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


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# **Afghanistan Situation Report**

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9 July 1985



State Dept. review completed

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	AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT	
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INSURGENTS INCREASE PRESSURE IN KABUL AND HERAT	25 <b>X</b> 1
The US Embassy reports that insurgents on 2 July rocketed several areas of Kabul while attacking the airport with machinegun fire and rockets or mortars. In mid-May, according to US Embassy sources, security in Herat was so poor that the provincial governor moved about in an APC with an armed escort. The 12-kilometer trip from the airport to the city required 90 minutes and involved passing through successive Soviet, regime,	051/4
Comment: The insurgent attacks on Kabul are the largest since the Soviets increased security in the area last November and coincide with reports that insurgents in the Kabul area are receiving more and better arms. Security in Herat has been deteriorating for months. The attacks will force the Soviets to move units again through the outlying areas of both cities in search of insurgent bands.	25X1 25X1
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AN	IMPEDES SUPPLY FLOWS	. 2
	Iran is again impeding the flow of materiel to	25
	insurgents in western Afghanistan.	2
	The guerrillas have waited	
	six to nine months before obtaining permission to ship weapons and ammunition from the triborder area in	25
	southwestern Afghanistan north to Herat. Some Hizbi Islami insurgents informed the Iranians that they would	
	prefer the danger of transporting supplies across the western plains of Afghanistan to dealing with Iranian	
	officials.	
	Comment: Tehran's continuing reluctance to assist the	
	mostly Sunni insurgents in western Afghanistan, even by	
	allowing supply caravans to transit Iranian territory, will oblige the resistance to rely more heavily on	
	captured arms and may cause it to postpone or cancel some operations while awaiting supplies. Shortages of	
	arms during major Soviet operationslast summer, for	
	examplereduced the insurgents' fighting capability.	,
BR	IEF :	
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	A Now York Times issues list to the same and	
	A New York Times journalist who recently travelled extensively in Afghanistan says that the resistance	
	controls about 95 percent of the countryside and that he saw no signs of famine or large-scale	
	attacks on civilians. The correspondent is	
	preparing a series of articles on his travels.	

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PERSPECTIVE		25 <b>X</b> 1
	AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE	25X
insurgency. Porganizations affiliated with southern and epolitically from the extreme Is Hekmatyar and Pashtun insurg Tajik-dominate Pashtun insurg frequently fou internecine fihave been milifighting the S	gent groups are central to the Afrashtuns lead most of the major rebased in Peshawar, and the groups the them dominate the insurgency in them dominate the insurgency is astern provinces. The exiles range of the monarchists linked with Galamic fundamentalists led by Gull Sayyaf. In the northern province gents have often been at odds with add Jamiat-i-Islami. In Qandahar figents from different tribes have gents from different tribes have gents. Their most noted command that has been responsible for many of Kabul area.	esistance  the  the  ailani to  buddin  es, the  rovince,  ole in  shtuns  groups  der is
determined res Kabul regime a difficulties i The Pashtun et insurgents' in are aggressive linked mainly of conduct (Pa in which venge comprise much military offic Pashtuns, incl	ultural factors account for the listance to the Soviet invaders and at the same time for the tribe n mounting a coherent military end has been a major factor in the ternecine fighting and rivalry.  I, fractious, and martial. They also do not be a common language (Pashtu) and shtunwali) based on Islam and trance is a key element. Though Parance is a key element in the latest	nd the esmen's fort. ne Pashtuns are I a code adition, ashtuns inate the ban several
		2000
dominant ethni academic exper in Afghanistan eastern, and n	re the largest and the politicall c group in Afghanistan. According ts, an estimated 6 million Pashtu, with the majority in the souther ortheastern parts of the country. farming and livestock raising; or the country.	ig to ins live ern, Most

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are merchants, artisans, soldiers, and civil servants; about a third are normally pastoral nomads, though the war has severely disrupted their migratory habits and turned many into sedentary refugees. Nearly all are Sunni. The more than 20 Pashtun tribes are divided into more than 400 clans; most tribes are grouped into the Durani and Ghilzai tribal confederations, which rose in opposition to each other in the 18th century.

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## Leadership and Hierarchy

Pashtun insurgent leaders are chosen for several reasons, including their military effectiveness. According to Western and Afghan academicians, a Pashtun leader is selected on the basis of his ability to protect his tribe from external threats and to solve internal tribal problems. Leadership qualities include bravery, wisdom, charisma, wealth, fighting ability, and hospitality--a willingness to receive, feed, and support others. To have a significant contingent of fighters, a tribal leader must come from a fairly large clan, according to an Afghan academician. Leaders are not normally elected by formal ceremony or vote, according to an academic expert, but emerge by demonstrating ability and are accepted by consensus. Once a person is regarded as a leader, a family member--usually a son or brother--customarily replaces him when he dies or grows too old to lead. Although the tribes have a hierarchy, the Pashtuns value individual freedom, equality, and respect for the dignity of the individual, according to Western observers.

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## <u>Pashtunwali</u>

The Pashtun code, Pashtunwali, is responsible for many of the divisions in Pashtun society and the insurgency. Accenting militarism and honor, the code has as its most important elements **badal**, vengeance; **melmastia**, the obligation of hospitality and the protection given each guest; and **nanavati**, the right of asylum and the obligation to accept a truce offer. The principles of honor and revenge have made feuds continuous processes in the Pashtun community. To infringe on someone's honor is cause for killing the transgressor, which in turn will call for another death

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	in revenge; blood money is sometimes accepted.	
	Families are obliged to seek vengeance, even after a	
	generation or more, and <b>badal</b> has led to feuds lasting	
	several generations. Melmastia is a matter of prestige	
	and a duty of the individual household. Hospitality	
	must be extended to known enemies as lavishly as to	
	friends or strangers. In turn the guest is expected to	
	behave in a friendly manner. Nanavati is a special	÷
	form of hospitality illustrated by a Pashtun folk story	
	that praises a woman who granted sanctuary to her son's murderer.	25 <b>X</b> 1′
	murderer.	Z3 <b>X</b> I
	Loyalties. A Pashtun's commitment to persons and	
	groups outside the family and clan is uncertain and	
	impermanent. According to Western observers, a	
	Pashtun's first loyalty is to his kin group, which is	
	the source of his livelihood, his social neighborhood,	
	and his moral code. His loyalty extends to his tribe	
	and nation only insofar as his family interests	
	coincide with the larger groups'. The importance of an	
	issue is often measured by how much it involves his	
	family honor or welfare.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Pashtun tribesmen have frequently agreed to truces with	
	the Kabul regime and have also agreed to serve as regime militia.	0EV4
	regime militia in many instances the tribesmen have accepted the government's	25 <b>X</b> 1
	offers of money and weapons and soon after redefected	
	to the resistance. Sometimes the tribesmen have agreed	
	to negotiate and then ambushed the regime's	
	negotiators. Such behavior is permitted by the tribal	
	codes, according to a Western academic expert, because	
	the regime is not considered a legitimate authority.	
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	Militancy. Tradition also encourages Pashtuns to	τ
	participate in the insurgency. Pashtuns, according to	
	Western observers, admire the posturing warrior, with	
;	bandoleer and rifle, who stands erect and moves	
	lithely. Readiness to do battle is suggested not only	
	by the custom of carrying weapons but also by village	
	construction the high defense towers of the fortified	
	village are common throughout Afghanistan, but	
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particularly in Pashtun territory. The heroic spirit, according to one Western observer, has prompted Pashtun insurgents to carry tape recorders to ambushes and fire fights. The recorded sounds of battle accompanied by the shouting of fierce insults and slogans are taken back to camp and played to admiring women and children. Reliable observers also indicate that Pashtuns prefer individual weapons to crew-served weapons because the former permit personal identification and greater ego gratification.

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Rivalry. The Pashtun custom of cousin marriage--a man weds the daughter of his father's brother--perpetuates the inward-looking nature of the society, according to Western observers, and often causes male cousins to become rivals, vying for inheritance from the common grandfather, for wives, and for influence within the family. Cousin rivalry has caused many Pashtun family feuds and is an important factor in tribal politics. If there are two factions within a tribe, cousins will usually be in opposite camps. Fundamentalist resistance leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, for example, is a first cousin of former President Hafizullah Amin, according to a Western academician.

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#### Pushtunistan

The concept of a united Pushtunistan has been a periodic battle cry of the Pashtuns. Advocates seek self-determination for the Pashtuns--that is, for those in Pakistan--and some want relocation of the border eastward to the Indus escarpment. The irredentist approach of successive Afghan governments has had diminishing appeal for Pashtun tribal leaders in Pakistan, however, who seem to prefer greater local autonomy within Pakistan to political union with their Afghan brothers.

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### Conclusion

The lack of a united front on Pushtunistan as well as other subjects underscores the individualistic nature of the Pashtuns. Of all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the Pashtun insurgents are the least likely to cooperate among themselves, let alone with others, but the most likely to fight indefinitely.

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