



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**


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National Intelligence Daily

*Monday
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


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USSR-PLO-SYRIA: Authoritative Pravda Commentary

The Soviets made clear in an unsigned editorial in Pravda on Saturday that, while they disapprove of the drive against PLO leader Arafat by Syrian-backed PLO rebels, they will not risk damaging their relationship with Damascus to stop it. 


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The editorial lamented the "senseless" clashes between the Palestinians and quoted Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement of 11 November on the urgent need for a resolution of the dispute. It noted that the USSR has been trying to resolve the dispute among the Palestinians through political means. 


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Pravda claimed that "imperialists" were taking advantage of the Palestinian strife to wage an anti-Syrian campaign. It said the fighting is especially inopportune because the US and Israel have plans for expanding "armed interference" in Lebanon and "direct aggression" against Syria. 


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The editorial said that under its present leadership the PLO's international prestige had grown, but it made no mention of Arafat. It noted that the USSR's stand on the dispute is based on an understanding of the "important" role of the PLO in the struggle against Israel and the US and on solidarity with Syria, which is now the "most important" force in that struggle. 


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Comment: The article is the most comprehensive Soviet commentary to date on the rebellion against Arafat. An unsigned editorial in *Pravda* signifies high-level party clearance. 

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
The editorial's unmistakable endorsement of Syria's primacy contrasts with the implicit mild criticism of the Syrian role in the dispute that was contained in Gromyko's public comments during Foreign Minister Khaddam's visit to the USSR earlier this month. Moscow may have believed it was necessary to refute claims by Western and Arab media that Gromyko had clashed with Khaddam over the issue. At the same time, the reference to Soviet efforts to resolve the PLO rift seems designed to convince moderate Arabs that Moscow is doing its part. 

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The Soviets, by failing to mention Arafat or to criticize the rebels directly, appear to be keeping their options open. Should Arafat fall, they will not want to be encumbered in their relations with the new PLO leadership by a record of clear opposition to the rebellion. 

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NICARAGUA: New Initiatives

The Sandinistas are taking new domestic and international initiatives in an attempt to deflect mounting pressures. [Redacted]

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The US Embassy reports that the Sandinistas recently said they are ready to agree to end support to insurgents in the region. A Salvadoran insurgent leader told the press on Saturday that representatives of the Salvadoran guerrillas would leave Nicaragua because of the danger of a US invasion. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Sandinistas may be placing themselves apart from the Salvadoran insurgents to indicate a willingness to negotiate with the US. It is still unclear whether they will close the command and control center in Managua and cut off the supply of arms and ammunition to El Salvador. [Redacted]

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IRAN-AFGHANISTAN: Military Tensions

Tehran fears Kabul will retaliate for continued Iranian aid to insurgent groups. [Redacted]

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The Soviets and the Afghans have been increasingly concerned about Iranian aid to insurgent groups. Nonetheless, they probably will continue to limit any retaliation to attacks on Afghan camps in Iran or on Iranian border posts that aid insurgents. [Redacted]

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Iranian clerics who do not wish to antagonize the USSR want to limit aid to the insurgents, while others favor an increase. Although Iranian aid is important to the insurgents in Herat Province and the mountainous central region, it apparently is only a small share of the total received by the guerrillas. [Redacted]

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The Afghans being moved away from the border probably are Sunnis, who are distrusted by the Iranian Shia regime. Iran wants the insurgents to establish pro-Khomeini organizations in Afghanistan in return for Iranian aid, something of little interest to most Sunnis. [Redacted]

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
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


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
PHILIPPINES: Armed Forces Gird for Protests

The Philippine military is preparing for anticipated antigovernment demonstrations this week. 

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Opposition groups are planning protest activities throughout the country—including a general strike and demonstrations—for the period leading up to the late Senator Benigno Aquino's birthday on Sunday, with Manila the focal point. More than 13,000 individuals demonstrated in a city northwest of Manila yesterday. The Catholic Church plans to read a highly critical pastoral letter at churches around the country on Sunday. 

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The military reportedly expects that the demonstrations will be the largest since Aquino's murder and that they will increase in size beginning on Friday. 

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Comment: The protests this week will be a major test for the opposition, which has been unable to convince President Marcos to initiate major political reforms regarding the succession or elections. Weakened by serious internal divisions, the opposition nonetheless has been preparing for these protests for several months, and they are likely to rival in size the mass rally of 21 September, which attracted several hundred thousand demonstrators. The active support of the Church—which is issuing its third antigovernment letter this year—will lend further impetus to the protest activities.



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The military was unhappy with the way it handled security during the rally in September, when violence erupted near the presidential palace and elsewhere in the capital. There is no evidence that the armed forces are planning a massive crackdown on dissent. 

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BOLIVIA: Coup Plotting

Coup plotters are discussing a possible move against Bolivian President Siles if protests this week against economic austerity measures are sufficiently widespread to give them justification.

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Armed Forces Chief of Staff Anez, who has been plotting for several months, remains the main threat to Siles. Leaders of the three largest opposition political parties, however—including two former presidents—have been plotting a “constitutional coup,” a scheme to marshal congressional support to force Siles to resign. There has been some contact between the two groups.

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Labor boss Juan Lechin, a bitter opponent of the President, has called for a national strike beginning today to protest price increases for food, fuel, and transportation and the 60-percent devaluation. Opposition party leaders also are planning protest demonstrations. The US defense attache in La Paz does not believe protest activity will be severe enough to enable the plotters to remove the President.

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Comment: Siles knows about the various plots and took a calculated risk in announcing the economic measures. He will resist the politicians' efforts to compel him to resign and thus force his military and civilian opponents to use unconstitutional means if they decide to try to oust him.

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It is not clear whether Anez and others have yet won the backing of the commanders of key military units, who are sensitive to US support for the constitutional process. The level of social unrest this week will essentially determine if these units decide to support an attempted coup.

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
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Airstrikes

Israeli aircraft struck Palestinian positions in Syrian-controlled territory near Bhamdun, Ayn Sawfar, and Falugha yesterday in apparent retaliation for a guerrilla attack near Sidon on Friday in which one Israeli soldier was killed and five wounded. Press reports indicate that one aircraft was lost during the raids, and Syria publicly has claimed responsibility for the downing. Eyewitness reports indicate that the Syrians' reaction to the airstrikes was limited to anti-aircraft artillery and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile firings. 

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
Comment: Attacks on Israeli forces in Lebanon will continue despite retaliatory raids on Palestinian or other targets, because many of these attacks are carried out by local Lebanese. As long as Israeli aircraft do not strike Syrian positions, Damascus has little incentive to try to prevent such attacks. 

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WEST GERMANY: Party Votes on INF

The Kohl government appears certain of victory in the Bundestag voting on INF expected tomorrow despite the overwhelming vote by the Social Democratic Party congress on Saturday to reject INF deployment. Only 17 of the 400 delegates to the party congress—including former Chancellor Schmidt—refused to join the consensus, although Schmidt announced he would not support the government in the vote. In contrast, about 75 percent of delegates at the Free Democratic Party congress supported party chairman Genscher's position favoring deployment—a higher percentage than voted in favor of the dual-track decision two years ago. Three of the Free Democratic Party's most prominent leftists endorsed deployment, while two of its 37 Bundestag deputies indicated they would not support the government's resolution. [Redacted]

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Comment: Except for the two dissenting Free Democratic deputies, probably no member of the governing center-right coalition—which has a 30-seat majority in the Bundestag—will vote against deployment or abstain. Schmidt's announcement makes it unlikely that any Social Democrats will support the government position, although the former Chancellor and a few party conservatives may abstain. [Redacted]

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Charter 77 Dissidents Arrested

Prague police apparently arrested three leading members of Charter 77 on Friday after the group had published a letter indirectly critical of planned Soviet missile deployments in Czechoslovakia. Charter 77 avoided taking an explicit stand on the deployments, stating in the letter that 15 to 20 of the Charter signatories had been warned two weeks ago that a negative stand would mean 10 years in prison. The letter also told peace groups in the West that they should be concerned about human rights as well as arms issues. The US Embassy has reported rumors of a small demonstration and circulation of a petition opposing the deployments. [Redacted]

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Comment: While this opposition will not alter the regime's commitment to accept the deployments, Prague is clearly hoping to curtail any expression of dissent that might politicize the population, which is already grumbling about stagnating living standards. [Redacted]

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EAST GERMANY-WEST GERMANY: Communications Accord

Bonn and East Berlin have agreed to renew for 1983-90 their accord on postal and telecommunications services on the eve of the Bundestag debate on INF. East Germany will receive about \$75 million annually to maintain and improve mail and telephone service, as well as a one-time advance of about \$38 million this year toward the cost of service improvements. The previous agreement, which expired at the beginning of this year, brought East Berlin about \$35 million annually. The two sides also agreed to construct a fiber optic telecommunications cable between West Germany and West Berlin, at an additional cost to Bonn of about \$7 million. 


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Comment: Bonn probably hopes that momentum created by this agreement and other recent contacts will sustain overall inter-German relations during the period of INF deployment. East Berlin is more narrowly concerned about safeguarding its flows of hard currency with new formal arrangements before it has to join any political Warsaw Pact countermeasures to INF. The East Germans may also hope to use the deployment atmosphere as an excuse to continue resisting political concessions to Bonn. This would be consistent with Moscow's apparent decision to keep its economic relations with the West Germans separate from political ones. 



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USSR-CUBA: Deliveries of Military Equipment

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[Redacted] thus far this year the Cubans have received from the Soviets at least 72 T-62 tanks, 25 T-54 or T-55 tanks, and 137 pieces of towed field artillery. These shipments have increased the number of tanks in the Cuban inventory to as many as 950 and the number of artillery pieces to as many as 720. [Redacted]

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Comment: Most known Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba in 1982 were fighter aircraft and naval vessels, but arms deliveries this year have consisted primarily of ground force equipment. The tanks will enable Cuba to replace the remaining T-34 tanks in its regular Army inventory. The new artillery is the same type that the Cubans currently have, and it probably augments rather than replaces existing artillery. Some of this equipment, however, may be intended to replace equipment the Cubans have sent to other Third World countries—such as Angola, which this year has received at least eight Cuban arms shipments, including one that involved 33 T-54 or T-55 tanks.

[Redacted]

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CHILE: Protest Rally Aftermath

The large and peaceful rally Friday in Santiago demonstrated that the moderates of the Democratic Alliance continue to dominate the opposition movement. Although it was the largest opposition demonstration to date, estimates of the turnout indicate that it did not draw the 200,000 protesters the organizers had hoped for. Democratic Alliance President Silva, in his address to the crowd, criticized the government's economic policies and human rights record and renewed demands for President Pinochet to resign. Alliance leaders will try to keep the pressure on by holding rallies around the country. [Redacted]

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Comment: The rally probably will not increase pressure on the government to grant new political concessions. It will enhance the credibility of the moderates, in part because it shows that they are still able to force Communist and other leftist groups to abide by fairly strict guidelines for protests. Opposition leaders recognize, however, that their momentum will be difficult to sustain after mid-December, when holidays and summer vacations will reduce public interest in political issues. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis

LIBYA: Qadhafi's Arab Policy

Libyan leader Qadhafi's failure to secure the chairmanship of the OAU at the summit last June has prompted him to make some changes in foreign policy. Since the summit, Qadhafi has been pursuing better relations with virtually all Arab governments, including moderates he has traditionally regarded as enemies. Most Arab states have welcomed Qadhafi's overtures, because they believe dealing with him in the context of Arab cooperation offers the best chance of curbing his radicalism. In doing so, they hope to reduce the chance of a US-Libyan clash and superpower rivalry in the region. [redacted]

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Qadhafi inaugurated his fence-mending policy during hastily arranged visits to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and North Yemen immediately after the summit. Shortly thereafter, he visited Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. [redacted]

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At each stop, Qadhafi offered his good offices in solving regional disputes, emphasized pan-Arabism, and urged a common front against Israel. He has even indicated a willingness to improve relations with Sudan and Somalia, two of his bitterest foes. [redacted]

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The Libyan leader's new course is intended in part to forestall criticism and perhaps military and financial assistance from other Arabs to forces opposing Libya's intervention in Chad. He is particularly anxious to deter Morocco from again providing military support to Chadian President Habre's government. Qadhafi's denial of Libyan involvement in Chad is designed in part to make it easier for Arab governments to remain neutral. [redacted]

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Qadhafi also seems to sense a significant change in the alignment of forces in the Arab world caused by Syria's new prominence. He may judge Arab moderates are now particularly vulnerable to arguments against the US role in the Middle East and to demands for a more united, militant Arab stand against Israel. He also may be responding to domestic uneasiness that tends to develop whenever he puts too much distance between Libya and other Arab states. [redacted]

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Courting the Saudis

Concerns about US military intentions toward Libya and the risk of a potentially disastrous fight with the French in Chad probably have helped persuade Qadhafi to seek the protection generally afforded by closer relations with moderate Arabs. He has again turned much of his attention to Saudi Arabia because of its influence with other

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Arabs, its Islamic prestige, its special relationship with the US, and the tolerant attitude the Saudis sometimes take toward him. [Redacted]

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Riyadh usually tries to keep its lines open to radical governments in the region. It was pleased with Libyan efforts several months ago to mediate a dispute with Tehran over the number and activities of Iranian pilgrims visiting the holy city of Mecca during the pilgrimage this year. [Redacted]

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Despite these developments, Saudi leaders distrust Qadhafi and still regard him as dangerous and erratic. At the same time, they see an opportunity to try to curb his disruptive behavior by easing his isolation in the region. They have urged Moroccan King Hassan and, unsuccessfully, Sudanese President Nimeiri to respond to Qadhafi's offers of friendship. [Redacted]

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As part of the Saudis' effort to reduce Qadhafi's isolation, they considered a stopover in Tripoli this month by Saudi naval vessels built by and purchased from the US on their way to Jidda. [Redacted]

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Relations With the Maghreb

Qadhafi's overtures to countries in the Maghreb have elicited cautious responses. In an effort to join an Algerian-sponsored regional cooperation effort that was moving apace without him, Qadhafi stopped rejecting Maghreb unity as too "regional" and declared that North African cooperation should be a first step toward Arab unity. He also hinted that Libya would be on its good behavior and that he might provide financial assistance to some of his neighbors. [Redacted]

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As an important first step, Qadhafi dropped his strong endorsement of the Polisario guerrillas in their struggle against Morocco for control of Western Sahara—a required move for dealing with Morocco and one welcomed by Tunisia and Algeria. Early in

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August Qadhafi reportedly told a group of pro-Moroccan Saharans that he believed a Saharan state would add to divisions in the Arab world and that his previous support for the Polisario insurgents had been a mistake. [redacted]

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Neither King Hassan nor other North African leaders put much stock in the durability of Qadhafi's commitments. Nonetheless, they hope to take advantage of his new posture to develop economic and political accords that will give him some stake in maintaining better relations. [redacted]

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Morocco agreed to the resumption of full diplomatic relations and some joint economic programs during the summer. Tunisia has encouraged Libyan participation in highway and electrification projects and trotted out the red carpet for visiting Libyan military and diplomatic officials. [redacted]

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Algeria's President Bendjedid, who seems especially committed to containing Qadhafi, has dealt with him more forthrightly. He has warned that Libya has to halt its adventurist foreign policies. [redacted]

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Prospects

Qadhafi's conciliatory stance ensures that most Arab leaders will continue low-cost gestures to keep him on his current track. They generally believe Qadhafi can best be handled within the Arab context, with only behind-the-scenes assistance from the US when Libyan threats against them assume dangerous dimensions. To indulge Qadhafi, they occasionally put some distance between themselves and the US. [redacted]

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This approach facilitates maintaining a dialogue with Qadhafi. It also is appealing to domestic and broader Arab constituencies who are wary of US influences in the region. These motives probably explain Hassan's acquiescence to a Moroccan-Libyan communique last July that hinted at US "hegemonism" in the region. [redacted]

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Beyond such gestures, Qadhafi's attempts to radicalize the Arab moderates are unlikely to have any success. Even his less extreme positions are unacceptable to most Arabs, and his claim of speaking for the Arab masses has no credibility with them. [redacted]

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None of the governments currently courting Qadhafi is likely to jeopardize any aspect of relations with the US on his behalf. They might, however, appear insensitive to US concerns about what they view as their political obligation to a fellow Arab. [redacted]

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