



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

~~Top Secret~~




OCPAS/CIG



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# National Intelligence Daily

*Tuesday  
31 May 1983*

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
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
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**EL SALVADOR: Terrorist Campaign**

*The largest and most radical of the five Salvadoran antigovernment factions may be stepping up its terrorist tactics.*

[Redacted]

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The Popular Liberation Front has claimed responsibility for the assassination of Commander Schaufelberger in San Salvador last week.

[Redacted]

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guerrillas executed a number of government soldiers who surrendered during an insurgent attack on a bridge in San Vicente Department last week. More than 40 of the 82 defenders reportedly died as a result of the attack.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Front may be seeking revenge for the deaths of its two top leaders in Managua last month. The insurgents publicly blamed the US for the killings, although reports indicate an internal feud led to the murders. After the deaths, the Front apparently murdered several captured soldiers after taking Cinquera in central El Salvador.

[Redacted]

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By killing the US adviser, the insurgents probably hope to bring new attention to the US military presence in El Salvador and stimulate opposition in the US to any increase. They may attempt similar killings in Honduras, where the US plans to send more advisers in conjunction with the opening of a new center that will train Salvadoran units in counterinsurgency tactics.

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**CHAD: Dissident Attack Expected**

*Chadian Government officials are concerned about the threat of direct Libyan support to the northern dissidents.*




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Senior officials continue to expect a major attack before the anniversary of President Habre's takeover on 7 June. They are not confident that government forces can hold the northern outposts of Faya-Largeau and Fada if the rebels strike with Libyan air support. Habre's efforts to defend the north continue to be frustrated by logistic problems and lack of adequate training for his troops, according to the US Embassy.



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**Comment:** Government forces should be able to repel a rebel attack unless it is effectively supported by direct Libyan air and ground forces. The dissidents have so far shown no desire to move against government outposts. If they do attack, Habre's troops probably will attempt to ambush them in the open desert—a tactic at which his troops are skilled and experienced.



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**INDIA-PAKISTAN: Troubled Relations**

*India's Foreign Minister goes to Islamabad tomorrow for the first meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission, but neither side expects much progress.* [Redacted]

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Relations between the two countries have dipped since the Joint Commission was established last March. New Delhi has been annoyed over press coverage in Pakistan of the massacre of Muslims in Assam, and the Indian press has accused Pakistan of providing arms and training to Sikh secessionists in Punjab. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, campaigning for elections in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, repeated earlier charges that Pakistan might start another war with India. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Comment:** Gandhi is nervous about the recent violence in Assam and Punjab and probably is using the "Pakistan threat" to consolidate domestic support and to warn Islamabad against assisting Sikh extremists. If India raises the issue of interference, Pakistan will counter with charges of Indian assistance to Al-Zulfikar terrorists. [Redacted]

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Both sides will try to maintain the appearance of better relations at their meeting, but neither will give ground on major issues. [Redacted]

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**POLAND: Party Plenum**

Polish hardliners could touch off some heated debate at the Central Committee plenum today, although they are unlikely to damage party chief Jaruzelski's position seriously. A long overdue session on divisive ideological questions had been scheduled for mid-May, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Since the Soviet journal *New Times* published criticism of Polish moderates early this month, there has been frequent speculation in Poland that Jaruzelski's policies and even his party position are under increased attack. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The plenum is not likely to ease the frustrations of hardliners who believe Jaruzelski has been too lenient with the regime's opponents and has paid too little attention to party affairs. Although there could be some personnel changes, Soviet and domestic criticism may force Jaruzelski to postpone moving additional military men into significant party positions. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**USSR: Death of Politburo Member**

Arvid Pelshe, who died on Sunday, had been Chairman of the Party Control Committee since 1966 and helped to bring the Baltic area under Soviet rule. His job was to oversee the party's disciplinary apparatus and review the cases of those punished or purged. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** General Secretary Andropov could enhance his disciplinary program and his authority in the party by replacing Pelshe with a vigorous ally. Some Politburo members probably would see such a move as contrary to their interests, however, and might prefer to entrust the party control post to an elder as has been past practice. The replacement for Pelshe could be announced at the Central Committee plenum that is expected in about two weeks. [Redacted]

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
**CANADA: New Tack on Disarmament Policy**

Prime Minister Trudeau's reported objections to language in the Williamsburg Summit arms policy statement exempting British and French nuclear forces from consideration at the Geneva disarmament talks mark an apparent reversal of his previous position, probably in part a recognition of the developing strength of the Canadian peace movement. In a parliamentary debate last month Trudeau was firm in his support for the anti-inclusion positions adopted by the US, UK, and France. Trudeau had sought to appease the Canadian peace movement by demanding that the US be more flexible at Geneva as a prerequisite for Canada's agreement to allow cruise missile testing over its territory. The peace movement, however, has coalesced around the testing issue and, according to the US Embassy, has been inundating the government with mail opposing the tests and urging Ottawa to promote an accord on nuclear arms.

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**Comment:** Trudeau's position at Williamsburg probably is a further attempt to placate the peace movement, this time by giving greater precision to his definition of the necessary degree of US flexibility in the arms negotiations.

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**PERU: Insurgent Attacks in Capital**

Terrorist attacks in Lima on Friday, the second major insurgent action in a week, have forced the government to declare a state of emergency and suspend individual rights for 60 days. The Sendero Luminoso group blacked out much of the capital for over an hour, seized and destroyed a chemical plant worth several hundred million dollars, and placed generally ineffective bombs near numerous other buildings, including the US Embassy and the presidential palace.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] the  
insurgents are proving to be better organized and more potent than generally believed, which will increase the pressure on the government to improve its counterinsurgency effort.

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**BELGIUM-USSR: Expulsion of Soviet Official**

[Redacted] the director of a joint Soviet-Belgian trading company that handles the import and export of computers and electronic components for the USSR has been asked to leave Belgium. He is accused of engaging in espionage aimed at acquiring programs and information affecting industrial and military areas. The company is an organization that engages in the illegal acquisition of embargoed electronics. [Redacted]


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**Comment:** There are about a dozen wholly or partially owned Soviet organizations in Belgium that may operate as conduits for illegally acquired technology. [Redacted] almost 40 percent of the personnel at the Soviet Embassy and in other officially credited agencies are intelligence officers. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**URUGUAY: Constitutional Talks Interrupted**

Military authorities last Friday decided to interrupt the constitutional discussions with the political parties—begun earlier this month—which are a critical phase in the transition to civilian rule scheduled for 1985. The officials gave no reason nor any indication of when the discussions might resume, but more details are expected later. Earlier the regime had closed an antimilitary Blanco Party weekly. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The armed forces probably reacted to reports that the Blancos were considering a postponement of the talks. By taking the initiative, the military reasserted its control over the political process, denied the parties the publicity they would have gained by stopping the talks, and may have forced them to proceed with greater caution. Thus far neither side has demonstrated the flexibility necessary to complete the talks, but restiveness may result if the military fails to announce a resumption in the near future. [Redacted]

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**INDONESIA: Cutbacks in Defense Procurement**

Indonesia has canceled plans to purchase new armored vehicles from France and instead intends to approach the USSR for spare parts for its aging Soviet equipment. Armed Forces Commander Murdani says budgetary constraints—not a desire for improved relations with Moscow—are behind the move. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Indonesia's deteriorating economy has forced it to make large reductions in defense expenditures, and the defense budget this year probably will decline by about 7 percent in real terms. The government recently shelved plans to purchase an advanced fighter aircraft, and the Army Chief of Staff has indicated that only half of the Army's planned acquisitions of equipment this year will be possible. Indonesia will be likely to seek more liberal terms and increased assistance from the US and other foreign arms suppliers. The USSR probably will be willing to provide the parts if they are available. [Redacted]

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**Special Analysis**

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**IRAN-IRAQ: Debate in Tehran on the War**

*Iran evidently is preparing another attack against Iraqi lines amid continuing debate within the Iranian leadership over growing war weariness among the people. Troop recruitment is becoming more difficult, and the military situation argues for limited attacks and a war of attrition. The decisive factor in resolving the debate, however, will be the wishes of Ayatollah Khomeini, who shows no sign of backing away from an aggressive military strategy.*

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Declining Morale**

[Redacted] for the first time small antiwar demonstrations have taken place in cities near the front. [Redacted] war weariness has grown noticeably in the military. [Redacted]

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In recent months desertions and unauthorized retreats from frontline units in combat increasingly have involved Revolutionary Guard and militia personnel, supposedly the regime's most highly committed troops. [Redacted]

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Since mid-1982, moreover, a number of reports suggest the government is having difficulty recruiting troops for the front. Last September Army Commander Shirazi stated that drives for volunteers were faltering [Redacted]

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Late last year high-ranking Revolutionary Guard officers publicly claimed that the lack of volunteers was hampering military operations. Khomeini was forced in November to issue a religious decree making it incumbent on every Iranian to give first priority to volunteering for the front. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Debate Over the War**

Substantial casualties and declining morale have intensified a growing debate over the war among Iranian leaders, but the precise positions of the various leaders is not known. Early this month Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, Khomeini's personal representative on the Supreme Defense Council, stated in a speech to Army officers that Iran would no longer invade Iraq "because the lives of our combatants are more precious than anything else." In March he made a similar point on the need to avoid heavy casualties in explaining the delay in launching an offensive. [Redacted]

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Rafsanjani is the only senior leader to link publicly Iran's high casualties to a change in war strategy. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Rafsanjani is joined by Prime Minister Musavi, Chief of Staff Zahirnezhad, and some senior military officers in arguing against more large-scale offensives. President Khamenei, Rafsanjani's main political rival, also appears to support a different approach to the war. [Redacted]

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Ayatollah Montazeri, who is Khomeini's heir apparent; Commander of the Revolutionary Guard Rezai; and Army Commander Shirazi are likely to prefer a military solution. [Redacted]

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Khomeini, however, will have the final word. There is no sign that he has abandoned his determination to use the war to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. [Redacted] Khomeini recently rejected proposals by a group of Iranian officials favoring an end to the war. [Redacted]

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Rafsanjani asserted in a major speech on 24 May that successful prosecution of the war was Iran's overriding priority. His statement suggests those who favor stopping the fighting again have been forced to back off, at least temporarily. [Redacted]

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**Outlook**

Another offensive could recover small pockets of Iranian territory, but almost certainly will not be able to push deep into Iraq. [Redacted]

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The Iranians also have been unable to develop tactics to break through Iraq's extensive fortifications, and they are unlikely to acquire soon the arms needed to reduce Baghdad's enormous advantage in firepower. [Redacted]

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Iran's last two offensives along the Doveyrich front were cut short after its initial attacks resulted in heavy losses. This pattern is likely to be repeated in any new offensive. [Redacted]

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
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Another defeat would strengthen the arguments of those in the Iranian regime who view the war as a liability. They probably would try again to persuade Khomeini. The Ayatollah is unlikely to approve negotiations to end the war, however, until he becomes convinced that the Iraqis cannot be defeated or that the prolongation of hostilities would threaten the Iranian revolution.



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