




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Afghanistan Situation Report



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15 January 1985

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT


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FACTIONAL INSECURITIES AMONG REGIME LEADERS

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Factionalism remains a significant problem in the government, and President Babrak recently warned Afghan Army officials, the Interior Ministry, and KHAD against criticism of his regime.



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
MOSCOW GIVES CORRECT TREATMENT TO 20TH PDPA ANNIVERSARY

1

Moscow sent a lower level delegation to the Kabul celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.



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President Zia is unlikely to change his position on his Afghanistan policy, but cynicism in Pakistan is widespread and few people believe the Soviets can be dislodged.



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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to



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PUBLICATION NOTE

Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we will not publish the AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT next week. The next report will appear on 29 January 1985.


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FACTIONAL INSECURITIES AMONG REGIME LEADERS [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the Babrak regime has begun a program to discredit the Khalqi faction of the ruling party. The program allegedly will permit public criticism of Khalqis and involve prosecution of Khalqis for crimes committed during Taraki's rule. [Redacted] in separate speeches to Afghan Army officials, the Interior Ministry, and KHAD, Babrak warned against criticism of his regime. He complained that senior Afghan officials frequently discuss with their Soviet advisers the prospects for a change in the Afghan leadership. [Redacted]

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Comment:

The appointment of a Khalqi to replace Defense Minister Qader probably produced a flood of rumors throughout Kabul officialdom that further leadership changes are in the offing. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Prosecutions and open criticism of Khalqis remain unlikely because of that faction's strength in the Army and the Interior Ministry. [Redacted]

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MOSCOW GIVES CORRECT TREATMENT TO 20TH PDPA ANNIVERSARY [Redacted]

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Moscow's delegation to the Kabul celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was headed by Uzbek First Secretary and Central Committee member Inamdzhon Usmankhodzayev and included party leaders from the Soviet Central Asian Republics. Usmankhodzayev's meeting with Afghan President Babrak Karmal was described by Soviet media as taking place in a "warm comradely atmosphere," with Karmal expressing "profound gratitude" for the Soviet Union's "great assistance". PRAVDA published the full text of Karmal's speech on the occasion. [Redacted]

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Comment:

The composition of the delegation, the level of Soviet media attention, and Soviet characterizations of the atmosphere are consistent with current Soviet practice for decennial party celebrations in Communist-oriented Third World countries. Moscow typically sends lower level delegations to party anniversaries than to observances of revolutions and national days. Moscow paid greater media attention and sent a higher level delegation to the April 1983 commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the Afghan revolution. The Soviet delegation on that occasion was headed by candidate Politburo member Sharif Rashidov, who was then first secretary of the Uzbek party. Moscow is not known to have sent any party delegation for the last major PDPA anniversary in January 1980, which occurred just after the Soviet invasion. [Redacted]

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


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


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insurgent attacks on a fuel pipeline in northwestern Afghanistan. Sabotage of the pipeline resulted in a large loss of fuel early this month. The guerrillas also attacked a fuel pipeline in Baghlan Province, causing several fires.



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Afghan army officers have instructed villagers to purchase and transport flour from Pakistan to Khost because it is cheaper and safer to transport than flour from Kabul. 

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PERSPECTIVE

THE VIEW FROM ISLAMABAD [REDACTED]

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This article is extracted from a report prepared by the US Embassy in Islamabad. [REDACTED]

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On the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, most Pakistanis view the Soviet presence as a fact of life. But Pakistanis hold a variety of attitudes about the domestic and international consequences of hosting over two million refugees. They have accused the refugees of:

- crowding Pakistanis out of economic opportunities, particularly in transportation and construction;
- increasing smuggling and arms/heroin trade;
- overtaxing limited in-patient and elective medical services;
- degrading the environment by destroying pasture land, forests, and water supplies;
- increasing crowding and disease in Peshawar, Quetta, and, to a lesser degree, Karachi; and
- raising crime rates. [REDACTED]

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These allegations are a mixture of fact and myth. The Afghans have begun to play a visible role in the country's transportation sector, but without the assistance of the Afghan transporters, indigenous transporters could not have met the needs of the refugees. The allegation that the refugees dominate construction trades because they receive free basic food and shelter and can thus underbid Pakistan's laborers is overstated; no Afghan receives food or shelter once he leaves the refugee camps. Afghans have placed a tremendous burden on the medical facilities in some areas of Pakistan; however, economic assistance from abroad is carrying a large share of the refugees' medical burden. The charges of degrading the environment and causing overcrowding are indisputable, at least within those areas where the refugees are concentrated. Afghans are certainly involved in the smuggling of drugs and arms and other goods, but statistics do not support the hypothesis that the presence of the Afghans has led to an increase in the crime rate. [REDACTED]

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The Pakistani public is sharply divided as to whether the refugees would return to Afghanistan if circumstances permitted. The refrain that the refugees never had it better and will stay to take advantage of the greater economic opportunities available in Pakistan is often heard. Others, primarily in government, believe that the refugees will return if a settlement

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is reached in the not too distant future. However, even President Zia this fall conceded that, at some future date, Pakistan must be prepared to absorb the refugees—to leave them festering in the camps indefinitely will eventually constitute a security risk for Pakistan. [REDACTED]

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The Dangers of Conflict

Some Pakistanis also see the Afghan refugees as an international liability heightening the risk of war for Pakistan with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. This view is frequently expressed by opposition politicians and intellectuals. They are convinced that the refugees constitute a target for Afghan/Soviet forces seeking to eliminate insurgent supply lines and intimidate Pakistani policymakers. They also see the refugees as a source of cover for foreign agents (especially KHAD) seeking to undermine Pakistan's internal security. [REDACTED]

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Zia's critics urge a more conciliatory GOP approach to the Afghan Government and Soviet Union, but public sentiment in favor of direct negotiations with the Afghan Government is spotty, and evidence of any broad opposition is inconclusive. Several "national" and regional parties are outspoken in criticizing the government and, interestingly, the government allows the media to report their comments in detail. Their leaders castigate the government's policy as neither war nor peace, and an invitation to more refugees and saboteurs. They accuse the GOP of unwillingness to undertake direct negotiations because it is beholden to the US. [REDACTED]

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However, Afghanistan is an issue on which Zia's domestic political opponents are divided. Even outspoken critics of the government's Afghan policy concede that the Soviets are an undesirable neighbor posing grave threats to Pakistan. They counter, however, that a martial law regime can ill afford to antagonize its Saudi and American paymasters and thus cannot work in good faith towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict. A popularly elected government, they argue, would have the strength of character to ignore pressure from the Saudis and Americans and to negotiate with the Afghan regime an honorable settlement which would lead to the return of the refugees and the withdrawal of the Soviets. They argue that once Pakistan entered into direct negotiations with the Karmal regime, a settlement would not be far behind. [REDACTED]

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There is no sign President Zia or any other top GOP leaders (civilian or military) are ready to change Pakistan's position. There is considerable skepticism in the military, as elsewhere, that the US can be counted on when the chips are down. The military, however, is even more doubtful about the consequences of doing business with the Soviets and their puppets in the Afghan regime, and some almost certainly believe Pakistan should take stronger military action against Afghan/Soviet border violations. We see little likelihood Afghanistan will be an issue in the upcoming national legislative elections. Opposition to the Pakistani Government's Afghanistan policy, however, could become more focused and widespread if there is a further

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significant escalation of Afghan/Soviet pressure on Pakistan beyond border areas now under attack and/or if a newly elected legislature becomes a forum allowing public criticism of Pakistani policy. [REDACTED]

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Baluchistan

We estimate there are around 300,000 Afghan refugees in Baluchistan; the official Pakistani tally after re-enumeration is 507,000. The refugees are an important economic force in Quetta and in the small towns near the Afghan border, and their presence and the international attention they attract has provided a considerable economic boost to the province. The Baluch worry, however, that a majority of the refugees will not return home, regardless of the war's outcome. They are concerned that the large numbers of refugees will tilt the ethnic balance in the province toward the Pathans, who will end up in control. However, there appears to be little tension between Afghan refugees and local residents, perhaps because the refugee population is concentrated in those areas which are predominately Pathan. Baluch leaders have been taken aback by the brutal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but they still like to allude to the prospect of cooperation with the Soviets as a means of obtaining some leverage with the government in Islamabad. [REDACTED]

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The Soviet presence in Afghanistan appears to have dampened Baluch yearning for independence. Active Soviet interference in provincial politics has seemingly not yet materialized. Prior to 1979 many Baluch considered Soviet support a viable option in a future confrontation with Pakistan. While this sentiment has not disappeared, any illusion that the Soviets would provide backing to tribal chieftains without trying to impose their own controls has run up against the reality of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

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Outside Influence

Pakistani perceptions of what the United States and other nations say about Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, and even more importantly how other nations are seen to support Pakistan's objectives, weigh heavily on Pakistan's perception of its own interests and policy toward Afghanistan. Pakistanis joke, but many believe, that the United States will support Afghanistan until the last drop of Pakistani and Afghan blood is shed. [REDACTED]

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
The readiness of 119 states to vote at the UN in favor of objectives in Afghanistan corresponding to those of Pakistan is not matched by their individual deeds to support those objectives. Consequently, the Pakistani government, its domestic critics, and general Pakistani public opinion have a nagging sense of lonely isolation in standing up to real and increased Afghan/Soviet pressure on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Over time, this is likely to affect Pakistan's willingness/ability to stick with its current policies. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Cynicism is widespread in Pakistan and few Pakistanis believe the Soviets can be dislodged from Afghanistan. At the same time, few are ready to accept the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. President Zia, in interpreting the recent referendum results as a mandate for him to remain in office another five years, is unlikely to show any slackening of his commitment to hold firmly to his Afghanistan policy. Nevertheless, Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan remains sensitive to domestic and international attitudes. 

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Islamabad is especially sensitive to US statements and actions. If the US and its allies focus on East-West arms talks and Afghanistan is relegated to the back burners, popular fears in Pakistan and pressure on Zia to compromise would grow. In short, the Pakistanis want Afghanistan to be seen by the world community as a test of Soviet willingness to play by accepted international norms of behavior. 

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Pakistan is carrying far more than its fair share of the burden of confronting the Soviets and supporting close to three million refugees. We expect this to continue at least as long as Zia is in control. But if Pakistan is not to falter over time, free world support must be at least maintained, and probably deepened and made more effective. 

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
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