




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# Afghanistan Situation Report



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29 January 1985

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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PAKISTANI CAUTION ALONG BORDER [redacted] 1 25X1

Islamabad has tightened restrictions on Pakistan Air Force attacks against airspace violators to avoid provoking escalation of Soviet-Afghan cross-border attacks. [redacted] 25X1

ZABIULLAH KHAN KILLED [redacted] 1 25X1

The Jamiat commander in Balkh Province may have been the victim of fighting among insurgent groups. [redacted] 25X1



IN BRIEF 2

PERSPECTIVES

ISMAIL KHAN: A UNIFYING FORCE FOR RESISTANCE IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN? [redacted] 3 25X1

Herat's Jamiat leader, Ismail Khan, has built one of the most effective insurgent organizations in western Afghanistan, and his efforts may prove important to the long-term survival of the insurgency in the west. [redacted] 25X1



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
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


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
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
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PAKISTANI CAUTION ALONG BORDER [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the Pakistan Air Force must now receive authorization from the highest levels in Islamabad before it could shoot down Soviet or Afghan aircraft over Pakistani territory.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Pakistani border troops may have shot down as many as two aircraft since last June--both crashed in Afghanistan--and fired on three aircraft that bombed the Arandu area on 23 January.

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**Comment:** Previously, the Pakistan Air Force could shoot at any aircraft from Afghanistan that were more than 10 miles in Pakistani airspace as long as the aircraft would crash in Pakistan. The tightening restrictions indicate that Islamabad does not want to cause an incident that might provoke an escalation of Soviet and Afghan cross-border attacks.

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[Redacted] Islamabad is trying to strengthen its control over Frontier Corps forces in the border regions, as well as to receive timely informatin on air incursions. In any event, the border posts are likely to continue firing at intruding aircraft.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] By limiting its own military activity along the border, Islamabad probably is trying to keep Moscow from escalating military pressure on Pakistan.

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[Redacted]

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IN BRIEF

-- [Redacted] heavy snowfall has increased the prospects for good crops in southwestern Afghanistan this year. Resistance and tribal leaders are urging farmers in refugee camps in Pakistan to return to Afghanistan for planting and harvesting. [Redacted]

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-- East Germany's ambassador to Kabul told US officials that Afghan Politburo member Nur Ahmad Nur was being groomed for "a very high post" and would remain in Moscow another year. The official also said it would require 20 or 30 years for a Marxist system like East Germany's to begin to take hold in Afghanistan. [Redacted]

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PERSPECTIVE

ISMAIL KHAN: A UNIFYING FORCE FOR RESISTANCE IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN?

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Since 1979 Jamiat-i-Islami leader Ismail Khan has built one of the largest and most effective insurgent organizations in western Afghanistan. Soviet and Afghan forces, despite repeated efforts to clear the Herat area, have failed to suppress Ismail's fighters and have suffered high casualties. Ismail's efforts to provide civilians with essential services through an insurgent administration have increased his popular support and may prove important to the long-term survival of resistance in the west.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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The Leader

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Ismail earned his rank of captain in the Afghan Army in the pre-Communist rule of Daoud. He was strongly influenced by Iran's military, economic, and cultural ties to the West under the Shah and he has tried to follow a rational and pragmatic approach to problems.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Ismail joined the resistance in the Herat uprising in 1978 when he led some of his troops from the Afghan 17th Division against government forces loyal to the Communist regime. After the unsuccessful uprising, he spent four months in Golran and contacted the Jamiat-i-Islami in Mashhad, Iran, before returning to Herat, Badghisat, and Ghowr Provinces of Afghanistan to build the resistance. He then went to Peshawar, Pakistan, and received rection from the Jamiat-i-Islami. He was elected head of the Herat Jamiat-i-Islami in 1980.

[Redacted]

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Unlike many other regional insurgent leaders, Ismail is respected for his political as well as military acumen. He offers an alternative to those Afghans who find the Babrak regime and the feudalism of some insurgent leaders unacceptable.

[Redacted]

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Civilian Support

Ismail's followers claim he is a unifying force in the resistance in the West [redacted] Civilians in Herat, who have been among the strongest supporters of the insurgents, respect Ismail's organizational skills and his successes against Soviet and Afghan forces. Moreover, the civilians are predominantly Sufi, and Sufism emphasizes support for a single leader. [redacted]

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Civilians view Ismail as friendly, low key, and approachable [redacted] [redacted] He has taken care in his military planning to protect the lives of civilians and has established schools and hospitals in the Herat area. Ismail has also redistributed some land, and because Soviet reprisals would damage fields and insurgents are needed for agricultural work, seldom orders attacks when harvests are due. [redacted]

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Growing Insurgent Organization

Ismail's insurgent organization has grown substantially since 1979. It now is the most powerful and influential of Jamiat-i-Islami groups in western Afghanistan. [redacted]

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[redacted] Ismail has expanded his base, and his guerrillas now operate throughout Herat Province, and in Badghisat, northern Farah, and parts of Ghowr Provinces. Insurgent groups in western Afghanistan directly controlled by Ismail or loosely affiliated with him number at least 25,000 and possibly as many as 35,000.

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[redacted] Ismail claims to have at least 5,000 insurgents under his direct command in Herat City and about 10,000 more in the rest of the province. [redacted]

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[redacted] Herat Province is divided into subdivisions for administrative purposes, each with its own Shura (council)--authorized to tax civilians, run the schools, adjudicate, and build food stockpiles for emergencies--and a mobile force to ensure that the Shura's orders are carried out.

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[redacted] the organization also includes four councils at the provincial level: Executive, Military, Provincial, and Urban. Ismail and his deputy Alawuddin Khan serve as the highest ranking members on each council. Most of the other representatives on the councils are former army officers who are loyal to Ismail and command groups at the local level. The Executive Council is the central governing body, and the Military Council serves as the focal point for strategy at the provincial level. Financial, religious, agricultural, and medical issues are addressed by the Provincial Council. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Ismail has increased his efforts to foster cooperation with other insurgent organizations--especially other Jamiat groups--in the western provinces and maintains contact with resistance leaders in other parts of the country. [Redacted] he has formed military alliances with groups in Badghisat, Farah, and Ghowr, and occasionally assists insurgents in operations in Faryab Province. Moreover, Panjsher Valley commander Masood and Ismail have exchanged some personnel. Ismail's organization has tolerated smaller non-Jamiat groups in the area, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Insurgent Operations

Ismail's insurgents--divided into small, comparatively well-trained mobile groups--have become increasingly aggressive since 1979. In response, the Soviets have launched frequent multibattalion-size sweep operations. We estimate that the Soviets and Afghans have conducted at least 15 large sweeps during the past year to relieve insurgent pressure on the city and major roads in the Herat and Shindand areas. [Redacted]

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The insurgents repeatedly cut the roads leading to the Iranian and Soviet borders, and ambushes of Soviet convoys between the border city of Towraghondi and Herat and Shindand to the south [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The Soviets have constructed a series of military posts along the road to provide additional safety and have increased the size of supply columns. Nonetheless, the guerrillas continue to strike convoys moving through the area and now also attack the small military posts, especially between Herat and Eslam Qal'eh on the Iranian border. [Redacted]

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
The Jamiat insurgents in Herat have successfully denied the Soviets control over the city for the past five years and most likely will continue to prevent the Soviets and their Afghan allies from establishing more than temporary ascendancy in the provincial capital. Repeated sweeps through the bazaar have

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failed to prevent insurgent groups from reestablishing positions or maintaining constant pressure on Afghan posts in the city. A Soviet and Afghan sweep through the city in June resulted in intense fighting and high civilian casualties but failed to dislodge the insurgents. A cordon-and-sweep operation southwest of Herat in September apparently was only of limited effectiveness, and the Soviets and Afghans launched a new operation against the resistance in December. 

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The absence of Soviet positions in Herat City has facilitated the high level of guerrilla operations. US Embassy sources report that Afghan troops usually are reluctant to leave their posts in the city. At night, the guerrillas move frequently through regime areas. 

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
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The resistance conducts frequent assassinations and arrests of government sympathizers in the city,   
 US Embassy sources report that in mid-December, the guerrillas killed over a dozen KHAD (Afghan intelligence) officials. 

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**Outlook and Implications**

Resistance in the western provinces--fired to a large extent by religious fervor--is likely to grow. Ismail's insurgent organization probably will continue to deny the Soviets long-term control of the Herat area despite resupply problems; occasional tensions with smaller, rival organizations; and the lack of substantial support from Iran. 

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
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Area insurgent groups probably will continue to cooperate under Ismail's leadership. Because of his Tajik heritage, however, he is unlikely to become more than a regional resistance commander.



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
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