




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


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# National Intelligence Daily

*Friday  
9 September 1983*

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**LEBANON: Druze Threats**


*Druze leader Walid Junblatt is threatening retaliation against two Christian villages in the Alayh-Shuf region if the Lebanese Army does not stop its advances into Druze areas.* 

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
  
 Junblatt said

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he will not bear any responsibility for the safety of largely Christian populations of Dayr al Qamar and Suq al Gharb—both in range of Druze artillery—unless the Lebanese Army pulls back. Druze forces, which had surrounded Dayr al Qamar on Wednesday, began bombarding the town Thursday afternoon, but the shelling stopped overnight, according to a Christian radiobroadcast. 

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**Comment:** The Druze advance since Monday probably has had the twofold objective of eliminating any Christian threat in the Shuf mountains and improving the Druze bargaining position in future negotiations. By threatening Beirut and holding some Christian towns hostage, Junblatt probably hopes to wring concessions from the government. A massacre of Christian civilians, however, would only strengthen the hand of Christian hardliners who oppose any accommodation with the Druze. 

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**USSR: Soviet Claims**

*The Soviets claim privately to have evidence that the downed Korean airliner was on a mission for the US.* [redacted]

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There has been no high-level public Soviet commentary since Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement in Madrid on Wednesday. Moscow has presented a demarche to the US, however, asserting that the Soviets have information confirming that the intrusion of the Korean airliner was "organized by the US special services." The Soviets say they will not make the information public for reasons of secrecy. [redacted]

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According to press reports, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan said yesterday that the Soviets had recovered debris and documents from the crash and would deliver them to Japan "in the near future." He indicated that the Soviets have not identified the crash site, but he gave the coordinates of four sites where the debris was found. The Ambassador also said that the Soviets had not recovered survivors or bodies as of Tuesday. [redacted]

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TASS reported that senior Soviet military and political leaders will give a press conference today in Moscow for foreign journalists. These leaders include Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, Party Central Committee information chief Zamyatin, and Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The sites listed by the Ambassador form the corners of an area somewhat removed from the locations where Soviet search efforts have been concentrated. The South Korean airliner probably broke up at a fairly high altitude, and pieces most likely are widely scattered. [redacted]

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By claiming to have found debris in international waters, Moscow may be attempting to reinforce its refusal to permit the Japanese to search in Soviet waters. The debris could have drifted considerable distances since the airliner crashed more than a week ago. Soviet surface ships continue to search in dispersed areas, suggesting that no major section of the airliner has been found. [redacted]

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The announced press conference probably is intended to permit the officials a chance to explain the shutdown publicly. They are likely to release additional details and probably will provide "evidence"—in all likelihood fabricated—supporting their position. The official Soviet position holds that the US sent the airliner on a spying mission and that the military performed its duty in defending Soviet borders. [redacted]

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**EASTERN EUROPE: Mixed Reaction to Shootdown**

*The Yugoslavs, Romanians, and Hungarians have avoided harsh criticism of the US while the other East European states have echoed the Soviet line.* [Redacted]

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The Yugoslav media criticized the Soviet action but gave some credence to Soviet charges of US responsibility. Yugoslav commentators expressed the overriding concern that the incident should not irretrievably damage East-West relations. [Redacted]

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The Romanians have made no official response and have avoided any mention in the media. The Hungarians have supported the Soviet line but only in a moderate and low-key manner. A Hungarian press summary of Foreign Minister Varkonyi's speech to the closing session of the Madrid CSCE meeting yesterday contained no direct criticism of the US. [Redacted]

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The other East European states have strongly defended the USSR and condemned the US, although Polish commentary has been somewhat less vitriolic. A Bulgarian Politburo member strongly attacked the US yesterday in a National Day speech. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The more moderate approaches of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary reflect the larger stake of these countries in good relations with the West, and a greater ability—particularly in the case of Yugoslavia and Romania—to preserve their own foreign policy lines. They are particularly anxious to avoid antagonizing the US on the eve of the Vice President's visit. [Redacted]

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Yugoslavia has traditionally steered an independent course between East and West, but Romania and Hungary must balance their desire for continued good relations with the West against their Warsaw Pact obligations. Bucharest may break its silence soon, but it probably will refrain from taking a clear-cut stance. Budapest may come under pressure to give more vigorous support to Moscow but will do the minimum required. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**WESTERN EUROPE: Responses to Attack on Airliner**

*A common West European response to the Soviet downing of the South Korean airliner is developing, but consensus is proving elusive.*

[Redacted]

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At the closing CSCE meeting in Madrid, the NATO Allies—except for Greece—deferred final agreement on a two-week suspension of flights to Moscow beginning next Thursday, according to press reports. France also refused to participate in the ban. The decision may be concluded in Brussels today, following a meeting of NATO ambassadors to discuss collective action. [Redacted]

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Senior West German officials doubt that a government-ordered 60-day suspension would be legal or effective and fear Soviet retaliation against communications with West Berlin, according to the US Embassy in Bonn. [Redacted]

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French Foreign Minister Cheysson reportedly questions the legal validity of even a token suspension but supports action by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The US Ambassador comments that the French are sensitive to appearing to follow US directions, and one French Foreign Ministry official noted that an official boycott of civil aviation would involve disproportionate costs to France. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Italian airline pilots yesterday joined the boycott of flights to Moscow. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** With the close of CSCE, the UN Security Council and the International Civil Aviation Organization are the most likely forums for condemnation of Moscow by the West European governments.

[Redacted]

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The EC Foreign Ministers probably will continue consideration of sanctions and diplomatic action at their political cooperation meeting Monday in Athens. [Redacted]

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The West European nations agree that specific action is needed before indignation subsides, but the concerns expressed by some governments may make further agreement possible only on minor symbolic measures. Individual countries may take additional steps.

[Redacted]

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
**NICARAGUA: Insurgent Activity**

*The increased actions by the insurgents are likely to cause the Sandinistas to take a tougher position in regional negotiations.* [Redacted]

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According to press reports, two small aircraft bombed Sandino Airport and a communications station south of Managua early yesterday, damaging the airport terminal building. One of the aircraft was shot down. Sandinista officials say it took off from Costa Rica, and Eden Pastora's Democratic Revolutionary Alliance claims responsibility for the action. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The attack on Sandino airport is the most dramatic insurgent action so far. Pastora evidently hopes to use such moves to gain more attention and increase his following inside Nicaragua. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

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The Sandinistas probably will condemn the attack during the current Contadora peace negotiations in Panama to reinforce their charges that Nicaragua is a victim of external aggression. They probably will also accuse Costa Rica of harboring Pastora's forces, which will damage their relations with San Jose. [Redacted]  
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**SOUTH KOREA: Further Reactions to Shootdown**

South Korea is urging additional international sanctions against the Soviets. The Prime Minister has announced that Seoul is considering organizing a joint investigation team of countries that lost citizens in the attack. A high-level official has proposed joint action by South Korea, Japan, and the US to press claims against the Soviets. The government-guided South Korean press is now emphasizing the need for actions to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, including strengthening trilateral security collaboration with the US and Japan.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** While strongly supporting the measured US response to the shootdown, Seoul is attempting to demonstrate to a highly emotional domestic audience that it is dealing effectively with the crisis. The Korean press initially characterized the American response as lukewarm and indecisive, and the Foreign Minister has come under heavy criticism in the National Assembly for the alleged hesitancy and timidity of Seoul's own reaction.

[Redacted]

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**CHILE: Tense Weekend Expected**

Democratic opposition leaders are evaluating the success of yesterday's national protest and preparing responses to the arrests of prominent spokesmen.

[Redacted]

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The government has maintained a firm but controlled response to the latest protests, and security police entered neighborhoods yesterday only when it appeared the situation would get out of control.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Interior Minister Jarpa's call for progovernment supporters to develop their own self-defense groups could lead to more serious violence over the weekend. So far, however, the clashes probably have not been serious enough to prevent the resumption next week of the dialogue between the government and the moderate opposition.

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
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**CHINA: Implications of Membership in IAEA**

Beijing's formal application this week to join the IAEA reflects its growing interest in acquiring foreign technology—especially from the US—to develop its nuclear power program. China has increased its efforts this year to obtain commercial nuclear power equipment and technology to meet its urgent energy needs. It has ample foreign exchange for such purchases. China hopes to build as many as five nuclear plants by the end of the century and needs to begin importing plants and equipment to help reach that goal. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** China's application is intended to indicate to Western suppliers of nuclear equipment, especially the US and Japan, that China intends to assume a more responsible attitude in international nuclear dealings. Beijing presumably hopes the application will help smooth the way for concluding a nuclear agreement with the US in time to allow it to be signed during Foreign Minister Wu's visit to the US next month. After joining the IAEA, China expects to gain greater access to other Western nuclear equipment. Japanese firms are particularly anxious for a nuclear agreement between China and Japan to facilitate such trade. [Redacted]

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


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### Syrian Presence in Lebanon



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## **Special Analysis**

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### **SYRIA-LEBANON: Damascus's Goals**

*President Assad is pursuing a strategy of calculated risks in Lebanon designed to head off the consolidation of a government that he believes is dominated by the Christian Phalange Party and is linked to Israel. He also aims to give Damascus an important voice in determining Lebanon's political orientation and to make Syria central to the success of any peace initiative in the region.* [Redacted]

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Assad has said repeatedly that Lebanese President Gemayel's regime represents only the Phalange and amounts to an imposition of minority confessional rule on the majority. A Syrian memorandum to the Arab League earlier this week charged Beirut with having turned Lebanon into an Israeli protectorate. [Redacted]

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At the same time, Assad has professed willingness to continue working through diplomatic channels to achieve a resolution of the crisis. He told Special Envoy McFarlane on Wednesday that Syria sees no need now to expand its presence in Lebanon or to move beyond its present positions, and he hopes circumstances would permit Syria's withdrawal. His conciliatory comments reflect his larger interest in achieving acceptance by Washington as the key to any progress in US-sponsored initiatives in the region. [Redacted]

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### **Syrian Strategy**

Assad probably calculates that by providing assistance to pro-Syrian militias he can maintain pressure on Gemayel, weaken the Christian Lebanese Forces militia, and undermine any prospects for the Lebanese Army to take control of the regions vacated by the Israelis. [Redacted]

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Direct Syrian intervention in the Shuf appears unlikely. Druze successes thus far, and Syria's capability to stir up diversionary clashes in Beirut, relieve Assad of any need to risk such intervention. [Redacted]

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Damascus reportedly is prepared to deploy troops in support of the Druze if the Army and the Lebanese Forces appear to be on the verge of a major victory. Assad might judge that the Israelis would not respond to a move limited to the Shuf. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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By putting pressure on the Damascus-backed National Salvation Front to stiffen its political demands, Assad clearly hopes to compel Beirut to abrogate the agreement it signed with Israel in May. In addition, Assad probably expects the continuing sectarian tension and military stalemate will compel Gemayel to accept a government of national unity that would be more responsive to Damascus. He would expect it to move toward constitutional reforms designed to give Muslims a greater political voice. [Redacted]

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Damascus almost certainly will continue to argue that Syrian units in Lebanon will be withdrawn only if Israel withdraws completely, regardless of the outcome of negotiations for a cease-fire and an internal political settlement. Refusal to withdraw while Israel retains security advantages acquired by military invasion preserves Syria's claim to Arab financial support as a "confrontation state." [Redacted]

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The Syrian military presence also strengthens Assad's hold over PLO leader Arafat. The PLO depends on Syria for freedom of operations and for supplies, and Syria has been influential in the Fatah rebellion in the Bekaa Valley. [Redacted]

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**Outlook**

The Syrian military presence in Lebanon, totaling some 50,000 men, gives Assad a range of alternatives. Ultimately, he probably intends to trade withdrawal for security concessions from Beirut and for assurances from the US that recovery of the Golan Heights will be included in a new, broader approach to the peace process. In the meantime Syrian troops provide a channel of support to the pro-Syrian militias and hold out the threat of direct intervention if Syria's allies face imminent defeat. [Redacted]

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Assad now sees an opportunity to supplement the Syrian-assisted military challenge to Gemayel with political pressure in negotiations for a cease-fire and national reconciliation. If the negotiations fail, Damascus can increase its indirect support to the pro-Syrian militias or stir up new sectarian fighting in Beirut. If the negotiations proceed, the Syrians can urge their surrogates in the National Salvation Front to hold out for major concessions from Gemayel. [Redacted]

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
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