



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

*Tuesday*  
*27 September 1983*

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
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
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
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
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**LEBANON: Wazzan Offers Resignation**

*Prime Minister Wazzan offered his and his cabinet's resignation yesterday, probably to facilitate the opening of talks on national reconciliation, but it may be a reflection of his own frustration at his inability to act effectively as Prime Minister.* 


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Wazzan said he wanted to resign to speed up the formation of a "national accord government" that would preside over the coming national reconciliation talks. President Gemayel subsequently asked the Prime Minister and other cabinet members to remain at their posts pending concrete developments in the negotiations. 


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Meanwhile, a Druze militia commander told US Embassy officials that the Druze are using the cease-fire to consolidate their positions in the Shuf and Alayh Districts to block any attempt by the Christian Lebanese Forces or the Army to enter Druze areas. According to the militia commander, the Druze have no intention of reaching a quick agreement on the movement of the Army into Druze strongholds. 


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The cease-fire has held with only minor exchanges of fire in Suq al Gharb, Kayfun, and a few other areas. Shia Amal militiamen, however, captured 180 Army soldiers in the southern suburbs of Beirut. 

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Prior to the cease-fire, Army troops—with Shia Amal agreement—had occupied checkpoints in the suburbs, but they apparently violated the agreement by setting up an additional checkpoint that would block the Druze-Shia infiltration route through Ash Shuwayfat. Amal militiamen are demanding that plans for a checkpoint there be abandoned in exchange for the release of the soldiers. 

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**Comment:** Druze leader Junblatt, with the backing of Damascus, had called for the resignation of Wazzan for several weeks. Wazzan's attempt to resign was expected, but its timing—coming immediately after the announcement of the cease-fire—apparently took Gemayel by surprise. 

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**CHILE: Political Developments**

*There are indications that talks between the government and the opposition may reopen early next month, but President Pinochet also may be considering more aggressive actions against some opponents.*

[Redacted]

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Archbishop Fresno, a key intermediary in the talks, expects a new round of discussions in the next few weeks. He is anxious to see the process resume because he believes popular discontent has reached alarming proportions in the slums—the worst since the Allende era. Fresno believes the climate for talks may be improved when the presidency of the opposition Democratic Alliance passes next week from outspoken government critic Gabriel Valdes—the president of the Christian Democratic Party—to another party’s representative.

[Redacted]

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The government’s decision on Friday to drop the remaining charges against Rodolfo Seguel and other leaders of the copper confederation for organizing protests and strikes meets one of the opposition’s conditions for resuming the talks. Moreover, Interior Minister Jarpa said publicly yesterday the government is ready to resume talks “soon.”

[Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Block]

**Comment:** Neither side wants to bear the onus for a breakdown in the talks, and their resumption is increasingly likely. If the government decides to use extreme tactics, however, it risks destroying the dialogue.

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
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


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**WARSAW PACT: Planned Meeting of Foreign Ministers**

The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers will convene on 12 and 13 October in Sofia, according to the Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister. The last Foreign Ministers' meeting was held in Prague in April. Last week a Bulgarian diplomat in Prague said that Soviet General Secretary Andropov's visit to Sofia would take place after this meeting, but he claimed that the two events were not related. 

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**Comment:** The primary purpose of the meeting probably will be to issue an appeal designed to encourage anti-INF sentiment in Western Europe. The Foreign Ministers could offer a draft nonaggression treaty along the lines of the one proposed by Warsaw Pact leaders last January. Much of the groundwork for such a treaty is likely to have been laid during the summer, when many East European political and military officials visited Moscow. The Romanians could prevent a consensus, however, as they apparently did both at the meeting in Prague and at the Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow in June. 

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**USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Status of CEMA Summit**


The long-delayed CEMA summit probably will be held late next month. A senior Bulgarian official has told the US Embassy in Sofia that it will take place after the annual meeting of CEMA premiers, which reportedly is scheduled for 18 to 21 October in East Berlin. The Bulgarian says an agreement reached this month to settle some issues bilaterally rather than in the CEMA framework has made it possible to schedule the summit. Prices for agricultural trade within CEMA, for example, are to be negotiated bilaterally, instead of being set by the organization for the entire region. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Bulgarian's timetable tends to confirm other recent reporting that preparations for the summit are nearly completed. There has been no indication, however, of progress on CEMA integration, Moscow's main goal for the meeting. The agreement to schedule the summit appears mainly to reflect a desire to reduce the embarrassment caused by repeated postponements.

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **PAKISTAN: Coping With Disturbances**

*President Zia is trying to ride out the current civil disorders in Sind Province by dealing firmly with violent protests while seeking to co-opt moderate members of the opposition. His hold on power remains strong, but his political skills will be severely tested by the unrest in Sind and negotiations with opposition groups.* [REDACTED]

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Unrest in Sind is likely to intensify as the government tries to conduct local elections. A prominent leader of the Pakistan People's Party has called for a general strike tomorrow. The US Consulate General in Karachi reports that Sindhis are threatening supporters of the principal Sunni party in the urban areas of Sind if it does not join the agitation. [REDACTED]

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The national leader of the Sunni party is under pressure from its influential wing in Punjab to call off an announced decision to launch a campaign on Saturday against martial law, according to US diplomats. The Sunni leader is discussing negotiations with the government, and he may use this as a pretext to postpone joining the agitation. [REDACTED]

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A prominent cleric and member of Zia's Federal Advisory Council from Lahore, capital of Punjab Province, recently criticized the President's Islamization policies and said national elections would have to be held within a year. Such criticism is embarrassing to Zia and suggests that, if the disturbances spread to Punjab, he cannot count on support from religious leaders. [REDACTED]

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### **Dealing With the Opposition**

The President apparently believes he can outlast the disturbances—as has been the case with lesser disorders in the past—without making major concessions. He has been careful so far to keep from using the Army as a last resort in dealing with the unrest. The regime is looking for ways to put pressure on traditional Sindhi leaders by reviewing their compliance with land reform and by reinstating old felony indictments. [REDACTED]

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[redacted]

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Zia has sought to emphasize his commitment to Islamization to keep Islamic groups in Karachi and in Punjab Province from joining the agitation. He also has agreed to allow influential opposition landlords in Punjab to run in elections on a case-by-case basis. In addition, his regime has tried to intensify concern in Punjab that the Indians and Soviets are exploiting unrest in Pakistan. [redacted]

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During a recent tour of Sind Province, Zia made minor gestures to Sindhi opinion. He might remove senior bureaucrats in the province, including the Punjabi Chief Secretary, who are widely believed to be corrupt. [redacted]

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Zia also could replace the Governor, a senior Army officer who was a member of the original Army group that overthrew the civilian regime in 1977. Zia would have trouble, however, finding a senior officer to replace him who is not a member of one of the communities disliked by Sindhis. [redacted]

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**Prospects for Negotiations**

Zia appears determined to carry through with his basic plan to hold elections, amend the constitution to strengthen presidential powers, and lift martial law by March 1985. His claim that he is ready to change some of the plan's details apparently is designed to divide the opposition. [redacted]

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Continuing unrest in Sind Province will require Zia to negotiate eventually with some opposition leaders. Failure to negotiate now would mean greater concessions later if the civil disturbances spread. [redacted]

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The moderate landlords in the People's Party evidently have increased their support by leading protests. If the protest campaign in Sind dies down, they may be prepared to negotiate. They have common interests with the regime in seeing that the more extreme groups that want land reform and rapid social change do not gain strength. [redacted]

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These landlords will demand earlier elections and the restoration of parliamentary government, but the key issue will be their right to participate in elections. Zia has to find a way to reassure them that Sindhi interests will be represented in Islamabad and that their place in the social order will not be diminished. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Once talks begin, Zia and various opposition groups probably will be involved in negotiations for several months. In negotiating with the moderates, Zia would have to watch his right flank carefully, particularly if it appeared that some elements of the People's Party might gain important concessions. [redacted]

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Zia would then face competing demands from conservative and Islamic groups. These groups, which have supported him in the past, deeply distrust the People's Party. They are maneuvering to gain leverage with the regime, and Zia may offer them places in an interim cabinet. [redacted]

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The announced decision of the principal Sunni party to oppose the government and the willingness of a prominent cleric in Punjab to criticize Zia suggest that support for the government among Islamic and conservative groups is weakening. For now, Zia still has the strong support of the Army and retains the upper hand in the crisis. His position would be quickly imperiled, however, if the religious parties in Punjab decided to challenge his regime in the streets. [redacted]

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There is substantial opposition to Zia in Punjab. From all indications, however, most Punjabis do not believe the time has come for the President to go. [redacted]

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A mishandling of the local elections or prolonged disturbances in Sind could persuade the Punjabis that Zia had lost the ability to govern. In these circumstances, the opposition movement would rapidly gain momentum in the country's key province. [redacted]

[redacted]

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