




Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



OCPAS/CIG



CY# 281

# National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday*  
*16 February 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-0401X


16 February 1983

Copy

281

**Page Denied**

Top Secret



25X1

Contents

Lebanon: *Military Movements* . . . . . 1



25X1

Israel: *No-Confidence Motions* . . . . . 2



25X1

Pakistan: *Urban Unrest* . . . . . 4

Bangladesh: *Political Disturbances* . . . . . 4

Persian Gulf - Egypt: *Expanding Ties* . . . . . 5



25X1

Chile: *Economic Cabinet Changes* . . . . . 6

Special Analysis

El Salvador: *The Military Balance* . . . . . 7



Top Secret




16 February 1983

25X1

25X1

# Beirut




25X1

Top Secret




25X1


LEBANON: Military Movements

*The movement of Lebanese Army troops into East Beirut yesterday will strengthen the central government's hand in its dealings with the Phalange-dominated Lebanese Forces.* 


25X1

The Israelis had warned earlier the deployment could cause problems, but it reportedly proceeded without incident. Although the Israelis protested that the Lebanese Government had not consulted with them on the deployment, President Jumayyil was careful to reach a prior understanding with the Lebanese Forces. 


25X1

The Israelis and the Lebanese Forces Christian militia are still allowed to use routes along the eastern edge of Beirut to supply their forces in the Shuf and Alayh areas. Lebanese Army Commander Tannous, however, is said to have ordered his troops to prevent Israeli movement into the city. 


25X1

Meanwhile, Major Haddad, the commander of the Israeli-controlled Christian militia in the south, returned to Sidon on Monday. He declared his "state," which stretches from Israel in the south to the Al Awwali River in the north, will exist as long as Lebanon is occupied by foreign forces. 

25X1

Comment: The Army's move into East Beirut will reduce the presence of the Lebanese Forces there. It also will expand the central government's authority into Christian as well as Muslim areas. 


25X1

Haddad's forces are widening their control throughout southern Lebanon with Israeli support to reinforce Tel Aviv's demand that security arrangements in the 45-kilometer zone be restricted to Haddad's militia and Israeli monitoring stations. Tel Aviv probably is trying to head off deployment of a multinational force or the Lebanese Army by creating a functioning security framework before the negotiations can deal with that question. 

25X1



Top Secret




25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

Top Secret



25X1

ISRAEL: No-Confidence Motions

Prime Minister Begin's success in winning the Knesset's approval for keeping former Defense Minister Sharon in the cabinet suggests he will have little trouble defeating several no-confidence motions criticizing his handling of the recommendations of the Beirut massacre inquiry commission. At least one coalition member, however, is threatening to vote against the government.

25X1

Meanwhile, Begin is meeting with leaders of Likud's Liberal faction to discuss Sharon's status and some new cabinet appointments. The Liberals want more seats in the cabinet in return for approving Ambassador Arens--a member of Begin's more conservative Herut Party--as Defense Minister. They also want Sharon's new duties to be narrowly limited.

25X1

Top Secret


16 February 1983

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied





25X1

Top Secret  
[redacted]

25X1

## PAKISTAN: Urban Unrest

Increasing unrest in major urban centers is testing the ability of municipal authorities to maintain order and could be exploited by President Zia's opponents. In Karachi, Sunni Muslim leaders have given authorities until Friday to meet their demands for action against Shias, including banning their religious processions. Bus and taxi drivers in the city--supported by student activists--are threatening to go on strike again to protest recent increases in fuel prices. In Lahore, police on Saturday reportedly beat and used tear gas against a group of prominent women attorneys protesting proposals to limit women's testimony in court. [redacted]

25X1

Comment: If communal discord becomes violent, it could be difficult for municipal authorities to control and could embolden other dissatisfied groups to take to the streets. A sustained alliance of students and labor over economic issues would be a danger signal for Zia that his opposition is beginning to coalesce. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

## BANGLADESH: Political Disturbances

With political violence growing, the military regime is cracking down on political and student opponents. The daughter of Bangladesh's political founder was among 30 political leaders detained yesterday after she called for a nationwide protest tomorrow against martial law. On Monday police clashed with several thousand students at Dhaka University protesting martial law and government education policies. The government has closed the university, tightened enforcement measures against prohibited political activity, and imposed a curfew on the capital. [redacted]

25X1

Comment: Despite the crackdown, student activists are likely to stage new protests next Monday, the anniversary of the martyrdom of student protesters in the 1950s. Political parties probably will have to increase support of the students to maintain their political credibility. Ambitious military officers, critical of General Ershad's leadership, may exploit these incidents as they try to develop their own support. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret  
[redacted]

25X1

16 February 1983


Top Secret



25X1

PERSIAN GULF - EGYPT: Expanding Ties


The Arab states on the Persian Gulf may be seeking increased cooperation with Egypt.



25X1

25X1

Comment: The Persian Gulf states remain worried about subversion and military threats from Iran, and they have been working in the Gulf Cooperation Council to strengthen their security. Led by the Saudis, however, the Gulf Arabs will normalize relations with Egypt slowly for fear of becoming the targets of Arab and Palestinian terrorists.



25X1



25X1

Top Secret




16 February 1983

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



CHILE: Economic Cabinet Changes

President Pinochet's cabinet shuffle this week has raised doubts about the government's ability to revive the economy and to resume external debt payments. According to the US Embassy, the new financial team of Finance Minister Caceress and Economy Minister Martin lacks the stature to resolve Chile's financial problems. In announcing the shakeup, Pinochet attacked domestic critics and said there would be no major changes in economic policies. [redacted]


25X1

Comment: The changes will do little to restore confidence, and foreign bankers probably will be more cautious in supporting Santiago's requests to restore credits and renegotiate maturing debt. Caceress and Martin will have to resolve the issue of government guarantees for private-sector foreign borrowings to get the stalled debt renegotiations back on track. Until this problem is resolved, bankers are likely to resist new lending. This will hinder financing of necessary imports and could lead to additional domestic bankruptcies. [redacted]


25X1  
25X1



Top Secret



25X1



25X1

Top Secret  
[redacted]

25X1

## Special Analysis

---

### EL SALVADOR: The Military Balance

*During the last several months, the insurgents have increasingly demonstrated a capability to overrun small towns and isolated military garrisons, thereby inflicting heavier losses on government personnel. The Army has responded again with large-scale sweep operations against guerrilla strongholds. These actions continue to have little lasting impact, however, and the government has little prospect of substantially weakening insurgent resistance before the elections in March 1984. The government probably hopes that, with continued US assistance, it can at least regain the initiative over the next year.* [redacted]

25X1

Some 3,500 government troops were killed or wounded in 1982, an increase of more than 20 percent from the previous year. Losses have been particularly high since mid-October, when the insurgents began a series of offensives that are continuing sporadically. [redacted]

25X1

The insurgents also have captured large numbers of prisoners, including over 250 in late 1982. They subsequently released the prisoners in an attempt to weaken the military's willingness to fight. [redacted]

25X1

In addition, government forces conceded insurgent control, at least temporarily, over large areas of eastern Chalatenango and northern Morazan Departments. This has strengthened the morale of the guerrillas, who claim some of these areas are "liberated." The insurgents also have seized upon recent political infighting in the Constituent Assembly and the officer corps to underscore the disunity in San Salvador. [redacted]

25X1

### Persistent Problems

The government has failed to take full advantage of the strengthening of the armed forces over the past year to gain a military advantage. The Air Force now has 18 UH-1H helicopters and six A-37 counterinsurgency aircraft, and the Army has two new US-trained and two Venezuelan-trained battalions--bringing total military and security personnel to more than 30,000. The new units,

--continued

Top Secret  
[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret  
[redacted]

25X1

however, have been used primarily in major operations that have failed to weaken the guerrillas significantly.

[redacted]  
25X1

The military's ability to capitalize on the improvements is hindered by poor leadership, inadequate training, and the continuation of a garrison mentality. Many departmental commanders still are appointed more for their political loyalty than for their command ability. Competent officers are sometimes removed because of their opposition to the top leadership, as illustrated by the recent rebellion led by Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa. [redacted]

25X1

New recruits still serve only 18 months and, because there is no standard training, units are often committed to combat prematurely. In areas of insurgent strength, there also is a reluctance to conduct aggressive small-unit patrolling because of fear of guerrilla ambushes.

[redacted]  
25X1

#### Guerrilla Gains

The insurgents appear to have at least maintained their personnel strength over the past year. They may even have increased it somewhat to as many as 4,000 to 6,000 armed regulars. [redacted]

25X1

The guerrillas also continued to receive arms via Nicaragua, with air delivery receiving high priority because of Honduran and Salvadoran land and sea interdiction efforts. As a result of the adequate supplies of arms, the insurgents apparently have been able to make better use of their 5,000 to 10,000 local militia and other support personnel for offensive operations. [redacted]

25X1

In addition, the insurgents have improved cooperation recently among their different factions, resulting in more joint operations and better coordination of offensive plans. Serious rivalries remain, however, particularly between the two largest factions. One still favors a prolonged war and prefers small-unit operations, while the other believes large-scale attacks are needed to touch off a spontaneous popular revolt. [redacted]

25X1

#### Outlook

Without the aid they have received from the US over the past several years, the armed forces might already

--continued

Top Secret  
[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

have lost the war. To prevent the guerrillas from making major gains, continued aid at least at the current level will be necessary to offset Cuban and Nicaraguan support for the insurgents. Moreover, without an amnesty proposal and a serious civic action program, the government appears to have little chance permanently to reduce insurgent control over specific regions. [redacted]

25X1

To regain the military initiative and provide adequate security for isolated towns, the Army would have to adopt more aggressive patrolling and mount hit-and-run raids. This would require effective small-unit leadership, better use of intelligence, improved mobility, and better coordination of forces--factors still lacking in many operations. [redacted]

25X1

Such changes, however, are likely to come slowly. Even if the military leadership manages to stick together over the next year, the Army will be hard pressed to do more than hold its own until the elections. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret


[redacted]

25X1



**Top Secret**

25X1



**Top Secret**