




**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

~~Top Secret~~



OCPAS/CIG

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday  
7 September 1983*

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


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**LEBANON: Gemayel Threatens To Step Down**

*President Gemayel's threat to resign today reflects his frustration with continued factional fighting and could be a desperate move to exact greater US support.* 


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He said he would appoint a Christian extremist—Maronite Monk Bulus Naaman—as his successor. Gemayel told the US Ambassador that his decision to resign will be firm unless the US convinces the Syrian Government to force the Druze to accept a cease-fire. 


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Lebanese Army units have established control of the coastal road between Khaldah and Ad Damur and are moving southeast toward Aramun, evidently to reinforce Christian Lebanese Forces units there. At least one company of the Army's 8th Brigade has been deployed along the Beirut-Damascus highway toward Arayya. 


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Druze fighters have made no significant gains since Monday. Fighting between Druze militia and Lebanese Forces units continues around Suq al Gharb and B'aqlin. The Druze reportedly continue to shell Khaldah as well. 

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**Comment:** Gemayel's threat to appoint Naaman—who would be unacceptable to most Muslim and Druze politicians—suggests that his main objective is to encourage US action. Gemayel legally cannot appoint his successor, who must be nominated and elected by the National Assembly. 

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If the Army pushes Druze fighters farther away from Beirut, the threat posed by Druze artillery to the airport and the city's southern suburbs will be considerably reduced. The Army probably will be able to maintain control of its new positions outside the capital, barring new factional fighting in Beirut. The Army apparently does not plan for now to move in force into the Shuf and Alayh Districts. 

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**INTERNATIONAL: Worldwide Reaction to Shootdown**

*Reaction to the US position on the Soviet downing of the Korean airliner generally has been favorable, and public and official indignation remains high.* [Redacted]

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A West German spokesman said yesterday that Bonn backs Washington's demand for clarification and punishment of those responsible, and opposition Social Democratic Party chairman Brandt praised the moderate tone of President Reagan's remarks. Initial British, Italian, and French media responses to the President's speech applauded its moderation and the US decision not to interrupt the Geneva arms talks or the CSCE process. [Redacted]

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A delegation of the three main Dutch parliamentary parties and the Minister of Agriculture have postponed visits to Moscow, and The Hague has called off a visit by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov. Italy, Sweden, and Spain plan strong support for the US initiative in the UN Security Council. The EC Ten are drafting a statement for the CSCE meeting today. [Redacted]

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Most national airline organizations are awaiting recommendations by the International Civil Aviation Organization or the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations. The latter met yesterday and demanded a 60-day ban on flights to Moscow. A US delegate estimated that 14 of the 17 national associations whose members fly to Moscow will observe a ban. [Redacted]

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Spanish Foreign Minister Moran said yesterday that Madrid will strongly support ICAO action. The Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries, however, have announced that, as a matter of principle, they will not participate in the boycott proposed by the US. [Redacted]

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In Japan media reaction to the President's speech and Tokyo's well-publicized role has been uniformly positive. The Chinese have replayed the speech without comment. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have indefinitely postponed scheduled visits. [Redacted]

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Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand have demanded that Moscow pay compensation for their nationals killed in the attack. Singapore is considering suspending Aeroflot service but would do so only in concert with other ASEAN countries. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** In view of the generally positive public reaction to what is perceived as the moderate tone and substance of US policy statements, most governments will have little difficulty agreeing with them publicly. Although some West European governments are raising legal objections to government-ordered sanctions against Soviet air traffic, most would support an ICAO-mandated boycott. [Redacted]

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**PANAMA: Cabinet Changes**

*The replacement on Sunday of several key cabinet officials probably will help strengthen President de la Esprilla's control over economic matters and increase new National Guard Commander Noriega's influence in the government.* [Redacted]

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Foreign Minister Amado was among the six cabinet-level officers who resigned. His successor is Oyden Ortega, a former Communist and ardent nationalist, who is a member of the Panama Canal Commission. De la Esprilla has assured US officials that he intends to take a more direct role in foreign affairs, implying he will limit Ortega's influence. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The cabinet shifts, which apparently represent a compromise between the President and Noriega, will provide Panama with a conservative economic team more sympathetic and attractive to business and investors. Noriega probably hopes the changes will strengthen his support outside the Guard by removing ministers loyal to retired Guard chief Paredes. [Redacted]

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The resignation of Amado immediately before the latest round of Contadora peace talks in Panama appears to be particularly ill timed. Amado's absence may further slow the progress of the group, which already has been forced to postpone its most recently scheduled meeting because of the appointment of the new Guatemalan Foreign Minister. [Redacted]

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**USSR: Decreasing Dependence on Imported Pipe**

*Soviet production of large-diameter pipe used for long-distance oil and gas pipelines is likely to increase substantially after 1985, reducing the USSR's almost total dependence on the West for such pipe.* [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Construction of a new large-diameter pipemill at Vyksa, approximately 250 kilometers south of Moscow, has been proceeding rapidly since 1978. The plant is partly operational and could be producing at full capacity by 1986. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Construction of domestic oil and gas pipelines in the USSR probably will slow considerably after the middle of the decade, as the need for additional capacity to transport oil and gas declines. As a result, the annual Soviet requirement for 1,420-mm pipe is estimated to drop by roughly 30 percent between 1986 and 1990. [Redacted]

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The reduced requirement, combined with increased production, may allow the USSR to halve imports of the pipe by the late 1980s.

[Redacted]

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Soviet demand represents a large share of the international market for large-diameter pipe. Substantial reductions in Soviet imports might enable Moscow to exact certain economic concessions. For example, Italy and West Germany, currently major suppliers of large-diameter pipe, might be required to purchase additional Soviet gas in order to sell pipe to the USSR. [Redacted]

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
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**PLO-SYRIA: New Clashes**

Fatah rebels and Syrian forces seized several positions from forces loyal to PLO leader Arafat after a series of clashes in the Bekaa Valley over the weekend. [Redacted]

[Redacted] The loyalists claim they were fired on by the Syrians. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** This was the heaviest fighting between the rebels and loyalists in more than three weeks. Syria and the rebels probably decided to increase military pressure on Arafat as a warning that he could face more serious consequences if he refuses to adopt the pro-rebel recommendations of the PLO mediation committee. The committee has proposed that Arafat end the rebellion by accepting rebel demands for more militant policies, stronger ties with Syria, and collegial rule. Arafat apparently is continuing to maneuver for maximum political advantage before giving his reply, which is due late this month. [Redacted]

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
**FRANCE: Mitterrand's Popularity Improves**

President Mitterrand's public approval rating has risen dramatically in the last few weeks. According to a poll last Saturday that was commissioned by an opposition paper, he now enjoys the approval of 43 percent of the voting population. Polls taken by another opposition paper during the early days of the current crisis in Chad showed his popularity at an all-time low of 28 percent. Another poll by a respected financial weekly, meanwhile, indicates that the conservative opposition is declining in popularity, dropping from 58- to 41-percent approval. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Mitterrand apparently is benefiting from his strong stand on Chad and from some recent economic indicators that suggest his austerity program is beginning to work. The rise in Mitterrand's popularity is likely to strengthen his hand in dealing with leftist critics at the Socialist Party congress next month. This would help him push through controversial new belt-tightening measures needed to keep his economic program on track. [Redacted]

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**CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: New Contacts**

China, using commercial intermediaries, has proposed confidential talks with South Korea for the return of the MIG-21 aircraft flown to Seoul last month by a Chinese defector. A senior South Korean official says the Chinese have suggested a meeting at the vice foreign minister level in a neutral location. He told US officials that Seoul is willing to discuss the proposal but wants Beijing to arrange the meeting directly through the South Korean Consulate General in Hong Kong.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Beijing's interest probably remains much narrower than Seoul's, as it was in the negotiations over the hijacked Chinese civilian airliner last May. The Chinese seem mainly interested in regaining their aircraft. Seoul still wants to use such meetings to explore the possibility of broadening contacts with Beijing.

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### **Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe**


Mugabe, 59, has pursued since independence in 1980 a measured, pragmatic approach to reform to avoid the mistakes of other African nations . . . deeply idealistic, he is committed to the eventual creation of a one-party, socialist state . . . rules by consensus, but adept at balancing competing factions within his government . . . an extremely controlled man who keeps a tight rein on his emotions.



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## **Special Analysis**

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### **ZIMBABWE-US: Prime Minister Mugabe's Visit**

*Prime Minister Mugabe probably hopes to use his visit to the US to ease strained relations and assure continued US aid. He probably will express unhappiness with Washington's policies toward South Africa and Namibia, but he also will try to allay US concerns about his coming trip to Moscow by explaining it as part of his policy of nonalignment.* [Redacted]

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Mugabe recognizes that US development aid and investment are vital to Zimbabwe's economic success, but he is sensitive to any suggestion that US aid is conditional. He also resents Western criticism of his efforts to quell dissident violence and further strengthen the position of his ruling party. He believes reporting on Zimbabwe in the Western press is exaggerated and biased. [Redacted]

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### **Between East and West**

The Prime Minister is likely to maintain that, as a nonaligned leader, he is striving for good relations with both East and West. On a more practical level, he hopes to diversify Zimbabwe's sources of international assistance. [Redacted]

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Relations with the USSR have been slow to develop, despite Moscow's assiduous efforts to persuade Mugabe that it no longer has ties to his political rival, Joshua Nkomo. Zimbabwe has not yet opened an embassy in Moscow [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Zimbabwe has close relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, North Korea, and China—states that gave the greatest support to Mugabe's forces during the struggle for independence. Mugabe's trip to Eastern Europe in May took him on his first visits to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. He obtained no significant economic aid, [Redacted]

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Despite Mugabe's ties with Communist states, military and economic relations with the West, particularly the UK, remain paramount. London shares US concerns about Mugabe's policies over the past year but recently advised Washington that it planned no cutbacks in its current level of aid. The UK also recently renewed its military training program in Zimbabwe, although the size of the effort was reduced. [redacted]

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London may reassess these decisions, however, if negotiations to gain the release of six Air Force officers—several of whom hold dual British-Zimbabwean citizenship—fall through. The officers were rearrested last week immediately after they were acquitted of participating in the sabotage of Thornhill Air Force Base last summer. (S NF OC)

US security assistance also may be on Mugabe's agenda, according to a Ministry of Defense official. The Prime Minister may follow up on recent discussions held in Harare on foreign military sales credits and Zimbabwean interest in US aircraft. [redacted]

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**African Issues**

Mugabe will want to discuss overall US policy toward South Africa, which he views as closely tied to US-Zimbabwean relations. He is likely to argue that the US policy of constructive engagement with Pretoria is not evenhanded, and he will push for greater efforts by Washington to restrain South Africa's activities in the region. [redacted]

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The Prime Minister will be wary of discussing the strained relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, however, because of the perception that Washington is too close to Pretoria. Harare and Pretoria maintain regular contact [redacted] through their trade missions. Nonetheless, Mugabe's refusal to accede to South African demands for ministerial-level meetings and frequent anti-South African statements by Zimbabwean officials continue to trouble relations between the two neighbors. [redacted]

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Mugabe may echo African criticism of US policy on Namibia, particularly the linkage of a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola with a Namibian settlement. On the conflict in Chad, he probably will continue to avoid any specific references to the role of the US, France, or Libya. Mugabe has maintained publicly that intervention in Chad's internal affairs by external forces only could make the situation worse. [redacted]

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**Economic Concerns**

The Zimbabwean leader probably recognizes that any substantial increase in US aid is unlikely, and he will be seeking only general assurances of continued US support. Mugabe may raise, however, his government's recent appeal for further emergency aid to alleviate food shortages caused by the continuing drought. [redacted]

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Mugabe probably will express regrets about the low level of private US investment in Zimbabwe. Foreign investor confidence has been eroded by the unfavorable security situation in the country, the government's commitment to a socialist path, and Mugabe's refusal to sign an Overseas Private Insurance Corporation agreement with the US. [redacted]

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Although Mugabe is personally committed to socialism, he recognizes the crucial role of the private sector in the economy. He is likely to try to persuade US officials and businessmen that Zimbabwe welcomes foreign investment. [redacted]

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