




Director of
Central
Intelligence

Top Secret



OCPAS/CIG



CY# 281

25X1

National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday
4 January 1983

Top Secret

CPAS NID 83-003JX



4 January 1983

25X1

281

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Contents


USSR: *Propaganda on Arms Control* 1



25X1

West Germany - US: *Visit of Opposition Leader* 3

Yugoslavia-USSR: *New Strains* 4




25X1

Special Analysis

Angola - South Africa - Namibia: *Signs of Progress* 7



Top Secret



4 January 1983

25X1


25X1

Top Secret




25X1


USSR: Propaganda on Arms Control

The Soviet leadership is intensifying its efforts to influence public opinion in the West before the resumption of START and INF negotiations later this month. 


25X1

The commentary published in *Pravda* on Sunday criticizes US "stubbornness" in rejecting the Soviet "comprehensive" approach linking medium-range and intercontinental missiles in arms control negotiations. It reiterates General Secretary Andropov's call, which was made in a written interview last week, for an expression of US good will in response to recent Soviet proposals at Geneva. 


25X1

The commentary alleges the US is stalling at the talks in the hope of maintaining an impasse that would allow "rearming" Western Europe with medium-range missiles. It repeats earlier Soviet vows to prevent the US from achieving unilateral military advantages. 

25X1

Comment: Moscow's decision to make its disarmament proposals public suggests it sees this as a critical time in its campaign to influence the public debate over arms control issues, particularly in Western Europe. The Soviet leadership reacted strongly when the French and British rebuffed Andropov's offer to reduce the Soviet medium-range arsenal in Europe to 162 missiles, implying a cutback to the force levels in France and the UK. 

25X1


The latest propaganda attack probably was also timed to set the scene for the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting that begins today in Prague. Andropov is likely to use this occasion to emphasize the main themes of the *Pravda* commentary. Foreign Minister Gromyko probably will give them further play when he visits Bonn the middle of this month. 

25X1

25X1



Top Secret



4 January 1983

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied


Top Secret



25X1

WEST GERMANY - US: Visit of Opposition Leader

Social Democratic Party leader Vogel begins a three-day visit to the US tomorrow to help strengthen his international credentials before the federal election slated for this March.



25X1

Last month the opposition party leader traveled to East Germany and visited both Italian and Vatican officials in Rome. Later this month he will visit Moscow and hopes to confer with government leaders in Paris.



25X1

Vogel, who enjoys support from all factions of the Social Democratic Party, was named chancellor-candidate after Helmut Schmidt declined to run again last October. Both Schmidt and party chairman Brandt endorse him. He served as Minister of Justice under Schmidt from 1974 to January 1981, when he became leader of the troubled party organization in West Berlin, a former party stronghold.



25X1

Comment: Having concentrated almost entirely on domestic affairs, Vogel needs to appear more at home with foreign leaders and international issues to develop his standings as a candidate for chancellor. He presumably planned his travels to the US and the USSR to demonstrate a balanced approach toward the two superpowers. The visit to Washington nevertheless is probably intended to reassure West German voters the Social Democratic Party is on good terms with US leaders.




25X1

The polls currently give Vogel little chance of becoming chancellor in March. Although the Social Democrats have fared better than expected in state elections since the change in government last October, they are likely to fall well short of an absolute majority.




25X1

Providing the current government fails to win an absolute majority, Vogel conceivably could obtain the chancellorship with support of the Greens--if they win representation in the Bundestag--but close cooperation with the environmentalists is unlikely. Although Vogel cooperated with a similar group to a limited extent when he was mayor of West Berlin, he almost certainly recognizes the danger this poses to Social Democratic unity at the national level.



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

4 January 1983

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: New Strains

Deepening differences in foreign trade priorities and Yugoslav suspicions about General Secretary Andropov's recent overtures to Albania have increased tensions in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. [Redacted]

25X1

Soviet officials in Belgrade recently described the annual trade negotiations as "difficult" and "rough," and said they broke off without results on 24 December. They say the Yugoslavs refused the Soviet proposal to reduce bilateral trade by about 10 percent but insisted Moscow buy \$850 million worth of Yugoslav consumer goods the Soviets do not want. [Redacted]

25X1

Soviet diplomats say the talks will resume this month, and they suggested the USSR would make concessions. One official recently implied, however, that the USSR will take advantage of Yugoslavia's need for crude oil and natural gas. Yugoslav officials blame Moscow for the difficulties and charge it is trying to develop leverage over their economy. [Redacted]

25X1

The Yugoslav press has attacked Andropov's recent offer of better relations with Albania, prompting a formal Soviet protest. Yugoslav Presidium member Vidic, in a speech to a Belgrade party meeting in early December, warned that any Soviet meddling in Albanian-Yugoslav relations would be seen as a threat to Yugoslavia's vital interests. [Redacted]

25X1

Comment: Since last April, the Soviets have been demanding better quality goods from Yugoslavia than Belgrade is willing to supply because it needs to export these goods to the West for hard currency. Moscow, however, increasingly is insisting that its trade with other Communist countries be mutually advantageous. [Redacted]

25X1

Yugoslavia ships 34 percent of its exports to the USSR to pay for essential imports of Soviet energy and raw materials. Nevertheless, it is presently more concerned with Western financial aid. Belgrade probably will make much of its disputes with Moscow to persuade the West to accelerate economic assistance. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

Special Analysis**ANGOLA - SOUTH AFRICA - NAMIBIA: Signs of Progress**

Developments since the meeting last month in Cape Verde between senior Angolan and South African officials suggest the deadlock in Namibia negotiations conceivably may be broken, although a number of serious obstacles remain in the way of a settlement. Angolan President dos Santos--who apparently is eager to reach a settlement and begin rebuilding his country's economy--was granted special powers by the ruling Popular Movement following the talks. Subsequent changes in the party hierarchy apparently have strengthened his position. [redacted]

25X1

In his most recent move, dos Santos late last month reportedly suspended more than 30 people from their party posts. The Angolan press says most of those suspended are members of a dominant leftist faction, and one of them is the wife of the regime's leading radical Marxist, Lucio Lara. [redacted]

25X1

Angola may be more willing to discuss with South Africa or the US the withdrawal of at least some Cuban troops. Talks are to be held with South Africa some time this month. Dos Santos has indicated flexibility on the Cuban troop issue in the past, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Hardline Opposition

Dos Santos will face strong opposition from Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners--who may still hold the balance of power in Luanda--if he appears too willing to compromise on a Cuban withdrawal. Angolan criticism of the US and of linkage of the Namibian and Cuban issues is harsher now than at any time in the recent past. [redacted]

25X1

There is no evidence, furthermore, to suggest that even dos Santos and his backers are prepared to meet South African and US demands that all or almost all Cuban combat troops leave. Luanda still needs either Cuban

--continued

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

4 January 1983

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

protection against the insurgency of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi, or a negotiated settlement with the insurgents. While dos Santos may favor such talks, there is no confirmation of Savimbi's recent claim that Luanda is now ready to negotiate. [redacted]

25X1

No Frontline Role

Angola's direct talks with South Africa have put the Frontline States on the sidelines, much to the annoyance of the Frontline chairman, Tanzanian President Nyerere. Most other Frontline leaders appear to support these talks but continue publicly to denounce South Africa and the US for wanting to include the Cuban presence in the negotiations. [redacted]

25X1

The South-West Africa People's Organization, meanwhile, remains in the background. Although SWAPO is still potentially a major political force in Namibia, South African attacks have weakened it militarily and the Frontline States now appear to give it little weight. [redacted]

25X1

South Africa Encouraged

The South Africans have been encouraged by the Cape Verde talks. In particular, Pretoria appears pleased that its proposals for a cease-fire and for a mutual troop withdrawal were received with interest and that the Angolans showed a willingness to exercise greater control over SWAPO. [redacted]

25X1

Pretoria is still fundamentally hostile to the Marxist regime in Luanda and probably would like to replace it. Pretoria nevertheless might be willing to coexist with a more pragmatic and less hostile regime, at least for a while. If Luanda were willing to cooperate with South Africa on a Namibia settlement that effectively diminished the influence of SWAPO, the South Africans would find an accommodation with Angola especially appealing. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret
[redacted]

8

4 January 1983

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret