


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**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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*Thursday
4 August 1983*

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CENTRAL AMERICA: Deadlocked Diplomacy

The recent meeting in Panama of the Foreign Ministers of the Central American nations and the Contadora group—Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama—was stalemated by procedural and substantive problems. [Redacted]

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A Honduran official says the Contadora group planned to have all five Central American countries sign a broad declaration of intent, followed by separate memoranda of understanding between Honduras and Nicaragua and between El Salvador and Nicaragua. The Central Americans—except Nicaragua—were aware of this strategy and undercut the step-by-step approach by presenting a document calling for simultaneous resolution of all regional problems and rejecting bilateral arrangements. [Redacted]

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In addition, the document noted several shortcomings in the 10-point program drafted last month at a summit meeting of the Contadora countries. According to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, these include the program's omission of guarantees that democratic elections would be held in all the Central American nations and of mechanisms to ensure arms reductions. [Redacted]

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A Nicaraguan counterproposal, which included demands that the US withdraw its naval presence and halt planned military exercises in the region, was rejected. The meeting concluded with agreement by the Contadora ministers that more time was needed to discuss the conflicting approaches. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Central American countries—except Nicaragua—appear increasingly resentful of what they view as the Contadora group's efforts to mediate bilateral agreements. This, coupled with their deepening perception of the Sandinistas as the common threat, suggests they will maintain their unity in subsequent meetings while resisting outside efforts to impose solutions. [Redacted]

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Another meeting of the nine nations appears likely later this month. Contadora strategists, meanwhile, probably will try to identify some common ground in the conflicting documents before renewing their efforts. [Redacted]

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JAPAN-USSR: Tokyo Proposes Trade Talks

Japanese Foreign Minister Abe's recent announcement of an offer to hold working-level trade talks with the USSR does not appear to portend a softening of Tokyo's overall policy toward Moscow. [redacted]

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Officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry report that, during discussions last month in Moscow on UN issues, Japanese diplomats suggested an ad hoc meeting between the Japanese Embassy's economic counselor and a Soviet Trade Ministry official. Such a meeting originally was suggested by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa during his visit to Tokyo in April. [redacted]

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Comment: Contrary to Japanese press reports, the offer falls short of resuming the annual bilateral trade talks last held in the spring of 1981. An official in the Foreign Ministry noted that the public announcement of the offer was timed to coincide with that of the Long-Term Grain Agreement between the US and the USSR. The appearance of improvement in US-Soviet economic relations without some movement by Japan would subject the government to strong criticism from businessmen. [redacted]

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The offer also is consistent with Prime Minister Nakasone's policy of maintaining a dialogue with the USSR while adhering to a tough line on issues affecting the Western alliance. Abe recently reaffirmed the hard line in an unusually blunt speech that condemned Soviet expansionism and called for greater Japanese efforts to halt the flow of advanced technology to the USSR. [redacted]

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The Soviets probably will take the Japanese up on their offer. They may broach the subject with Abe next week, when he visits Moscow on his return from the Middle East. Meanwhile, Soviet media are continuing criticism of Japan's foreign policy, especially Tokyo's security ties with Washington. [redacted]

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
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USSR-MIDDLE EAST: Call for a Role in Peace Process

Pravda's top Middle East commentator on Tuesday issued Moscow's strongest public call in months for the USSR's participation in an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. His article, which was carried by the unofficial Soviet news agency Novosti, but not by *Pravda*, claimed that Washington's failure to recognize Soviet interests in the Middle East heightens tensions there and drives US peace plans into a "blind alley." The commentator suggested reviving the Soviet-US declaration of October 1977 to facilitate a peace settlement and emphasized that the USSR will not abandon its friends in the Middle East. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Soviet message almost certainly was aimed at both the Arab world and the US. It probably was timed to coincide with US special envoy McFarlane's current trip to the Middle East and specifically designed to reinforce Syria's criticism of US efforts to arrange peaceful settlements in the region. The Soviets' use of an "unofficial" news agency allows them to stress their point without committing their prestige in the event that this latest call falls flat. [Redacted]

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
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USSR-SRI LANKA: Soviet Reaction

Initial coverage by Soviet media of the violence in Sri Lanka has been straightforward and factual. On Monday, a Moscow domestic television news broadcast did note that the Sri Lankan authorities were trying to mask their inability to halt the disorders quickly by blaming the country's "progressive forces" for the trouble and banning the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Sri Lanka. The Soviet news commentator also said some observers believe that the disorders are becoming anti-Indian. [Redacted]

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Comment: Moscow apparently believes that New Delhi's restrained reaction to the crisis constrains it from exploiting the problems of President Jayewardene's government. By raising the allegedly anti-Indian nature of the violence, the Soviets seem to be implicitly hinting that Prime Minister Gandhi should be more critical of the Sri Lankan Government. Moscow's attitude could change if the government blames the USSR for fanning the riots and carries through with plans to expel a large number of Soviets. Such a move probably would result in a prolonged period of strained relations. [Redacted]

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BELGIUM: Playing Politics With INF

Belgian officials are pushing the US to change the activation date of the ground-launched cruise missile repair facility from 1987 to 1985. The facility will be placed in Belgium as part of a package of economic inducements to help win acceptance of INF. The Belgians now say they want the repair facility to begin operations as close as possible to the scheduled deployment of the first contingent of missiles at Florennes. [Redacted]

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Comment: The politically predominant Social Christians face divisive economic problems and the prospect of increased "peace" demonstrations this fall, and they continue to be wary of the INF issue. Economic benefits are an integral part of the government's strategy for gaining approval for deployment. Walloon Social Christians, who are balking at formal announcement of Florennes as the base site and who are worried by their party's declining fortunes, clearly want to demonstrate their ability to bargain for tangible benefits for Wallonia. [Redacted]

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ETHIOPIA: Doubts About Counterinsurgency Prospects

Ethiopian officials believe that the security situations in Eritrea and Tigray have deteriorated markedly.

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[redacted] Eritrean insurgents last month inflicted several major defeats on government forces, leading provincial leaders to doubt they can ever control the insurgency.

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Comment: Mengistu remains committed to a military victory in both provinces, and he almost certainly will not consider making any significant concession. Despite the pessimism of local officials, he is likely to push ahead with more offensives. In the past, Mengistu has replaced or executed commanders for challenging this policy and has been able to divert blame to subordinates for the government's military failures. He also has blamed his Soviet advisers, who have been heavily involved in both campaigns.

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
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BULGARIA-US: Zhivkov on INF and Bilateral Ties

General Secretary Zhivkov earlier this week denied to the US Ambassador that Bulgaria is considering deploying Soviet missiles, but he implied that Bulgaria would respond to US INF deployments with some defensive measures. Although Zhivkov complained about a US "campaign" against Bulgaria, he said that Sofia's own anti-US propaganda could be "corrected" if bilateral relations were to improve. He also urged the US not to "ignore" Bulgaria, invited Secretary of State Shultz to visit, and promised to look into bilateral problems. [Redacted]

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Comment: Zhivkov has proposed a regional meeting on a Balkan nuclear-free zone. Although he probably would not be eager to have the USSR put missiles in Bulgaria, he would be unlikely to refuse if Moscow insisted. It will be difficult for Zhivkov to offer concrete improvements in bilateral ties without a substantial improvement in Soviet-US relations. Nonetheless, Zhivkov's gesture suggests he wants to play down his reputation as a Soviet puppet and offset damaging allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the attempted assassination of the Pope and in narcotics smuggling. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis

CHAD: Regional Attitudes

African governments are concerned about the longer term implications of the expanded fighting in Chad, especially if Libyan leader Qadhafi emerges with a victory. Most, however, have chosen to keep a low profile as the best way to protect their own interests.

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Nigeria recently opened its borders to Chad to allow the shipment of vital supplies, but it is preoccupied with national elections. The military, moreover, remains angered by the recent fighting over the disputed Lake Chad border.

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Zaire's more active support has left it exposed and largely isolated. If the military tide turns against President Habre's forces, President Mobutu will come under pressure to withdraw the limited forces he has provided N'Djamena.

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Sudan has a longstanding fear that a pro-Libyan government in N'Djamena would make eastern Chad a staging ground for attacks by Libyan forces or Sudanese dissidents. President Nimeiri will continue to allow other countries to use his country for shipments of military aid to Habre's troops, but economic problems and the growing insurgency in the south prevent Khartoum from providing troops or weapons.

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North African Positions

Egypt is concerned about the threat that a Libyan-supported regime could pose to Sudan, and it probably will continue to furnish diplomatic support and some arms to Habre. Cairo is unlikely to send its own troops, however, as long as Sudan's security is not directly threatened.

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The Maghreb countries have been especially careful not to disrupt relations among themselves or to discourage Qadhafi's recent interest in improving relations. In addition, Morocco has financial difficulties and is preoccupied with the war in Western Sahara. Algeria's opposition to any outside interference in the region has led it to refuse overflights for French and other aircraft engaged in supply missions to Chad.

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Qadhafi's Options

Western support for Habre has raised the stakes for Libya, and Qadhafi has responded with the air attacks of the past few days. Tripoli, however, probably will not launch a ground invasion of Chad similar to the 7,000-man operation in 1980. [Redacted]

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Qadhafi would be more likely to continue to provide advisers, a limited number of forces, and the bulk of the dissidents' arms and equipment. If airstrikes do not force Habre to pull back from Faya-Largeau, Qadhafi probably will help the insurgents to regroup. Although Qadhafi would view this as a tactical defeat, he presumably would calculate that, over the long run, Habre's allies would be unwilling to offset Libya's commitment to the dissidents. [Redacted]

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
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Nigerian Federal States and Tribal Groups



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Special Analysis

NIGERIA: Election Outlook

After four years of civilian rule, Nigeria again faces the hurdle of getting safely through national elections that are likely to provoke controversy and violence. Political stability will depend largely on popular perceptions of the fairness of successive weekly elections for president, state governors, federal legislators, and state assembly positions. President Shagari is favored to win a second term in the voting on Saturday, but his party may lose ground in the legislative elections. Disputes over alleged vote rigging at any stage could cause violence and force the military to intervene to restore order or even to resume control of the government.

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The US Embassy reports that few substantive issues have emerged during the campaign and that even the country's economic problems probably will have little impact. As in past elections, candidates from the six officially recognized parties have emphasized personalities and have appealed to tribal loyalty while trying to heal intraparty feuds.

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Shagari's National Party, which has the most financial resources and the broadest base of cross-tribal support, is the front-runner. Opposition efforts to unite behind a common presidential candidate have been thwarted by personal rivalries and longstanding ethnic mistrust.

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Thus far, partisan violence—a normal feature of Nigerian campaigns—has been less than expected. Nevertheless, the number of politically inspired disturbances has increased as the elections have approached. All parties have squads of thugs responsible for intimidating voters and stuffing ballot boxes.

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Possibility of Election Fraud

The federal election commission's inept handling of procedures and its pro-Shagari bias has prompted criticism from the opposition. The commission's performance almost certainly will raise serious doubts about the validity of the elections. Last week, for example, the commission released voter registration lists that show marked increases in states where the National Party expects to run well.

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Election Scorecard

Party	Presidential Candidate and Ethnic Group	Results in 1979			Bases of Strength
		Federal		Governorships	
		Senate	House		
National Party of Nigeria	Shehu Shagari* (Hausa-Fulani)	36	168	7	Hausa-Fulani in northern states; minority tribe states.
Unity Party of Nigeria	Obafemi Awolowo* (Yoruba)	28	111	5	Five predominantly Yoruba states in southwest.
Nigerian People's Party	Nnamdi Azikiwe* (Ibo)	16	78	3	Two predominantly Ibo states in southeast and in some minority tribe states.
People's Redemption Party	Hassan Yussuf (Hausa-Fulani)	7	49	2	Northern states of Kano and Kaduna.
Great Nigeria People's Party	Waziri Ibrahim* (Kanuri)	8	43	2	Northeastern states of Gongola and Borno.
Nigerian Advance Party	Tunji Braithwaite (Yoruba)	Not recognized until 1982			

*Party nominee in 1979.



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The 80,000-man police force is ill equipped to monitor some 150,000 polling stations, supervise vote counting, and control extensive violence. Shagari clearly prefers not to involve the military in administering the elections. The Army has contingency plans to back up the police, however, and it has been placed on alert for the elections.

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The Presidential Race

Despite some inevitable disputes and strife, most Nigerians are likely to accept the election results if they are not rigged too blatantly.

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Shagari is in a good position to be reelected on the first ballot. Complex electoral laws, however, require a candidate to win a nationwide plurality of the popular vote and at least 25 percent in two-thirds of 19 states.

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If Shagari fails on the first round, he will be forced into a runoff 10 days later, probably against southern Yoruba leader Awolowo. Unless the opposition unites behind Awolowo—which seems unlikely—Shagari should win.

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If the President loses, however, there could be serious unrest in the north. Awolowo is widely disliked in that region.

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A Time of Tension

Even if Shagari wins, intense competition for state and legislative offices, along with charges of vote manipulation, will keep political tension high throughout the month and lead to a spate of postelection court challenges by defeated candidates. Despite public pledges by the major candidates to preserve Nigeria's fragile democratic institutions, Awolowo and other likely losers might find it difficult to accept defeat passively.

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Parties that appear in danger of losing control in their ethnic strongholds might try to scuttle the remaining elections or to incite their supporters to violence. In turn, the government could feel compelled to suspend any remaining elections, declare a state of emergency, and call out the Army to restore order.

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There is no evidence that the military wants to resume power. To preserve national unity and stability, however, it probably would try to take control.


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