Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1



650

Top Secret

file Soured

25X1

Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

18 June 1985

79-81 IMC/CB

Top Secret

NESA M:85-10130JX SOVA M 85-10113JX

18 June 1985




•	Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T01058R00040650000	1-1
	TOP SECRET	•
	25X1	
	AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT	
	CONTENTS	
	SOVIETS TAILOR SPETSNAZ UNITS FOR AFGHANISTAN	1
	Soviet special-purpose forces (Spetsnaz) in Afghanistan are trained for, and perform, different tasks than other Spetsnaz units	
		1 2
	IN BRIEF	3
	PERSPECTIVE	. 25
	AFGHANISTAN IN MAY	5
25X1	The Soviets launched their spring offensive in May. The largest operation occurred in the Konar Valley Soviet and Afghan troops,	
	supported by large numbers of aircraft, relieved the beseiged Afghan garrison at Barikowt (in early June) and disrupted insurgent resupply efforts.	25)
	This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near	
	Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to	25X
		25)
	18 June 198 NESA M 85-1	5

	25X1	1
	SOVIETS TAILOR SPETSNAZ UNITS FOR AFGHANISTAN	25 X 1
	Soviet special-purpose forces (Spetsnaz) in Afghanistan perform different tasks than other Spetsnaz units. Instead of concentrating on reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy linesclassic Spetsnaz missionsSpetsnaz units in Afghanistan are used primarily as elite ground	: : :
25 X 1	unit combat troops. in Afghanistan Spetsnaz are used to interdict insurgent supply lines and support sweep operations conducted by regular ground troops and also conduct typical Spetsnaz missions such as extended patrols and	25X1
	ambushes.	25X1
		25 X 1
	Comment: The Soviets clearly have found that the Afghan conflict requires both Spetsnaz and traditional ground combat skills. We believe the Soviets are manning the battalions in Afghanistan with conscripts specially trained for Afghan missions and that these	
	troops may lack some capabilities, such as intelligence collection and sabotage, characteristic of Spetsnaz	25 X 1,
	troops opposite NATO.	25X1
		25X ²
		. :
	18 June 1985 NESA M 85-101 1 25X1 SOVA M 85-101	

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1


<u>TOP</u>	SECRET	:	. :	2011	

25X1



25X1

18 June 1985 NESA M 85-10130JX SOVA M 85-10113JX



TOP SECR	LET	
 5X1	Pravda's Kabul correspondent had seen security improve in the capital but not elsewhere during the last two and one-half years. Travel outside Kabul was tense and required elaborate and burdensome logistical and security preparations, he said.	25X 25X1
		20/
·		
	25X1 18 June 1985 NESA M 85-10130 4 SOVA M 85-10113	

25X1

•	Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP8		1
		TOP SECRET	
	25X1		;
	•		
	PERSPECTIVE		
	AF GHANISTAN IN MAY NE SA		25X1
25X1	The Soviets launched their spring off simultaneous operations in the Konar the Pakistani border; in Ghazni, Lowe Provinces also in the east; and in set the south, west, and north as well. probably involved the largest number troops and aircraft of any Soviet operations are arrived in opening the Afghan Army garrison at Barikowt besieged by insurgents during the past operation also probably disrupted in efforts temporarily. It resulted in casualties for both sides. The Konar terrain and its proximity to Pakistant tages for the insurgents, however, and them to resume their activities in the sides.	River Valley near gar, and Paktia everal locations in The Konar campaign of heliborne eration to date and a supply road to, which had been st year. The surgent resupply relatively high rarea's rough n provide advan-nd should enable	:
	The Konar Valley Campaign	•	5X1
25 X 1	The Konar operation was the largest since the April 1984 Panjsher campai	ground operation gn. Soviet and Afghan	25X1
25 X 1	multiple rocket launchers took part. nearly all Soviet air	s, artillery, and	25X1
25X1	Afghanistan were involved.		25X1
25 X 1]
			25X1
25X1	reached Asmar by the end of May and ducted a major sweep in the adjacent which insurgents use as a supply rou	Pich River Valley,	
25 X 1	Valley.		25X
	5	18 June 1985 NESA M 85-10 SOVA M 85-10	; 130JX

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1

	DP SECRET	•
	JEGNET	25 X 1
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	25 X 1
		. 4
25X1	most of an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 insurgents in the valley initially withdrew from the valley to avoid the intensive aerial bombardment. They subsequently returned to ambush convoys, raid small outposts, and fire rockets and mortars at the larger garrisons. Konar insurgents are	25X1
23/1	better armed than any other insurgent groups because of their proximity to Pakistan.	25X
	Soviet Operations in Other Areas	
	The Soviets mounted smaller operations elsewhere in Afghanistan. Diplomatic sources indicate that the Soviets cleared the Kabul-to-Gardeyz road and attacked insurgent positions in Lowgar, Paktia, and Nangarhar Provinces. We believe the Soviets are continuing to emphasize operations in these provinces in order to block the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistan. The Soviets also expanded their presence in Ghazni City and conducted several heliborne assaults among the surrounding villages, according to diplomatic sources.	
25 X 1		
		25X1
	the Courtet	
25 X 1	the Soviet motorized rifle division at Shindand was involved in multibattalion operations in western Afghanistan from early to mid-May and that Soviet ground forces were active around Kholm in Samangan Province in northern Afghanistan.	25X1
	25X1 18 June 1985 NESA M 85-10130 6 SOVA M 85-10113	

	TOP SECRET	
·	Cross-Border Airstrikes	
,		25X
X1	aircraft from Afghanistan bombed Arandu on the Pakistani border, across from the Afghan Army garrison at Barikowt, three times and that a fourth attack occurred near on the border in Baluchistan. None of these attacks caused casualties	25X1
	An airstrike deeper inside Pakistani territory on 31 May, however, caused the largest number of casualties since January 1984. Eight aircraft killed 11 civilians and wounded 30 others near Drosh approximately 14 miles into Pakistani territory at the northern end of the Konar River Valley.	2 5
	Insurgent Initiatives	25 X 1
- 1/4		
5X1	Sources of the US Embassy in Kabul report that insurgents bombed Jalalabad airport in early May as tribal leaders returned from a meeting with regime officials.	25X1
5 X 1	that insurgents bombed Jalalabad airport in early May as tribal leaders returned from a meeting with regime	25X1 25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1

25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1 TOP SECRET 25X1 The insurgents were active in Herat and Qandahar. 25X1 insurgents set the governor's house on fire and harassed the Soviet and 25X1 Afghan Army outposts that ring the city. the insurgents harassed 25X1 Afghan Army outposts and <u>stripped a tank qiv</u>en to them 25X1 by Afghan Army defectors. 25X1 Untested US Embassy sources say that one helicopter crashed near Feyzabad in Badakhshan, two others crashed near Kabul, and a MIG-17 was downed in Nangarhar The sources do not know if these planes were 25X1 shot down or crashed because of malfunctions. Outlook We believe the Konar operation will disrupt temporarily insurgent resupply efforts and force the querrillas to find alternative and perhaps less accessible infiltra-But the Soviets are likely to find longtion routes. term success difficult to secure. Even if the Soviets establish permanent garrisons between Asadabad and Barikowt, however, they will be vulnerable to insurgent The Konar's difficult terrain will also harassment. make Soviet resupply difficult. 25X1 The next phase of the Soviets' campaign may be a summer offensive against strategic areas in which the resistance is strong, such as the Panjsher Valley and Qandahar and Herat cities. Unless they add to their forces, Soviet large-scale operations against these areas would reduce significantly the forces available to block insurgent infiltration routes in the border areas. 25X1

> 18 June 1985 NESA M 85-10130JX SOVA M 85-10113JX

25X1

Sanitized Copy	Approved for Release 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T0)1058R000406500001-1
Top Secret		•
	25X1	

Top Secret