



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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OCPAS/CIG



CY# 285

National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday
15 June 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-140JX



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
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President Alvaro Magana

Magana, 57, is a prominent attorney and economist . . . for more than two decades he acted as a behind-the-scenes adviser to presidents and juntas . . . became provisional president in April 1982 . . . he has been an able arbitrator among contending political groups . . . favorably disposed toward the US . . . holds a Master's Degree in economics from the University of Chicago, where he studied during the 1950s.

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
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EL SALVADOR-US: President Magana's Visit

President Magana, who arrives in Washington tomorrow, will cite his political successes as he tries to obtain more US aid.



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The US Embassy reports that Magana will point to the amnesty program, under which nearly 500 political prisoners have been released, as one of his government's foremost accomplishments. Only about 50 guerrillas have turned themselves in, however, and most of them are camp followers. According to the head of the program, the amnesty may be extended beyond its current deadline of 15 July.



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Magana also plans to stress progress on the new constitution. He expects the first draft to be completed within a few days, and the head of the drafting commission believes that the document will be approved by the Assembly by the end of next month. As another sign of progress by his administration, the President will focus on the government's call for a dialogue with the left.



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Defense Minister Vides, who will accompany the President, believes that the delegation will come under fire for lack of progress on cases involving the deaths of US citizens. He also says unfavorable publicity may result from a current campaign by the military to round up prominent leftist supporters.



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Neither Magana nor Vides expects any serious problems during their absence from the country. Nonetheless, both reportedly are anxious not to be away any longer than necessary.



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Comment: A strong showing in Washington would improve Magana's standing among El Salvador's divisive political factions, some of which are rumored to be dissatisfied with his performance. The President's concern that dissident elements will use his absence to intensify criticism is reflected in his desire to return home as soon as possible.



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Magana's difficulties are complicated by increasing concern over the accelerated election timetable. Moreover, the political parties and the military are beginning to grow uneasy as the possibility for talks with the insurgents increases.



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
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HONDURAS-US: Concern About Training Center

Honduras wants a long-term commitment from the US for increased military and economic aid in return for the political risks it is incurring in sponsoring Salvadoran troop training at the US-staffed Regional Military Training Center. [Redacted]

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Honduran Armed Forces Commander Alvarez and Foreign Minister Paz Barnica plan to emphasize in their addresses to the Honduran Congress this week the domestic benefits that may accrue from the new training school. Many Congressional deputies of different persuasions plan an open debate following Paz's presentation today. The principal objection is the danger that Honduras might become more deeply involved in a regional conflict as a result of training foreign troops, especially Salvadorans. [Redacted]

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Meanwhile, plans are being completed for a meeting between the Honduran and Salvadoran Presidents to expedite the resolution of the longstanding border dispute between the two countries. The meeting is tentatively scheduled for some time later this month.

[Redacted]

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Comment: Alvarez is likely to stress to the Congress the benefits that may result from his trip last week to the US, during which he requested compensation in the form of tangible military and economic aid. Nonetheless, Honduran legislators probably will be generally hostile to the decision on the training center [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Tegucigalpa may expect the US to urge the Salvadoran Government to make concessions on the border delineation. A favorable settlement would help reduce widespread opposition to the presence of Salvadoran troops in Honduras. [Redacted]

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LEBANON: Problems in the South

The growing frustration of Lebanese in the south under Israeli occupation presages continued attacks against Israeli forces and difficulties for President Gemayel if he tries to extend government authority over the region. [Redacted]

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In recent weeks there have been numerous demonstrations in the south and attacks on Israeli forces there. Lebanese Shia Muslims, who comprise 80 percent of the region's population, are incensed by what they view as Israel's heavyhanded attempts to extend its influence and by Beirut's seeming indifference. Several Israeli-backed local militias have intimidated area residents into cooperating with Christian militia leader Haddad and Israeli forces. [Redacted]

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Amal—the major Shia political organization—has not officially condoned the violence against Israeli soldiers, but Shia extremists are responsible for many of the attacks. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Palestinian querrillas also are

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responsible for some of the attacks. [Redacted]

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Comment: Southern Lebanese fear that the central government—which historically has neglected the south—will abandon the region to the Israelis. If Tel Aviv withdraws its troops from any part of the area, Gemayel will not easily regain the trust of local residents. [Redacted]

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The southerners will be particularly wary of the Lebanese Army's performance. Many doubt that the Army will disarm local Israeli-backed militias. [Redacted]

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Israel is increasingly frustrated by the violence. The Israelis cannot crack down on the perpetrators, many of whom are Lebanese, without further aggravating tensions. Amal leaders have warned, moreover, that a partial Israeli withdrawal would result in more attacks against Israeli soldiers. [Redacted]

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Soviet Inflexibility

The UN-sponsored indirect talks on Afghanistan resume tomorrow in Geneva, but the chances of major progress are slim. [Redacted]

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Pakistani officials say that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko repeated longstanding demands last week when he met with Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan in Moscow. Gromyko reiterated that Soviet troops cannot be withdrawn until all outside interference has ended, adding that there can be no mention of withdrawals in the draft UN document. He was equally firm in rejecting any change in the regime in Kabul. [Redacted]

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Yaqub was impressed by the difference between Gromyko's remarks and the views of UN officials on progress at the round of talks in Geneva in April. Although Pakistan will ask the Soviets to give dates for a troop withdrawal, the US Embassy in Islamabad believes that Yaqub is going to this round expecting to accomplish little more than to keep the negotiations alive. [Redacted]

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Comment: Moscow's conditions for a political settlement virtually require Soviet troops to remain until there is no more armed opposition to the Marxist regime. Gromyko's refusal to allow mention of withdrawals in the UN draft is an apparent change from earlier Soviet positions. Pakistani and UN officials believed they had already secured this concession from the Soviets in February. [Redacted]

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If the Soviets stand firm on these issues, the dialogue could break down. [Redacted]

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USSR: Chernenko Addresses Party Plenum

General Secretary Andropov opened the Central Committee plenum yesterday, and Politburo member Chernenko delivered the main report on current aspects of the party's ideological and mass political work. Chernenko lauded Andropov's leadership and cited his pronouncements several times. On international affairs, Chernenko criticized US policy as "adventuristic" and asserted the USSR's continued interest in "peaceful coexistence and detente." Domestic themes in the address included the need for discipline among workers and for candor and openness in discussing the problems of Soviet society. [Redacted]

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Comment: Chernenko's report clearly bore the stamp of Andropov's ideas, and the allusion to Andropov's leadership of the party—including a rare reference to his "heading" the nominally collective Politburo—will further strengthen the General Secretary's authority. Chernenko was the logical person to deliver the report because he is the Soviet party secretary overseeing ideological matters, and his renewed prominence after a long absence strengthens the impression of some observers that he might be difficult to remove from the leadership. The plenum probably will hear a concluding address by Andropov today. High-level personnel shifts, which are widely anticipated, are customarily announced without discussion as the last item of business. [Redacted]

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LEBANON: Withdrawal Agreement Approved

The National Assembly's overwhelming vote yesterday approving the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement reflects unusually broad support for the government on the issue, especially among the important Sunni Muslims. Two further steps remain in the ratification process—signature of the resolution by President Gemayel and the exchange of ratification documents with Israel. [Redacted]

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Comment: Gemayel probably will sign the resolution shortly. He may delay the exchange of ratification documents, however, hoping that this would help persuade the US to influence the Israelis to withdraw completely from Lebanon. [Redacted]

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NICARAGUA: Crackdown on the Opposition

The Sandinistas are using the recent expulsion of three US diplomats and continuing insurgent activity as pretexts for tougher measures to quell domestic dissent. Most of the nine people who have been arrested in connection with the alleged plot to assassinate Sandinista leaders are Democratic Conservative Party officials. The US Embassy reports that the Sandinistas also have dismissed a number of dockworkers and have arrested six union leaders to prevent them from joining an independent labor confederation. In addition, the government has confiscated the company of a prominent business leader who formerly headed the Red Cross and who has been an outspoken critic of the junta. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Sandinistas increasingly are portraying anyone not on their side as being against them. Although security officials announced that they were not filing charges against the Conservative Party itself, the Sandinistas have become highly suspicious of it since a party leader joined the insurgents' political leadership last year. [Redacted]

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IRAN-IRAQ: Mediation Efforts Collapse

Attempts by the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council to mediate the war between Iran and Iraq and to resolve the Persian Gulf oilspill issue collapsed last week, according to a senior official of the United Arab Emirates. Iran broke off negotiations and refused to allow mediators to return to Tehran because of Kuwaiti public statements linking the talks to an eventual cease-fire. Iranian spokesmen had warned that the talks had to be confidential and limited to the oilspill problem. In a speech on 4 June, Ayatollah Khomeini ruled out any negotiations. [Redacted]

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Comment: There has never been a consensus in Tehran for peace negotiations, and President Khamenei, Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, and other leaders who favored mediation were undercut by Kuwait's public announcements. Officials in the Persian Gulf states, who were misled by statements from a senior official in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, overestimated Iran's flexibility on negotiations. [Redacted]

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IRAQ: Callup of Kurdish Draftees

The Defense Ministry announced on Sunday that it is resuming the callup of Kurds for military service, including Kurds previously demobilized. This reverses the policy announced last December exempting Kurds from serving in the armed forces. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The exemption of the Kurds from military service was resented by many non-Kurdish conscripts, particularly Shias. [Redacted]

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Comment: The callup probably is part of a larger operation to control the Kurds that Iraq is undertaking with Turkey's cooperation. Baghdad evidently believes it will be easier to control the Kurds if they are in the military, and the Army needs additional men to fill its conscription quotas. Nonetheless, many Kurds already demobilized almost certainly will go into hiding rather than return to their units. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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NETHERLANDS: Catholic Bishops on INF

The pastoral letter issued on Monday by Dutch Catholic bishops opposing deployment of INF and neutron weapons in Western Europe probably will have its greatest impact on Prime Minister Lubbers' Christian Democratic Party, which is divided on the INF issue. The letter also calls on the Soviets to withdraw their intermediate range forces from the European USSR. Press reports say that the letter accepts nuclear weapons in general as a "temporary deterrent" while arms control negotiations continue. 

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Comment: Opponents of INF will stress the letter's apparent rejection of INF regardless of the outcome of arms control talks. Supporters of INF will point to the bishops' conditional acceptance of nuclear weapons in order to argue against any unilateral Dutch actions. The Liberals support deployment and Labor opposes it, and most members of these parties are unlikely to change their positions as a result of the bishops' stand. 

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
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


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EAST GERMANY: Warning to the Peace Movement

The recent expulsions of peace activists to the West show that the regime's tolerance of the most militant nonofficial peace groups is wearing thin. In the last three weeks more than 25 people from the southern city of Jena, including families, have been expelled. Jena's "peace community" is tied less closely to the Lutheran Church and is more active and publicity-conscious than its counterparts elsewhere in the country. US Embassy contacts in the peace movement anticipate a nationwide crackdown late this year as INF deployment begins in West Germany and Luther Year celebrations end. 

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Comment: The expulsions could lead some peace groups to become more militant, which in turn could provoke the regime to take tougher action. The government's actions also probably will intensify divisions in the peace movement because many activists still favor working more quietly within the system. They have little hope, however, that the regime will moderate its policy. 

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Special Analysis**WEST GERMANY: Standing Fast on INF**

The West German Government, with the approach of Chancellor Kohl's trip to Moscow and the initial INF deployments, is increasingly firm and vocal in its support for the dual-track decision on INF and on the US negotiating position in Geneva. Kohl would still prefer an arms control agreement precluding the need for deployments, but he now apparently accepts that progress in the negotiations is unlikely before the first deployments begin. Officials in Bonn remain worried about possible problems in maintaining public order as a result of opposition to the deployments.

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During a major address to the Bundestag last week, Kohl took an unusually strong stance on INF. While indicating his government's interest in arms control and improved relations with the USSR, he blamed the lack of progress in Geneva entirely on Moscow and warned it that threats of countermeasures are useless. Kohl defended the flexibility of the Western negotiating position, asserting that the negotiations are being conducted "seriously and energetically."

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The Chancellor emphasized that consideration of French and British nuclear systems has no place in the Geneva INF talks. Any agreement, he said, has to be verifiable and based on equality of numbers, and no agreement is acceptable that could allow an increased Soviet SS-20 threat in the Far East. Kohl and members of his government probably will press these points during a two-day debate on security issues in the Bundestag beginning today and during the Chancellor's visit to Moscow beginning on 4 July.

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This blunt policy statement followed weeks of conflicting press reports in West Germany and the US about the government's position. Unnamed senior West German Government officials were variously quoted as saying that the government endorsed the informal US-Soviet proposal made last year to limit INF missiles or that Kohl wanted Washington to give him some indication of further Western negotiating flexibility to take to Moscow. Some alleged that Bonn would prefer that the US forgo Pershing II deployments and instead deploy ground-launched cruise missiles in December.

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These statements may have been made to demonstrate that the West Germans want the negotiators to show greater flexibility in Geneva and to test Washington's reactions. Kohl has wanted to avoid

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involving himself in the details of INF issues, and he probably has had differences with the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry is controlled by the Free Democrats and has wanted to examine all possible negotiating approaches. [Redacted]

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Whatever the intent of the statements, they have embarrassed Kohl and caused him to assert himself at a cabinet meeting on 1 June. The Chancellery now might take the lead on INF matters, a move that could help clarify West Germany's position. [Redacted]

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Kohl's resolve on INF probably has been strengthened by:

- His own and Prime Minister Thatcher's election victories.
- Recent affirmations by the Alliance of unity on INF, which Kohl can use to justify his government's policy.
- The Social Democratic Party's retreat on INF in a manner undermining its own credibility.
- Soviet threats of countermeasures, including a possible deterioration in intra-German relations. [Redacted]

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Preparing for Deployments

Bonn appears to be preparing the public for deployments. The media are reporting that site preparations are in progress. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Most West Germans hope to avoid the deployment of additional nuclear weapons in their country, and the government at the least wants the Soviets to be blamed for any failure of the Geneva talks. Officials in Bonn recently expressed concern to US officials that demands might grow to support the informal proposal of last year unless a way can be found to demonstrate that the US consulted the Allies and was not responsible for rejecting the proposal. [Redacted]

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The government probably would agree to any INF accord acceptable to the US. Any agreement precluding the need for Pershing II deployments would be easier to sell to the public and would even have a chance of winning endorsement by the Social Democrats. [Redacted]

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Statements by top officials in Bonn indicate, however, that they believe the deployment schedule has to be maintained. They also favor a mix of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles. The officials believe that West Germany has to deploy some missiles later

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this year to prevent support for deployment from dissipating in other basing countries. [Redacted]

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The Opposition to INF

The government remains nervous about maintaining public order, although the vast majority of West Germans would not sanction violent demonstrations. A few extremist factions probably will try to provoke violence and blockade deployment sites. [Redacted]

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While the problem appears manageable, officials fear that some unpredictable incident—such as the shooting of a demonstrator by police or possibly by US guards—could galvanize opposition to INF. They also are concerned because the government's legitimacy could be undermined if it were to crack down too hard on protesters. [Redacted]

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Most West Germans will go along with INF deployments if Italy and the UK also proceed with preparations. They view INF as a test of West Germany's commitment to NATO. [Redacted]

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A poll conducted since the election in March shows that a large majority now is more concerned about other issues. Another poll shows that, if another election were held now, Kohl's Christian Democratic Union would do even better than in March, despite its staunch support for the NATO decision. [Redacted]

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The Social Democratic Party now appears certain to oppose INF deployments in the absence of an agreement in Geneva. The vehemence with which some Social Democrats oppose INF is partly motivated by sentiment against the US administration and by the frustrations of being members of a party in disarray. [Redacted]

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The Social Democratic Party, however, is damaging its own credibility through its haphazard retreat from the security policy of former Chancellor Schmidt. It has become vulnerable to charges of being anti-US and less than firm in its commitment to NATO. [Redacted]

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