





**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday
30 July 1983*

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
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
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


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


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WESTERN EUROPE-US: Views on Central America

Media reactions in Western Europe to new US military initiatives in Central America have been divided along ideological lines, but official government reactions have been restrained. 


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The major conservative and most centrist newspapers in London, Bonn, Rome, and Paris generally have given factual reports of the President's news conference. The leftist press has maintained that Washington's military initiatives are increasing the chances for war in the region and has suggested that the bipartisan commission is just a smokescreen for "gunboat diplomacy." 

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Official reaction to the news conference thus far has been sparse and cautious. French Foreign Minister Cheysson, who is visiting Latin America, has said that US warships off the Central American coast do not help the cause of peace in the region. The French Government, which has spoken out against US policy in the past, has reacted mildly to recent developments. 


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A West German Government spokesman declined to comment on recent developments in US policy on Central America, saying that it has not yet manifested itself in "concrete terms." 


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Comment: The paucity of official reactions reflects the longstanding caution of many West European governments on Central American issues. Despite deep concern about the growing tension, many political leaders believe that Central America holds little economic and strategic interest for their countries. West European leaders, moreover, fear that open support for the US will hurt them politically. 


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The French reaction may indicate that Paris wants to assume a lower profile on Central American issues. The West German Government, which generally has shared US views on Central America, is likely to continue to delay sending an ambassador to El Salvador. 

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WESTERN EUROPE: Preparing for Disarmament Conference

Some NATO members, now that the conclusion of CSCE is imminent, are urging the Alliance to move quickly to map out strategy for the European Disarmament Conference to be held in Stockholm in January. [Redacted]

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West German and British representatives to NATO this week proposed that the Alliance seek rapid agreement on a nearly complete package of confidence and security building measures that the Allies devised in 1980. They also called for discussion of other issues related to the conference and possible proposals that Eastern nations and neutrals might raise. [Redacted]

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The 35 participants in CSCE are mandated by the conference's final document to hold a European Disarmament Conference, the first phase of which focuses only on confidence and security building measures. Malta now appears ready to modify its objections to the Madrid agreement, allowing CSCE to end soon and enabling delegates to meet in Helsinki in October for preparatory talks on the Disarmament Conference. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Allies will find it especially difficult to agree on notification and verification procedures for military activities. They also have not decided what mechanism to adopt to coordinate their negotiating activities or addressed other procedural matters. Major substantive issues include whether out-of-area military actions or nonconventional forces should be covered and how the Disarmament Conference would relate to MBFR and other arms control forums. [Redacted]

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The Disarmament Conference is particularly important to the INF basing countries and to France, which view it as a way to demonstrate their commitment to arms control and better East-West relations while US INF deployments proceed. West Germany and the UK have been working individually on preparations for the conference. The Mitterrand government probably will largely follow the blueprint it inherited from the previous administration. [Redacted]

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EC members apparently have not yet tried to forge a joint position on the conference, probably because the effort to wind up the meeting in Madrid has fully involved their CSCE experts. They are likely, however, to begin coordinating their views on the conference within the EC's political cooperation framework. [Redacted]

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
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SRI LANKA: More Violence

Communal conflict has again intensified in Colombo. [Redacted]

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Rumors of attacks by Tamil terrorists have prompted a new wave of communal violence matching that of last Monday. Armed Sinhalese gangs took to the streets yesterday and attacked the largest of the refugee camps set up to house 45,000 to 60,000 displaced Tamils. [Redacted]

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Security forces are not quelling the violence. [Redacted] the US Embassy says that their failure to restore order reflects a decision by President Jayewardene to give the Army free rein for three days to "teach the Tamils a lesson." Jayewardene, in a speech on Thursday, made no conciliatory gestures and in effect banned the Tamil political party. [Redacted]

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India continues to take a moderate stance toward the situation in Colombo. Prime Minister Gandhi assured her parliament that India would not intervene in Sri Lanka. India has withdrawn some members of its diplomatic mission, which has been harassed by crowds. [Redacted]

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Comment: Security forces in the capital are finding it increasingly difficult to identify Tamil terrorists amid the growing lawlessness of the Sinhalese mobs. Tamil political extremists and radical Sinhalese nationalist groups are both taking advantage of the chaos in the city to incite sympathetic elements to violence. [Redacted]

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The mild Indian response probably is designed to avoid aggravating Colombo's fears of Indian interference, or even military intervention. Gandhi so far appears to be succeeding in keeping at bay demands—particularly by Indian Tamils—for stronger action. [Redacted]

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GUATEMALA: Elections Scheduled

President Rios Montt has set July 1984 as the date for constituent assembly elections, despite rightwing pressure for earlier balloting.

[Redacted]

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Press reports state Rios Montt has support for this timetable from most of the 24 political groupings formed or reorganized under political laws that went into effect in March. The centrist Christian Democratic and Revolutionary Parties and the leftist Social Democratic Party also support elections next year. The traditional rightist parties, including the country's strongest, are virtually alone among the parties in pushing for early elections. [Redacted]

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The President also announced that the death penalty imposed by the widely condemned secret Special Tribunals will be suspended until modifications are made in the criminal justice system. Rios Montt met two weeks ago with Catholic Church leaders who have criticized the Tribunals. [Redacted]

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In meetings with military officers, Rios Montt agreed to delegate more responsibility for armed forces matters to Minister of Defense Mejia. [Redacted]

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Comment: The President's commitment to a firm and broadly supported election schedule will help ease opposition from those military officers and rightwing parties demanding early elections. The timetable still gives new groups enough time to be able to contest the traditional parties—which Rios Montt believes are not representative of Guatemalan society—in elections. The suspension of the death penalty will appease some of his critics in the Catholic Church and in the political parties. [Redacted]

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
Granting Mejia a more prominent role reestablishes the military chain of command and responds to another complaint by the officer corps. Nevertheless, the President apparently does not intend to remove his two military aides or evangelical advisers from their posts as was demanded last month by the officer corps. Although Rios Montt probably has made enough compromises to ease pressures on him, some officers and rightwing parties are likely to continue their agitation. [Redacted]

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ISRAEL-SYRIA: Exchange of Fire

Israeli and Syrian forces near Bhamdun briefly exchanged small arms fire yesterday. An Israeli military spokesman said Tel Aviv did not know what provoked the exchange but added that five separate firing incidents occurred. He stated the Israeli Army did not incur any casualties.

[Redacted]

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Comment: The local Syrian commander might have been responding to an Israeli action. Tel Aviv has indicated that small arms exchanges with the Syrians along the cease-fire lines are commonplace and usually result from local decisions. Nonetheless, the exchange yesterday reemphasizes the potentially volatile situation along the current cease-fire lines.

[Redacted]

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FRANCE-CHAD: Wavering on Air Support

The US Embassy in Paris reports that President Mitterrand's closest advisers on Africa are divided over sending in aircraft if the Libyans launch airstrikes against government forces about to attack Faya-Largeau. The French continue to be concerned about the high cost of military assistance to President Habre, which they believe may total nearly \$40 million by the end of August. French officials, however, appear resigned to the prospect of having to remain involved in Chad for some time to come.

[Redacted]

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Comment: The French have publicly promised to respond in kind to Libyan involvement, and they have privately indicated that this would include sending their own fighter-bombers. Mitterrand will make the final decision on the use of aircraft. France probably will continue to try to block Libyan encroachment in Chad to protect its strategic and economic interests in the region. Paris, however, may not necessarily view an all-out commitment to the Habre regime as its only long-term alternative.

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
USSR-CUBA: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

The USSR reportedly is seeking Cuba's assistance to discourage certain members of the Nonaligned Movement from trying to disrupt preparations for the Non-Proliferation Review Conference in 1985. A Mexican diplomat says the Soviets have asked the Cubans—who chair the movement's special coordinating committee for nuclear cooperation—to keep tight control over the activities of certain committee members. Moscow is concerned that Argentina, India, and Yugoslavia will join forces and take the nuclear supplier states to task for their restrictive export practices and the nuclear weapons states for failing to make more progress in arms control. 

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Comment: Moscow's concern is well founded, because the special coordinating committee formulated the negotiating position of the developing countries at the last Review Conference in a way that contributed to its failure. Although Cuba is unwilling to adhere to the Treaty, it has not joined other developing countries in criticizing the nonproliferation regime that the USSR, the US, and other major nuclear supplier states want to preserve. 

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
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UNITA'S Presence and Recent Actions in Angola



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Special Analysis**ANGOLA-CUBA: The Cuban Troop Withdrawal Issue**

Luanda has not yet provided the US with a promised timetable for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Decisions emerge slowly from the faction-ridden Angolan leadership, but in this instance President dos Santos and some of the other more moderate officials may share the reservations of Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners about sending the Cubans home. Recent military gains by the South African-backed UNITA insurgents probably have increased fears among all factions that UNITA would win major—and perhaps decisive—victories if the Cubans departed.

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In addition to the UNITA threat, dos Santos's uneasy position in the divided regime inhibits him from reaching a decision on a Cuban withdrawal. Although the President recently appears to have strengthened his position somewhat through personnel changes in the government and the ruling party, his freedom of action is still limited.

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Dos Santos has to contend with the continuing influence of the hardliners and of a more moderate black nationalist group that is larger than the hardline faction but lacks outside backing. Moscow and Havana probably are encouraging the hardliners to resist a Cuban withdrawal, which would be widely viewed as a setback for the USSR.

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Insurgent Gains

Luanda currently is preoccupied with the continued pressure from UNITA's forces. Major guerrilla gains during a rainy season offensive between November and April have been followed by further successes in several parts of the country.

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In the north, which is outside UNITA's traditional areas of operation, the insurgents are trying to gain control of a stretch of territory running north between Malange and Saurimo to the Zairian border. They hope to undermine Luanda's control of the economically important northeast.

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[Redacted]

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The guerrillas have been increasing raids and sabotage operations in this region. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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The guerrillas also continue to attack population centers and transportation links in central Angola, long a major area of UNITA activity. A number of government positions, including the key provincial capital of Huambo, remain isolated. [Redacted]

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In the past month the insurgents reportedly have overrun several towns north of Huambo. They have not yet engaged major Cuban units, however, and they have not attacked heavily defended main garrisons manned by Cuban troops. [Redacted]

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Optimism in Pretoria

The insurgents' gains have encouraged a belief among a growing number of influential South African officials that UNITA can win the war without a Cuban withdrawal. The chief of the South African police recently said that Savimbi "could take it all" in the next three months. [Redacted]

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The South Africans probably are overly optimistic about UNITA's ability to defeat the Cubans, at least in the short term. Nonetheless, UNITA's recent successes suggest that Pretoria has increased its already substantial material assistance to the insurgents. [Redacted]

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Luanda's Alternatives

With the hardliners in Luanda apparently continuing to hold a veto power over key decisions, the regime has shown little inclination to negotiate with UNITA. Although Savimbi continues to assert that he favors negotiations aimed at establishing a coalition regime, his military successes may lead him to demand tougher terms for a settlement. [Redacted]

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The Angolan Government, despite its apparent unwillingness to pursue a settlement with UNITA, clearly is anxious to obtain relief from the array of military and economic pressures it faces. One alternative in which it has shown interest is a limited disengagement pact with South Africa. [Redacted]

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Such an arrangement would involve a withdrawal of South African, Cuban, and Namibian guerrilla forces from southern Angola. Although it was the subject of Angolan-South African talks at Cape Verde in December and February, no agreement was reached. [Redacted]

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Luanda probably anticipates that, under a disengagement agreement, Cuban and Angolan forces now tied down in defensive positions near the South African-occupied zone in southern Angola could be transferred to other areas of the country where UNITA is more active. Nonetheless, Pretoria's own awareness of this possibility—coupled with its growing optimism about UNITA's military prospects—probably would lead the South Africans to drive a hard bargain in any new talks. 

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