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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday 14 July 1983

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CPAS NID 83-164JX 14 July 1983

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


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| | | | 25X |
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| | CHAD: Government Success at Abeche | | |
| | The capture of Abeche yesterday is the success in two months, but the long-term as Libyan-backed dissidents. | | 25X |
| | Chadian officials say that President Hall government forces north of the town are try dissidents. Libyan-supplied arms and vehicles in the state of the same terms are the same terms. | ying to trap the retreating | 25X |
| | with at least one Libyan radio operator. | | 25X1 |
| | | | |
| | Comment: Habre's success at Abeche much-needed encouragement. Nonetheless on French support. | s, he remains dependent | 25X ⁻ |
| | If Mitterrand decides to increase assistant additional advisers or order attacks by the bombers stationed in central Africa. The dicapabilities would not be able to prevent F | eight to 10 Jaguar fighter- ssidents' weak <u>air defense</u> | 25 X |
| | France probably still wants to avoid a c | | 20/(|
| | this point, however, direct intervention by I unlikely. | | 25X |
| | Tripoli probably will send more adviser dissidents. If the dissidents were to dispers | se and begin guerrilla | 20/ |
| | operations, France would be drawn into the indecisive involvement it wants to avoid. | e kind of long and | 25X |
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| ITALY: Political Maneuvering | | |
| Formal negotiations on a new goweek, but Socialist leader Craxi's caminister is gaining momentum. | overnment are not likely until next andidacy for the office of prime | 25X ² |
| The US Embassy believes that I decided to ask Craxi formally to put | | 25X ² |
| Craxi plans to negotiate first wi | | |
| however, Craxi has already begun a leaders of the small parties. | | 25X ² |
| Comment: Craxi's optimism second control of the c | openly expressed the view that the | |
| | | 25X1 |


These Christian Democrats believe that allowing Craxi to be prime minister would permit their party to regroup after its setback in the election. They remain convinced that the next government will have to introduce an unpopular austerity program, and they would like Craxi to bear the onus for it.

Although the odds seem to be in Craxi's favor, his ambitions could be thwarted again. Republican leader Spadolini has announced that his party would refuse to join a government that failed to make fighting inflation its first priority. Such a decision would not preclude a Socialist-led coalition, but it would reduce the size of the government's majority and make its hold on power more fragile.

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President Amin Gemayel

Ten months into his 6-year presidential term... 42 years old... has activist approach to affairs of state, involved with details of policy... pragmatic.

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Special Analysis

LEBANON-US: President Gemayel's Visit

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| President Gemayel, who arrives in Washington next Tuesday, will give first priority to coordinating a Lebanese-US response to a partial Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He will seek US assurances that the Multinational Force will support Lebanese Army units assigned to areas vacated by the Israelis. Gemayel also will expect the US to propose additional diplomatic initiatives aimed at eventually achieving a complete withdrawal of foreign troops. |
| The Israelis currently are thinning out some of their positions in Lebanon. Tel Aviv probably will not proceed with a partial withdrawal, however, until after Prime Minister Begin's visit to the US late this month. |
| The Israeli pullback from a checkpoint near Beirut last week apparently was intended to test the performance of the Lebanese Army, which occupied the position without incident. Israeli units continue to patrol the area near the checkpoint. |
| The Lebanese Government still has not obtained agreement from the Druze on the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the Shuf region, where Druze and Christian militias continue to clash sporadically. Druze leader Walid Junblatt insists on the withdrawal of Christian militiamen from the area. The leader of the Phalange militia told a US official this week that his forces will not leave the region but that he would not oppose the stationing of Lebanese Army or multinational units in the Shuf. |
| Gemayel probably will argue that any indication of US support for a partial Israeli withdrawal will undermine his government. If Tel Aviv redeploys its forces within Lebanon, sectarian leaders will accuse the central government of acquiescing in the permanent partition of Lebanon. In addition to requesting an expansion of the Multinational Force, Gemayel almost certainly will ask the US to oppose a partial Israeli pullback unless it is linked to a timetable for complete withdrawal. |
| continued |

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Top Secret 25X1 **Concerns About US Resolve** Gemayel is increasingly concerned that the US will lose interest in breaking the stalemate on troop withdrawal. To encourage continued US involvement, he will threaten to abrogate the Lebanese-Israeli 25X1 agreement signed in May. The Lebanese President also may hint that the Lebanese will ask the USSR to intervene with Syria if the US cannot establish an effective dialogue with Damascus. Such suggestions by Gemayel, however, will be largely tactical. He is intent on maintaining good relations with the US. 25X1 **Preparing for Partition** Gemayel may argue that the lack of movement on troop withdrawal will force him to bow to demands that he consolidate Christian control over a truncated Lebanese state. Christian militia leaders claim that the Israelis already have approached them about 25X1 working out arrangements for governing southern Lebanon. If partition of Lebanon were to appear likely, Gemayel probably

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would quietly seek to improve ties with the Israelis. He would ask for their assistance in maintaining control over a Christian Lebanon.

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