



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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OCPAS/CIG



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# **National Intelligence Daily**

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*Thursday  
13 October 1983*

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
13 October 1983

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## Contents

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25X1

<b>Japan:</b> Implications of the Tanaka Verdict .....	2
<b>North Korea-South Korea:</b> Possible New Strategy .....	3
<b>Nicaragua:</b> Reaction to Insurgent Attacks .....	4
<b>Chile:</b> Week of Protests .....	5
<b>Poland:</b> Party Central Committee Plenary Meeting .....	6



25X1

<b>Warsaw Pact:</b> Foreign Ministers Confer on INF .....	8
<b>Western Europe:</b> Labor Statement on INF .....	9
<b>Norway:</b> Impending Challenge to INF .....	9
<b>Central America:</b> Regional Council Reactivated .....	10
<b>International:</b> New Tactics at the IAEA Meeting .....	10
<b>USSR-Iraq-Iran:</b> Commentary on French Aircraft Sale .....	11
<b>UK:</b> Criticism of Thatcher .....	11



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**Top Secret**



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13 October 1983

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


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**JAPAN: Implications of the Tanaka Verdict**

*The guilty verdict in the bribery trial of former Prime Minister Tanaka probably will not threaten Prime Minister Nakasone's political position.* 


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Lawyers for Tanaka have appealed the conviction, and he will remain free pending resolution of the appeal, a process that could take years. Tanaka says he is innocent and is determined to fight the decision of the court. Many members of the Tanaka faction are rallying around their leader. 


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All the opposition parties released statements calling for Tanaka to resign from the Diet. They are expected to seek a vote on a resolution against Tanaka that indirectly attacks Nakasone. The media uniformly demand Tanaka's retirement from politics. 


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Nakasone, who relies heavily on the support of the 119-man faction led by Tanaka, has tried to remain aloof from the controversy. He says the legal system should be allowed to take its course as provided for in the Constitution. The Liberal Democratic Party still has a commanding majority in the Diet, and none of Nakasone's rivals in the party is prepared to challenge his leadership now. 

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**Comment:** Nakasone, strengthened by his strong standing in the polls, will try to divert public attention by focusing Diet debate on politically popular measures such as a tax cut. Initial public reaction has been calm, and recent polls suggest the public is tired of the issue, which has dragged on since 1976. 

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Opposition parties will find it difficult to boycott the Diet, as they have threatened if the Liberal Democratic Party refuses to participate in any debate over Tanaka's fate. If Nakasone cannot contain the controversy, Tanaka is likely to resign to spare the party further embarrassment. 

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13 October 1983

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
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
**NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA: Possible New Strategy**

*Indications of North Korean responsibility for the bombing in Rangoon—though still not conclusive—raise the possibility that P'yongyang is adopting a more aggressive strategy toward South Korea.*



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Burmese security authorities yesterday apprehended a third Korean suspect. South Korean investigators in Rangoon reportedly have been given permission to interrogate him.




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**Comment:** P'yongyang largely avoided highly visible terrorist actions during the late 1970s. It viewed talk of US troop withdrawals and the growth of political unrest in South Korea as favorable developments.




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Since South Korean President Chun took office in 1980, North Korean President Kim Il-song has been dealt a series of setbacks in his efforts to reunify the peninsula on his terms. Chun has firmly consolidated control since taking power.




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South Korea, as host country to a number of impending international events, is achieving considerable worldwide recognition and prestige. The US-South Korean security relationship has been reaffirmed and strengthened. P'yongyang may have viewed Chun's visit to Rangoon as an opportunity to remove the one individual most responsible for these trends.



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Tight security in South Korea virtually rules out a successful North Korean terrorist strike against Chun and other high-level officials. Security precautions in Rangoon, on the other hand, are less stringent, and the North Koreans have an established presence in Burma. Chun's trip was first announced in June, giving P'yongyang ample time to plan such an operation.




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13 October 1983

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**NICARAGUA: Reaction to Insurgent Attacks**

*The attack on the fuel storage facility at Corinto has dealt a psychological blow to Sandinista leaders, who are debating on how to respond.*



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Nicaragua delivered an official protest to the US Embassy yesterday, charging Washington with direct responsibility for the raid. The Sandinistas report that five fuel storage tanks have been destroyed and 25,000 residents of the port have been evacuated. A US oil company official valued the initial fuel loss at more than \$2 million and says it will cost about \$1 million to replace the largest fuel tank.



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**Comment:** Managua may retaliate for the attack by sponsoring terrorist raids in Honduras and perhaps Costa Rica. Nicaraguan leaders have backed away from recent statements by Defense Minister Ortega that the Sandinista military would engage in hot pursuit of insurgents into neighboring countries. The Sandinistas reportedly have conducted raids on insurgent camps in Honduras, however, and unpublicized attacks on targets near the border probably will continue.



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The Sandinistas are likely to increase efforts to strengthen air and coastal defenses. Cuba and the USSR are unlikely to agree to a Sandinista request for MIGs at this time, but they may provide additional anti-aircraft artillery, hand-held surface-to-air missiles, and coastal patrol boats. The Sandinistas probably will seek fighter aircraft from other sources—such as Libya, which tried previously to deliver L-39 jet trainers.



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The Sandinista leadership probably will judge that offering any political concessions now would be viewed as a sign of weakness. Coming soon after the sabotage of the oil import facility at Puerto Sandino and a series of insurgent air attacks, however, the raid could again prompt the Sandinistas to tell US officials they are willing to negotiate all issues. This would include their support for Salvadoran insurgents.



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**CHILE: Week of Protests**

*The suspension of the democratic opposition's dialogue with the government and its withdrawal from protest activity increases the likelihood of leftist-inspired violence today and tomorrow.*

[Redacted]

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The antigovernment rally in Santiago on Tuesday, organized by a new leftist coalition, was authorized by the government and was generally nonviolent. Plans for additional protests and marches, including a large demonstration tomorrow night, do not have government approval. Leaders of the moderate Democratic Alliance have announced they are not formally participating in these activities.

[Redacted]

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The Democratic Alliance on Monday said it was suspending the dialogue because the government had not responded to its demands.

[Redacted]

Alliance leaders believe they are losing ground in their attempts to extract concessions from the government and fear possible dissolution as members leave to join more active leftist groups.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** The democratic opposition will lose credibility if it refuses to engage in protests. On the other hand, it risks alienating its moderate elements and jeopardizing hopes for accommodation with the government if it becomes embroiled in leftist-inspired violence.

[Redacted]

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Groups in the Alliance are divided on strategy but probably have not yet ruled out resuming talks with the government. Moderates may seize on the government's apparent willingness to form a mixed commission on political laws to salvage the dialogue.

[Redacted]

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The leftists' determination to undermine the dialogue and the regime's resolve to discourage protests also make further violence more likely. Serious turmoil this week would harden attitudes on both sides.

[Redacted]

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**POLAND: Party Central Committee Plenary Meeting**

*The long-delayed party Central Committee plenary session on ideology that is to begin tomorrow will discuss a new policy on middle-level leadership and may be the scene of maneuvering over personnel changes, but Premier Jaruzelski's position as party first secretary seems secure.*

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] an open struggle is unlikely between Jaruzelski and his opponents. On the other hand, Jaruzelski wants to place moderate Vice Premier Rakowski on the Politburo and the Secretariat, despite objections from party hardliners and the Soviets.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** The repeated postponement of the meeting since early this year probably reflects Jaruzelski's preoccupation with security issues and his concern that he could not control the discussion of such a contentious topic. Soviet pressure

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] helped prompt Jaruzelski to hold the Central Committee session now. Moscow probably considers a new ideological program essential to rebuilding the party.

[Redacted]

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Jaruzelski probably is confident that his critics cannot challenge his control of the party. The successful conclusion of the papal visit in June and the ease with which the regime handled the small demonstrations by Solidarity on 31 August have strengthened his position. He may also believe that recent criticism of the church in the government press will refute charges that he is too lenient with the opposition.

[Redacted]

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Rakowski's recent uncharacteristically harsh attack on the US may be intended to improve his standing with the Soviets, who criticized him in May. Failure of Rakowski's candidacy could indicate there are still significant constraints on Jaruzelski's power.

[Redacted]

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It is unlikely that the Central Committee will unite the party behind an ideological program. The party's proposed policy on middle-level leadership, announced in August, probably did not go down well with hardliners. The new policy would provide for the appointment of more nonparty people to managerial posts in the economy and in the government, and hardliners—fearful of losing their jobs—argue that the party should have a monopoly on these posts.

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
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**WARSAW PACT: Foreign Ministers Confer on INF**


*Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers convene in Sofia today to consider responses to NATO's plans for INF and to discuss new ways to fan Western fears that deployments will further damage East-West relations.* 

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
 a strongly anti-US and anti-NATO draft communique has been coordinated by all the Pact members except Romania, which late last month was uncertain whether to concur. The draft also calls for agreement at Geneva, reviews past peace initiatives by the Pact, and repeats the warning issued after the Warsaw Pact summit last June that member states will not allow the West to gain military superiority. 

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Foreign Minister Gromyko, following the ministerial meeting, will meet with West German Foreign Minister Genscher in Vienna. Genscher has indicated publicly that INF will be a major theme of their talks, which were to have been held during the UN General Assembly session. 


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Gromyko reportedly also has invited other West European foreign ministers to meet with him. Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen is planning to visit Moscow late this month. 

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**Comment:** The USSR presumably has sought to bring the Romanians into line. If they acquiesce, the Soviets may be encouraged to try to convene another Pact summit before INF deployments begin in December to try again to secure endorsement of countermeasures to INF deployment. 

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Gromyko and other Soviet and East European officials will take this hard line with their West European counterparts. In this connection, the Soviets may now regard the cancellation of some of Gromyko's UN consultations as a blessing in disguise, as rescheduled meetings will be less affected by the incident of the South Korean airliner shutdown. 

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**WESTERN EUROPE: Labor Statement on INF**

The executive committee of the European Trade Union Confederation today will consider a draft statement urging the US and USSR to reach an arms control agreement on INF and criticizing their failure to do so thus far. The draft demands a greater European role in negotiations and asks that French and British systems be included in the talks. The Confederation asserts that, if the talks show no progress by late November, European labor will consider stronger action. The organization plans to deliver its statement to the US and Soviet delegations in Geneva after the peace demonstrations set for 22 and 23 October.

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**Comment:** This draft is more critical of the superpowers than the Confederation's resolution of April 1982 and reflects the growing involvement in protest activities of key labor groups in the INF basing countries. French labor representatives, however, are likely to oppose the draft's references to French nuclear systems. The Confederation is the umbrella organization for 35 national labor groupings covering a rather wide political spectrum. Its affiliates are not obliged to act on the statement, but might join a short Europe-wide work stoppage if an INF agreement is not reached.

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**NORWAY: Impending Challenge to INF**

Prime Minister Willoch probably will face a major parliamentary challenge on INF this fall. Willoch is fairly confident he can retain a parliamentary majority in favor of INF deployments. The opposition Labor Party, which did well in local elections last month, is coordinating its efforts with other social democratic parties in Western Europe and is following events in West Germany closely. Meanwhile, Norway's well-organized peace movement is planning to stage demonstrations this month.

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
**Comment:** The two parties that formally joined Willoch's coalition in June are likely to provide enough votes to keep the government in power. Willoch will try to exploit divisions on INF in the Labor Party and deflect its ability to attack the government's economic policies. The demonstrations are unlikely to be either massive or unruly, in part because Norway is not an INF basing country.

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
**CENTRAL AMERICA: Regional Council Reactivated**

Defense Ministers from Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Panama are planning a second meeting in Tegucigalpa next week to try to revive the Central American Defense Council. During a meeting in Guatemala on 1 October, the Ministers agreed to present a united front against Nicaragua and to warn the Sandinista government not to involve itself in other countries' affairs. A Guatemalan military spokesman asserted, however, that the Council's mission would be "defensive" and that it would not seek to destabilize Nicaragua. The Ministers hope their governments will officially endorse the organization and issue a statement of its political principles.



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
**Comment:** Guatemalan Chief of State Mejia, who heads the Council, hopes to establish a strong Guatemalan role in regional affairs. He probably wants the Council to take a more assertive position against Nicaragua's support of regional revolutionaries than the Contadora group has. If Panama becomes an active member, Council leaders will point to the presence of one of the four Contadora countries as indicative of the Council's nonaggressive posture. That could be offset by Costa Rica's decision not to participate because of its neutral position in regional conflicts.



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**INTERNATIONAL: New Tactics at the IAEA Meeting**

The US Mission at the IAEA in Vienna reports that Iraq has offered a draft resolution at the IAEA General Conference calling for the termination of all scientific cooperation between the IAEA and Israel. Egypt and several black African states are circulating a similar resolution prohibiting IAEA technical assistance to South Africa. These resolutions require only a simple majority. The votes on these resolutions could take place today.




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**Comment:** Baghdad's resolution suggests that the Iraqis have abandoned plans for a more direct attack on Israel's membership status and for challenging Tel Aviv's credentials to attend the conference. The Iraqis can count on support from many developing nations. They will not be disposed to weaken the resolution, since it represents their minimum demands. The votes on the Iraqi resolution and on the one on South Africa are likely to be close.



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**USSR-IRAQ-IRAN: Commentary on French Aircraft Sale**

A Soviet television commentator on Tuesday said the Iranian reaction to the reported delivery to Iraq of five French Super Etendard aircraft could lead to the involvement of other countries in the war. He claimed that the "greatest danger" is that the US would use such an escalation as an excuse for "armed interference." The commentator repeated the USSR's longstanding appeal for a negotiated settlement and said the Soviets are "resolutely against" outside military interference.



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**Comment:** These remarks, although not especially authoritative, are Moscow's first response to the reported delivery of the aircraft and Tehran's threat to close the Persian Gulf. His focus on the possibility of US military involvement suggests concern about an increased US military presence in the region. For the Soviets, such a prospect probably outweighs the potential benefits of the temporary disruption of Western economies that may follow an interruption in oil exports from the Persian Gulf.



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
**UK: Criticism of Thatcher**

Prime Minister Thatcher probably will have little difficulty in weathering the current spate of political and media criticisms. The major focus of media attention has been Trade Secretary Parkinson, who has admitted that his former secretary is carrying his child out of wedlock. Various commentators also have discussed the government's supposed lack of clear direction following Thatcher's landslide reelection in June. In addition, a series of disputes between the Treasury and other ministries over spending levels have received wide publicity.



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**Comment:** Thatcher's problems in demonstrating strong leadership reflect the customary summer political lull, her absence from center stage following eye surgery, and a sense that a large majority allows the Tories to indulge in squabbles among themselves. The "Parkinson affair," coming on the eve of the Conservative conference, is embarrassing to Thatcher, who has often stressed family values. While there is no clamor for Parkinson's resignation, the Prime Minister is monitoring Tory sentiment and probably would not hesitate to remove him if she believed the matter were a threat to her position.



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
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