




Directorate of Intelligence

Top Secret

(2)

570



25X1

# Afghanistan Situation Report



25X1

8 January 1985

Top Secret

NESA M 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX

25X1

8 January 1985

Copy 79

**Page Denied**

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

ESTIMATE OF INSURGENT STRENGTH

3

[Redacted] we estimate the number of full and part-time insurgents at 150,000. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

IN BRIEF

3

PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER

5

The Soviets and Afghans launched a large operation to relieve insurgent pressure in Paktia Province and stem infiltration from Pakistan, and the insurgents maintained a high level of activity in Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat Provinces. [Redacted]

25X1

THE SOKOLOV PROMOTION

8

The promotion of Marshal Sokolov to Defense Minister will lead to some shifting of responsibilities within the Soviet military for the war in Afghanistan. There are a number of senior Soviet officers who could succeed him as chief architect of the war. [Redacted]

25X1

8 January 1985  
NESA M 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX

[Redacted]


25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to



25X1

25X1

8 January 1985  
NESA M 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX


25X1



TOP SECRET



25X1



800084. 1-84




**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1


TOP SECRET



ESTIMATE OF INSURGENT STRENGTH



25X1



25X1

[redacted] we estimate the number of full and part-time insurgents at 150,000. Several thousand more—such as those in the Hazarehjat—are armed but fight the Soviets and regime only rarely, expending most of their energies in internecine conflicts. We further estimate that no more than five to 10 percent of the insurgents are under the operational control of any Peshawar-based group, though nearly all are affiliated with a Peshawar organization in at least some loose fashion for the purpose of obtaining support.

25X1



25X1

25X1

25X1

IN BRIEF

-- Resolutions passed by the Islamic Conference foreign ministers meeting in December criticized the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but the highly publicized final communique omitted reference to the Soviets in Afghanistan. Muslim diplomats said some Arab states were reluctant to fault the Soviets on non-Middle Eastern issues.

25X1

— Diplomatic sources in Kabul report the Afghan regime is planning the 20th anniversary celebration of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan on 10 January. [redacted] Politburo member Ponomarev and delegations from some 30 countries will come to Kabul. Few high-ranking officials are likely to attend because of poor security conditions and low esteem for Afghan leadership.

25X1

25X1

— On 5 January the Afghan Politburo announced that volunteers for military service would be required to serve a minimum of two rather than three years. This inducement is the latest in a continuing effort to gain recruits for the dwindling Afghan Army.

25X1

8 January 1985  
NESA M 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX



25X1

**Page Denied**



TOP SECRET

25X1



PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER

25X1



25X1

Signs of the Afghan insurgency's vitality five years after the Soviet invasion were abundant in December. For the third time in 1984, a large-scale Soviet and Afghan multibattalion operation was attempting to relieve insurgent pressure in Paktia Province and stem infiltration from Pakistan; the resistance maintained a high level of activity in Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat Provinces; and harassment of the Soviet and Afghan forces in the Panjsher Valley increased. Meanwhile, the sacking of Defense Minister Qader testified to the Soviets' dissatisfaction with the incompetence and infighting in the Afghan military.

25X1

As on the fourth anniversary of the invasion, the Soviets and the Kabul regime illustrated their ability to curtail guerrilla activity in the capital by means of extraordinary security measures. Moreover, the continuing availability of consumer goods and fuel in Kabul indicated that successive Soviet and Afghan assaults on the Panjsher Valley in 1984 have held down insurgent attacks on convoys on the vital highway from Termez to Kabul.

25X1



25X1

Paktia Province

One of the largest Soviet and Afghan multibattalion operations of the war in the border area began in mid-December in Paktia Province, but--like previous large-scale operations in Paktia in February and August--it will probably yield only temporary results and prove costly.

25X1

about two Soviet regiments and a large Afghan contingent are deployed in the Ali Khel area near the Pakistan border, and the area has been heavily bombed.

25X1

Soviet and Afghan forces are meeting fierce resistance when they try to leave their encampments.

25X1

The operation--like the earlier ones--probably is designed to relieve insurgent pressure on Ali Khel garrison and to close some of the insurgents' resupply routes. The insurgents are well armed and close to their support bases in Pakistan, however, and numerous passes allow them to transit the border area almost at will.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat

While winter weather may have contributed to limiting combat activity in much of Afghanistan, the insurgents maintained a high level of activity in Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat Provinces. According to US Embassy sources, insurgents and Soviet forces clashed frequently in the city of Ghazni in

8 January 1985  
NESAM 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX



25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

December, and security on the main highway through the province deteriorated. The sources claim that in one attack on a convoy, the insurgents damaged some 70 vehicles. Qandahar, often subjected to Soviet sweeps, remains insecure from the regime's point of view; US Embassy sources report that skirmishes with the resistance and bombing of the surrounding villages remain common. [redacted] a large Soviet and Afghan operation was underway in Herat during December, and US Embassy sources said that the insurgents destroyed several armored vehicles in a Soviet convoy near the provincial capital. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Kabul Area

As in 1983, tight security prevented the insurgents from carrying out significant action in Kabul to mark the 27 December anniversary of the Soviet invasion. The US Embassy reports that increased security measures included thorough searches of vehicles, night use of spotter planes and flares, and shelling of suspected insurgent concentrations. On several nights, nevertheless, guerrillas managed to harass Soviet positions and attack the Defense Ministry with rockets and heavy machineguns, according to US Embassy sources. Soviet pilots, the US Embassy reported, continued to exhibit concern over insurgent possession of heat-seeking missiles; the pilots fired flares and used tight spiral flight patterns on takeoffs and landings. [redacted]

25X1

Panjsher Valley

Insurgent pressure, harsh weather, and other problems hampered Soviet and Afghan military operations in the Panjsher Valley area. [redacted]

25X1

Embassy sources report that the insurgents have almost uncontested control of the upper valley and the side valleys, and continue to strike at convoys on the highway between Termez and Kabul, though not to the extent they did a year ago. [redacted]

25X1

Defense Minister's Dismissal

[redacted] Afghan Defense Minister Qader was removed for his lack of effectiveness, lack of ideological commitment, and inability to overcome problems of factionalism in the military ranks. Qader was replaced by Nazar Muhammad, a member of the Khalqi faction, which dominates the military. The move may boost morale among some party members in the military, but the Afghan forces' ineffectiveness--rooted in disloyalty, poor training, and manpower shortages--will be difficult to overcome. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

8 January 1985  
NESAM 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX


25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

Outlook

Increasingly harsh weather probably will keep combat actions at a low level. Besides providing security on the highway between Termez and Kabul, the Soviets' and Afghans' most difficult task will be to maintain their Panjsher garrisons in the face of insurgent harassment. 

25X1

8 January 1985  
NESA M 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX

25X1



TOP SECRET

25X1

## PERSPECTIVE

## THE SOKOLOV PROMOTION

[REDACTED]

The promotion of First Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov to Defense Minister will lead to some shifting of responsibilities within the Soviet military for the war in Afghanistan. Over the past five years, Sokolov has acted as the Defense Ministry's chief overseer of the war and probably has done more than any other individual to shape the current Soviet military approach to the war. Whoever assumes these responsibilities—Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces Petrov is a top candidate—will operate under Sokolov's continuing influence and the same constraints that have dominated for the past five years. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

The political leadership of the Soviet Union makes all the policy decisions on the war, including the key questions of manpower and material commitments. But the political leadership gives the Soviet military more leeway than military professionals generally receive in the West when it comes to tactics. [REDACTED]

25X1

A Favorable Report Card?

Sokolov's promotion, together with the elevation of Marshal Akhromeyev to the position of Chief of the General Staff last September, suggests that the Soviet leadership is not deeply concerned with the conduct of the war to date. Akhromeyev also has long been associated with the Afghan war, accompanying Sokolov on most of his visits to Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

25X1

Nonetheless, Sokolov and Akhromeyev have been subject to criticism for the USSR's lack of progress in the war and have had to endure internal debate over how to bring the war to a successful conclusion. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] there has been a continuing debate over the relative merits of multibattalion search and destroy operations (advocated by Sokolov) versus smaller unit ambush and raiding tactics (favored especially by Army General Mayorov, the senior Soviet commander in Afghanistan in 1980-81). An effective balance between these two approaches remains a problem for the Soviets to the present day; the larger operations tend to dominate, but not to the exclusion of small unit actions. [REDACTED]

25X1

Changes in Command

There are a number of senior officers who could succeed Sokolov as chief architect of the war. One of the leading contenders probably is Marshal


8 January 1985  
 NESA M 85-10007CX  
 SOVA M 85-10009CX

25X1


TOP SECRET



25X1


Petrov, currently Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, and also a candidate to replace Sokolov as a First Deputy Minister of Defense. Petrov has considerable experience in counterinsurgency, having directed Cuban operations in both Angola and Ethiopia. 

25X1

Army General Varennikov, currently First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and head of its Main Operations Directorate, might be tapped to replace Akhromeyev. In this position he too has been closely associated with operations in Afghanistan and has made a number of inspection trips there, the most recent last month. 

25X1

25X1



SECRET

8 January 1985  
NESA M 85-10007CX  
SOVA M 85-10009CX



25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

**Top Secret**