



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday  
1 June 1983*

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
**SYRIA-LEBANON-ISRAEL: Syria Reduces Alert**

*Syrian forces have reduced their alert status since their command and control exercise ended Saturday, but they remain at a higher-than-normal level of readiness.* 


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A decree ratifying the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal accord was scheduled to be submitted to the Lebanese parliament yesterday. Assad remains opposed to the accord, and his efforts to block Lebanese parliamentary approval could extend the debate to more than a week. 


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Assad flew to Libya yesterday for talks with Libyan leader Qadhafi. 


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**Comment:** Despite reports of greater Syrian readiness, the likelihood of conflict has been temporarily reduced. The increased Palestinian guerrilla activity in Lebanon that has resulted in the death of eight Israeli soldiers this month, however, could still provoke Israeli retaliation. 


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Submitting the Lebanese-Israeli accord to parliament is risky for President Gemayel because it gives Syria an opening to disrupt Lebanese domestic politics. It also could lead to defeat of the resolution. 

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Gemayel probably would not put the agreement to the parliamentary test unless he were confident that it would be approved. The extraordinary powers granted to the Lebanese Government by the parliament suggest that parliamentary approval of the accord may not be required, but it would help legitimize the agreement and strengthen Gemayel's domestic position. 

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Assad's trip to Tripoli is probably designed to emphasize to the Saudis and the US that he is not alone in rejecting the Lebanon-Israel accord. 

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**The Bases Compensation Package**

	1983 Agreement	1979 Agreement
Period covered	1985-89	1980-84
Duration of negotiations	April-May 1983	1975-79

*Million US \$*

Economic support	475	200
Military assistance	125	50
Military sales credits	300	250
<b>Total commitment</b>	<b>900</b>	<b>500</b>
Grant component	600	250

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**PHILIPPINES-US: Review of Bases Agreement**

*Philippine and US officials have completed the review of the Military Bases Agreement after less than two months of unexpectedly smooth preparatory negotiations.* [Redacted]

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Under the agreement signed in Manila today, the Philippines will receive \$900 million in compensation, an 80-percent increase over the agreement of 1979. The grant component will more than double, in line with Manila's demands. [Redacted]

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Unhampered US operation of the bases, however, is assured. Manila has moderated hardline demands on access to sensitive areas of the US facilities. Potentially troublesome issues, including labor relations on the bases, have been relegated to other negotiating panels and will be dealt with in the coming months. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** In 1979 protracted and contentious negotiations were required to produce an agreement. This year President Marcos moderated demands by military hardliners throughout the talks and played a personal role in reaching a compromise on the size of the compensation package. [Redacted]

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The quiet settlement of most issues in private channels also has effectively foiled plans by radical and moderate opponents of the government to exploit the negotiations by appealing to Philippine nationalism. There was little criticism of Marcos or of Manila's relationship with Washington during the negotiations. The sizable compensation package probably will enable Marcos to undercut any grumbling. [Redacted]

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**TURKEY: Political Party Banned**

*The military government has dissolved the recently formed rightwing Great Turkey Party and has barred its founding members from politics.* [Redacted]

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The move comes only two weeks after the generals lifted the ban on political party activity, which they had imposed soon after coming to power in September 1980. The government's decree accuses the party's leaders of trying to revive the banned Justice Party and places some of the founding members and supporters, including former Prime Minister and Justice Party chief Demirel, under house arrest. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The decree does not affect Turgut Sunalp's Nationalist Democracy Party or Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party. They will compete for the conservative vote in the general election scheduled for 6 November. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The generals know that Demirel still commands a substantial following. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Domestic reaction to the move is likely to be muted. The council also has banned any discussion of the action. The generals, however, are likely to come under heavy criticism in Western Europe. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Felix Houphouet-Boigny**

78, has ruled for 23 years . . .  
an accomplished and pragmatic  
politician . . . has a self-assurance  
born of years of experience . . .  
steeped in French culture.

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**IVORY COAST-US: Houphouet-Boigny's Visit**

*President Houphouet-Boigny's major objective during his official visit to Washington beginning next Tuesday will be to reaffirm his country's close ties with the US and to seek assurances that the US remains committed to protecting its friends in the Third World from Soviet and Libyan subversion.* [redacted]

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**Comment:** Houphouet probably will urge greater Western economic assistance to moderate African states as the most effective way to stem outside meddling. The US Embassy reports Houphouet is increasingly concerned that economic and political instability in West Africa, especially in neighboring Ghana, could provide new opportunities for Moscow and Tripoli to exploit, and the resulting disturbance could spill over into Ivory Coast. [redacted]

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Although Houphouet generally supports US policy in southern Africa, he may urge that Namibian independence not be linked to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Most Ivorians would prefer a radical black regime in Windhoek over a continuation of white rule. [redacted]

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The President also is likely to raise anew the need for improved terms of trade for commodity producers, in particular better prices for Ivory Coast's exports of coffee and cocoa. He believes the free market operates to the detriment of developing countries because of the market strength and financial control of developed states. [redacted]

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The Ivorian leader appears especially interested in strengthening ties with Washington at a time when his country is coping with its most severe recession since independence was gained in 1960. The government has had to respond forcibly to occasional outbreaks of public unrest to demonstrate its resolve to carry out austerity measures. [redacted]

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France is Abidjan's major source of aid, trade, and investment, but Paris has its own economic problems and younger Ivorians want to reduce the paternalistic influence of the French. As a result, Houphouet views the US as an increasingly important source of assistance. [redacted]

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Houphouet will not allow differences over specific economic issues to interfere with his country's strong relationship with the US. He almost certainly will continue to work with the US and the leaders of French-speaking African countries to try to contain conflicts and reduce radical influence in the region. [redacted]

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**WARSAW PACT: Defensive Use of Chemical Agents**

*Warsaw Pact countries evidently continue to believe that chemical warfare agents can play an important role in defensive as well as offensive combat situations.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the wartime missions of Warsaw Pact chemical warfare units still include the intensive contamination of terrain with chemical agents. [Redacted] such concentrated applications would be used in defensive tactical situations. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] a chemical warfare company in support of a FROG rocket battalion in Poland has a mission of terrain contamination. In order to help cover the retreat of the battalion, the company would chemically contaminate the area through which enemy forces would have to advance. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] three battalions in the Romanian Army are equipped to lay down chemical barriers using spray devices to apply a thick layer of liquid contaminants in a 10-meter-wide strip. The Romanians have nerve agents and blistering agents. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Warsaw Pact doctrine has long provided for both offensive and defensive use of chemical agents, delivered primarily by missiles, rocket and cannon artillery, and aircraft. The use of these agents in a defensive role could seriously impede NATO counteroffensive operations. [Redacted]

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Chemical warfare defensive systems in NATO may be vulnerable to highly concentrated ground contamination and aerosols. Liquid chemical agents would severely test the protection afforded by NATO charcoal-fiber garments, which are designed for protection against low concentrations of chemical agents. [Redacted]

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If NATO forces have to operate in heavily contaminated terrain, they will first have to give priority to decontaminating the area. This would substantially reduce NATO mobility and would give Warsaw Pact forces more time to reorganize. [Redacted]

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
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**USSR: Chernenko Reappears**

Politburo member Chernenko made his first public appearance since 30 March during ceremonies in Moscow yesterday for his deceased Politburo colleague, Arvid Pelshe. Western correspondents had been told earlier that Chernenko had been ill but was back at work. A party newspaper editor told the US Embassy last week that Chernenko would address a Central Committee plenum on ideology this month and that General Secretary Andropov would deliver a concluding statement. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** As long as Chernenko retains his seats on the Politburo and Secretariat, he is a potential alternative to Andropov. A review of Chernenko's most recent book in *Pravda* on 24 May implies that the worker discipline campaign, which is associated with Andropov, had been overdone. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] His appearance and the continuing signs of respect that he received in the press while absent suggest that he is prepared to play a vigorous political role. [Redacted]

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**Younger Soviet Leaders**

**Full Members of Politburo**



Mikhail Gorbachev  
Age 52  
Party Secretary  
for Agriculture



Geydar Aliyev  
Age 60  
First Deputy Premier




Grigoriy Romanov  
Age 60  
Leningrad Party Chief

**Candidate Members of Politburo**



Eduard Shevardnadze  
Age 54  
Georgian Party Chief



Vladimir Dolgikh  
Age 58  
Party Secretary  
for Industry



Nikolay Ryzhkov  
Age 53  
Party Secretary  
for Economic Planning



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## Special Analysis

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### USSR: The Next Generation of Leaders

*General Secretary Andropov is 68 and has heart problems. If he should die soon, virtually the same group of senior leaders who selected him last November would meet to choose his replacement. The most powerful members of this group also are the oldest, and the next leader would likely be of their generation. The senior leaders could easily dominate the ruling group for another five years, but they will continue to look to the more junior leaders for allies.*

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In the middle ground between the seniors and the juniors, the most powerful and able individual seems to be Vladimir Shcherbitskiy. At 65, however, time is running out on his chances to make it to the top.

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Shcherbitskiy, as the party chief of the Ukraine, is a full member of the Politburo. Nonetheless, he needs to move to a post in Moscow, which would allow him to keep his Politburo seat while he waits for those senior to him to leave the scene.

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### Six Candidates

Only six of the 22 Politburo, candidate Politburo, and Secretariat members are less than 65. Of this group, the 52-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev seems to be in the best position to assume the top post eventually.

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As a full Politburo member, Gorbachev helps make national policy. As a secretary, he administers its execution and selects key personnel.

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Although Gorbachev has spent much of his career as an agricultural manager and currently supervises the Food Program, his dual leadership posts give him political influence beyond his seeming limitations. Andropov apparently has given Gorbachev strong support at a recent meeting of all the party's regional secretaries. He might try to maneuver Gorbachev into position as his successor, but may not live long enough to do so.

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Nikolay Ryzhkov, 53, became a secretary without ever having served in a party post, but Andropov chose him to make an extensive study of national economic problems. This is an even broader

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assignment than the one Gorbachev assumed for agriculture, and it might presage his elevation to the Politburo. [redacted]

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Vladimir Dolgikh, 58, is a candidate Politburo member and the secretary who supervises the industrial sector. His political strength is unclear, but he could eventually take his place among the most powerful members of the leadership. [redacted]

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Grigoriy Romanov, 60, is party boss in Leningrad and a full Politburo member. He is openly ambitious and reportedly is personally disliked by some of his colleagues. It is past time for him to be given a new assignment, and his future is difficult to predict. [redacted]

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Geydar Aliyev, 60, may have risen as high as he can go as a full Politburo member and as a first deputy premier. Unlike Andropov, Aliyev was a career KGB professional and his colleagues may thus view him as a threat. Slavic members of the leadership might look down on Alyev's Azerbaydzhani background. [redacted]

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Eduard Shevardnadze, 55, is the vigorous and able party leader of Georgia, but he may have to live down the appearance of having sided with Secretary Chernenko before Andropov took over. He is a candidate Politburo member, but he also may be handicapped by ethnic prejudices and his regional isolation. [redacted]

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All six of these younger men have had careers that put them in charge of large party entities or major regional economic or agricultural undertakings—or both. They thus have more in common with such former leaders as Khrushchev and Brezhnev—or with Shcherbitskiy—than with Andropov, Chernenko, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko. [redacted]

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Under Brezhnev, local leaders were promoted up through the ranks without transferring them to other areas; consequently, the current generation of junior leaders lacks the wide experience their predecessors acquired. [redacted]

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**Career Path for Newcomers**

New appointments to the Politburo are unlikely until incumbents die or are otherwise removed. There is a standard set of other jobs that qualify their holders for a seat on the Politburo, but almost all of those positions are already filled. [redacted]

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The Secretariat probably is the best staging area for younger leaders to join the leadership group and eventually move into the Politburo. Yegor Ligachev, 58, a former regional party secretary, who recently was appointed chief of the party personnel department, is a candidate for a secretaryship. [redacted]

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There also could be other appointments to the Secretariat from the large number of regional party secretaries. Such recruitments have traditionally been the prime source of a general secretary's strength. [Redacted]

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**The Generational Difference**

The outlook of the leadership cannot fail to be changed by the addition of younger men. Even today there is a substantial difference between the experiences of the majority—the seniors—and the handful of those in their fifties. [Redacted]

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Of the current leaders, only one had joined the party during the civil war. Two others, including Ustinov, joined in 1927 during the height of Stalin's struggle with Trotsky. [Redacted]

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Gromyko and Chernenko joined in 1931, as millions of peasants were forced into collective farms, sent to prison camps, or died as a result of famine. Andropov and six others joined the party in 1939, while Premier Tikhonov joined in 1940. [Redacted]

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Thus, the three men who represent the postwar generation in the current leadership—Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, and Shevardnadze—were small children or had not yet been born when most of the others had experienced revolution, civil war, the purges, and the German invasion. Ryzhkov joined the party in 1956, when Khrushchev delivered his secret denunciation of Stalin. [Redacted]

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As other younger men move into the leadership circle, the struggles and dangers of the Stalin period will have personal relevance to fewer people. The newcomers may not have a Stalinist conception of the US as a capitalist "colossus" intent on destroying their country, but their memories will tend more and more to include only the period since the USSR became a superpower. [Redacted]

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The next generation of leaders will for a time arrive with narrower career experiences than the current generation has. The junior leaders now in place are former regional managers, not the foreign affairs professionals who serve as staff for Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Chernenko. [Redacted]

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These leaders, and those who come after them, will have a clear view of Soviet military power—and a set of values and attitudes that will cause them to insist on preserving and increasing that power. While it is not known at this stage how firmly their views are set, the younger leaders probably will be even less flexible and more assertive than their predecessors. [Redacted]

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
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### Special Analysis

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#### VIETNAM-ASEAN-KAMPUCHEA: Diplomatic Maneuvering

*Vietnam is increasing its efforts to obtain international support for its policies toward Kampuchea. There are tentative signs that these moves may lead ASEAN to adopt a more flexible strategy on Kampuchea that would counter possible criticism that it is the intransigent party in the conflict. Although neither Hanoi nor ASEAN appears ready to make major changes in its approaches toward Kampuchea, each side will continue testing the other for signs of genuine shifts in policy.*



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The major dry season fighting in Kampuchea has ended, and Hanoi has moved quickly to follow up its military successes with diplomatic gains. To underscore the strength of their military position, the Vietnamese are heavily publicizing a limited troop withdrawal now under way and have agreed to consider a Thai proposal that Vietnamese troops be pulled back 30 kilometers from the Thailand-Kampuchea border.



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Hanoi also has renewed its longstanding invitation to Thailand's Foreign Minister Siddhi to visit Hanoi for discussions on Kampuchea, and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach is scheduled to visit the Philippines early this month. Senior Thai officials say Thach has asked to call on Siddhi, who will meet him next week. The US Embassy in Canberra reports the Vietnamese also have indicated a willingness to receive Australia's Foreign Minister to discuss Kampuchea.



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In addition, Hanoi is probing for weak spots in ASEAN unity. Behind the scenes, Vietnam is dangling new hints of flexibility before Malaysia and Indonesia—the two ASEAN states it believes are most susceptible to a solution in Kampuchea that does not involve a total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.



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Despite these moves, there are still no signs that Vietnam is willing to negotiate except on terms involving recognition of the regime it supports in Phnom Penh and the maintenance of a Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. There also is no evidence of a real change in Vietnam's military posture in Kampuchea. The troops

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that have been withdrawn were located in an area of only sporadic resistance activity, and some have already been replaced by Kampuchean troops. [Redacted]

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**ASEAN Reactions**

Hanoi's moves are prompting ASEAN to reevaluate its strategy toward Kampuchea and demonstrate more tactical flexibility. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Limited Flexibility**

There are limits on ASEAN's willingness to soften its tactics toward Hanoi. ASEAN has emphasized that a final settlement would have to conform to UN resolutions calling for a complete Vietnamese withdrawal. As a result, the current diplomatic maneuvering is not likely to lead to fundamental changes in ASEAN policy toward Kampuchea, including its support to the resistance. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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