




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
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
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


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## EL SALVADOR: Status of Military Dispute

*A peaceful resolution of the power struggle between Defense Minister Garcia and rightist Army Field Commander Ochoa seems likely--the two may meet today--but military unity has been damaged and Garcia's future is in doubt.*

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Comment: Although many officers sympathize with Ochoa, even his closest supporters cannot ignore his serious breach of military discipline. Ochoa thus appears increasingly likely to relinquish his post and accept a foreign assignment after some compromise with Garcia.

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Such an arrangement could entail Garcia's retiring on schedule next month and stepping down as head of the armed forces. This would save face for both officers and allow the military to reach consensus on a new leader.

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The political battle ultimately is a test between moderates led by Garcia and hardliners led by Assembly leader D'Aubuisson. Garcia's departure would be a personal victory for D'Aubuisson, but it would not enable his followers to consolidate their power.

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Ochoa's rebellion--and subsequent exile--will serve to weaken the small extremist clique in the military. The officer corps is likely to choose another pragmatist as defense minister in an effort to strengthen the unity of the armed forces.

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DIA Comment

DIA does not agree that the present crisis is a "test between moderates . . . and hardliners." Rather, it is the result of a number of factors, including military politics associated with officer-class affiliation; a growing feeling within the officer corps that Garcia has served his time; and a conviction that changes are necessary both in the military personnel organization and in the prosecution of the war. The probable outcome will reinforce the military's tradition of deliberative negotiated consensus, avoiding extreme positions, and preserving a centrist conservative organization.

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## INDIA-USSR: Interest in Nuclear Reactors

The Indian Embassy in Moscow reports the Indian Government may be leaning toward accepting a Soviet offer to build nuclear power plants in India. The Soviets reportedly have agreed to accept payment in rupees, which makes the offer much more attractive. During Prime Minister Gandhi's trip to Moscow in September, the Soviets were asked to consider providing three or four small power reactors rather than the 1,000 megawatt reactor they have been trying to sell India for several years. Most of the scientific community in India, however, is still opposed to importing reactor technology.

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Comment: New Delhi's counteroffer and possible interest in Soviet technology probably reflect in part its embarrassment over the failures of the domestic power program, which is largely based on Indian copies of Canadian-designed heavy water reactors. India is likely to postpone a decision on the Soviet offer because the government has tried to keep foreign involvement, including safeguards, in its nuclear program to a minimum. In addition, the money and prestige put into the program and the confidence of Indian scientists that they can solve the problems plaguing heavy water production facilities make any foreign reactor deal unlikely in the near future.

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