


25X1



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**


~~Top Secret~~



CCFAS/CIG



CY# 285



25X1

National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday
17 August 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-193,IX

17 August 1983

Copy 285

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Contents

Libya-Chad-Sudan: Potential Threat to Nimeiri 1

Poland: Regime Preparing for Protests 2

Angola-South Africa: Invasion Fears 3

USSR-East Germany: Tougher Policy on Air Violations 4

France-Chad: More Military Support 5

Nigeria: Tensions Over Elections 5

USSR: Exercise Announcement 6



25X1

Pakistan: Opposition Protests 8



25X1

Special Analyses

Chad: Implications of a Partition 9

Lebanon: Gemayel's Precarious Position 11

25X1




Top Secret



17 August 1983


25X1

Top Secret




25X1


LIBYA-CHAD-SUDAN: Potential Threat to Nimeiri

Several hundred Sudanese dissidents sent from Libya to Chad in the past month could assist Libyan leader Qadhafi's campaign to topple Sudanese President Nimeiri. 


25X1




25X1

Comment: Nimeiri's decision to allow US AWACS planes to use the airfield at Khartoum to monitor Libyan involvement in Chad almost certainly has intensified Qadhafi's determination to oust the Sudanese leader. 

25X1


Neither Chad nor Sudan is able to control movement across the border. Although Qadhafi has not yet sponsored forays into Sudan by Sudanese dissidents, protracted insurgent control over eastern Chad would make it easier for him to do so. There were indications during Libya's invasion of Chad in 1980 that Sudanese dissidents attached to Libyan forces planned to begin operations across the Chad-Sudan border. 

25X1

A large part of the population of western Sudan has long been alienated from the government, and the area probably would be fertile ground for antiregime activity from Chad. Subversion in this region is unlikely to become as serious as the growing insurgency in southern Sudan, but it could make Nimeiri spread his hard-pressed security forces more thinly. 

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

POLAND: Regime Preparing for Protests

The authorities are taking steps to counter demonstrations that are planned for the end of the month to commemorate the founding of Solidarity. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

The provincial governor of Gdansk yesterday declared that for the next 30 days violators of regulations on public gatherings will face summary trials. Such prosecution also applies to those who distribute and display illegal literature and posters. [Redacted]

25X1

The announcement follows a small demonstration on Monday by Solidarity activists at the Gdansk shipyard. During the protest, former Solidarity chief Walesa reiterated the threat by an underground group to begin a seven-day job action next week unless the government initiates talks with workers. [Redacted]

25X1

Last Friday Walesa told the US Chargé that support for the union remains solid in the shipyard and that he expects a large turnout at the end of the month during the third anniversary of the Gdansk agreements. He also believes that the police will provoke violence at the planned demonstrations. [Redacted]

25X1

Comment: Walesa's use of more aggressive tactics is aimed at maintaining his credibility with the shipyard workers. He also may calculate that the regime will be forced to tolerate symbolic protests if he is present, because workers might react violently if he were arrested. Walesa almost certainly does not expect his actions to lead to negotiations. [Redacted]

25X1

As the end of the month approaches, the government probably will deploy additional security forces, particularly in Gdansk, to make a show of force and to be available for contingencies. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1


Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret
RUFF UMBRA

Recent Actions in Angola



634934 8-83

Top Secret
TCS 2893/83
17 August 1983

Top Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

ANGOLA-SOUTH AFRICA: Invasion Fears

Angola appears shaken by recent South African and UNITA activities, [Redacted]
[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

Luanda has announced that South Africa has increased its forces in southern Angola and sent ground troops into the UNITA-controlled southeast. Angola also claims that South African aircraft bombed positions near Mulondo and Quiteve over the weekend and provided air support to UNITA forces attempting to capture Cangamba. [Redacted]

25X1

South Africa recently told the US that it is continuing sweeps against SWAPO insurgents in southern Angola but plans no large-scale offensives soon. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

[Redacted] Luanda's allegations of South African airstrikes at Cangamba have been denied by Pretoria. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

[Large Redacted Block]

25X1

Comment: UNITA apparently is consolidating its hold on the southeast by attacking the few sizable Angolan garrisons remaining in the region. The outcome of the battle at Cangamba is unclear, but casualties were heavy. South African participation is unconfirmed. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted Block]

25X1

Top Secret
[Redacted]


25X1

Top Secret




25X1


USSR-EAST GERMANY: Tougher Policy on Air Violations

Increased Soviet and East German complaints about Western violations of East German airspace probably reflect East Berlin's political and commercial concerns and are not an attempt to threaten retaliation for INF deployment in West Germany. 


25X1




25X1

The US Mission in West Berlin reports that Soviet air traffic controllers at the Berlin Air Safety Center have objected to Western aircraft deviating from the established air corridors. They say that, if protests are insufficient, stronger measures may be warranted. Pilots usually leave a corridor to avoid bad weather. 


25X1

The East Germans have protested to West Germany about airspace violations several times in recent months. They also objected to the West German Transport Minister's recent indirect call for a boycott of East Berlin's Schoenefeld airport. To earn hard currency, the East Germans have been offering low-fare flights through Schoenefeld. 


25X1

Comment: The East Germans are usually sensitive about violations that ignore their sovereignty. They may have turned to the Soviets for help because of concern that airlines serving West Berlin have increased their passenger traffic—business that could have gone to Schoenefeld. 

25X1

If the West concedes to Soviet protests, some West Berlin-bound air traffic would be diverted to a more distant corridor, which would increase the expense to the airlines and cause passenger delays. This would indirectly aid the East German airline operating out of Schoenefeld. 

25X1

The Soviets may become more aggressive in defending East German airspace. In the past, their aircraft and helicopters have often tracked and occasionally forced down violators. 

25X1



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

FRANCE-CHAD: More Military Support

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Comment: The F-1s probably will be used to protect the Jaguars, if they are sent into Chad. French pilots would be more than a match for their Libyan counterparts. If the additional troops are sent, they will be equipped with Milan antitank missiles, some probably mounted on helicopters. Paris has asked the US for Redeye antiaircraft missiles, and it might also request Stinger antiaircraft missiles.

[Redacted]

25X1

NIGERIA: Tensions Over Elections

Nearly complete results from the gubernatorial elections indicate that President Shagari's National Party has won at least 11 of 19 state contests. In 1979 his party won only seven states. The US Embassy reports that tensions are running high in several states where opposition incumbents have been ousted by National Party candidates. Although there have been few instances of unrest, the government has ordered curfews and a ban on demonstrations in at least six states. [Redacted]

25X1

Comment: Political stability has depended largely on each major ethnic group retaining political control in its own traditional homeland. Current election trends suggest the President's party has made some unprecedented inroads in areas that until now had been fully controlled by ethnic groups opposed to his northern-dominated National Party. The people in these areas probably will attribute National Party victories to election rigging. The opposition may call for a boycott of senatorial elections this weekend, and violence could erupt. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret



25X1



634933 8-83

Top Secret



17 August 1983

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1


USSR: Exercise Announcement

The Soviets announced on Monday to all the military attaches in Moscow from the signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act that they will conduct an exercise in the Odessa Military District from 5 to 10 September. The exercise will involve about 23,000 troops and will feature coordinated ground and air force operations. The announcement of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops is optional under the Helsinki Accords. Hungary is the only Warsaw Pact country to make such announcements routinely. [Redacted]

25X1

Comment: This is the first time that the USSR has announced an exercise below the 25,000-troop threshold. The move apparently is part of Moscow's recent efforts to appear conciliatory and open about its military actions as INF deployments approach. The exercise may involve regularly scheduled field training, which usually precedes end-of-cycle readiness inspections. [Redacted]

25X1



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

17 August 1983

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1



25X1

634932 8-83

Top Secret



17 August 1983

25X1

Top Secret



25X1


PAKISTAN: Opposition Protests

Opposition demonstrations, which began on Sunday as part of a civil disobedience campaign, continued on Monday in Karachi and resumed yesterday in several other cities in Sind Province. Police were stoned and government vehicles were burned in several places, and in one town the office of a progovernment organization was bombed. The US Consulate General in Karachi says the protests are becoming more identified with the Pakistan People's Party of former Prime Minister Bhutto and are attracting some student support. Some of those offering themselves for arrest in Sind are prominent landlords and local religious leaders.




25X1

Comment: Although the police thus far appear to have the demonstrations under control, the opposition has shown more vigor and better organization than expected by local observers. President Zia could have difficulty dealing with a strong protest movement in Sind, where there has long been opposition to martial law. His hold on power would not be threatened, however, so long as he retains the Army's support and the unrest does not spread to Punjab Province.



25X1



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

Special Analysis

CHAD: Implications of a Partition

There is no evidence that the French and the Libyans have reached an understanding to partition Chad, but the current military situation raises the possibility of an informal division. A likely dividing line probably would run roughly from Salal to Abeche. An attempt to partition Chad, however, would prove short-lived and unsatisfactory to all involved. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] diplomatic reporting indicate that an emissary of French President Mitterrand arrived in Tripoli on Sunday. [Redacted] The French almost certainly are using these contacts to explore whether Libyan leader Qadhafi would be willing to settle for anything less than total control of Chad. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

France probably is open to a solution that would provide for an informal division of Chad, leaving the northern areas under dissident control. According to press reports, Foreign Minister Cheysson has identified himself with the long-held French view that only the agricultural south is "useful" and worth defending. On the other hand, Mitterrand—who is already being criticized for a weak performance in domestic affairs—risks being seen by the public as having "failed" to defend French interests in Chad. [Redacted]

25X1

The Libyans probably would not view partition as a final solution, particularly if it left President Habre in power. By introducing Libyan ground forces into Chad, Qadhafi has clearly demonstrated that he is willing to use force to preserve what he regards as Libya's vital interests in the area. A cease-fire at this point, however, would reduce the chances of a direct confrontation with French forces. [Redacted]

25X1

If Qadhafi were to go along with such an agreement, he would be likely to use the north as a base for continuing the insurgency, banking that his staying power would be greater. The Libyans could keep an intervention force of a few thousand troops in Chad for an extended period, although they probably would curtail operations so long as French forces remained in their path. Qadhafi, however, would have to be mindful of the effect of a prolonged occupation on morale in his armed forces and the increased potential for a coup attempt. [Redacted]

25X1

continued

Top Secret
[Redacted]
17 August 1983

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

African Views

One of the main factors that has impelled Paris to defend Habre's regime is the fear that a failure to act would undermine French credibility and influence in the region. Many African states would regard any territorial compromise as a French defeat. They also almost certainly would see even an informal partition as a violation of OAU principles and a clear threat to their territorial integrity. [redacted]

25X1

A temporary cease-fire accompanied by negotiations among all parties would attract more support, particularly from Nigeria. Nevertheless, Habre's strongest backers—Sudan, Egypt, and moderate Francophone countries—would be especially reluctant to accept any agreement that detracts from the Chadian leader's legitimacy or that grants recognition or acceptance of Libyan gains. [redacted]

25X1

The Rival Leaders

Habre and dissident leader Goukouni are unlikely to agree to anything other than a temporary cease-fire. The President will not accept negotiations that effectively put Goukouni's forces on an equal footing with his government. Moreover, since Habre's most trusted lieutenants and main fighting force come from the north, a prolonged cease-fire could lead to dissension and increase his vulnerability to a coup. [redacted]

25X1

Goukouni also would hesitate to settle permanently for half of the country. Any significant slowdown in his drive south would aggravate divisions in his coalition, which includes dissidents from southern and central Chad. [redacted]

25X1

Outlook

Any arrangement between the French and the Libyans is unlikely to last. Neither Habre nor Goukouni is inclined to want to stand still for much longer than it takes to resupply their independent-minded forces. [redacted]

25X1

A unilateral move by Habre, however, would cause a crisis in Chad's relations with France. It probably would reinforce efforts by the French to groom alternate leaders, or give Paris an excuse to break with Habre and withdraw from Chad. On the other hand, a push southward by the Libyans and the dissidents would again confront France with the reality that only it can prevent Habre's defeat. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Special Analysis

LEBANON: Gemayel's Precarious Position

President Gemayel's inability to act decisively to resolve the latest factional fighting further erodes his fragile power base. He is afraid to challenge extremist Christian militia commanders, who are again flouting Beirut's authority and alienating Muslims and Druze from the government. Gemayel's political paralysis is undermining efforts to strengthen the control of the central government. [Redacted]

25X1

The principal goal of the 4,000-man, Phalange-dominated Lebanese Forces—the largest militia in the country—is to preserve Christian hegemony in Lebanon. In recent months the Lebanese Forces militia has defied Gemayel by operating openly in East Beirut and by staging terrorist attacks against Druze and Muslim targets.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

The President's ability to control the Lebanese Forces is further hindered by the growing opposition of his father—who is leader of the Phalange Party—toward his son's government. During the clashes last week between the Lebanese Army and Druze militiamen, Pierre Gemayel publicly suggested that civil war is a real alternative if negotiations fail to resolve Lebanon's factional disputes. Without his father's backing, the President probably lacks the political strength to control the Lebanese Forces.

[Redacted]

25X1

A Paralyzed Presidency

Gemayel probably will continue to heed US suggestions that he try to arrange a national reconciliation. His efforts will be blocked, however, by Christian militia commanders and by Muslim and Druze leaders who will not cooperate until Gemayel restrains the Lebanese Forces.

[Redacted]

25X1

If Gemayel dares to arrange political compromises without the backing of the Lebanese Forces, he may risk assassination.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

continued

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

Neither Gemayel nor Army commander Tannous—who has had close ties with the Phalange—appears willing to use the Army to challenge the Christian militias directly for fear of setting off a new civil war. Gemayel is intent on preserving his own position. He probably will hold discussions with Muslim and Druze leaders, but the prospects for compromise are poor. [redacted]

25X1

An Alternative to Gemayel

Gemayel's continued ineptitude may encourage latent presidential ambitions in Tannous, who advocates a united Lebanon. Tannous might eventually try to step in to pick up the pieces if the President falters. In 1958 Lebanon's President was replaced by the Army commander. [redacted]

25X1

Tannous probably does not have enough political strength to succeed Gemayel if the President departs the scene soon. Lebanese politicians would prefer to elect a more traditional Christian leader. Tannous, however, would be likely to try to use his position as Army commander to exercise influence in any new government and to put himself in a better position to obtain the presidency. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1
25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

17 August 1983

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



Top Secret