




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


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National Intelligence Daily

*Tuesday
7 June 1983*

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7 June 1983

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
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Beirut's Tactics

Beirut is trying to increase Arab pressure on Syria to accept the Lebanese-Israeli troop withdrawal agreement, but if this tactic fails President Gemayel will look again to the US to obtain Syrian and PLO cooperation on withdrawal. [redacted]

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Lebanon is suggesting publicly that it will soon call for an Arab summit on the accord. Gemayel knows that moderate Arab states would be reluctant to participate in a summit because it would reveal their disunity on several issues. To avoid this, he hopes they will put more pressure on Damascus. [redacted]

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Beirut believes that parliamentary ratification of the agreement will place the Lebanese in a better position to negotiate with Syria and the PLO on troop withdrawal. The parliament began committee debate on the agreement yesterday, and officials expect the issue to come to a vote during the next two weeks. [redacted]

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Comment: The government is confident that a majority in the parliament will favor the withdrawal pact. Gemayel probably will then ask Syria and the PLO to withdraw their forces once the agreement is ratified. [redacted]

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Syria is unlikely to respond positively to Lebanon's pressure campaign unless it is accompanied by Lebanese and US concessions. Beirut's actions probably are designed to convince the US that it is doing all it can to produce a Syrian and PLO pullback. [redacted]

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The Lebanese almost certainly believe that at least a partial Israeli withdrawal is likely some time this summer. After that, Beirut would expect Western countries to emphasize their commitment to Lebanon's security by expanding the size and deployment of the Multinational Force. [redacted]

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If the Israelis do not withdraw, the Lebanese Government believes that at least a limited Syrian-Israeli conflict is likely in the Bekaa Valley. Some Lebanese officials probably would welcome such a conflict and would expect the Israelis to push the Syrians out of Lebanon. [redacted]


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EL SALVADOR: Military Developments

The insurgents destroyed two important government communications stations serving eastern El Salvador during the past week. [Redacted]

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A guerrilla broadcast says saboteurs destroyed a microwave and satellite communications complex on San Miguel Volcano in a raid on Sunday. It claims that 15 of 60 government troops guarding the station were killed. Long-distance telephone, telex, and television communications have been disrupted. [Redacted]

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Earlier last week insurgents in Morazan Department overran a government outpost and destroyed a military communications station at Cerro Cacahautique. Some 40 government soldiers were killed or captured in that battle. Army reinforcements retook the destroyed facility on Saturday after heavy fighting. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Comment: Strategic communications apparently have become priority targets for the guerrillas, along with bridges and electric power facilities. In both recent attacks, the guerrillas have been able to overwhelm isolated garrisons by delaying reinforcements with ambushes. Government units continue to be stretched thin trying to defend economic targets, leaving them vulnerable to surprise attack by superior forces. [Redacted]

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USSR: Andropov's Statements on Arms Issues

Arms issues were prominent in General Secretary Andropov's speech yesterday at a dinner for visiting Finnish President Koivisto. Andropov praised Helsinki's longstanding proposal for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone and reiterated Moscow's willingness to consider unspecified "substantial measures" regarding Soviet territory adjoining the zone and to make the Baltic Sea a nuclear-free area. He also reaffirmed the USSR's determination to take steps in response to INF deployments, both against the countries in which the missiles are deployed and against the US. [Redacted]

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Comment: Andropov's proposals are not new and fall short of previous and more specific Soviet offers on a Nordic nuclear-free zone. In early March, for example, General Staff arms spokesman General Chervov said publicly that the USSR would be willing to withdraw its six ballistic missile submarines in the Baltic as part of an agreement on a denuclearized Nordic region. The speech appears aimed at assuaging the concern of Nordic governments about Soviet submarine operations in the area and exploiting anti-INF sentiment in Western Europe. [Redacted]

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
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African National Congress Terrorist Operations, 1981-6 June 1983



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Special Analysis

SOUTH AFRICA: Shift in the ANC's Strategy

The recent car bombing in Pretoria and the discovery of a similar bomb earlier last month in Durban may indicate a change in the African National Congress's policy of avoiding civilian casualties. Pretoria probably will respond by adopting more stringent internal security measures and intensifying its attacks against locations in neighboring countries suspected of harboring ANC personnel. [Redacted]

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The ANC was established in 1912, and it initially sought change through legal political action and nonviolent civil disobedience. When it was outlawed in 1960, it formed a military wing and began a low-level sabotage campaign against symbols of apartheid. Several years later the government crippled the movement by imprisoning many of its leaders. [Redacted]

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Other leaders went into exile to rebuild the group. The military wing recruited thousands of young blacks fleeing South Africa after the Soweto riots in 1976 and renewed its "armed propaganda" campaign. [Redacted]

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The ANC's Communist ties are extensive. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The pro-Soviet South African Communist Party has members in many ANC leadership positions. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Limited Terrorist Attacks

The insurgents in recent years have pursued an "armed propaganda" campaign designed primarily to improve the ANC's standing with blacks and to focus international attention on the grievances of blacks. The ANC most often attacked energy and

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[Redacted]

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transportation targets but also struck government buildings and security personnel and facilities. To increase the impact of its attacks, the ANC frequently has scheduled them near historic dates, including 16 June—the anniversary of the Soweto riots. [Redacted]

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The ANC's operational restraint reflected its leaders' fear that it might not survive a major South African counterattack. A survey of ANC literature suggests that it carefully avoided inflicting civilian casualties in order to be included eventually in talks as a "responsible" representative of black interests in South Africa. The moderate strategy helped the ANC win international political support, particularly from West European countries and from the UN. [Redacted]

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This policy of restraint has been a contentious issue within the ANC for years. Some black nationalists, who resent white Communist control of the military wing, have advocated more aggressive terrorist tactics, [Redacted]

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Tactical Shift

The South African raid on Maseru last December, in which about 30 ANC personnel were killed, probably was the most important single factor that could have prompted a shift in tactics. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The ANC presumably also has been worried about the South Africans' recent dialogues with neighboring states, on which it relies for support. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Implications

Pretoria probably would respond to a bloody campaign by trying to eliminate suspected ANC members and sympathizers, particularly

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among South Africa's fledgling black labor movement. Rising terrorist violence would make it more difficult for Prime Minister Botha to win approval for his controversial constitutional reform proposals in a referendum for white voters slated for some time during the next year. The proposals would grant limited political rights only to Coloreds and Indians, but many Afrikaners fear that such a move would become a first step to eventual black rule. [Redacted]

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Pretoria also would order additional attacks against neighboring states that it believes are assisting the ANC. It has issued public warnings to these states. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Pretoria will continue to try to intimidate the guerrillas and their supporters and to reassure South African whites. [Redacted]

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