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Afghanistan Situation Report

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27 August 1985

Top Secret

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
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Soviet and Afghan troops launched multibattalion operations in Paktia Province at Ali Khel, just opposite Parachinar, Pakistan.]	
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The Indian Government expressed its willingness to convey messages between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Geneva peace negotiations and reportedly also relayed the official Pakistani position on direct negotiations with the Afghan regime.		
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SOVIETS PREVENT CRITICISM OF AFGHANISTAN AT WORLD FESTIVAL OF YOUTH	25X1 4	
Moscow prevented Western delegates to the World Festival of Youth from openly protesting the	25X1	
Soviet presence in Afghanistan.		
IN BRIEF	5	
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RSPECTIVE	
E ORDEAL OF A FRENCH JOURNALIST IN AFGHANISTAN	7
During his imprisonment in Afghanistan, French television journalist Jacques Abouchard was generally well-treated by his Afghan and Soviet captors, probably because Moscow was afraid of damaging its relations with France.	25X 25X1
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to	
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PUBLICATION NOTE

Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we will not publish the **AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT** next week. The next report will appear on 10 September 1985.

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HTING PICKS UP IN PAKTIA	PROVINCE			7
		a multibat	ttalion	25>
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INDIA-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: INDIAN VIEW OF THE DOS	ST VISIT 25X1
During the seventh meeting of the Indo-Afghan	
Commission, held early this month in New Delhi Indians transmitted Pakistani views on the Gen	eva peace
process to Afghan Foreign Minister Dost, accor senior Indian official. The official told US that New Delhi would not mediate between Afgha	diplomats
and Pakistan, but would be willing to continue as a conduit for messages between the two side	to act
also said that Dost believed that direct Pakis Afghan talks on Afghanistan would be possible	tani- because
Islamabad no longer viewed them as equivalent recognition of the Kabul regime.	25X1
The meeting between the two foreign ministers little new ground in bilateral relations betwe	broke
and Afghanistan. New Delhi agreed to provide aid to Afghanistan's public health program, sm	technical
industry, and power generation; and to continufinance a children's hospital and an industria	e to help l park in
Kabul. The two countries also signed a cultur agreement.	al 25X1
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Comment:			25X1
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For its part, New Delhi communications link bet could reflect India's n June, Rajiv Gandhi had personally relay to Gor the United States was w Afghanistan. New Delhi downplayed th for bilateral relations two sides had resolved that have impeded trade meeting in Kabul in Oct continues the small Ind Indira Gandhi in 1969.	ween Afghanis ew activism of foreign Secre bachev India' illing to hol e significanc and merely a some transpor since the la ober 1983. T	tan and Pakistan on Afghanistan. In tary Bhandari s impression that d serious talks on e of the Dost visit nnounced that the tation problems st Commission he grant aid	25X1 25X1
SOVIETS PREVENT CRITICISM OF	AFGHANISTAN	AT WORLD FESTIVAL OF	25X1
Several western Europea Festival of Youth in Mo to publicly object to S were stopped by Soviet delegate, for example, of the Soviet presence prevented from doing so system coincidentally "occasion, several Norwe parade in Red Square we "Soviets out of Afghani rounded up and returned delegation was subseque "provocative" actions r longer be able to guara	scow earlier oviet policy countermeasur tried to read in Afghanista when the aud broke down". gian delegate aring identic stan; " they we to their hot ntly told tha ecurred, the	this month intended on Afghanistan, but es. A Swedish a speech critical n, but was itorium's address On another s showed up for a al shirts saying, ere summarily el. The Norwegian t if such Soviets would no	25X
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	mir tig	ment: The Soviets were unwilling to tolerate even a nimal give-and-take on the Afghanistan issue. Their that control of the discussions alienated the more phisticated representatives from western Europe and the advanced nations.	25X1
IN B	RIEF	•	25 X 1
		Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Mohammed Dost and Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan met with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko on 26 August en route to the Geneva peace talks, according to press reports. It is not clear if the two foreign ministers had private	
		discussions.	25X
			25X1
			25X1
		Afghan Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand left for Moscow on 13 August, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. His unannounced departure may be related to persistent rumors that Moscow would promote Keshtmand to the largely ceremonial head-of-state position now held by Babrak Karmal, leaving Babrak with the sole title of Secretary General of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Although Keshtmand's promotion would bolster his position vis-a-vis Babrak, Keshtmand has reportedly argued to stay in his post, believing he will be more effective there.	25X1
		27 August 1985 NESA M 85-10176	25X 5CX



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PERSPECTIVE		25 X 1
the ordeal of a french journalist in a by nesa	FGHANISTAN	25X1

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Jacques Abouchard's account of his six-week long imprisonment in Afghanistan, In the Cage of the Bear, gives a unique picture of Soviet and Afghan handling of suspected foreign intelligence agents. The Soviets and Afghans tried to force Abouchard to say he worked for US or French intelligence by using threats, frequent and prolonged interrogation, and isolation, but they did not physically abuse him. Abouchard denied any ties to the CIA or French intelligence, but provided his captors with some potentially useful intelligence information on the insurgents.*

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Capture by Soviets

Jacques Abouchard, a noted French television journalist, and two French camera technicians entered Afghanistan from Pakistan with an insurgent band allied with resistance leader Sayyid Ahmand Gailani on 17 September 1984. Abouchard intended to film for French television the group's planned attack on Soviet and Afghan regime forces. Although Abouchard's network is controlled by the French government, he claims that the French Foreign Ministry and the French Embassy in Islamabad were unaware of his project.

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Soviet airborne troops apparently had advance intelligence about Abouchard's plans. They captured him in Qandahar Province after his group had been in Afghanistan only a day; the French technicians escaped to Pakistan. The Soviet commander indicated that he had known when the party was going to enter Afghanistan. Abouchard believes that Afghan Government agents found out about the party's plans at Chaman, the Pakistani border town where the party stayed for several days.

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* Abou	chard's book,	Dans La Cage de L'Ours,	was published in
rrance	in 1985. He	is currently working in	Washington for the
French	television s	tation Antenne 2.	wasnington for the

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SECRE I	25
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The Soviet airborne troops treated Abouchard	
correctly. They did not interrogate him extensively during the 24-hour period they held him. Abouchard	
refused to say whether he was accompanied by other	
iournalists and his captors did not pursue the	
question. They also untied his arms after an hour and shared their food and water with him. They seemed much	
more interested in Francerepeating frequently "Paris"	_
and "champagne"than in Afghanistan.	2
The Soviet forces, however, stole Abouchard's	
traveler's checks, toothpaste, and toilet paper. Only	
their commander prevented them from taking his watch.	_
	2
Abouthard noted that the troops' clothes were filthy,	
their boots had no laces, and they used string to hold	2
up their pants.	2
Soviet Interrogation in Qandahar	
After his capture, Abouchard was taken to Qandahar	
where he was interrogated for three days by Soviet and	
Afghan officers. The senior Soviet officer asked Abouchard about CIA operations in France and CIA	
relations with French intelligence, but the officer did	
not pursue the subject when Abouchard said he knew	
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Abouchard says that Khad director Dr. Najibullah, who joined the interrogation before Abouchard's press conference and trial, tried to convince him to be cooperative. Najibullah was correct but cold. None of the interrogators tried to recruit Abouchard to work for Afghan or Soviet intelligence.

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Afghan intelligence used threats, frequent and prolonged interrogation, and isolation to try to extract a confession:

- -- They threatened Abouchard with a long prison term unless he cooperated.
- -- Although they never threatened physical violence, Abouchard shared a cell with Afghans who were beaten and he occasionally heard screams of people being tortured.
- -- Afghan intelligence questioned him nearly every day for periods lasting up to 12 hours. Most interrogations started at dawn, although some began around midnight.
- -- They gave him a monotonous diet of thin soup, corn-beef, and bread; he had to sleep in a cold, small cell with three other people, wash with cold water despite the cold weather, and was allowed to use the toilet only at certain times. He was allowed walks only rarely. He was permitted to see a doctor.
- -- They isolated Abouchard from nearly all contact with the outside world, rejecting his repeated requests to see the French ambassador in Kabul or receive letters from his family and colleagues. They also forbade contact with all prisoners except those in his cell. Abouchard heard no news because prison guards intentionally lowered their transistor radios during news broadcasts.

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Abouchard's Response

Abouthard made few compromises with his interrogators. He admitted only to having entered Afghanistan illegally and to having claimed falsely on his passport to be a businessman. Abouthard denied

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	categorically that he had links to the CIA and French intelligence and claimed he revealed little important intelligence information. He did, however, provide the	
	Khad with a description of the physical appearance of the insurgents he accompanied, and described where they	
	procured their arms and how the Pakistani Army allowed them to pass unhindered through numerous roadblocks in	
	Baluchistan. He claimed this information was too vague	
	to be of much use.	25X1
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	His Show Trial and Release	
	After his interrogation at Sidorat, Afghan and Soviet	
	authorities displayed Abouchard at a press conference and trial. There they accused him of being a member of	
	foreign intelligence services and presented his	
	captured camera equipment and introductory letter to an	
	insurgent group in Qandahar as state's evidence.	
		25X1
	After a brief show trial, Abouchard was found guilty	
	and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Abouchard's	
	treatment improved during his short incarceration at	
	Puli-Charki prison in Kabul. He could awaken when he	
	wanted, ate better food, and circulated freely among most of the prisoners. He was released on 29 October	
	after only five days.	
		25 X 1
	We believe that Abouchard was released quickly after	
	his trial because Moscow wanted to limit damage to its	
	relations with France. Abouthard's capture received widespread publicity in France and sparked protests and	
	demonstrations, including several outside the Soviet	
	embassy in Paris. Even the French Communist Party	
	sought his release. The French government told Soviet	
	officials that bilateral relations would suffer	
	seriously if Abouchard were imprisoned for a long period.	
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We believe Abouchard was better treated than many suspected foreign agents would have been because he is a well-known French journalist. Soviet and Afghan authorities treated a French doctor whom they captured in 1983, Philippe Augoyard, far worse. Augoyard spent five months in prison even though he praised the Afghan government and criticized the insurgents at a public trial. Afghan authorities also periodically threatened Augoyard with hanging.*

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* Augoyard's book *La Prison published in France in 1985. in support of the insurgency	Pour Delit D'Espoir was also Augovard is still active in France 25X1		
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