




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


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# National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday*  
*10 August 1983*

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
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**LIBYA-CHAD: Closing in on Faya-Largeau**


*French officials say Libyan and dissident forces are deployed around Faya-Largeau and that they are likely to attack it today.*




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The French Defense Ministry announced yesterday that about 180 French paratroopers from Central African Republic will move to N'Djamena to serve as "instructors." The French Air Force has 12 Jaguar fighter-bombers and three tankers in central Africa and C-160 cargo aircraft in Chad to help supply government forces. France also reportedly is conferring with Cameroon about using Garoua as a base for French combat aircraft. 


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Foreign Minister Cheysson warned on Monday that intervention by Libyan forces would have unspecified "consequences." Although he claimed Paris and Washington are not coordinating their efforts, a Foreign Ministry spokesman later said the remark reflected Cheysson's desire that US and French moves not be viewed as a joint action. 

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**Comment:** Continuing bad weather at Aozou appears to be one key factor that could delay the attack. Tripoli probably expects that the Libyan and dissident forces' superior firepower will enable them to recapture Faya-Largeau quickly. The Libyans do not appear overly concerned about the possibility of French intervention. 

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The French troops being sent to N'Djamena probably are intended as a demonstration of French resolve. A base in northern Cameroon would allow French combat and tanker aircraft to move closer to targets in Chad. Fuel supplies at the airport at N'Djamena are chronically low. 

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**FRANCE-CHAD: Political Reaction to Involvement**

*Domestic political reaction in France to events in Chad thus far has been restrained, but President Mitterrand will come under increasing pressure if it appears that he is not adequately protecting French interests.* [Redacted]

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Gaullist leader Chirac and most other members of the opposition publicly support the government. At the same time, they have not given Mitterrand a blank check. Chirac, for example, has been evasive on the matter of direct intervention and has said that only the President can make the decision on the issue. [Redacted]

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Former Prime Minister Messmer, an old-line Gaullist, has warned against intervention and raised the possibility of dividing Chad into Libyan and French spheres of influence. Former President Giscard has refused comment. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Mitterrand's political position is delicate. The opposition's support for intervention is lukewarm and clearly does not extend to sending troops. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Mitterrand almost certainly believes, however, that the opposition will criticize him if he fails to protect French interests in Chad. Recent polls show the President's approval ratings at an alltime low of 28 percent. [Redacted]

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**FRANCE-CUBA: Results of Cheysson's Visit**

*French Foreign Minister Cheysson's talks with Cuban President Castro do not appear likely to lead to any initiatives.* [Redacted]

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Cheysson completed a low-key, three-day trip to Cuba on Saturday. According to the US Interests Section in Havana, Central America was a main topic of discussion. [Redacted]

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Castro reportedly adopted a restrained tone and tried to persuade Cheysson to convey to the US Cuba's sincerity in seeking a negotiated settlement. He said the Salvadoran insurgents have to play a role in any settlement, but he repeated his publicly stated willingness to withdraw his military advisers in Nicaragua and curtail the flow of arms to Central America. [Redacted]

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The Cuban leader did not rule out elections in El Salvador as part of a solution. He indicated, however, that the guerrillas could not participate in the election process as it currently is envisioned by the US. He also said that an attempt at a military takeover would provoke US intervention. [Redacted]

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Cheysson stated that US special envoy Stone's negotiating mission seems to hold more promise than the Contadora group's initiative. He agreed that successful peace negotiations have to include the direct participation of the Salvadoran insurgents. Nonetheless, Cheysson said that France would have to pay lipservice to the Contadora initiative. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Cheysson appears to have parried Castro's efforts to involve France more actively in Central America. The French realize that they have only limited leverage in the region. [Redacted]

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Nevertheless, the French want to keep channels of communications with Havana open because they hope that they can reduce Cuba's dependence on the USSR. Cheysson also tried to make the case that France and Cuba share a concern for national independence of their respective countries and for improving relations with the Third World. [Redacted]

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**LEBANON: Increasing Violence**

*The car bombings over the weekend and a hardline public stance by a Christian militia commander have dimmed the prospects for Christian-Muslim cooperation as the Israelis prepare to withdraw from the Shuf and Alayh region.* [redacted]

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Prime Minister al-Wazzan and other Lebanese Muslim leaders have denounced the bombings in Tripoli and Ba'labakk, which killed 54. Both incidents occurred in Syrian-dominated locations. [redacted]

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Before the bombings, a commander of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia in the Shuf and Alayh area further antagonized the Druze community by stating publicly that his militiamen have no intention of pulling back from the mountains. The Druze have cited a Christian withdrawal as a precondition for negotiating an end to the fighting. A political adviser to the Lebanese Forces added that, while the militia is dismantling some bases and barracks, it is leaving small units in the mountain villages for local defense. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Extremists in the Lebanese Forces who favor a partition of Lebanon may have carried out the bombings in order to alienate Muslims from the central government. Muslims in the Beirut area are likely to retaliate. [redacted]

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The Muslim community probably believes that President Gemayel is doing nothing to control Christian-instigated terrorism. In addition to damaging Gemayel's credibility, the violence increases the likelihood that Lebanese Muslims will view Syria as a protector and thus oppose Syrian troop withdrawals. [redacted]

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**UPPER VOLTA: Overtures Toward the West**

*Leftist Head of State Sankara is continuing attempts to convince the West and moderate African states that he wants to maintain good relations.* [Redacted]

25X1

Sankara, in a meeting with US Embassy officials earlier this week, emphasized that he wants to promote economic development and indicated that he plans to send a delegation to the US soon to explain the reasons for the coup. He repeated assurances of his desire for cooperation with neighboring Ivory Coast, Togo, and Niger in telephone conversations with the leaders of those countries. [Redacted]

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In addition, Sankara has publicly called on Libyan leader Qadhafi to halt an "unsolicited" airlift to Ouagadougou. French sources claim that Libyan cargo aircraft arrived last weekend to deliver weapons. [Redacted]

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Meanwhile, the government is organizing Cuban-style defense committees to mobilize the population. It also is enlisting military recruits along with some former soldiers demobilized by previous regimes. Several senior Army commanders still have not declared their support for Sankara. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Sankara's professed concern with economic development suggests that he recognizes the dependence of Upper Volta—one of Africa's poorest countries—on aid from the West. The regime cannot afford to alienate France, Upper Volta's chief economic benefactor, or the US, the country's main source of food aid. [Redacted]

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If Sankara is unable to gain widespread support for his promised "revolution" from the public or the Army, he may turn to the radical defense committees to repress opposition. He also could turn to Tripoli for increased military aid, although Qadhafi's preoccupation with Chad is likely to prevent him from providing substantial support now. [Redacted]

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**CHILE: Another Day of National Protest**

*Chile's fourth day of national protest tomorrow will indicate whether President Pinochet's continuance in office is becoming the key political issue, and it will set the tone for opposition activities on the 10th anniversary of the overthrow of President Allende next month.*

[Redacted]

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The protest, which was called by a broad range of opposition forces, is to include commercial and transport boycotts, street rallies, and other nonviolent activities. Previous protests were aimed generally at a faster return to democracy, but several opposition spokesmen have announced that this demonstration will call specifically for Pinochet's resignation. [Redacted]

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This demand is a key provision of a declaration negotiated in recent weeks by the Christian Democrats and other opposition groups. Their manifesto also calls for a plebiscite to approve the calling of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, the creation of a transition government, and an emergency economic plan to revive the economy. [Redacted]

25X1

Pinochet has tried to slow the momentum of the opposition by creating a commission to propose rules for bringing back political parties and the Congress and for holding elections. Opposition leaders, however, are criticizing the lack of a provision to accelerate the current timetable for restoring democracy in 1989. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the government may be planning some additional concessions, such as the replacement of the Interior Minister by a civilian, more exile returns, and a specific transition calendar.

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[Redacted]

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Government officials are disturbed by the opposition's increasing cohesion and boldness. Pinochet is seeking to appease military and cabinet officials who believe some liberalization is necessary to maintain social peace. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The President appears to be holding plans in reserve for more significant concessions. He probably intends to use them in coping with the massive protests expected around 11 September. [Redacted]

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**PAKISTAN: Zia's Political Plans**

*President Zia, in his scheduled address to the nation this Friday, probably will announce revisions to the suspended constitution that will strengthen presidential powers.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The President's opponents say they are preparing for a political battle. The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, with support from some labor leaders, will call for a civil disobedience campaign starting on Sunday if Zia fails to lift martial law and call early national elections. Leaders of the well-organized Islamic party that usually supports Zia want him to end martial law but reject civil disobedience as a threat to national security. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Although Zia knows most Pakistanis want a return to civilian rule, he will move cautiously to ensure that his military support remains intact. He probably will introduce a presidential system while preserving the Army's dominance through a formalized military council. Zia also is likely to put off ending martial law and calling national elections until constitutional revisions have been completed. [Redacted]

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The opposition probably will not be successful in staging mass demonstrations. The Movement, a coalition of eight parties, lacks public support and suffers from serious strains among its constituent parties. [Redacted]

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The Islamic fundamentalists could become more critical of the regime if they believe Zia has not gone far enough. They will not support demonstrations, however, unless they believe public opinion has shifted strongly against the President. [Redacted]

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
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**IRAN: Continuing Unrest**

*Popular disenchantment with the government reportedly is increasing in Iran.* [Redacted]

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On Friday 50,000 to 100,000 people demonstrated in northern Tehran against the regime. [Redacted] The protesters moved slowly through the streets, causing massive traffic jams. Radiobroadcasts by exiled opponents of the regime the previous week had called on residents of Tehran to use this tactic on Friday. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] discontent has increased among the lower classes because of economic hardship and corruption among the clergy and Revolutionary Guard. [Redacted] antigovernment unrest also has increased in cities in the east. Posters of the son of the late Shah have appeared on walls and mosques in Mashhad, Zabol, and Zahedan. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** These demonstrations probably do not indicate a serious threat to the regime. Ayatollah Khomeini's liberalization decree last December and the government's generally restrained response to displays of dissent have encouraged the increase in open criticism. [Redacted]

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Unlike the protest demonstrations in Tehran last month, the one last week was peaceful and consisted primarily of middle and upper class Iranians, who have never supported the Khomeini regime. Clandestine radio announcements of increased unity among exile opposition groups may have encouraged the upper classes in northern Tehran to risk an open show of defiance. [Redacted]

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Protests by the lower classes typically avoid direct criticism of Khomeini and usually focus on economic problems. Unless the exiles can achieve greater unity and closer coordination, however, they are unlikely to be able to exploit the discontent of the lower classes. [Redacted]

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**PORTUGAL: IMF Loan**

*Portugal has completed negotiations with the IMF for a \$300 million standby loan after agreeing to take further austerity measures.* [Redacted]

25X1

IMF approval of the loan in October is to be conditional on the reduction of import surcharges and on raising new revenue. The Portuguese also agreed to limit the current account deficit to \$2 billion this year and to \$1.2 billion next year, slash the budget deficit from 12 percent to about 6 percent of GNP by 1984, and curtail domestic and foreign borrowing. In addition, the government is developing plans to dismantle some public-sector enterprises. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** To narrow its current account deficit, Lisbon has to constrain import demand further by lowering incomes. Moreover, reducing domestic borrowing and cutting government investment projects probably will increase bankruptcies and unemployment. [Redacted]

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The stabilization program almost certainly will produce some strains. For example, the Communist trade unions appear ready to increase strike activity this fall. The coalition government, however, appears to have the will to stand firm. [Redacted]

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Despite the government's resolve, Portugal is unlikely to meet the IMF targets. Even under more stringent policies, the current account deficit may reach \$2.4 billion this year. [Redacted]

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**IRAQ-IRAN: Iraqi Withdrawal Announced**

Baghdad announced yesterday that it had ordered a withdrawal of forces from Iran after achieving its objectives in fighting around Mehran. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Iraqis achieved their limited objectives of inflicting maximum casualties on the Iranians while strengthening their own tactical position along the border. President Saddam Husayn probably ordered the withdrawal to minimize Iraqi casualties and to avoid the unnecessary risks of defending additional occupied territory. The Iranians, nevertheless, will claim they pushed the Iraqis out of Iran. [Redacted]

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
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**UN-CYPRUS: Proposal for a Settlement**

The UN special envoy to Cyprus early this week gave Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders a new proposal for a Cyprus settlement drafted by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. According to the envoy, the proposal directly confronts the sensitive questions of division of territory and composition of the federal executive. A copy reportedly has been forwarded to Ankara. Meanwhile, Cypriot President Kyprianou has cut short his vacation to visit Athens for consultations with Prime Minister Papandreou. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** UN-sponsored talks between the two Cypriot communities have been stalled for months. Although the Greek Cypriots have been urging the Secretary General for some time to play an active role, the timing and content of the new proposal seem to have come as a surprise. The initiative's emphasis on the most controversial aspects of a settlement makes it unlikely that either side will greet it with enthusiasm. Nonetheless, the shock value of the proposal and Perez de Cuellar's personal involvement may prompt the resumption of some sort of dialogue. [Redacted]

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
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**LESOTHO-SOUTH AFRICA: Planned Expulsion of Refugees**

Lesotho has informed the US that Prime Minister Jonathan plans to expel the 2,000 to 3,000 South African refugees registered in the country. Pretoria has long accused the refugees of involvement with the African National Congress. Jonathan's decision follows an assassination attempt against him last Thursday and precedes ministerial talks scheduled with Pretoria for today. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Domestic opponents or South African-backed insurgents probably tried to kill Jonathan. Although the Prime Minister has not yet found a country that will accept the refugees, his decision to expel them sets a positive tone for the discussion with the South Africans on security matters. If the talks go well, South Africa is likely to abandon the strict border controls it recently imposed and may release arms shipments for Lesotho being held in Durban. Jonathan, however, cannot prevent ANC personnel from reentering the country. [Redacted]

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