



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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*Monday
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PORTUGAL: Progress on Government Formation

Both the Socialist and the Social Democratic Parties have agreed to talks on formation of a government, but they are still divided over the shape and policies of a coalition. 

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A referendum among Socialist Party members last week gave party leader Soares an overwhelming mandate to negotiate the formation of a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party. That party finished second behind the Socialists in the general election last month. The Social Democrats have agreed to talks with the Socialists, but they also intend to open separate negotiations with the conservative Social Democratic Center Party to bring it also into the government. 


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Comment: Debate over participation in a Socialist-led government has divided the Social Democrats. Some have differences with the Socialists over economic policy, and almost all are reluctant to assume responsibility for needed austerity measures. 

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A coalition that included the Social Democratic Center would spread responsibility for belt-tightening measures among all three major parties. Social Democratic Center participation could also swing coalition policies toward Social Democratic views. 

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Soares, however, probably will not want to weaken his hold over the government by including the Social Democratic Center. He probably will argue that a three-power pact would leave the Communists as virtually the only parliamentary opposition, thereby undermining Portuguese democracy. 

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George Price, has been the leader of Belize for over 20 years . . . honest and deeply religious, he studied for the priesthood in the US in the 1930s . . . he has sought US assistance in support of an active drug interdiction and eradication program.

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BELIZE-US: Prime Minister's Visit

Prime Minister Price arrives in Washington this week seeking assurances of US support for Belize's territorial integrity and financial aid for development projects. [Redacted]

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Price's major concern is the threat to Belize's security posed by the unresolved territorial dispute with Guatemala. Negotiations broke down earlier this year, after Guatemala demanded almost one-fifth of Belize's territory. The Prime Minister is worried that an eventual withdrawal of British forces would encourage Guatemalan military adventurism, and he reportedly will ask the US to help the UK maintain its troops in Belize. [Redacted]

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Economic conditions are forcing Price to adopt austerity measures and postpone development projects. He reportedly will request US financial assistance for priority road and electrification improvements. His leadership of the ruling party is being increasingly challenged by conservatives concerned about his desire to increase the role of leftists in the party apparatus. [Redacted]

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Comment: Although Price would like the US to encourage the British to maintain their military presence, he probably does not want US troops stationed in Belize. The Prime Minister generally maintains a neutral foreign policy and probably believes a US presence would jeopardize his policy of noninvolvement in East-West disputes. [Redacted]

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Price is sympathetic to the Sandinistas, but he has refused offers to establish diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. He is unlikely, however, to endorse current US policy in Central America. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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GUATEMALA: Military Reorganization

A fundamental reorganization of the armed forces' command structure apparently is intended to improve counterinsurgency operations and to give regional military commanders more control over local political activities.




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Military zones have been made smaller to improve operational efficiency. Each zone will contain at least one battalion, whose commander will control all Civil Defense Forces, reservists, police, and civilian government officials in the area.



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A new General Staff already exercises operational control over the zones. Security forces, currently under the Ministry of Government, will be shifted to the Ministry of Defense. The detective component of the National Police already has been transferred, resulting in the dismissal of 265 policemen for corruption.



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Comment: In the near term, the reorganization is likely to worsen the shortages of personnel, weapons, and facilities. Streamlining tactical command and control, however, will help the Army expand its presence in the remote Western Highlands and the Petén. This will enable the government to provide more support for priority development projects there.



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The acquisition of authority over additional personnel and programs probably will strengthen the Army's political control. Bringing the Civil Defense Forces under the military, however, should help reduce human rights abuses. It also should help end the misuse of these troops by local politicians and military commissioners.



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THAILAND: New Coalition

Top cabinet positions remain unchanged in Prime Minister Prem's new coalition government. The government consists of the Social Action, Democrat, Thai Citizens, and National Democratic Parties. Prem retains the defense portfolio, and Sitthi Sawetsila stays on as Foreign Minister. 

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Comment: The coalition will command a clear voting majority in parliament, but poor relations among leaders of the member parties will keep the new government factionalized and potentially unstable. The makeup of the new cabinet, however, indicates Prem's desire to leave key government policies unchanged. The Thai Nation Party, which was in the previous government but was eliminated after a failed power play, apparently will form the core of the opposition. 



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CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: Smooth End to Hijacking Talks


Unprecedented consultations between Beijing and Seoul have concluded, and the visiting high-level Chinese delegation is to return home with most of the passengers and crew of China's hijacked airliner. Two injured crew members will remain in South Korea until their health improves, and the jet will be repaired and flown out. South Korea, however, turned aside China's request to extradite the hijackers and plans instead to try them in accordance with international conventions. 

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Comment: Both nations seem satisfied with the results of their first official discussions since the Korean war. Without unduly straining its relations with North Korea, China publicized its concern over hijackers and defectors in gaining quick acceptance by South Korea of international hijacking conventions. South Korea probably sees the cordial outcome as leaving the door open for future contacts with China on such issues as mutual emergency rights for commercial aircraft. 

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SOUTH AFRICA: Parliamentary Byelections

The ruling National Party will be tested in three parliamentary byelections tomorrow. The main issue has been Prime Minister Botha's controversial proposals for constitutional reform that would grant limited political rights to South Africa's Colored and Indian minorities. 

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Comment: All three byelections probably will be decided by narrow margins, but the National Party will retain a clear majority of parliamentary seats whatever the outcome. A strong showing by the Conservative Party, however, would be likely to prompt rightwing Nationalists to question further the wisdom of the reforms Botha presented to Parliament last week. The Prime Minister might modify his proposals or delay pushing them through Parliament, but he would be unlikely to abandon the reforms after investing so much of his energy and credibility in them. If Conservative Party leader Treurnicht is defeated, the party's viability as an alternative for Afrikaners would be threatened. 

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Opium-Growing Areas in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province



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UN-PAKISTAN: Narcotics Control Effort Threatened

The US Embassies in Islamabad and Vienna report district-level Pakistani officials consider the UN-funded rural development project in the poppy growing area of Buner to be a failure. The Executive Director of the UN's Fund for Drug Abuse Control has been told by villagers that little development work has been done and that most of the \$4 million spent on the project so far has gone for administrative overhead. Growers are threatening to renew poppy cultivation unless the project is carried out faster and project officials stop spending money on nondevelopmental activities. Pakistan, particularly Buner subdistrict, is a major source of heroin consumed in the US. [Redacted]

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Comment: Depressed opium prices in Pakistan have made US-funded crop substitution programs more welcome, at least in areas where the government has control or influence. The US rural development project in the neighboring Gadoon subdistrict will become more hazardous to carry out, however, if the hostility of the poppy growers in Buner spreads to the cultivators in Gadoon. [Redacted]

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Key Politburo Members




Yuriy Andropov
Party General Secretary



Mikhail Gorbachev
Agriculture Secretary



Nikolay Tikhonov
Premier



Dmitriy Ustinov
Defense Minister



Konstantin Chernenko
Senior Secretary



Andrey Gromyko
Foreign Minister

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Special Analysis

USSR: Prospects for Leadership Changes

General Secretary Andropov has displayed strong public leadership over the past month, and he now appears to be in a position to arrange high-level personnel changes that are likely to be announced next month at meetings of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet. The removal of Premier Tikhonov through retirement or appointment to the less powerful presidency would give Andropov a chance to improve his standing within the Politburo. Despite the apparent illness and continuing absence from view of Konstantin Chernenko—Andropov's longtime rival for the top party post—Chernenko probably will retain his posts in the Politburo and Secretariat if his health permits and will continue to act as a constraint on Andropov's consolidation of power.

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Andropov's discipline and anticorruption campaign now seems focused on officials at a lower level, leaving ministers and regional party secretaries with less reason for concern. Those changes that have occurred at the higher levels involved transfers or were treated as honorable retirements, while deputy ministers and party officials at lower levels have been dismissed and subjected to party discipline. This tactic appears to be a prudent compromise on Andropov's part.

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In addition to a less threatening approach in his anticorruption campaign at higher levels, Andropov has strengthened his position among the leaders. In a *Pravda* article today, Defense Minister Ustinov referred to Andropov for the first time as Chairman of the Defense Council. This is a post Brezhnev held when he was party chief, but its occupancy has been uncertain since Andropov took over.

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Another move by Andropov involved taking responsibility for the administration of party cadre appointments away from a Brezhnev appointee to the Secretariat and giving it to a junior official from the provinces. Control of this function—and assignment of supporters to key posts—is essential to the establishment of firm leadership. The appointment of someone not beholden to Brezhnev's old guard should benefit the Secretary General.

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Andropov convoked virtually the entire regional party leadership to hear his vigorous reaffirmation of the national food program that the party endorsed a year ago. This action demonstrates a firm

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alliance with Gorbachev, the party secretary responsible for agriculture and a rising power within the party. [REDACTED]

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Andropov still requires periods of rest under medical supervision. Even during these times, he has remained at the political forefront by parceling out written responses to questions from media correspondents and foreign citizens. [REDACTED]

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Future Leadership Assignments

Warsaw Pact attachés in Moscow have said that the vacant post of the President will be filled in mid-June and that Ustinov is a likely candidate. The presidency is an essentially ceremonial position, however, and Ustinov's value as an Andropov ally would be diminished in it. [REDACTED]

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A middle-level Soviet diplomat told a US official that Tikhonov might become president, a move Andropov might prefer because it would open up the premiership, a much more powerful post. The recent promotion of Foreign Minister Gromyko, an ally of Andropov, to First Deputy Premier makes him available to step in as Premier. Andropov also could argue that Ustinov should be Premier as he virtually ran the Soviet economy from 1963 to 1965, managing the allocation of resources to both the defense and civilian sectors. [REDACTED]

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The 78-year-old Tikhonov may simply retire. This would give Andropov two positions to fill, and he might allow Ustinov to assume the presidency if Gromyko is appointed Premier. [REDACTED]

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There are some indications in Ustinov's and Gromyko's ministries that both men might receive higher posts. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev has been promoted to Marshal, marking him for further advancement. He could replace Ogarkov in the number-two position if Ogarkov becomes Defense Minister. [REDACTED]

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Gromyko has stayed on as Foreign Minister even after becoming a First Deputy Premier, but some Soviet officials continue to predict that Ambassador to the US Dobrynin is to become Foreign Minister. There are, however, better placed candidates to succeed Gromyko. In any event, Gromyko wrote of generational change in a recent party journal article in a manner that suggests he may anticipate leaving the supervisory responsibilities of Foreign Minister. [REDACTED]

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Chernenko's Foothold

Chernenko remains a force in Soviet politics as a possible alternative to Andropov, although his current monthlong absence from public view, probably due to illness, may have dissipated some

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of his political strength. All the public signs of respect for Chernenko continue; his signature appears on obituaries, his portrait is in its customary place, and a party periodical has praised his latest book. If he returns to his activities reasonably soon, he would still represent a source of security for Soviet leaders who might wish to resist Andropov's policies. 

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Andropov may eventually succeed in removing Chernenko or in isolating him by promoting newcomers to the leadership. For the present, however, if Chernenko returns to work, Andropov will continue to treat him as a colleague. Andropov may now have become more directly involved in cadre appointments, but Chernenko could still have a strong say in these matters. 

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