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Afghanistan	Situation	Report
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17 September 1985

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT		
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COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PAKTIA AND QANDAHAR	1	25 X 1
Major Soviet operations continue in Paktia Province and Qandahar.		25 X 1
MASOOD'S INACTIVITY	1	25X1
Some diplomats in Kabul have criticized the recent inactivity of Masood's fighters, who probably are recovering from the Panjsher offensive, which		
ended in late July.		25 X 1
		25 X 1
UNITED NATIONS TO CONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT	3	25 X 1
The United Nations General Assembly is focusing more intently on the situation in Afghanistan, especially in the area of human rights.		25X1
NEW AFGHAN DIPLOMATS NAMED	4	25 X 1
Kabul has assigned several officials to new diplomatic posts as part of attempts to improve Afghanistan's international relations.		25 X 1
		25 X 1

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		25 X 1
PERSPECTIVE		
NEW LIFE IN HELMAND PROVINCE INSURGENCY	6	25 X 1
Insurgent groups in the Helmand Valley have ended longstanding differences and have become more effective, thereby increasing both resistance and Soviet activity in the region.		25 X 1
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to		25 X 1
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AT OPERATIONS IN PAKTIA AND QANDAHAR	•
Recent military activity focused on Paktia Province and Qandahar, and Soviet operations north of Kabul ended.	24
indicates Afghan forces continued to operate near Khowst and along the Pakistani border in Paktia Province. Press reports indicate insurgent machinegun fire downed an MI-24 helicopter carrying two Afghan generals and a high ranking Soviet officer in Paktia	2
Province on 17 September.	
	2
the 70th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade continuing a combat sweep in	25)
the Qandahar area, probably in reaction to several successful insurgent attacks in the area.	
	2
OD'S INACTIVITY	
Western, Chinese, and Pakistani diplomats in Kabul have recently criticized Panjsher Valley commander Masood for his failure to open a second front while Soviet troops were occupied in the Konar and Paktia Province offensives this summer, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. The recent lack of combat in the Panjsher, coupled with reports of a Soviet truce offer to Masood, have fueled speculation among Kabul diplomats that Masood may not be initiating attacks while he considers the pact. The Embassy also reports that Masood's inactivity highlights the lack of insurgent coordination and undermines the efforts of resistance	
as a whole.	
Comment: We believe that Masood's inactivity results largely from his need to rest and resupply his units following intense combat in the Panjsher last July.	2
supply levels are now good among the 5,000 insurgents under Masood's leadership. Panjsher insurgents did	25
attack convoys along the Salang highway and attacked the garrison at Peshghowr during the Konar campaign in	
late May and early June.	
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	25 X 1
Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Although diplomatic reporting indicates that Pakistan is interested in having a member of the insurgent alliance address the committee, Islamabad is reluctant to support formal resistance representation at the General Assembly sessions because it fears a strong Soviet reaction.	
	25X1
NEW AFGHAN DIPLOMATS NAMED	25X1
Kabul recently appointed new ambassadors to East Germany and Syria and a new charge d'affaires to Italy. The appointees to Rome and Damascus are low-level party figures but the new ambassador to East Germany, General Baba Jan, is a candidate member of the PDPA Central Committee and a former Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (1980-84). A career military officer, Baba Jan, about 60, was "retired" for failing to prosecute the war aggressively. The Syrian appointment upgrades relations from the charge level; the Syrians do not maintain a post in Kabul.	25 X 1
Comment: We believe that the Syrian appointmentonly the second Afghan ambassador currently assigned to an Islamic country (Iraq is the other)is part of Afghanistan's ongoing effort to improve its international image. Kabul would like full diplomatic relations with as many nations as possible and probably sees states friendly to Moscow as the best place to start. Baba Jan's posting, however, is clearly a diplomatic exilea frequent fate for out-of-favor party figures. Other fallen stars now stationed overseas include Khalqi leader Assadollah Sarwari (Ulan Bator) and former Finance Minister Abdul Wakil	
(Hanoi).	25 X 1
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		25 X 1
UNITED NATIONS TO CONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS H	DED ODM	25X1
		25/(1
The United Nations General Assembly unprecedented amount of attention to	(UNGA) will give an	
question this year, considering for	the first time the	
human rights situation in the countr	y. In the spring	
of 1985, the UN Human Rights Commiss that accused "foreign forces" in Afg	Hon issued a report Thanistan of using	
chemical weapons and massacring civi	lians. The UNGA	
Social and Humanitarian Committee wireport in November and probably issu	ll consider this	
based on it.	e a resolution	25 X 1
In mid-November, the General Assembl	v plopove vill alea	
vote for the seventh time on a resol	ution calling for	
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from	Afghanistan. In	
1984 a record 119 countries supporte with only 20 countries opposed. The	Afghanistan issue	
may also arise in the UNGA Decoloniz	ation Committee.	0EV4
		25 X 1
Comment: The US Mission to the UN p	redicts that the	
human rights resolution would pass b margin; no significant change is exp	y at least a 5 to 1	
totals on the resolution calling for	the withdrawal of	
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PERSPECTIVE	25 X 1
NEW LIFE IN HELMAND PROVINCE INSURGENCY	25 X 1
Major improvements in insurgent cooperation in the upper Helmand Valley area in 1985 resulted in a high level of activity, threatening Soviet and Afghan regime control of the Kajaki Dam and security on the highway from Qandahar to Herat. For the first five years of the war, insurgents in Helmand Province, beset by internal squabbling, posed little challenge to the Soviets and the Kabul regime.	25X1
Strategic Importance	
The importance of Helmand Province derives from its agriculture and the segment of the highway from Qandahar to Herat. The most productive agricultural area is the Helmand River Valley. In the upper valley, the US-built Kajaki dam and a 36-mile long lake feed a network of irrigation canals; a hydroelectric station at the dam serves Gereshkan important transfer and supply point for Soviet and Afghan Government convoys,	
Gereshk is situated on	25 X 1
the Helmand River and the road from Qandahar to	25 X 1
The war has increased the economic importance of the upper Helmand Valley. since 1980 the area has replaced Qandahar as the regional economic center because of frequent Soviet and	25X1
Tambah, has grown into a major black market for items	25 X 1
obtained from Soviet soldiers,	25 X 1
Soviet and regime forces maintain battalion-sized garrisons at Gereshk and other forces at Lashkar Gah. The Soviets reinforced their contingent in the province this spring. Larger units are brought in from Qandahar and Shindand for major operations in the province. The rest of Helmand Province has little strategic importance. Apart from the sparsely populated Helmand River Valley and the mountainous north, the province is desert.	25X1
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Insurgent Discord	
There were deep differences between the various insurgent groups active in Helmand until the last year or so much of the tension grew out of efforts by the Hizbi-Islami Gulbuddin faction to expand its influence at the expense of the more moderate Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami. Beginning in about 1980 and lasting until late 1984, Hizbi and Harakat forces fought each other. The struggle intensified when Iranian-backed Shia groups from the Hazarehjat region, eager to take revenge on	25 X 1
the Harakat for earlier attacks on Shia groups in the eastern Hazarehjat region, entered the fighting on the	25 X 1
side of the Hizbi,	25X1
In late 1984 or early 1985, mediation by a local	20/(1
religious leader brought an end to fighting between the Harakat and Hizbi, and we believe that political shifts outside the region	25 X 1
also contributed to development of accord among the groups in the upper Helmand.	25X1
in late 1984 relations between Iran and Hizbi	25X1
from the Hazarehjat probably loosened their ties with Hizbi, making Hizbi accord with the Harakat possible. Moreover, at about the same time Pakistan began pressuring Gulbuddin's organization to show more tolerance toward other Sunni groups, to facilitate the formation of the new	25 X 1
resistance alliance.	25 X 1
Renewed Insurgency	
The end to internecine fighting had dramatic effects on the insurgency in the area. Morale rose and attacks on Soviet and regime targets increased sharply in February	25X1
and March 1985, producing the heaviest fighting of the	25X1
war in the Helmand Valley, Harakat attacks on Gereshk resulted in heavy	25 X 1
casualties on Soviet and regime forces, and prompted the Soviets to send	25 X 1
reinforcements and counterattack. The insurgent attack on Gereshk, further raised	
morale among Qandahar guerrillas, who believed the	25X1
Soviets would have to spread their resources and thus relieve pressure on the Qandahar groups.	25 X 1

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	Heavy fighting continued into the spring and summer. In March, insurgents	25 X 1
	attacked Soviet and regime positions near the Kajaki	25X1
	some 5,000 insurgents participated in the attack, and	
	the attacks continued, with varying intensity, for more than two months. In early June, the insurgents were expecting to retreat	25 X 1
	into the northern mountains and, although the	0574
	insurgents suffered heavy casualties, morale was high. In mid-June,	25 X 1
	insurgents detroyed the Afghan Army's 20th Brigade and killed its commander; government	25X1
	retaliatory strikes aimed at breaking the alliance	
	succeeded mainly in killing large numbers of civilians. In mid-July,	25X1
	Soviet and Afghan forces broke off the offensive.	25X1
		25X1
	The insurgency in the province remains strong although the guerrillas	20/1
	admit to heavy casualties and large arms and ammunition losses, they claim to have inflicted much heavier	25 X 1
	losses on the Soviet and Afghan forces. They were especially proud of having successfully resisted Soviet and Afghan regime efforts to take the village of Musa Qaleh. At heavy cost, insurgents aggressively attacked advancing armored vehicles, destroying many and breaking the siege. Insurgents claim, moreover, that more than 300 regime soldiers deserted to the resistance during the fighting.	25X1 25X1
	Outlook	20/(1
	Prospects are good for a continuing strong insurgency in Helmand Province. Soviet and Afghan regime military pressure has often caused insurgent groups to set aside internecine quarreling and concentrate on fighting. Such pressure is likely to continue. Once begun, military cooperation among insurgent groups has tended	
	to persist.	25 X 1
	Insurgent cooperation in Helmand, however, probably will remain somewhat vulnerable to political shifts outside the region. For example, a strong effort by Iranian-backed Shiite groups to extend their influence into the Helmand Valleythough unlikely in the near termcould disrupt the current cooperation and set in motion internal bickering.	25 X 1
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