could lead to serious unrest, even compelling the military to take over. Such a step would be a sharp departure from the military's traditional apolitical role. [redacted]

**Political Victories**

Diouf began his efforts to solidify and consolidate his hold on Senegalese politics following his decisive victory in the presidential election in February 1983. The election gave him the personal mandate he had lacked as the constitutional successor to former President Leopold Senghor and left the ruling Socialist Party dominant in the National Assembly. [redacted]

Diouf's most significant task was to neutralize the party's "barons"—the powerful and corrupt cronies of Senghor—who had used their positions in both the government and the party to impede policies threatening to their interests. Last January Diouf and Jean Collin, the President's right-hand man and number-two power in both the government and the party, used a party congress to grant Diouf the authority to appoint the Political Bureau and Central Committee. Diouf used this power to remove "barons" from the Political Bureau and to install his own men. [redacted]

Diouf and Collin also used the congress to make structural changes in the party, including reducing the powers of the influential regional secretaries. Diouf now is more directly involved with the activities of local party offices. The changes give Diouf more control over party affairs, but also more administrative details to oversee. [redacted]

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The party shakeup was only one part of Diouf's attack on the entrenched self-interests he inherited. The second was a housecleaning of the National Assembly. In April Diouf and Collin engineered a turnover of the officers of that body, removing the "barons" from their last bastion of power. As in the purge of the party, Diouf installed loyalists into leadership positions who would help carry out his programs. [redacted]

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The President's efforts—encouraged by the IMF—to cut bloated government ministries have been less successful. University students, whose only hope of employment upon graduation is the state, went on strike for two months this year to protest a prospective shortage of government jobs. Diouf's cautious reaction to the strike shows that, even with his powers, he realizes he has to weigh carefully the political consequences of his acts. [redacted]

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Under the best of conditions, we believe it will take Diouf years to pare away the layers of flab that encase the Senegalese public sector. We have seen no signs that he is daunted by the task, but following through on it will cause considerable unhappiness and dislocations. [redacted]

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**Economic Difficulties**

The economy shares the same problems facing other resource-poor African states: increased oil costs, falling prices of raw materials, few exportable

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commodities, a rapidly expanding population, inadequate and uncertain rainfall, and undeveloped infrastructures. To make a normally bad situation worse, this year's rains came so late and so miserly that Senegal expects its worst harvest since independence in 1960. The peanut crop, the country's major export item, is down 50 percent from last year. Cereal production will meet only about a quarter of the need. Forage shortages are likely to cause starvation or premature slaughtering of perhaps a fifth of livestock herds. [redacted]

The drop in export earnings and need to spend more foreign exchange for food imports will hurt Diouf's fiscal austerity program. Diouf has withstood economic adversity in the past, however, and he most likely will do so again. In 1981, the first year of Diouf's presidency, the economy was in even more precarious straits than it is now. The IMF, France, and moderate Arab Gulf states saved the day. Since then, Diouf has adhered closely enough to IMF guidelines to win a renewed IMF seal of approval, which should also ensure continued assistance from major individual donors. This support will keep Senegal going, but only further austerity and structural reform will promote recovery. [redacted]

Less certain is the continuing support of the population. Up to now, the people have, with good reason, blamed the previous regime for Senegal's economic ills. Diouf rolled into office on a wave of popular approval and high expectations. His modernization and anticorruption plans had widespread appeal, as did his reputation for personal rectitude and technical brilliance. After three and a half years of at best halting progress, though, enthusiasm for Diouf is ebbing. [redacted]

Diouf's fiscal austerity is resulting in higher prices and reduced imports of a broad range of staples and consumer goods. Farmers are particularly hard hit by the loss of crop revenues. At the same time, they face higher prices for food and fertilizer, and tighter credit. The poor peanut crop will increase unemployment significantly throughout Senegal's nonfarm labor force, a large portion of which is involved in the industrial processing of peanuts. Business will also suffer from tight credit, restricted

imports, and reduced consumer and business spending. The urban elite is unhappy that imported items are scarcer and more expensive. [redacted]

**Potential Threats**

Senegal's major interest groups do not currently pose a threat to Diouf, but this could change quickly. Leaders of the country's influential Islamic religious sects hold sway over rural peasants and a growing number of young urban dwellers. Diouf has placated the sects whenever possible, but some of his plans for reducing corruption and reorganizing the economy run counter to their interests. The sect leaders' toleration of Diouf could turn to outright opposition if he pushes his programs too far too fast. [redacted]

Wildcat strikes by workers or students could set off a chain reaction of popular protest based on pent-up economic discontent. The leadership of the government-dominated labor confederation has weak control of its rank and file. Diouf, for example, had to intercede last March to put the lid on a garbage collectors' strike. Recent power struggles at the upper reaches of the confederation and splintering or breaking away of individual unions have further weakened the influence of the national leadership. [redacted]

Some of the 15 small opposition political parties are capable of minor troublemaking. [redacted]

**The Military**

The armed forces could become the final arbiter of power should social turmoil or economic collapse result in a political crisis. Military intervention, however, would almost certainly take place only as a last resort. The French schooled Senegal's armed forces in the concept of military subservience to

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
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civilian authority, and dedication to the preservation of the civil government remains high. Senegalese regular Army officers are trained in French schools, and French advisers serve with Senegalese forces. In addition, France maintains infantry and air combat units in Senegal totaling almost 1,500 men. [redacted]



Another factor militating against military intervention in politics is the ethnic diversity of the Army. No single tribe dominates; virtually all are well represented. The Senegalese soldier identifies with his profession, not his religious or tribal origins, and sees himself as a guardian of the state. [redacted]

**Outside Meddling**


The country's moderate, pro-Western orientation, the basing of a French intervention force, and chronic economic troubles make Senegal an inviting target for outside meddling. Soviet and Libyan subversion currently is at a low level because the government is able to monitor their activities and steps in forcefully when the situation warrants. In addition, the lack of receptivity by most Senegalese to radical political or religious doctrines hinders meddling by outsiders. Attitudes could begin to change, however, if economic conditions dramatically worsen, Western aid dries up, or IMF-mandated reforms do not produce results. [redacted]

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The Soviets have over 100 officials in Dakar, but this is because their Embassy has regional responsibilities.

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**Chad: Monitoring the Southern Insurgency** [redacted]

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Although Libyan-backed Chadian dissidents pose the greatest potential threat in the north, rebels in the south and east also pose problems for Chadian President Habre's efforts to hold Chad together. ALA's Africa Division is developing a computerized data set that can help track trends in the south and east to improve understanding of these complex and less studied areas. [redacted]

**Scope**

The data set uses [redacted] [redacted] insurgent actions since September 1983 in provinces not directly bordering Libya. Incidents include rebel infiltrations from Libyan-occupied provinces or neighboring countries into the southern and eastern regions, violence involving the rebels, and incidents fostering or inhibiting reconciliation between the rebels and the Chadian Government. [redacted]

The inset details the types of information that have been collected for the roughly 300 incidents recorded so far. Data is entered for the location and date of the event; the identity and number of rebels involved; casualties among civilians, rebels, and government personnel; and target of the attack, if applicable. Textual descriptions of incidents can also be included for information not as easily placed into simple categories. This information can include the names of insurgents or victims, types of weapons used or recovered, and other unique aspects of the event. Analysts are able to obtain simple tallies (for example, the number of rebels who rallied in January) and produce tables (such as, where each group conducted its operations over a given period), bar histograms, and pie charts. [redacted]

**Limitations**

As with any electronic or paper files, the utility of the data set depends upon the reliability and comprehensiveness of the information. [redacted]



Africa Division is developing similar computer data sets to track terrorist and insurgent actions in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The choice of information on incidents in those countries will differ from that of the Chadian data set to reflect the specific characteristics of these insurgencies and intelligence interests of consumers. [redacted]

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**Types of Information Coded on Incidents Involving  
Insurgents in Southern Chad**
**Type of Event**

Fighting

Sabotage

Infiltration by insurgents

Reconciliation/rallying to government

Breakdown of reconciliation

**Date**

Month

Day

Year

**Nature of Target**

Government

Military

Civilian

Foreign

Economic

Other rebels

**Region/Prefecture**

West

Chari Baguirmi

Kanem

Lake Chad

South

Logone Occidental

Logone Oriental

Mayo Kebbi

Moyen Chari

Tandjile

Center-East

Batha Biltine

Guera

Quaddai

Salamat

N'Djamena

**Town****Size of Attack/Rally Force****Casualties**

Number of civilians, officials, rebels killed or wounded

**Group Name**

Armed Forces of Chad (ex-FAT Kamougue followers)

Black Commandos

Chadian Armed Forces (FAT)

Coconut Palm Commandos

Commandos of Hope

Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)

First Army

Green Commandos

Green Commandos of Hope

Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT)

National Democrat Union (UND)

Organization for the Liberation of Chad From

Imperialism and Fascism (OLTIF)

Red Commandos

Third Army

Volcan

**Textual Description of Event**


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**Table 1**  
**Incidents of Rebel Activity in Southern Chad,**  
**by Region and Month**

Region	1983						1984			
	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Central/East			1	7	10	7	18	19	16	5
South	2	7	13	23	21	12	27	12	19	8
West			2	1	8	1	8		6	
N'Djamena					5		2		1	

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**Table 2**  
**Incidents of Rebel Activity in Southern Chad,**  
**by Group and Month**

Group	1983				1984			
	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)			3	7	3	10	8	1
Green Commandos	1		7	1	6	4	1	1
First Army		1	3				6	1
Commandos of Hope					6	3		1
National Democratic Union (UND)		1	3	2				
Red Commandos				3	2			
Coconut Palm Commandos					1	3		
Kamougue's former Armed Forces of Chad (ex-FAT)	1		2					
Organization for the Liberation of Chad From Imperialism and Fascism (OLTIF)		1					1	1
Third Army	1							
Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT)		1						
Volcan			1					
Chadian Armed Forces							1	
Black Commandos								1
Green Commandos of Hope								1

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## Africa Briefs

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### South Africa

#### Surprise Leap in Taxes

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Projections of a large budget deficit have prompted the government to increase the general sales tax from 7 to 10 percent. Only some basic foodstuffs are exempt from taxation. The size and timing of the increase, which comes less than four months after the rate was moved up from 6 to 7 percent,

Because record high interest rates have increased the cost of government borrowing, officials are emphasizing tax increases and spending restraint to control the budget deficit. The government also is worried about the current account deficit, and it hopes the higher sales tax will slow consumer credit buying and thus reduce imports. Restraint on demand, however, is likely to force the economy to contract in 1984 for the third consecutive year.

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The exemption of some foodstuffs from sales tax is a concession to blacks, who normally bear disproportionately more of the sales tax burden. Several black leaders, however, have criticized the new measures, contending that the benefits of the exemption will be outweighed by the overall effects of the tax increase and its contractionary impact on the economy.

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#### Mineworkers and Regional Detente

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South Africa may double the number of Mozambicans working in its mines as a reward to Maputo for signing the recent nonaggression pact,   
 The South Africans also have implied that Lesotho mineworkers will bear the brunt of replacement by Mozambicans if Maseru does not agree to a security accord with Pretoria. Lesotho would feel the pinch from cuts in mine employment because 40 percent of the country's national income comes from the remittances of its miners in South Africa.

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Whether South Africa will carry through with its threat to Lesotho is uncertain. The Lesotho Foreign Minister recently told the US Embassy that Maseru is close to signing a security accord. Moreover, South African mine owners have expressed concern about replacing highly skilled Lesotho miners with less skilled workers from Mozambique. Thus, we believe that any increase in Mozambican workers will be gradual, and that any cuts in mining jobs will not fall disproportionately on Lesotho.

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**Nigeria****New Currency** 

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Nigeria last month unexpectedly closed its borders and issued a sharply reduced quantity of new naira notes to replace existing currency. The military regime announced that the conversion was needed to decrease money in circulation, curtail black-market trafficking of naira, and eliminate the "ill-gotten gains" of corrupt Nigerians, former civilian officials in exile, and foreigners. The move has temporarily tightened liquidity, causing prices to drop considerably. Black-market trafficking, however, continued with hardly an interruption. The new naira is selling both domestically and in markets across the borders at close to the old rate. Although Lagos caught several minor offenders in the anticorruption drive, the major ones had long before converted their naira into foreign currency and moved their money abroad. The currency conversion may temporarily reduce the money supply, but we believe that these benefits will be short lived and do little to address trade distortions resulting from the overvalued naira. Moreover, the exchange is causing additional hardship for the average Nigerian.

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**Somalia-Saudi Arabia****Oil Given to Somalis** 

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Somalia may be able to avoid a major financial or production crisis for a few months even without an IMF agreement. The US Embassy in Mogadishu reports that Saudi Arabia apparently has granted Somalia 60,000 metric tons of crude oil—enough to cover the country's needs for the next two to three months. The grant, which replaces one that ended at the beginning of this year, will release up to \$13 million in foreign exchange that Somalia could use to reduce its past due debt. Increased food aid shipments and the likelihood of higher agricultural production as a result of recent rainfall also will ease the country's economic problems.

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We believe these developments are likely to reduce pressure on the government to reach a quick agreement with the IMF on a loan of about \$85 million. President Siad has rejected IMF measures to liberalize the state-run economy, largely because he fears they would limit his ability to dispense patronage. Siad is likely to credit the oil grant to US intervention and may again ask Washington to urge the IMF to soften its conditions. Low export earnings and difficulties in obtaining enough foreign aid, however, eventually are likely to lead Mogadishu to reopen formal negotiations with the Fund.

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**Liberia****Rubber on the Rebound** 

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Firestone, Liberia's largest foreign rubber concessionaire, is projecting profits for the first time in several years and will be able to resume tax payments that had been curtailed during the years of losses. The chief inducement to continuing operations in Liberia is the resurgence in world rubber prices, which this year have reached 58 cents a pound—some 50 percent above their low of 39 cents a pound in

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late 1982. Moreover, cost-cutting measures are helping boost profits, and early rains this year probably will raise production. Natural rubber is Monrovia's second-largest export commodity behind iron ore, which currently is in low demand worldwide.

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Firestone's commitment to remain in Liberia portends other domestic benefits for Head of State Doe's regime. It will soften public accusations that Doe is unable to manage the economy. In addition, Firestone's expensive social welfare projects—schools, housing, medical facilities, and transportation—will continue for the 20,000 or so workers employed by the company in Liberia. These workers account for 40 percent of the country's estimated salaried labor force.

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**Sierra Leone****Power Shortages Heighten Discontent** 

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Power shortages have added to the public's dissatisfaction with the deterioration of the economy, according to the US Embassy. The outages have affected public transit, telephone communications, and food refrigeration, particularly in Freetown, the capital. Austerity measures mandated by the IMF, including devaluation, have been unpopular, and the government's inability to stem corruption and smuggling of exports has lowered hard currency earnings. Sierra Leoneans are struggling with an inflation rate of 90 percent this year, and they will face higher food prices as shortages develop this summer. They may take to the streets as they did in 1981. President Stevens could buy time by blaming these economic woes on unpopular ministers and conduct a cabinet reshuffle in an effort to ease the criticism.

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**Mali****Opposition to Economic Reforms** 

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The US Embassy reports that President Traore is facing the first organized threat to his economic reform program since he introduced it two years ago. Labor leaders attacked Traore's IMF-mandated program at their annual Labor Day rally on 1 May. The unions demanded the return to state enterprises, salary increases when Mali reenters the French-backed West African Monetary Union in June, and denounced the policy of examinations for entering civil servants. The rally ended peacefully when union officials promised to negotiate their demands with the regime, but, in our judgment, there could be serious unrest over the longer term as Mali's economy continues to deteriorate. The left-leaning Traore government in recent years has begun turning away from socialism toward a more open economy and to Western donors for increased aid, and it has been one of the few black African countries to meet IMF performance criteria to date.

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