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**International Issues
Review**



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December 1984

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GI IIR 84-006
December 1984

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International Issues Review

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This publication is produced by the Office of Global Issues. Some issues contain articles drafted in other offices. Some articles are preliminary or speculative in nature, but the contents are formally coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the views of a single analyst; these items are clearly designated as noncoordinated views.

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Note to Readers

This is the last issue of the *International Issues Review*. Beginning in 1985, the Office of Global Issues will publish material previously seen in the *Review* in several publications with more specifically focused subject areas and audiences. Readers interested in receiving future publications should write to the Chief, International Security Issues Division, OGI, 2G18 Headquarters, specifying subject areas of interest. 

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Narcotics

Worldwide Narcotics Highlights


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
Summary

Each *International Issues Review* presents a summary of recent developments affecting narcotics production and trafficking in host countries and US attempts to halt illicit drug activities abroad. The items in this summary cover the period from 1 October to 15 December 1984. 

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South America

From 6 to 9 November, representatives from **Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Colombia** met in Bogota to discuss measures to combat illegal drug trafficking and abuse in South America. According to the US Embassy, two of the more important items raised in the meeting were the formation of a multilateral police force and the standardization of sentences for drug-related offenses. According to press reports, Venezuela urged the participating nations to adopt a uniform drug code, offering its own new drug law as a model. Other issues discussed were: the establishment in each country of a center with a secure communications system and data base on drug trafficking; the implementation of stronger controls on the production, transportation, and sale of chemicals used in cocaine processing; and more effective drug treatment and rehabilitation programs. A number of reservations were expressed about several of the proposals, particularly the establishment of the communications network. Some officials are reluctant to share sensitive law enforcement information out of fear that traffickers will corrupt police officials assigned to the center. 

Council on Drugs had suspended the licenses of 147 aircraft suspected of involvement in drug trafficking . . . 55 of the 147 licenses have been revoked . . . on 29 October a Bogota criminal court judge filed indictments against Pablo Escobar and 16 others for complicity in the murder of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla . . . Escobar has managed to elude Colombian authorities and, according to press reports, avoided capture when Colombian police raided a farm outside Medellin on 16 November . . . according to the US Embassy, Colombia has eradicated a total of 3,250 hectares of cannabis this year representing a potential 4,875 metric tons of marijuana . . . authorities also seized 1,716 metric tons of marijuana in September, October, and November 1984. 

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On the legal front, the Colombian Government took several measures that should strengthen its hand in its war with the drug mafia:

- On 26 October the government passed a decree that gives the government authority to dispose of vehicles and other properties used in the production and transportation of narcotics. The decree authorizes the government to use the funds acquired from the sale of the property to finance the activities of the National Council on Narcotics.

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Colombian Developments

The **Colombian** crackdown on drugs continues to keep traffickers off balance . . . two judges have been dismissed for impropriety in the handling of drug-related cases . . . as of 19 October the Colombian National

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- On 14 November, the Colombian Senate rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that would have prevented the extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States. The amendment was introduced by Senator Jose Ignacio Vives Echeverria, a senator from Magdalena Department suspected of being in the pay of drug traffickers. The amendment was soundly defeated by a vote of 42 to 4. [redacted]

Americans for every Colombian extradited to the United States . . . [redacted]

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
[redacted] . . . the threats are being taken seriously in light of the 26 November bombing outside the US Embassy in Bogota. [redacted]

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On the downside the fate of the Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties remains unclear:

- The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty—passed by the Colombian Senate—is still tied up in the Colombian House of Representatives. It has been stalled since 1983, and, according to the US Embassy, the Betancur administration has exerted no pressure to get it out of committee. The Embassy reports that a majority of representatives want changes before they will approve the treaty, and the Embassy sees no hope for any action soon.
- Colombian officials still want to revise the US-Colombian Extradition Treaty. During a meeting with Embassy officials on 17 October and again in an interview published on 28 October, Minister of Justice Enrique Parejo brought up the subject of modifying the treaty. Attorney General Carlos Jimenez has voiced opposition to the treaty on several occasions. Although the Supreme Court of Colombia continues to support the legality of the Extradition Treaty, Jimenez claims the treaty violates several articles of the Colombian Constitution. [redacted]



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Other Developments

The National Committee To Fight Narcotics Trafficking (CNLCN) in **Bolivia** was reorganized following the 8 October dismissal of its former director, Dr. Rafael Otazo, over his controversial meeting with cocaine king Roberto Suarez. The new head of the Committee is Lt. Col. Carlos Fernandez, who has moved his offices into a new building and replaced many key staffers throughout the organization. Fernandez has also appointed directors to oversee and coordinate police operations and other coca control activities in specific departments. According to the US Embassy, the upheaval within the Committee—normal for Bolivia—has affected the efficiency of the organizations involved. Evidence of improved morale came on 27 October, when special units of the

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Colombian traffickers are responding to the government initiatives with intimidation and violence . . . two national police officers were killed in October during drug control operations in the Lomas/Yari area of Caqueta . . . one of the officers was killed while leading a ground patrol on 12 October; the other by sniper fire on 15 October while landing his helicopter at the Lomas airstrip . . . in response, the Colombian Air Force staged a series of bombing and strafing runs using several T-33 aircraft against airfields and suspected cocaine processing facilities . . . the traffickers have threatened to assassinate President Betancur, the Spanish Ambassador, and US Embassy officials in retaliation for their role in the ongoing drug crackdown . . . they have also threatened to kill five

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Bolivian National Police led by Fernandez launched several raids against suspected cocaine processing and trafficking centers operated by Suarez. Logistic support for the operation was provided by the Bolivian Air Force and included several aircraft, helicopters, and T-33s. Suarez was not captured, but several of his ranches in the Beni region were occupied, 300 kilograms of cocaine seized, and his trafficking network disrupted. Suarez counterattacked in the media, lambasting the Bolivian Government for being a US lackey, accusing the US Ambassador of interfering in Bolivian affairs, and leveling charges of corruption at several high-ranking members of the Siles administration. Although no major traffickers were arrested, the October raid is the first evidence that Bolivian police and military units—under pressure—can conduct joint operations against trafficking organizations. [redacted]

On 29 October, peasants in the Chapare region of central Bolivia protested recent government restrictions on the sale and movement of coca leaves outside the area. According to the US Embassy, more than 7,000 demonstrated peacefully in Cochabamba, the region's major city. The following day, several public buildings were occupied, and some of the demonstrators went on a hunger strike. On 1 December, a tentative accord reached between the government and the campesinos included a provision that La Paz would at least listen to a proposal from the Minister of Campesino Affairs to permit free production and marketing of coca in the Chapare. Siles is attempting to placate both the United States and the coca growers whose support he needs to maintain his fragile position. [redacted]

On 22 November, three men tried to kidnap Bolivian congresswoman Nora Matienzo de Lopez, a member of the Chamber of Deputies and vice president of a congressional commission investigating links between the Bolivian Government and cocaine traffickers. At a press conference later in the day, other members of the commission revealed that they had received threatening phone calls and letters. A US Embassy source claims that Colombian drug traffickers were responsible for the attempted kidnaping. Bolivian traffickers may make more frequent use of violence and intimidation, favorite tactics of the Colombian drug mafia, to counter increased government pressure on their activities. [redacted]

At the request of the Bolivian Government, a high-level OAS commission visited Bolivia, 15 through 30 November, to evaluate La Paz's drug control programs. The commission examined Bolivian programs to control the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of illicit drugs, and considered various enforcement measures, both social and economic, to aid them in their efforts. The commission is expected to recommend to Bolivia a wide-ranging program to control and enforce the growing, processing, and trafficking of drugs within an international framework and a plan to prevent corruption within the organizations involved. US officials speculate that the visit was requested by Siles to drum up support for his drug policies and to deflect domestic congressional opposition. [redacted]

In mid-November, 19 **Peruvian** members of a US-backed coca eradication team operating in the Upper Huallaga River Valley of north-central Peru were killed by unknown assailants. The eradication team had been operating without the protection of the Special Civil Guard Unit (UMOPAR) since August, when the military took over the political and military administration of the region under the provisions of the state of emergency. According to the US Embassy, the restrictions placed on UMOPAR units by the military have resulted in fewer arrests and lower seizures of narcotics. The Peruvian Government has acted quickly to assuage public outrage and postponed the scheduled withdrawal of the armed forces from the region. More important, the military has decided to lift the restrictions placed on UMOPAR units and will permit them to resume their interdiction and protection duties. [redacted]

Peru's first National Drug Abuse Prevention Conference—organized and cosponsored by the United States Information Service, Lima—was held 29 through 31 October in Lima. The conference was officially opened by the Minister of Health and closed by President Belaunde and was attended by over 300 representatives of various civic organizations, church and youth groups, the medical profession, educators, news media, and the Peruvian Government. Among

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the topics discussed were: drug addiction, treatment, prevention, and public awareness of drugs. According to the US Embassy, a psychodrama illustrating the impact of drug abuse on family life and values was particularly effective. The Embassy believes the conference has helped dispel the notion that drug abuse is strictly a US problem and followup sessions are in the works. [redacted]

In late November, **Ecuadorian** National Police, supported by DEA and **Ecuadorian** Army units, destroyed 75 hectares of coca and 18 coca paste laboratories, arrested five Colombians, and seized three canoes with outboard motors. The operation took place near the town of Santa Elena in northeast Ecuador, not far from the Colombian border. Despite bad weather and some mechanical problems with support aircraft, the operation was a success and underscores Quito's determination to take the offensive against drug trafficking. Continued action on the narcotics front by Ecuador will make it more difficult for Colombian traffickers to find safehaven from the ongoing crackdown in Colombia [redacted]

Brazilian narcotics authorities continue to press for increased drug control measures, minus the voice of one strong advocate—Dr. Hugo Povoá, Director of the Federal Police Narcotics Division, who resigned in late November. A number of control programs have resulted in a relatively brief time. The Planning Ministry has allocated an additional \$150,000 for eradication, primarily for continuing coca eradication in the Amazonas region. At the recent Second Annual Drug Enforcement Conference in Brazil, Brazilian and Colombian enforcement officials stated their information-sharing preference as a source was secure telephone lines for which the DEA Administrator promised technical assistance. The US Customs Service will conduct a narcotics detection course for the Brazilian Customs Service in January 1985. In addition, a long-planned drug education program for new military recruits will become operational in January 1985. The varied nature of these measures reflects growing recognition by Brazilian narcotics authorities of the need for a multifaceted approach to effective narcotics control. [redacted]

Doubts about **Venezuelan** President Lusinchi's tenacity in actively pursuing control of the drug trade are

surfacing in Caracas despite his following through on a number of antinarcotics campaign promises. His accomplishments include: reactivating the moribund US-Venezuelan working group established in 1978 to control drug trafficking; the signing of an accord by the Venezuelan and Colombian Ministers of Defense giving formal recognition to cooperative efforts to control narcotics trafficking and guerrilla operations along their common border; and promulgating a new antidrug law that revised and strengthened Venezuela's antiquated 1930s version. US Embassy sources [redacted] have expressed concern over situations that belie Lusinchi's highly publicized antidrug commitment. Responsibility for narcotics policy and enforcement remains essentially scattered and uncoordinated among various ministries and policy and military units. The size of the well-regarded narcotics squad of the State Security Police had been reduced. The announced border patrol cooperation agreement with Brazil has not been formalized but, rather, exists as a verbal arrangement between regional commanders. Some veteran observers fear that the current government interest may wane and follow the pattern of past Venezuelan administrations on narcotics control—persuasive rhetoric and politically expedient, ineffectual gestures. [redacted]

In **Paraguay**, the disposition of cocaine-processing chemicals seized by the government remains unresolved, despite pressure from US officials. According to Embassy and DEA reports, the intended recipient of the chemicals almost certainly is Army strongman Gen. Andres Rodriguez whose alleged involvement in the narcotics trade dates back to the early 1970s. [redacted] Rodriguez apparently still intends to divert the chemicals to traffickers outside Paraguay. Paraguayan customs authorities have refused to approve destruction of the chemicals pending the outcome of a case in a local court involving importation of the contraband substances. Embassy sources believe that the government may have initiated the case as a pretext to avoid destroying the chemicals. [redacted]

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Mexico


The discovery by **Mexican** federal police and Army troops in mid-November of marijuana plantations and processing facilities of unprecedented size and sophistication in the northern border state of Chihuahua underscores the marked resurgence of narcotics activity during the past year. The fields—many of which were located near rail lines or highways providing easy transport to the US border—reportedly were irrigated by complex networks of pumps drawing water from a river and were tended by forced laborers. No reliable estimates have been made thus far of the quantities of cannabis that were under cultivation or had already been processed for shipment to the United States, but unconfirmed reports say the amount might have been considerably more than what the Drug Enforcement Administration believes was produced for export in all of Mexico in 1983. In our judgment, Mexico has surpassed Jamaica as the second-largest exporter of marijuana to the United States, and we believe the discovery of such large plantations is a further indication that Mexican narcotics production and trafficking have rebounded beyond the government's ability to regain control any time soon. President de la Madrid reportedly remains committed to reviving antidrug efforts, however, and is likely to continue seeking increased assistance from the United States, which has provided about half of the approximately \$15 million in funds and resources that Mexico has devoted to narcotics suppression this year. [redacted]

Caribbean

Operation Wagonwheel—a major US drug interdiction effort—has affected trafficking patterns in the **Caribbean**. Smugglers of Colombian marijuana have shifted to routes in the western Caribbean instead of the traditional path through the Windward Passage and north through The Bahamas. Marijuana traffic through the Yucatan Channel has increased; and Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Honduran waters have become increasingly popular staging areas for marijuana headed north. [redacted]

The Jamaican Government showed signs of significant progress in the antinarcotics front over the past two months, an indication that US pressure for an improved drug control effort may be paying off:

- On 25 November 1984, Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) officers raided a major processing facility and seized 10 tons of cured marijuana. The facility included sleeping quarters for an estimated 50 workers and a lighting system that allowed them to process marijuana 24 hours a day. Extensive fields of marijuana also surrounded the apparently permanent installation. The JCF reportedly burned the processed marijuana and the wooden buildings and planned to return the following week to destroy the remaining crops. This seizure, as well as other recent multiton seizures, was a good indication that growers harvested a bumper crop this fall.
- Jamaican authorities have begun applying the expanded enforcement powers of the recently amended Civil Aviation Act. On 9 November 1984, two persons were apprehended after landing without permission at an airport in Portland Parish. A Jamaican magistrate imposed fines of \$20,000 each on the two violaters, who pleaded guilty. The traffickers were deported and their aircraft confiscated. Before the recent amendment, which became law last month, the maximum fine would have been \$200 apiece.



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On the downside, in a November conversation with a US official, Prime Minister Seaga reemphasized his opposition to eradication of marijuana with herbicides sprayed from aircraft. Seaga pointed out the steps

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Jamaica had taken recently, notably the airfields bill and the taxes levied on major traffickers, and added that aerial spraying was simply too controversial in Jamaica. Given the Prime Minister's strong opposition to spraying and his evident conviction that he has gone as far as he can against the marijuana industry, we believe it is highly unlikely that the Jamaican Government will begin an aerial eradication program.

[redacted]

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Southeast Asia

Prime Minister Prem and other high-level military officials have approved plans to eradicate opium poppy cultivation in Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son Provinces in northern Thailand during the 1984-85 poppy season.

[redacted]

Approval of eradication plans probably indicates that the Prem government has reached a political consensus in favor of opium eradication. With the exception of a small eradication program late in the season last year, previous crop destruction plans received strong political opposition from many agencies of the Thai Government

[redacted] A successful poppy eradication program this year will reduce the 1984-85 harvest and may deter future plantings.

[redacted]

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Burma's test aerial eradication program has been delayed due to flooding at the airport serving the test site. Government officials are still confident that a program will get under way this year. Some 200 hectares of poppy have been identified during aerial training and photo missions over the test area in the Shan State. The ineffectiveness of Rangoon's manual eradication program prompted the interest in aerial eradication, probably the most effective way to reduce widespread opium cultivation in Burma.

[redacted]

On 15 October the Malaysian Government, concerned over rising narcotics trafficking, submitted legislation to Parliament providing for preventive detention of drug traffickers. The legislation would authorize the Home Affairs Minister to imprison drug traffickers without trial for an initial period of two years, subject to extension in increments of two years. The new legislation was prompted by the failure of laws enacted in 1983, including the death penalty for trafficking more than 15 grams of heroin, to shut down the major traffickers and financiers behind the drug networks. The government also plans to enter into several bilateral treaties that would improve government-to-government cooperation in bringing drug smugglers, dealers, and financiers to trial and open the way for confiscation of their overseas as well as local assets.

[redacted]

Southwest Asia

In October, under the auspices of the United Nations, Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani representatives held a rare meeting to discuss regional narcotics production and trafficking developments. All the delegates agreed that the drug-trafficking situation was growing worse and promised stepped-up efforts at interdicting processed narcotics. Only Pakistan submitted an estimate for its 1984 opium crop—some 45 metric tons. The Afghan delegate claimed that the regime's land reform policy had succeeded in almost eliminating opium cultivation; yet, satellite imagery shows that at least 4,000 hectares of poppies producing approximately 160 tons of opium were grown in Afghanistan in 1984. Iran, probably the world's second-largest opium producer, would admit only to

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having a large number of drug addicts. In light of these comments, it is unlikely that either Afghanistan or Iran will initiate serious efforts to control opium cultivation. [redacted]

President Zia in October ordered **Pakistan's** Ministry of Defense to carry out an aerial photographic survey of Pakistan's 1985 opium poppy crop. [redacted]

[redacted]

The government previously opposed an aerial survey as a security risk, since opium cultivation was close to the Afghan border and in areas controlled by militant tribesmen. Dropping his opposition to the survey is another indication that President Zia is increasingly concerned with the severity of Pakistan's narcotics problem. Moreover, he may use the results of the survey to disprove recent attempts by Afghanistan and Iran to portray Pakistan as the major source of narcotics for the region's vast number of addicts. [redacted]

The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that opium producers in remote parts of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province planted more poppies this October and November than last year. According to the Embassy, opium growers are probably responding to increased demand, which reportedly has driven up opium prices at the farm by 33 percent. Although opium production is declining where the government is combining enforcement operations with development projects, the Embassy report suggests that 1985 may become the second consecutive year of increased cultivation in areas where authorities have little or no control. With good weather, the 1985 opium crop could be as much as 60 percent greater than the approximately 45 tons harvested in 1984. We expect much of this increase would be converted into heroin destined for US and European drug markets. [redacted]

The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that, nearly a year after President Zia signed tougher drug laws, Pakistani courts still are not imposing maximum sentences on convicted drug traffickers. Designed to be serious deterrents, the new laws require that

traffickers convicted for dealing in amounts as little as 10 grams of heroin or 1 kilogram of opium be sentenced from two years to life in jail. Most of the major narcotics cases are now being tried by military tribunals which, according to the Embassy, often impose sentences of less than two years and rarely greater than three. An important test of the new law should occur soon when a heroin laboratory operator who was arrested in the Khyber Tribal Agency in October comes to trial. Although several laboratories have been raided by authorities in the past, this operator is only the second to be arrested. The first, who was tried before the promulgation of the new laws, received only a three-year sentence. [redacted]

Europe

The **West German** Government may increase its efforts to get foreign governments to suppress drug crop production, according to authorities who met in October with visiting State Department officials. Noting that narcotics production is increasing in areas where Germany funds crop substitution programs, Finance Ministry officials said they now plan to specify crop suppression requirements in their rural development programs and link their aid to efforts by governments of drug-producing countries to enforce production controls. These policy changes—more in line with US narcotics control programs—reflect greater determination by the Germans to attack narcotics trafficking as close to its source as possible and get producer countries to take greater responsibility for narcotics control. [redacted]

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**Opium Production Yields
in Thailand**

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Summary

A statistical analysis of reporting on poppy cultivation in Thailand indicates that yields have declined steadily over the past four years, possibly due to soil depletion and weather conditions. Average yields range from 5 to 7 kilograms of raw opium per hectare, considerably less than was once believed. Regional differences in yields arise from local growing conditions and are not related to the presence of crop substitution programs.

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Introduction

Much of the world's supply of heroin comes from the opium produced in a region of Southeast Asia known as the Golden Triangle (Burma, Thailand, and Laos). Estimation of opium production requires knowledge of both the number of hectares planted and the yield of the cultivated area. Previous crop assessments have suffered from limited information on yields.

Production of Raw Opium

Highland Units which are major producers one year tend to be major producers the following year—as indicated by the high correlation in production from one year to the next. A statistical model permits projections of the relative production levels expected next year. However, since data are not available for all Highland Units for every year, it is not possible to conclude how often a minor producer one year becomes a major producer the following year. there are a few new growers each year and a few Highland Units show considerable annual variations in production.

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Opium Yields

an assessment of yields by Highland Unit were inferred from the production and hectareage figures. The analysis demonstrates a significant decline in yields over the past four years and suggests

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¹ These yields are for selected Highland Units.

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regional differences in yields. [redacted]
[redacted] these regional differences arise from local growing conditions and are not a result of the crop substitution programs. [redacted]

Outlook

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The statistical analysis of field reports on poppy cultivation offers a systematic framework for examining both yields and overall opium production. The dramatic decline in yields over the past four years is unlikely to continue, since yields cannot fall much lower. Different yields in different Highland Units are probably attributable to local growing conditions, not to the presence of crop substitution programs, as was earlier believed. This finding does not preclude an effect from crop substitution over a smaller area though. [redacted]

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The yields decreased steadily from 7.7 kilograms per hectare in 1981 to 5.4 kilograms per hectare in 1984. Much of this decline has been attributed to soil depletion and poor rainfall. It is clear from the statistical analysis that the decline in yields is real and not due to random fluctuations in the data. [redacted]

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The distribution of the yields within a single year shows a clustering by region, most apparent in 1983 (map). The higher yields are prevalent along the ridges north of Chiang Mai and south of Chiang Rai, with lower yields occurring in the outlying areas. These high-yield areas are consistent with local weather conditions for the 1983 growing season. [redacted]

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Another explanation advanced for the regional differences in yields relates to the crop substitution programs in Thailand. The presence of such programs provides farmers with superior growing techniques, equipment, and fertilizers. If these factors are applied to poppy cultivation, then yields are expected to be higher in areas with major crop substitution efforts. By examining the yields and the crop substitution programs by Highland Unit, this idea was tested. [redacted]

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Using 1983 data, the average yield for Highland Units with crop substitution programs was compared to the average yield for Highland Units without such programs. The respective averages were 5.81 and 6.28 kilograms per hectare, and a statistical test revealed no significant difference between these two values. Thus, the crop substitution programs do not account for differences in yields reported at the Highland Unit level. Nevertheless, it is possible that these programs induce yields over a smaller region and some further research will be required to address this issue. [redacted]

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Arms Transfers

Arms Transfers: Significant Sales and Negotiations

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Summary

This article presents a listing and analysis of recent significant arms sales, negotiations, and trends. An item may be considered significant for political, military, or economic reasons. Prices will be listed when possible. Sales and negotiations from the fall of 1984 are presented.

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Mideast

hands.

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Persian Gulf

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Algeria also is negotiating with both **France** and the **USSR** for new air defense systems. The French electronics firm Thompson-CSD recently sent a sales team to Algeria to demonstrate its ability to upgrade Soviet equipment now in the Algerian inventory. They also took the opportunity to demonstrate weaknesses in the Soviet equipment, presumably suggesting French replacements. The presence of Soviet Air Defense Chief, Marshal Koldunov, at the 1 November National Anniversary celebration unsettled French Embassy personnel who fear losing the estimated \$1 billion sale.

Kuwait became the first non-Bloc customer for **Soviet** SA-13 and SA-14 anti-aircraft missiles when Minister of Defense Sabah signed agreements worth over \$30 million during his August visit to the **USSR**. Also included were spare parts for the SA-8 launchers that were delivered to Kuwait in October.

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Saudi Arabia signed an Industrial-Military Cooperation Agreement with **Brazil** in October. The agreement includes exchanges of technology and training personnel and the joint production of arms.

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Saudis are interested in T-27 Tucano trainer aircraft, Astros multiple rocket

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The **Soviet Union** agreed in principle, during President Assad's mid-October visit to Moscow, to provide **Syria** with new Soviet military equipment and increased quantities of equipment already in Syrian

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launchers, and Osorio tanks. [redacted]

[redacted]

patrol boat. In November a **Soviet** cargo ship, the first to directly deliver combat weapons to Nicaragua, unloaded four small coastal minesweepers, additional attack helicopters, and probably other military equipment. Another Soviet cargo ship delivered two more MI-8 medium-lift helicopters, which are routinely reconfigured with rocket pods and bomb racks. [redacted]

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Asia

[redacted]

West Germany sold BO-105 helicopters to **Mexico** and **Honduras** for \$8 million and \$6 million, respectively. Mexico will receive six aircraft; and Honduras, five. [redacted]

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Guatemala purchased an unknown number of G-222 transport aircraft from **Italy** for \$28 million. [redacted]

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Europe

Greece announced that it would buy 40 Mirage 2000s from **France** and 40 F-16 fighters from the United States. The decision follows six years of prolonged negotiations over terms involving substantial and complex offset arrangements for Greek defense and civilian industries. Athens reduced its total order from 100 to 80 aircraft, but plans to purchase an additional 20 fighters of one or the other type in three years. [redacted]

South America

Chile took delivery of two warships for its fleet. The SS Almirante Cochrane, a County-class frigate and former HMS Antrim, arrived in September from the **United Kingdom**. The SS Simpson, a **West German**-built Type 209 submarine, was turned over to the Chilean Navy in the same month and is expected to arrive in Chile in late December. [redacted]

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Africa

Togo became the first foreign customer for the Epsilon trainer aircraft when it ordered three from **France** in October. Over 150 of these aircraft have already been delivered to the French Air Force. [redacted]

Argentina also took delivery of a **West German** submarine. The TR-1700-class Santa Cruz left for Argentina in September. [redacted]

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Guinea-Bissau has received as many as five MIG-21 fighters and three MIG-21 trainers from the **USSR**. This is the first known delivery of MIG aircraft to Guinea-Bissau. [redacted]

Bolivia bought 18 T-33 jet trainer aircraft from **France** for \$6 million. Long-range Bolivian plans call for the acquisition of three to six more modern aircraft over the next three to five years. [redacted]

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Central America

Nicaragua took delivery of substantial amounts of Soviet military equipment in October. A **Bulgarian** ship unloaded armored cars, attack helicopters—the first anywhere in Central America—and three batteries of radar-controlled antiaircraft guns—Nicaragua's first. **Cuba** delivered two minesweepers and one

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Peru has purchased \$8 million worth of general purpose bombs from **South Africa**. Working under a 30 November deadline to spend an authorized \$16 million, the Peruvian Air Force ordered these munitions from Pretoria which was the only country willing to provide financing. Peru wanted 100-percent credit in the deal.

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Israel made its first sale of the Manned Portable Anti-Tank Weapons System (MAPATS) to **Venezuela** for an estimated \$5 million. The Venezuelans will get 25 launchers and 300 missile rounds. Delivery is scheduled for April 1985.

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Communist Activities

Nicaragua: Attempts To Develop A Communist-Type Educational System

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Summary

The Sandinistas are trying to instill Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Nicaraguan educational system following the examples of Cuba and the Soviet Union. Such attempts have been generally successful, but strong resistance has been encountered from church-affiliated schools. Now that the elections have occurred the Sandinistas will probably try to increase pressure for cooperation.

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The Government of Nicaragua, dominated by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), is actively trying to follow the Communist method of indoctrination in its educational system. Since coming to power in 1979, Sandinista educational changes have included:

- Acceptance of Soviet and Cuban assistance in the Nicaraguan educational system.
- Use of educational content permeated by Marxist-Leninist ideology.
- Attempts to control private religious education.

Soviet and Cuban Assistance

Nicaragua receives extensive cooperation in the field of education from Cuba and the Soviet Union including aid agreements, academic scholarships, and teacher exchanges.

The major areas of Cuban and Nicaraguan cooperation are student and teacher exchanges and training:

- A delegation of teachers and student organizations headed by new Nicaraguan Education Minister Tunnerman visited Cuba in October 1979 to learn about the Cuban educational system.

- In late 1979, over 1,000 Cuban teachers were sent to Nicaragua to help in a nationwide literacy campaign. Since 1981, as many as 2,000 Cuban teachers in Nicaragua, down to 1,500 at the present time.

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- Approximately 1,200 Nicaraguan students have attended the schools on Cuba's Isle of Youth each year since 1980.

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- Cuban and Nicaraguan media reported that about 1,000 Nicaraguan youth arrived in Cuba in February 1984 for several months of intensive teacher training. In June over 200 new Nicaraguan primary school teachers were reported to have returned from Cuba.

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Soviet cooperation in Nicaraguan education consists mainly of academic scholarships for study in the Soviet Union and some advisory and assistance programs:

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- In December 1980 the Soviet Union agreed to provide for technical advice and institutional support for the reorganization of Nicaragua's higher education, according to a State Department report.

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Major Entities Involved in Education

Nicaraguan	Cuba	Soviet Union
FSLN National Committee	PCC Central Committee	CPSU Central Committee
Department of Propaganda and Political Education (DEPEP), Leonel Espinoza Linart ^a	Internal Education Department, Antonio Diaz Ruiz	Propaganda Department, B. I. Stukalin, ^c Deputy Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
Association of Sandinista Children, Ana Morales (indirect educational link)	National Association of Nicaraguan Educators, Carlos Carrion Cruz, ^a Coordinator, 19 July Sandinista Youth	Academy of Social Sciences
	Directorate Member for Press and Information, Carlos Nunez Tellez, ^a President, GRN State Council (indirect educational link)	Culture Department, V. F. Shauro, candidate member, CPSU Central Committee
GRN	ANPP Council of Ministers	USSR Council of Ministers
Minister of Education, Fernando Cardenal Martinez; ^a Carlos Tunnerman Bernheim was Minister until July 1984.	Minister of Education, Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez ^b	Minister of Education, M. A. Prokof'yev ^c
Minister of Culture, Ernesto Cardenal Martinez, ^a brother of Fernando	Council Vice President, respectively, for Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Fernandez Alvarez.	State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education, N. A. Petrovichev ^c
	Minister of Culture, Armando Enrique Hart Davalos, ^b Member, PCC politburo	Ministry of Culture, P. N. Demichev ^c
	Minister of Higher Education, Fernando Vecino Alegret, ^b Vice President, Cuban-Soviet Friendship Association	State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade, B. N. Pastuklov ^c
	Standing Work Committee for Education, Science, and Sports, Mirta Rosa Rodriguez Alonso, Union of Young Communists' Secretary of Ideology	Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, V. P. Yelyutin ^c
		Academy of Sciences

^a Members, Sandinista Assembly.^b Members, PCC Central Committee.^c Full members of the CPSU Central Committee.

- In 1981 the Soviets provided assistance for the construction of training schools and equipment for the National University, according to the US Embassy in Managua.
- In December 1982 Nicaragua and the Soviet Union signed an agreement recognizing the equivalency of their educational degrees.
- The number of Nicaraguans studying in the Soviet Union has grown from 135 in 1980 to about 1,000 in 1983.

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Ideological Content in Education

The Sandinistas have used both Soviet and Cuban educational systems and concepts to gain firmer control of the ideological content of Nicaraguan education. They have increased the Marxist content of texts, implemented a literacy campaign modeled after Cuba's, and promoted a "new man" concept similar to the Soviet philosophy. [redacted]

Using Cuban and Soviet material, the Sandinistas have increased the Marxist content of text:

- In its 1981 report on Nicaragua, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted charges by parents that textbooks were highly political in content and criticized the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist content of Cuban educational materials.
- [redacted] by 1981 texts in Nicaragua had pro-Cuban, pro-Sandinista themes and emphasized Castro's guidance and assistance to the Nicaraguan Revolution.
- The US Embassy in Managua reported that a Cuban agreement to provide literary material has noticeably increased the flow of Soviet Bloc books into Nicaragua.
- The State Department's 1983 human rights report asserts that, although domestic and imported books are not censored, few books are imported from the West while Marxist literature is freely circulated. [redacted]

Another early development was the Sandinistas' use of a "new man" concept in their educational programs. This concept reflects the Soviet philosophy which continues to stress the need to "mold the new man," that is, changing man himself in order to make a revolutionary transformation of society:

- In 1979 Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Education Miguel de Castilla spoke of the need to shape a "new man" and announced that the National Autonomous University would offer courses in Marxist-Leninist political training in order to achieve this goal.

- Also in 1979 the Association of Sandinist Children requested the establishment of a political-education school for children 6 to 14 in order to develop the "new man" mentality and integrate them into the revolution. [redacted]

Described as the first goal of Sandinista education, the formation of the "new man," also called the new Nicaraguan, was outlined in a November 1982 Ministry of Education working paper. The paper listed political and social values that individuals must develop to enable them to participate in the construction of the Sandinistas' new revolutionary society. These values included discipline, a revolutionary view, anti-imperialism, internationalism, and identification with the interests of the workers. [redacted]

Nicaragua conducted a National Literacy Crusade in 1980 similar to a campaign conducted in Cuba in the early days of the revolution. The Nicaraguan literacy campaign was administered by Father Fernando Cardenal Martinez, who became Nicaraguan's Education Minister in July 1984 (see inset). Fernando's brother and current Nicaraguan Minister of Culture, Ernesto Cardenal Martinez wrote that he was impressed by the 1961 Cuban campaign which combined the teaching of basic reading and writing skills with socialist political indoctrination. [redacted]

During 1980, classes were suspended for five months to let 80,000 volunteers, mostly high school students, participate in the literacy campaign. According to the US Embassy, the FSLN called the national literacy campaign "the greatest political seminar in Nicaraguan history." The US Embassy commented that the campaign plus the continued commitment to adult education is an excellent way to indoctrinate Nicaraguans in FSLN ideology. By 1984, political ideology, especially that of Sandino, was being taught everywhere from preschool to civil defense courses to militia training. [redacted]

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Fernando Cardenal Martinez

Fernando Cardenal Martinez is a Jesuit priest, who directed the Sandinista literacy campaign in 1979 and 1980 before becoming vice coordinator of the Sandinista youth organization JS-19J in 1980 and then second in command of the Sandinista Defense Committees in 1983. In July 1984 he became Minister of Education—an appointment the head of the Jesuit Order in the Vatican had forbidden him to accept. He has been pro-Sandinista since 1970 when he was fired from his post as vice rector of the Jesuit-run Central American University in Managua (UCA) for supporting a leftist-inspired student strike. In 1973 he founded the Revolutionary Christian Movement, which spawned many subsequent FSLN leaders. He told an interviewer in December 1982 that he had "not found, in this work I now do with youth, the least contradiction, inconsistency, or conflict of conscience with the orientation I had all the way through my Jesuit training."

- Responding to parents' complaints in late 1982 about government attempts to indoctrinate their children in Marxist-Leninist ideology, Education Minister Tunnerman stated that, despite the revolution's guarantee of the existence of private schools, only the state can make policy and it cannot ignore the reality of the class struggle.

- In addition, students in church-affiliated schools have been required to spend part of their vacations in FSLN-coordinated work programs. [redacted]

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The Catholic Church, however, has, on occasion, successfully challenged the Sandinistas. For example, this year at one Catholic high school the Church removed and replaced proregime teachers despite a Sandinista threat to close the school if it made such change. The Sandinistas did not act on their threat.

[redacted]

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Cuba, when faced with a similar problem in early 1961, closed the 250 schools operated by the Catholic Church. Students in Cuba have also been refused admission to universities for continued participation in religious activities, according to the State Department's 1983 human rights report. [redacted]

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Control of Private Religious Education

Sandinista attempts to force a Marxist curriculum on church-affiliated schools have had only limited success. Unlike Cuba and the Soviet Union, many Nicaraguan high school students attend church-affiliated institutions. The Sandinistas have tried to reach these students through the curriculum as well as through outside programs:

- The Sandinistas use threats, such as school closures, to press for the appointment of proregime teachers to Catholic schools.

- To continue their work, teachers and students throughout the country are required to attend Civil Defense courses for political indoctrination, [redacted]

[redacted]

- Marxist materials have been used in Catholic schools as required texts, although [redacted] teachers often glossed over such material and concentrated on more traditional Catholic teachings.

The policy in the Soviet Union is even more restrictive. The Law on Religious Associations forbids instruction of any religious teachings in educational institutions. Soviet textbooks and teachers depict religion as unsanitary, unhealthy, corrupting, morally degrading, and encouraging ignorance. [redacted]

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After gaining power in 1979, the Sandinistas formed government and party organizations to achieve direct party control of education. They have developed a rudimentary organizational structure resembling the educational bureaucracy in Cuba and the Soviet Union:

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- The FSLN's Department of Propaganda and Political Education performs functions similar to the Cuban Communist Party's Internal Education Department and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Propaganda Department.

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- Both the Nicaraguan Minister of Education and Minister of Culture are highly placed members of the Sandinista party just as their counterpart Cuban and Soviet ministers are in top positions in their parties. Like their Cuban and Soviet counterparts, the Nicaraguan ministries concentrate on disseminating party ideology to the education system.
- An organization that appears to be developing Cuban and Soviet styles is the Association of Sandinista Children (ANS). Like the Cuban and Soviet Pioneer organizations, the ANS is a propaganda vehicle to indoctrinate young children in party ideology. [redacted]

various official and semiofficial positions in defiance of Vatican and Jesuit orders to leave or refuse such appointments. Nevertheless, these priests have apparently failed to convince the majority of the population to withhold support from the Church hierarchy. [redacted]

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Recently there have been some indications of efforts to lessen external influences and ease internal policies:

- Nicaraguan teacher trainees returning from Cuba are replacing Cuban teachers, so that, by the end of the year, only a few Cuban teachers may be left.
- There has been less mention of Soviet themes, such as the "new man concept," in Nicaraguan educational literature, suggesting an attempt to back away from close association with the Soviets.
- The FSLN has shown restraint in dealing with church-affiliated schools as part of an attempt to improve relations with the Catholic Church.

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However, these may have been only temporary measures aimed at reducing tensions prior to the elections. We expect that as long as the Sandinistas stay in power they will continue to take opportunities to exploit education for their own gain. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Assessment

Although Soviet educational assistance to Nicaragua has grown, Cuba has provided more substantial aid in the form of volunteer teachers and training, and probably has had more direct influence. Direct Soviet and Cuban involvement in Nicaraguan education will probably continue at its present level for the next few years and decline as the Sandinistas gain greater experience in educational control. However, the Sandinistas are likely to maintain their dependence on Soviet and Cuban literature for Marxist educational material. [redacted]

Despite complaints from parents, the FSLN has had some success in incorporating Marxist-Leninist ideology into its educational materials, primarily by taking advantage of the opportunities to obtain materials from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Nicaraguan literacy campaign of 1980, which mirrored Cuba's program, provided opportunities to indoctrinate Nicaraguans, particularly adults, in FSLN ideology. [redacted]

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The Sandinistas have had more limited success in gaining control of students receiving private religious education. Many of Nicaragua's students still attend Catholic schools, and the Sandinistas have been unable to dominate the Catholic Church. However, there is a small faction of Catholic priests who form the "Popular Church" and continue to support the Sandinistas. Mostly from religious orders outside the direct control of the Church hierarchy, members hold

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