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Central Intelligence

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Thursday 8 December 1983

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CPAS NID 83-286.IX

8 December 1983

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
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EC: Summit Fails	
The failure of EC leaders to resolve agricultural and budget problems at their recent summit in Athens deepens the Community's financial crisis.	25X1
A deadlock developed on ways to limit runaway farm spending and relieve the UK's budget burden. Prime Minister Thatcher, with the support of West Germany, again threatened to block new revenue measures until British and West German payments to the Community are cut. French President Mitterrand, however, rejected new British	
budget proposals.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The budget dispute was so intense that the Ten failed for the first time to issue a final communique. Aides prepared draft statements on the Middle East, Cyprus, and Central America, but the heads of government did not have time to address foreign policy issues.	25X1
government did not have time to address foreign policy issues.	25/1
Comment: Although the negotiations were heated and unproductive, Thatcher apparently did not threaten again to withhold future EC budget payments until her demands are met. The next EC summit is scheduled for March, but France—which assumes the EC presidency in January—is likely to push for a special meeting before then.	25X1
The Ten have to agree on how to raise new funds by the middle of next year if the EC is to avoid bankruptcy. The European Parliament could apply additional pressure next week by rejecting the EC budget for 1984. As a result, Community expenditures would continue to be based on allocations for 1983.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Farm price supports held to the level of this year would irritate France, Italy, and Ireland. The British budget rebate for 1984 also might be withheld.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The summit's failure to agree on the future course of its agricultural policy may complicate the US Cabinet-level meeting tomorrow with the EC Commission. Although the EC leaders seemed	
near consensus on limiting imports of US corn gluten feed, they apparently remain divided on whether to deal with the US bilaterally	25X1
on the issue or to take emergency measures under the GATT.	25X1
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WEST GERMANY-US: Air Defense Agreement	
Bonn views the new air defense agreement with the US, which was signed on Tuesday, as a positive step in bilateral relations and a sign of Washington's commitment to the two-way street in NATO armaments procurement.	25X1
Under the agreement, the US will give the West Germans 14 Patriot surface-to-air missile fire units—12 operational, one spare, and one for training—and the West Germans will buy an equal number. In return, the West Germans will man two US Patriot battalions and provide and operate 27 French-German Roland surface-to-air fire units at three US airbases in West Germany.	25X1
Comment: Defense Minister Woerner regards the agreement as a first step in redressing the inadequacies of air defense in West Germany and in NATO's integrated air defense system. Bonn needed the agreement in order to meet its NATO commitment to field Patriot systems and procure Rolands for its own airbases and still keep within existing budget limits.	25X1
West German officials have long been concerned that what they view as a protectionist US Congress is impeding US procurement of European-produced weapons and equipment. They view the Patriot-Roland agreement as an important test of the US commitment to defense procurement that benefits economies on both sides of the Atlantic, and this will influence West German attitudes toward future armaments cooperation programs.	25X1
West Germany has urged Belgium and the Netherlands to improve their NATO air defense systems. Both have followed the US-West German negotiations closely and now may seek equally	
beneficial arrangements.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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
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<b>EAST GERMANY-WEST GERMANY: Post-INF Relation</b>	8	
Fact Parlin in daing business on your with Page de-	_ (a	
East Berlin is doing business as usual with Bonn desp		
threats to impose an "ice age" in relations after INF dep	ioyments.	0574
		25 <b>X</b> 1
East German leader Honecker initially criticized the \	West German	
Bundestag's support for deployment as inconsistent with		
Treaty governing bilateral ties. He has reaffirmed East B		
support for the treaty, however, and has pledged to exar		
any West German proposals for improving relations.		25 <b>X</b> 1
Since the vote in the Bundestag, East German official	als have	
continued negotiations to transfer operations of a local t		
in West Berlin to Western control. On Monday an East G		
Politburo member discussed bilateral issues for an hour		
German politician. East German media, after an initial to	ugh reaction.	
did not repeat the criticism of Bonn voiced in the press	7	
Moscow on Monday and have not contradicted the view		
German leaders that bilateral relations will continue.		25X1
Chancellor Kohl and other West German officials ha	ve remained	
optimistic, ignoring the ambiguity of Honecker's statement	ent and the	
harsher criticism from other East German leaders.		25 <b>X</b> 1
		25X1
Comment: East Berlin seems to be trying to insulate	e bilateral	
relations from any significant cooling of East-West ties.		
to be indicating to Bonn and to its own citizens that bila		
could still suffer, particularly if Moscow demands more t	angible	
political reactions to deployment.		25 <b>X</b> 1
East Germany may try to use INF deployments as ar		
resist granting major political concessions. East Berlin is	s likely to	
believe that it can continue getting hard currency payme	ents from	
Bonn without making such concessions. It probably calc	ulates that	
Bonn needs to show that its policy on INF will not prever		

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movement in intra-German relations.



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IRAQ: Oil Exports To Increase  Iraq's Oil Minister has announced that Baghdad proil exports through the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline from just barrels per day to 900,000 barrels per day beginning of to 1 million barrels by next April. The increase is being the addition of new pumps to the pipeline, now Iraq's exporting oil.  the Iraqis are detexport as much oil as possible, regardless of the outcourrent OPEC meeting in Geneva.  Comment: Iraq has to increase oil exports substate ease its financial difficulties. Nevertheless, the \$1 billion annual oil revenue that may be obtained by increasing the pipeline through Turkey would fall short of covering Moreover, Iraq probably will have difficulty sustaining new target level because of the soft market for oil that year. Earlier this year Baghdad had to cut the pipeline make its oil competitive.	at under 800,000 on Saturday and g achieved by sole means of termined to come of the  antially if it is to on in additional g the capacity of ng Iraq's needs. exports at the at is likely next	25X1 25X1 25X1
IRAN: Attacks on Afghan Refugees  Iranians in the Tehran area attacked Afghan refugeseparate incidents last week, according to a statement Interior Minister on national television. The Minister be incidents on "Afghan agents of the US and the USSR, want to fan communal tensions in Iran and discourage for the Islamic Afghan resistance.  Comment: These incidents reflect the frustration Iranians, especially the poor, who resent the regime's 1.5 million Afghan refugees in Iran. Refugees fill jobs, and receive welfare benefits that might otherwise go the service of the Islamic Afghan refugees in Iran.	ont by the Iranian plamed the control of the said e Iranian support of many a support for the occupy housing,	25X1

Iranians, including the nearly 2 million internal refugees from the war with Iraq. Few Iranians will believe that the incidents were provoked by foreign meddling. Although more violence is likely, Tehran almost certainly will continue to support the refugees.

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## **NORWAY: Challenge to Security Policy**

The opposition Labor Party is asking the parliament to consider today a resolution requiring Oslo to support the nuclear freeze concept in international forums and to endorse a merger of INF and START negotiations. This latest challenge to government security policy is prompted by a press article written and signed by two members of the Christian People's Party in the governing coalition. They expressed qualified support for a nuclear freeze. Most US Embassy contacts expect the government to avoid defeat on the resolution, possibly by deferring it until spring.

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**Comment**: The government has narrowly defeated four previous challenges to its security policy over the last year, but each time only by a single vote. With the possible loss of two swing votes, Prime Minister Willoch may find it difficult to defeat this resolution, because it supports international arms control efforts and does not directly oppose NATO policy. The government will not be endangered by such a vote unless it is made a vote of confidence. A defeat nevertheless would weaken the coalition and complicate discussions in NATO.

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### **ROMANIA: Growing Unrest**

Recent government austerity measures are causing widespread Workers have staged brief discontent. 25X1 strikes in and near Bucharest to protest wage cuts imposed when their factories failed to meet unrealistic production targets. 25X1 there is unhappiness with shortages of food 25X1 and of fuel and electric power and that the government is considering an increase in food rationing after Christmas. 25X1 criticism of President Ceausescu has increased and that dissatisfaction with his policies now extends to upper levels of the 25X1 party and the government. **Comment**: Public unrest probably will intensify during the winter as living and working conditions deteriorate. An increase in food

as living and working conditions deteriorate. An increase in food rationing could provoke demonstrations—as the introduction of rationing did two years ago—and sharpen existing divisions in the leadership. The continued strong backing of the security forces, however, puts Ceausescu in a good position to head off serious challenges to his authority.


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EASTERN EUROPE: Winter Grain Crops Threa	itened	
Fall drought has damaged winter grain crop		
Romania, and Bulgaria, according to US Embase Czechoslovakia 25 to 30 percent of the winter growth and the statement of the winter growth and the statement of the winter growth and the statement of the statemen	rains failed to	
germinate, and in Romania dry soil prevented co	ompletion of sowing	25 <b>X</b> 1
on time.		25X1
Comment: Romania and Bulgaria had poor		
and financial problems have constrained imports countries. Consequently, the harvest next year v		
important in determining whether adequate food	d supplies are	
available. Winter grains normally account for mograin production in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria		
Romania. Low soil moisture is increasing vulnera	ability to winterkill in	
Czechoslovakia and is threatening to reduce yie three countries.	aus next spring in all	25 <b>X</b> 1
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### Changes in Size of Population Unemployment in Midyear and Labor Force Millions 1960-70 Number 14.9 Total Unemployed Rate 6.4 (thousands) (percent) Age groups 18,306 10.6 6.9 Western Europe 15-24 8.92,320 West Germany 2,029 8.5 France 25-54 2,258 9.7 Italy 2,970 12.4 United Kingdom 4.0 55-64 3.2 145 Austria 510 11.9 Belgium 10.6 285 Denmark 1970-80 150 Finland 6.8 21.0 Total 370 10.0 Greece 11.7 1.3 Iceland Age groups 146 15-24 14.2 Ireland 0.9 2 1.3 Luxembourg 17.4 841 Netherlands 25-54 14.8 61 13.4 3.4 Norway 9.0 390 Portugal 55-64 17.5 2,141 Spain 3.4 135 Sweden Population 52 0.8 Switzerland Labor force 20.0 3,500 Turkey 301344 12-83

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
Special Analysis	
WESTERN EUROPE: The Unemployment Crisis	
Western Europe is struggling with the highest levels of unemployment since the reconstruction period after World War II, with little prospect for improvement before the end of the decade. As of mid-1983, 18 million workers—more than 10 percent of the labor force—were jobless, and the rate is expected to climb to 12 percent by 1990. This persistent trend will be a heavy burden on Western Europe's political and social institutions and could disrupt economic, political, and security relations with the US.	25X1
Some three-fourths of unemployment in Western Europe is caused by rapid growth of the labor force, accelerating labor costs, and an inability to reorganize industry. The recent recession has aggravated the situation, accounting for the additional one-fourth of those out of work.	25 <b>X</b> 1
During the 1970s, the total population increased only slightly, but the prime working-age population—ages 25 to 54—grew two times faster than in the previous decade. Simultaneously, wages and nonwage labor costs rocketed, encouraging employers to reduce jobs through attrition.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Western Europe's inability to shift employees from declining traditional kinds of work into high growth industries further limited job creation in the 1970s. Although economic growth in the region during the 1970s was comparable with that in the US, Western Europe added only about 5 million new jobs, while US employment grew by more than 20 million workers.	25X1
Western Europe will not be able to solve its structural unemployment problems quickly, and the number of unemployed will continue to climb gradually throughout the decade. The baby boom of the 1960s and more workers in the older working-age brackets will mean even more people will be in the labor force than during the last decade. Economic growth is not likely to provide jobs for the additional members of the labor force.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The one potential mitigating factor would be lower labor costs that could result from high unemployment and weaker unions. The additional demand for labor encouraged by more competitive wages, however, would promote only marginal improvement in employment. By itself, it is unlikely to reverse the dismal unemployment prospects.	25X1
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
# Rapid Rise of Labor Cost in Big Four

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
# Index: 1970=100 Real labor costs 200



## Real wages



## Real nonwage costs




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# Western Europe and the US: Employment Changes, by Sector, 1970-80

Percent



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	Current West European economic policies probably are helping to promote a climate more conducive to growth without rapid inflation, but the underlying causes of unemployment problems are not being adequately addressed. For the most part, governments are	
	concentrating on reducing working hours and providing government subsidies for hiring the long-term unemployed. Such programs, however, do little more than redistribute the current unemployment.	
•		25 <b>X</b> 1
	Few countries are carrying out their plans to hold down nonwage labor costs for employers in order to encourage overall employment. Governments are doing little to reduce public intervention in the economy, a major factor slowing the restructuring process. Moreover, they are continuing to prop up outmoded and uncompetitive industries rather than promote investment in new and more dynamic industries.	25X1
	Implications for the US and NATO	
	The continued high unemployment in Western Europe will lead to new strains in relations with the US. Trade disagreements are likely to become more numerous and more hotly contested as trade opportunities are increasingly equated with job opportunities.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Recent disagreements with the US over trade in steel and agricultural goods could become the rule, not the exception, and may affect political and military cooperation. Moreover, the increasing importance of exports will encourage West European countries to relax enforcement of trade restrictions on sales to Warsaw Pact countries.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	As trade difficulties mount, protectionist pressures in Western Europe will grow. New barriers against US products probably will be limited, but restrictions against imports from Japan and the newly industrialized countries may increase. This would force those countries to offset lost sales in Western Europe by trying to sell more	
	Dim employment prospects also will make it more difficult for West European countries to meet their defense commitments to NATO. Unemployment already has caused a severe financial drain on West European governments, and, with budgets likely to remain tight, demands to curb defense spending will intensify. The Allies almost certainly will increase pressure on the US to buy West European military equipment to help maintain employment in their defense	25X1
	industries.	25X1
	continued	
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	In addition, the unemployment problem will have other political and economic ramifications that could affect the US. In the next few years, the inability of incumbent West European leaders to solve the unemployment problem may usher in more frequent changes between governments of the left and right. Political extremism may spread among young people, when much of an entire generation of youth tries to cope with years of joblessness.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	In Spain and Turkey, where unemployment will remain extraordinarily high and will be coupled with rapid inflation and foreign debt difficulties, serious political instability could result. Foreign workers increasingly will become targets of resentment by the unemployed, leading to social strains both within and among West	

European countries.

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