




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
Afghanistan Situation Report



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
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
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
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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
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AFGHAN OFFICIAL EXPELLED BY PAKISTAN


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Islamabad expelled the Afghan Consul General in Peshawar after linking him with recent terrorist incidents in Pakistan. 

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SELLING AFGHAN REFUGEE FAMILIES

3

Sales of Afghan refugee families in Pakistan are reportedly increasing so that buyers can gain food rations and support allowances. 

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IN BRIEF

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


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PERSPECTIVE

THE WAR IN KONARHA PROVINCE, 1978-1984

4

Major Soviet offensives in early 1980 wrested control of the Konar Valley from the insurgents, but increasing insurgent effectiveness and a declining Soviet effort have left the Afghan Government with only a slightly better situation than at the time of the invasion. 

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AFGHAN OFFICIAL EXPELLED BY PAKISTAN



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The Government of Pakistan recently declared the Afghan Consul General in Peshawar **persona non grata**, reports the US Embassy in Islamabad. A Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told US diplomats that Islamabad had evidence linking the Afghan to a failed attempt to bomb the Peshawar headquarters of resistance leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and to several other recent terrorist incidents. Afghanistan retaliated for the Consul General's expulsion by expelling the Pakistani third secretary in Kabul.

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Comment: Islamabad has long suspected the Afghan Consulates in Peshawar and Quetta of aiding KHAD activities in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Provinces.



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albeit with little success in disrupting the mujahidin or fomenting Pakistani resistance to the Zia government. Pakistan continues to tolerate an Afghan diplomatic presence, however, in order to maintain its consulates in Afghanistan to monitor Soviet and Afghan regime activities there. Neither country has publicized the expulsions, probably because both want to avoid publicly souring prospects for the next round of Geneva peace talks set for late April or early May.



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SELLING AFGHAN REFUGEE FAMILIES 

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
 an increase in the "sale" of Afghan refugee families living in camps in Baluchistan. The buyer becomes the new tribal head of the family that is sold and gains control of its aid rations and support allowances. 
 in two recent sales, the going price for a family was about 1,000 Pakistani rupees--a little over \$60. 

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
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
Comment: Refugee administrators in Pakistan use Afghan tribal leaders to help distribute assistance to Afghan refugees. Although this system follows tribal traditions, it also provides opportunities for graft and inequities. If the selling of families becomes more widespread, refugee and insurgent morale is likely to decline because buyers tend to show less interest in the welfare of their charges than did the original leaders. 

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IN BRIEF





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--  Afghan party factionalism was responsible for a fight between a KHAD unit and a provincial police force near Kabul that resulted in 28 dead and eight wounded. 

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--  insurgents have enough technicians to maintain a repair shop for refitting captured Soviet weapons in the Hazara tributary of the Panjsher Valley. Masood had lost a number of technically trained persons in the exodus of civilians caused by Soviet offensives in 1984. 

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
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PERSPECTIVE

THE WAR IN KONARHA PROVINCE: 1978-1984

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Insurgents controlled all but a few isolated posts in Konarha Province at the time of the Soviet invasion. Major Soviet operations in the spring of 1980 restored tenuous government control in the Konar Valley. Since then, increasing insurgent effectiveness and a declining Soviet effort have left the government with only a few more posts than it held at the time of the invasion.

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The Province

Difficult terrain has evidently discouraged Soviet or government military operations. Only a few narrow valleys cut through the rugged mountains of Konarha Province where travel is possible only by animal or on foot. Almost all military operations have been along the province's only motorable roads in the valleys of the Konar River and its two main tributaries the Basgul (or Landay Sin) and the Pech Dara.

- The Konar flows through the southern part of the province roughly paralleling the Afghan-Pakistani border after entering Afghanistan near Barikowt. Before the war, about half the population--predominately Pushtun--lived in the Konar Valley. Much of Konarha's population has since fled to Pakistan. Asadabad, the provincial capital, and Asmar, the main military base about 30 kilometers to the north, are located on the Konar's banks.
- The Basgul (or Landay Sin) roughly parallels the border in the northern part of the province, joining the Konar near Barikowt. Kamdesh is the most important town in the valley. About 10 percent of the population--predominately Nuristanis--lived in this region before the war.
- The Pech Dara flows east through southern Konarha to Asadabad, located about halfway between Barikowt and the province's southern


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
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border. The valley contained about a quarter of the province's population before the war. 

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Konarha's main importance to the insurgents is probably symbolic--the resistance began in Konarha and had some of its greatest victories there early in the war. Islamic fundamentalist resistance broke out in the Pech Dara Valley in December 1977, 

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. After the Communist coup in Kabul the following April, tribesmen in the Basgul Valley also rose against the government. By autumn, fighting was heavy in the Pech Dara, insurgents had seized most of the Basgul, and some insurgents were active in the Konar Valley. 


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The arrival of two regiments from Kabul in late 1978 to support the Afghan regime's mountain brigade permanently stationed at Asmar enabled the government to clear the Basgul Valley in January 1979, but an effort to strengthen control in the Pech Dara Valley failed the following month. Despite heavy air attacks that destroyed many villages and parts of Kamdesh, in March and April insurgents forced government forces to withdraw from the Basgul Valley. 


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Government forces also retreated from the Pech Dara, and by April insurgents were besieging posts in the Konar Valley. Insurgent pressure mounted during the summer and on 20 August the brigade at Asmar mutinied and surrendered. 

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except for a few kilometers outside Asadabad and Barikowt, the insurgents held the entire province. 

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Fighting in Konarha also strengthens other conclusions we have reached from examining the war elsewhere in Afghanistan:

- The Afghan Army is generally unable to hold its own without Soviet help.
- Terrain plays a major part in determining areas of military operations.
- Soviet and Afghan regime clearing operations have little lasting effect. 

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