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Afghanistan Situation Report

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30 July 1985

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	This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the	
	Office of Soviet Analysis.	25 X 1
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	25X
SOVIET OPERATIONS IN PANJSHER, OTHER AREAS	25X
After intensified operations in the Panjsher Valley,	
Soviet forces apparently are withdrawing. some Soviet motorized rifle and artillery units have left both Bazarak and Rokha	25X1 25X1
and are moving toward the mouth of the valley. Some	
Soviet forces remain at Bazarak, the northernmost Soviet deployment in the valley. The Soviet withdrawal	
follows intensified activity that included operations	
in the Hazara Valley and the deployment of Soviettroops_into the upper reaches of the Panjsher Valley.	
and the state of t	25X
In other regions, areas of Kabul and the Soviet	
military complex at Darulaman were rocketed on 16 and	
18 July, respectively, according to the US Embassy. In Feyzabad, Badakhshan, guerrilla attacks nearly	
succeeded in closing the airport,	25X
	25x
The crew of two Soviet MI-25 Hind helicopters defected to Pakistan on 13 July, bringing their aircraft with them. Guerrilla spokesmen in Peshawar reported that	
131 captured Afghan officers about to be exchanged were killed when Afghan Government helicopters bombed a mujahedin stronghold in the Panjsher Valley.	25x
CATUATYON AN USBAT	25X
SITUATION IN HERAT	232
resistance forces were	25X
successful in operations in the first part of this month against Soviet and regime units in Herat. By	
10 July, the insurgents controlled two-thirds of the	
city, and by 17 July, after intense fighting, regime forces withdrew.	25 X 1
major elements of two Soviet motorized rifle regiments had left their garrisons in the Herat area.	25X
and left there garrisons in the herat area.	25X 25X
Comment: The regime's inability to improve its	
position in Herat probably has prompted another Soviet	
sweep of the area, The Soviets may temporarily suppress the	25X1 25X1
insurgents in the cityprobably at the cost of high	_5,(,
casualtiesbut they have insufficient forces to effect	
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	duamatic improvements in accumit.	house. The wall
	dramatic improvements in security the	nere. Ine well-
	to concentrate on attacking tangets	handan nasts
	organized insurgent forces in the auto concentrate on attacking targets convoys, and the fuel pipelineleft the Soviets conduct urban operations	t undefended while
	the Soviets conduct urban operation	s in Herat.

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	25X:
two Flogge	r 25X1
G-equipped Soviet fighter squadronsone at and another at Shindand airfieldshave rot They were replaced with two Flogger G varia equipped squadrons, which will marginally i Soviet air combat capabilities.	ated. nt-

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PERSPECT IVE	
NURISTAN: GATEWAY TO NORTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN	25X1
	25X1
Nuristan, a rugged area bordering Pakistan, is typical in many ways of the sparsely populated, remote regions of Afghanistan that are not strategic but that provide the insurgents with a safe source of supplies and transit. The Nuristanis are politically independent and generally have remained outside the conflict between the Kabul regime and the insurgents.	25X1
The Liberation of Nuristan	
Nuristan comprises the northern half of Konarha and Laghman Provinces in eastern Afghanistan. The area is inhabited by about 100,000 Nuristanis, one of Afghanistan's smaller ethnic groups. Most of the region is extremely mountainous and well-forested, making it difficult for Soviet and regime forces to penetrate, although armored vehicles can enter the area's three main river valleys on primitive dirt roads.	25X1
The Nuristanis were the first ethnic group to take up arms against the Communist regime in Kabul after the April 1978 coup. They revolted after Kabul authorities had executed the Afghan Interior Ministerthe highest ranking Nuristani official in the Daoud governmentand arrested a number of local Nuristani government officials, according to a Western observer. During the summer and autumn of 1978, they pushed the Afghan Army and police out of the area's three main river valleys.	25x1
A government effort to reconquer the region in late 1978 failed. The government organized a militia composed of about 20,000 neighboring Gujars (an Indian people originally from the Gujarat area of the Punjab) and 15,000 Pushtunsthe Nuristanis' traditional ethnic rivalsand promised them that they could pillage Nuristani villages, according to a Western observer.	

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Reinforced by three regular Army bath militia pushed its way back into three valleys in October 1978 but was force the spring. Several ineffective bomb Afghan Air Force against several Nurfailed to intimidate the area's inhalf and the intermidate the area's inhalf and the several Running and R	ee main river ed to retreat in bing attacks by the istani villages
Since the expulsion of the Afghan Armbeen important as an insurgent supply Nuristan's main trails have been used of several routes to the Panjsher Valuer and Afghanistan, Tajiks from Badakhshan have some the Foffensive in late 1982 to export gents in Pakistan to buy arms. The Nuristanis have sometimes harasse insurgents but have not actively sides	y route. d by Tajiks as one lley and to ave also used the Panjsher Valley s, which they sell ed the Tajik
Nuristani groups, who claimed they reindependent Nuristan, were demanding insurgents.	
Few Nuristanis have joined Kabul's magovernment funded Sanwar Nuristani, to commander of the Kabul Central Garris Minister Daoud, and sent him to north 1980 to raise a militia to interdict	the former son under Prime nern Afghanistan in

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Little Activity Against Soviet and Afghan Forces Nuristani insurgents have been active only in the upper Konar Valley, against the Afghan Army outpost at Barikowt. the most active commander was Jaliatullah Jalal, who began harassing the Afghan Army outpost in 1981 with about 500 armed men and subsequently gained control of a number of villages south of the outpost. Jalal's insurgents included about 120 Gujars, but that a change in leadership among either ethnic faction could cause this alliance to collapse. Other Nuristani insurgents have been inactive because they are far from Soviet and Afghan forces. With the exception of the upper Konar River Valley in Nuristan, Afghan and Soviet troops are located only in the southern part of Konarha and Laghman Provinces in Pushtun areas.	2.
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Pushtun areas. tribal and ethnic divisions continue to handicap	
	2
the Nuristanis. The two main insurgent leaders of the Nuristani interior, Mollah Afzal, the leader of the Kati tribal group of upper Nuristan, and Amin Anwuar	2
Khan, the leader of the Kam tribal group of lower Nuristan, have never cooperated extensively with each other or with Jalal in exchanging intelligence information or in attacking Soviet or Afghan forces. The Pushtun Hizbi Islami leader in southern Nuristan, Mollah Rustam, has extended his influence because of	
this lack of unity	25X

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Outlook

Nuristan probably will continue to have only a minor role in the insurgency. The Soviets and Afghan Government are unlikely to seek military domination of the area in the near term because of its remoteness, rough terrain, and independent populace. Meanwhile, the region will remain important as one of several transit routes for the insurgents, especially the Jamiat.

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Portr	rait of the Nuristanis	
considered to be now thought to be central Asia. Th	ern academics, the Nuristanisordescendants of the ancient Greeks related to an earlier people frey tend to have lighter features sive towards women than other Af	sare om and
the Kabul authori Islam in 1895 by the name of their infidels) to Nuri were treated well	re the last people to be conquerties. They were converted forci the King of Afghanistan, who cha region from Kafiristan (land of stan (land of light). The Nuris by the King and proved loyal su ccessors. Many rose to prominen d military.	bly to nged tanis bjects
with their southe Gujars. Accordin siezed most of th areas over the la Nuristanis into t Gujars, though le have been competi Nuristanis and th	aditionally have been on poor tern neighbors, the Pushtuns and g to Nuristani tradition, the Pust several centuries and forced he back valleys and mountains. Ess numerous than the Pushtuns, a tors for land. Warfare between the Pushtuns was frequent until the pushtuns.	shtuns asin the The lso the

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