




Director of  
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# National Intelligence Daily

*Friday*  
*6 May 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

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
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
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
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**JAPAN: Timing of National Election**

*The debate over the timing of national elections is continuing, although it now appears less likely that Prime Minister Nakasone will call elections for the lower house this summer.*



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Late last month Nakasone publicly denied any intention to force elections.



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
Younger members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party oppose elections this summer because they believe they would be the most vulnerable at the polls.



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**Comment:** Nakasone probably is concerned that the Liberal Democrats would lose some ground but not control of the government.



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The press is speculating that Nakasone may make an announcement at a press conference on Monday, near the end of his current visit to ASEAN countries. Other observers believe Nakasone will wait until after his trip to Washington and Williamsburg in late May because he does not want to represent Japan at the economic summit as head of a lameduck government.



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[Redacted]

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**CHINA: Record Grain Harvest**

*Beijing has announced a record grain harvest for 1982, but the Chinese will still remain active in the international grain market.*

[Redacted]

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The State Statistical Bureau reports grain production during 1982 reached 353 million tons, up 9 percent from 1981 and surpassing the previous record set in 1979. Total agricultural output for the year rose 11 percent. The Bureau attributes this success to good weather as well as to new policies linking peasant income to production.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Agriculture has become the showcase for Beijing's new economic policies, which have helped peasants produce bumper harvests over the past four years. The report shows grain production exceeding the goal for 1982 by 20 million tons and far outstripping population growth. In contrast, the Bureau reports a lackluster performance by the rest of the economy.

[Redacted]

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Beijing's planners appear worried about the possibility of poor weather and the long-term effects of the liberal policies that have encouraged large acreages to be shifted to more profitable industrial crops. They are calling for more acreage to be sown to grain this year.

[Redacted]

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Despite the record harvest, grain imports in 1983 probably will approach the record level in 1982 of 14.5 million tons. The US is likely to remain the largest single supplier.

[Redacted]

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**LEBANON: Christian Areas Shelled**

Official Lebanese Government sources claim the shelling yesterday of Christian areas north of Beirut originated in part from Syrian-occupied Duhur ash Shuwayr. Targets included Al Judaydah, Ad Dubayyah, Juniyah, and several inland villages of the Kasrawan district. The US Embassy believes that only Syrian batteries—or those of Syria's allies such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party—have the range to hit these areas. The shelling of the coast was preceded by heavy artillery duels between Druze and Phalange forces in the Shuf and Alayh districts, which spilled over into East and West Beirut. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The extent of Syria's responsibility for the shellings is unclear, but Damascus could have initiated the incidents to maintain pressure on the Lebanese. The Syrians reiterated their tough position in discussions with Foreign Minister Salem on Monday. They may have decided that a stalemate in the talks is preferable to any agreement that results in less than a total Israeli withdrawal. [redacted]

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**CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: Response to Hijacking**

China, in a surprise move yesterday, announced that a delegation headed by the Director of Civil Aviation will visit Seoul to request the handing over of the hijackers of a Chinese passenger plane. This will be the first time a Chinese official has paid a public visit to South Korea since the Korean war. Seoul has already privately assured Beijing through the US that it will abide by international conventions, which require the return of the plane and either the return of the hijackers or their prosecution. China has requested US as well as Japanese intervention with South Korea to resolve the matter. [redacted]

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**Comment:** This is the first successful hijacking in China, although there were at least two attempts in the past year. Beijing's reaction, which will annoy P'yongyang, demonstrates its determination to halt future hijackings. If South Korea decides to keep the hijackers, it could jeopardize prospects for future bilateral contacts with China and possibly add a new irritant to Sino-US relations. Seoul nevertheless will welcome the opportunity to add to its diplomatic stature by holding discussions with P'yongyang's closest supporter. [redacted]

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
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
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
**SOUTH AFRICA-MOZAMBIQUE: Bilateral Talks**

Pretoria announced yesterday that Foreign Minister Botha was meeting with Mozambique's Foreign Minister Chissano in the South African border town of Komatipoort. This is the first meeting between the two governments since negotiations were held at the ministerial level last December.



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**Comment:** South Africa's hard line makes it unlikely that these talks will yield significant results. Pretoria's support for the Mozambican insurgents far outweighs that which Maputo gives to the guerrillas of the African National Congress. Although Mozambique has placed some restrictions on the ANC in recent months, it probably will not take any additional steps without some corresponding moves from South Africa.



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[Redacted]

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**WESTERN EUROPE: Conference of Peace Groups**

The second European Nuclear Disarmament Conference, which begins Monday in West Berlin, has been billed in the West German press as a major planning forum for the West European peace campaign this fall. Except for the West German Greens and Social Democrats, however, only minor non-Communist peace groups will attend.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Lack of participation by major peace groups does not indicate the peace movement has lost the strength to mount effective demonstrations later this year. The conference probably will focus on theoretical debate, while most decisions on specific protest activities will be made at the national level. Moreover, disagreements about Soviet culpability are not likely to keep independent and Soviet-controlled organizations from joining forces this fall to oppose INF deployment.

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**CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Tough Personnel Decisions Ahead**

Premier Strougal has been hospitalized, and the government advises that he will not resume his duties "for a certain time."

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The Embassy reports there does not yet appear to be a consensus within the leadership on Strougal's successor. Strougal has been a key supporter of limited reform to deal with the troubled economy.

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**Comment:** The Premier's [Redacted] illness—along with the recent death of party presidium member Hula—increases the need for the leadership to make difficult personnel decisions. It has appeared reluctant to make any changes within the delicately balanced presidium until the implications of General Secretary Andropov's accession become clearer. The choices to fill these vacancies could demonstrate the degree of political strength of party secretary Jakes and other reformists and could provide an indication of whether Moscow intends to encourage reforms elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

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**CUBA-ETHIOPIA: Possible Cuban Contingency Force**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

A US diplomat in Addis

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Ababa recently encountered several Cuban soldiers who identified themselves as special forces on temporary duty. They claimed their unit could respond within 48 hours to a call for assistance from anywhere in Africa. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The 8,000 Cuban combat troops already in Ethiopia have performed little except garrison duty for more than four years, and they probably could be sent elsewhere without weakening the country's defenses. Mozambique is the country most likely to call for Cuban military forces. In any major move, the Cubans would need Soviet transport. [Redacted]

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**NORTH YEMEN-SOUTH YEMEN: Heightened Tensions**

North and South Yemen reportedly have sent additional ground forces to their common border. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** North Yemen has been trying to consolidate its control of border territory that it retook in 1982 from dissidents supported by Aden. Salih also may want to keep tensions high to obtain aid from Saudi Arabia and to discourage attempts by Arab states in the Persian Gulf region to moderate Aden's politics with financial aid. South Yemeni President Hasani probably is responding to Salih's moves under pressure from those in his government who opposed withdrawal of Aden's support for the insurgents. Hasani's policies have heightened tensions in the regime, and his rivals may seek to reduce his influence during the session of the central committee of the ruling Socialist Party that began on Monday. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
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
**BURMA: Antinarcotics Operation**

The Burmese Army, in its first major operation against heroin refineries in two years, swept the San Klang area near the Thai border last month, destroying 10 refineries, a chemical storage site, and military camps belonging to the Third Chinese Irregular Forces and to the Shan United Revolutionary Army. Early warning of the operation enabled the traffickers to move most of the narcotics and refining chemicals to other areas in Burma and to reduce stocks by lowering the price of heroin. Burma produced 600 tons of opium last year and largely determines the amount of heroin exported from Southeast Asia. 

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
**Comment:** Since the Thai Government began sending military units to attack traffickers along the Thai-Burmese border last year, heroin refineries have been relocated deeper in Burma, and the Chinese Irregular Forces and Shan United Revolutionary Army have expanded their operations. The Burmese Government probably will continue to attack heroin refineries in order to encourage the US to provide more support for its narcotics control program. 

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## **Special Analysis**

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
### **SYRIA-ISRAEL: Prospects for Hostilities**

[Redacted] *the Syrians are preparing for renewed hostilities with the Israelis in Lebanon, although military activity on both sides appears normal. Syria's preparations probably reflect concerns in Damascus over a possible Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Syria also may be convinced that Israel will attack Syrian forces in Lebanon. Although the Syrians are unlikely to attack Israeli forces, the current charged atmosphere presents a risk of miscalculation that could precipitate hostilities.* [Redacted]

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The evident war fever in Syria apparently is designed at least in part to focus US attention on Syria's interests in any Israeli-Lebanese agreement. It probably is aimed specifically at influencing Secretary of State Shultz's current mission. [Redacted]

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The Syrians clearly are worried that the Secretary will obtain an agreement in Lebanon that allows the Israelis a residual presence and considerable influence in the south. Assad almost certainly will tell the Secretary he cannot accept such an agreement, and, under such

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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circumstances, that he could not pull his troops out of Lebanon. Assad may claim that he expects the Israelis will attack Syrian forces in Lebanon and that he will have no choice but to fight. [Redacted]

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Assad frequently resorts to intimidating military gestures when he wants to draw attention to his country's interests. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Fear of an Israeli Attack**

The Syrians, however, may actually believe the Israelis plan to launch an attack in the Bekaa Valley. Syrian concerns about a large-scale Israeli attack, however, are exaggerated—at least in the immediate future. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuing Palestinian raids, however, might provoke punitive Israeli air and artillery strikes on guerrilla positions behind Syrian lines. Such actions could develop into a large-scale offensive. [Redacted]

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**Prospects for a Syrian Offensive**

Syria's reported preparations also may indicate that Damascus—with or without Moscow's backing—intends to launch a limited attack on Israeli positions in the hope of achieving political gains. This is a less likely possibility, but Assad almost certainly believes hostilities would disrupt the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations. [Redacted]

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The Syrian leader might even be willing to risk allowing an expansion of the fighting into Syria. Although he probably recognizes that a wider conflict would end in another Syrian military defeat, he may hope it would force the superpowers to arrange a settlement that included Syria as a principal party. [Redacted]

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The USSR wants to maintain tensions in the area in order to wreck US negotiations on Lebanon and to sidetrack the US peace initiative. Although the Soviets probably are not pushing Syria to initiate major hostilities, the Syrians may be mistaking Soviet propaganda for support and encouragement. [Redacted]

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**Danger of Miscalculation**

Whatever the Syrians' motivation, there is a real and growing risk of the kind of miscalculation that has so often played a role in Arab-Israeli hostilities. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] The Israelis are becoming increasingly concerned that the Syrians have no intention of allowing a Lebanese agreement to be reached and that their gains of last summer will be erased by a Syrian-sanctioned Palestinian resurgence in Lebanon. [Redacted]

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Without an agreement that prevents the PLO from reinfiltrating the bulk of its dispersed forces into the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon, Israeli military action to neutralize them would become inevitable. The absence of an agreement also means that Assad will not withdraw his forces, even though he believes their continued presence in Lebanon is certain to lead to renewed hostilities with Israel. [Redacted]

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