Approved For Release 1 8229/74 2009/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00150015

Approved For Release

2009/09/29:

CIA-RDP85T00875R00150015

Secret

25X1



# Economic Intelligence Weekly

Secret

CIA No. 8229/74 20 November 1974

Copy Nº 423



Secret	

25X1

## **ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY**

## 20 November 1974

Developed Countries: Export Volume Slumps	•	•	•	•		•	•	-	. 3
		•							. 6
End of Guarantees Should Depress Sterling				•					. 7
Sugar Prices: Spiral Continues									. 8
Israel: A Strained Economy			•						10
US-Soviet Trade: Shifting Gears									11
Notes, Publication of Interest, Statistics									

25X6

### Overview

Exports by the Seven Major Developed Countries declined 1% in real terms during the third quarter as a result of the worldwide economic downturn. Exports probably will continue to decline in the months ahead despite growth in sales to OPEC countries and the USSR.

The Thirtieth Annual Session of the GATT Contracting Parties in Geneva this week is expected to accomplish little more than a review of recent developments in world trade. LDC representatives will plead for greater preferential treatment in view of declining prices for their products and rising import costs. Developed country delegations will concentrate on preparing for January's Trade Negotiations Committee meeting, which is expected to revive movement in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

The Continued Soviet Buying Spree in the West promises to be a mixed blessing. Soviet contracts for Western plant and equipment, already at a record \$3 billion this year, will bolster depressed capital goods industries. Additional purchases of corn, wheat, and sugar, however, will strain already tight commodity markets.

Note: Comments and queries regarding the Economic Intelligence Weekly are welcomed. They may be directed

25X1

Secret	

25X1

The World Food Conference ended with agreement only on general goals. A World Food Council has been established to deal with the recommendations of the 130-nation conference. Key recommendations include

- a food aid program of at least 10 million tons of grain a year,
- an internationally coordinated system of national grain reserves,
- an international agricultural development fund, and
- a global information and early warning system on food and agriculture.

An Extended US Coal Strike would have a serious impact on many foreign purchasers. Coal stocks of world steel producers are low after several years of high steel output; the Canadian steel industry would be the first to be affected. Stocks held by utilities in Western Europe have been drawn down to reduce oil consumption.

Currency Speculation last week centered around the remark by West German
Chancellor Schmidt that he would not object to an appreciation of the mark. This
statement, coupled with an apparent absence of heavy central bank support, led
to substantial speculation against the dollar. The traditionally strong Deutschmark
and Swiss franc appreciated 4.7% and 7.6%, respectively.

25X1


Secret

### **Articles**

### DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: EXPORT VOLUME SLUMPS


The seven major industrial countries are encountering growing weakness in export demand on top of the sluggishness in domestic demand. In the third quarter of 1974, their combined export volume declined by 1%, or at an annual rate of 4%. Export performance would have been even more dismal if the drop in sales among the seven had not been offset by increases in sales elsewhere.

The third-quarter trend contrasts sharply with the change in the first quarter, when exports by the seven countries rose at an annual rate of 19%. During the first quarter, their trade with one another remained buoyant, partly because automobile manufacturers were building up inventories. By the second



quarter, trade among the seven had flattened out. Continued demand from the rest of the world nevertheless permitted a moderate rise in their total exports.

OPEC countries now are providing the main stimulus to foreign sales. Because economic slowdown and payments deficits are hitting the smaller OECD countries as well, their imports from the seven dropped markedly in the third quarter. Sales to the rest of the world slowed as the financial problems of non-oil LDCs worsened.



Secret

# Developed Countries<sup>1</sup>: Change in Volume of Exports, by Destination

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Percent
	_	over Previous		
	1974 I	1974 II	1974 III	Share of Exports 1973
Total exports	4.4	1.5	-1.0	100,0
To developed countries	7.2	-0.1	-4.7	39.5
To smaller OECD countries	4.4	3.6	-4.6	30.8
To OPEC countries To non-OPEC LDCs and	12.1	13.4	14.0	3.9
Communist countries	3.0	4.6	2.0	25.8

<sup>1.</sup> Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany.

Some countries have been hit harder than others. The sharp drop in Canadian export volume reflects a cutback in oil shipments as well as the slowdown in the US economy. France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom have suffered from a broad decline in demand for intermediate and manufactured goods. Japan has kept sales growing through an all-out export drive, but its efforts met with diminished success in the third quarter. Italy's remarkable export performance in the third quarter resulted from a combination of a 7% depreciation of the lira, an export promotion drive, and an austerity program that will be difficult to sustain.

The implications of a continued decline in export volume are ominous. The low rate of economic growth in major industrial countries forecast for the year ending in June 1975 is predicated on a 6% annual rise in export volume. Continuation of third-quarter export trends would further dampen chances for an economic recovery in the months ahead.

Note: Changes in the physical volume of trade for each of the seven countries were calculated by taking officially reported value series and adjusting them by export and import price indexes.

STAT

\* \* \* \*

5



					2
		* * *	*		
Londor of sterling a be less willing sell-off of p	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings.	eliminate exchange tend to weaken to accumulate steem. The oil produce the state of the pound.	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat	es for official Ough oil produ Inlikely to star tive financial I	rt a rapid managers
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchang tend to weaken t o accumulate ste	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	icers will rt a rapid managers roughly
Londor of sterling a be less willing sell-off of p and stand to	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	icers will rt a rapid managers roughly
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about
Londor of sterling a be less willing self-off of p and stand to \$4 billion s	n's decision to e at yearend will t ng than before to present holdings. o lose a great d	eliminate exchanged to weaken to accumulate ste The oil produce al if the pound	ge-rate guaranted he pound. Altho rling, they are u ers are conservat plummets. The	es for official ough oil produntikely to startive financial rey have added	rt a rapid managers roughly to about

Approved For Release 2009/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150050-1

Approved For Release 2009/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150050-1

The guarantees cover less than \$1.4 billion of OPEC members' sterling assets -basically investments made before the recent surge in oil revenues. These guarantees nonetheless are important psychologically because of the implied British commitment to maintaining the value of the pound. The pound is overvalued in terms of the trade competitiveness of British industry. The exchange rate for sterling has been maintained this year in part because of the willingness of oil producers to invest a substantial part of their surplus earnings in sterling denominated assets. If the oil producers anticipate that the pound is headed down and stop accumulating sterling, the prophecy could easily become self-fulfilling. One Middle East country apparently has already decided to get out of sterling in an orderly manner.

A gradual depreciation of sterling accompanied by reduced OPEC investment probably would not present much of a problem for the United Kingdom in the short run. Although part of the British trade deficit would no longer be financed automatically by the reflow of oil money, Britain already has credit sufficient to cover the deficit through most of 1975. A lack of investment alternatives aside from the already heavily utilized dollar will tend to limit the switch from sterling as will attractive interest rates for sterling assets.

25X1

#### \* \* \* \*

### SUGAR PRICES: SPIRAL CONTINUES

Scare psychology triggered by adverse market reports in the past four weeks has sent world sugar prices soaring another 50% - to 61 cents a pound f.o.b. Caribbean ports, five times the 31 December 1973 level.

- Reports from the EC, the USSR, and Eastern Europe indicate that their combined harvests in the crop year ending 31 August 1975 could drop 2 million types, or 8%.
- The poor harvest outlook could bring the USSR into the world market and is forcing the EC countries to greatly increase purchases for 1975 delivery.
- Poland has suspended sugar shipments, and the Philippines also has held up sales, ostensibly to assess damage from recent typhoons.

8

We believe that the market has overreacted to these reports. Nevertheless, they point to substantially increased pressure during the coming year on the 20% of world sugar supplies that enters Free World trade. The combined EC and Soviet purchases, which could exceed 1 million tons in 1975, compared with an estimated 300,000 tons in 1974, would add 5%-7% to normal world market demand. At the same time, the Polish withdrawal will mean a slight reduction in world market supply in 1975. We believe the Philippine move was intended only to drive up prices and will soon be canceled.

The tight sugar market has been several years in the making. Rising LDC demand, particularly in Asia, helped to push up world prices from the average of 3 cents a pound for 1964-70 to 10 cents in 1973. Having been burned by overexpanding production following the 1963 sugar boom, the main exporting countries except for Brazil responded slowly to subsequent price increases. Thus, world production remained below consumption for four consecutive years. By the end of the 1973/74 crop year (31 August), the ratio of total world stocks to annual consumption had slipped to 18.5% -- well below the 25% level desired for market stability.

The price rise of the last four weeks, coupled with the worsening recession, probably will induce consumers to curb purchases enough to put substantial downward pressure on prices. Prices could drop in the second quarter of 1975 even if the EC and USSR go ahead with the presently expected purchases.

Net Sugar Imports from the World Markets

		Million To	ns, Raw Value	
	1972	1973	1974	
Total	16.3	16.9	16,4	
Asia	5.6	6.0	6.0	
Africa	1.6	1.6	1,6	
USSR	0.8	1.0	Negl.	
Canada	1.0	1.0	1.0	
Europe	1.7	1.9	1.8	
Of which:				
EC <sup>2</sup>	0.4	0.3	0.3	
United States	5.0	4.8	5.5	
Other	0.6	0.6	0.5	

<sup>1.</sup> Estimated.

<sup>2.</sup> Including the United Kingdom.

The sugar market is sensitive to small changes or rumors of changes in supply. Because rumor has played a leading role in the price advances of the past four weeks, we remain uncertain as to the timing and size of the anticipated drop in prices. In any case, the market will continue tight in 1975. Prices seem unlikely to drop below the range of 25 to 35 cents required to maintain supplies in view of inflated production costs and high prices for competing crops.

25X1

\* \* \* \*

### ISRAEL: A STRAINED ECONOMY

The partial mobilization of Israeli reservists will heighten strains on an economy already staggering under a heavy arms burden.

The mobilization of up to 10,000 reservists from the labor-short economy follows closely the announcement of new austerity measures. Massive arms purchases have placed Israel's foreign exchange reserves under severe pressure. Defense imports this year are likely to total \$2.4 billion, compared with \$500 million to \$600 million in pre-war years. Although the United States is covering the bulk of Israeli arms imports with official aid, the government apparently has purchased up to \$400 million in arms under commercial contracts.

The austerity package — including a devaluation of the Israeli pound, a reduction in food subsidies, and an increase in taxes to cut consumption — aims mainly at slowing the foreign currency drain. Last July the government implemented measures to curb inflation and trim nonessential budget outlays. A third economic package that will concentrate on wage, income, and tax reforms has yet to be announced.

Finance Ministry officials said the new economic program was made imperative by the large decline in foreign exchange reserves. According to Israeli officials, the current account deficit has soared to \$3.5 billion this year from a deficit of only \$1 billion before the war. At the end of September, official reserves stood at \$1 billion, a drop of \$800 million since the beginning of the year. The new measures are expected to save \$700 million in foreign exchange.

The new measures will surely aggravate inflation, which has climbed to a 40% rate since the war. The reduction in food subsidies by itself has caused the consumer price index to jump 17% – some officials are speculating that prices could rise as much as 50% within a year.

10

The success of the economic program depends vitally on whether the Histadrut labor federation goes along with the government's desire to hold the line on wages in upcoming negotiations. The position of Prime Minister Rabin was buttressed when the Knesset approved the economic package. Public reaction has moderated in recent days as attention has shifted from economic problems to the tense military situation on the border with Syria and deteriorating security in the occupied territories.

\* \* \* \*

25X1

# US-SOVIET TRADE: SHIFTING GEARS

The rapid growth of US-Soviet trade in recent years has been marked by the sale of American grain and machinery in an atmosphere of detente. In coming years, expansion of trade will depend largely on the degree of US participation in Soviet economic development projects, especially in Siberia.

### Recent Growth

In two short years US-Soviet trade shot up from \$219 million (1971) to \$1.4 billion (1973). Soviet purchases of grain and machinery dominated the growth, grain alone accounting for 70% of US exports in 1973. As for imports, the United States bought substantial quantities of platinum-group metals from the USSR, and oil became an important purchase for the first time.

Because of a sharp decline in deliveries of grain, US exports to the USSR will fall in 1974. Imports probably will double, however, because of increased purchases of oil, platinum-group metals, and nickel. The roughly \$1 billion US surplus in 1973 will be reduced to \$200 million to \$300 million in 1974.

### 1975 and Beyond

US exports are expected to rebound in 1975. About \$300 million in grain deliveries are already scheduled, and the Soviets could place additional orders in the fall of 1975. As a result of the large number of new Soviet contracts, deliveries of machinery in 1975 could climb to \$400 million to \$500 million. US imports from the USSR may also increase, particularly if recent trends in imports of oil and metals are sustained. The granting of MFN would also stimulate imports, especially of diamonds, although the initial effect would be small. Whatever the rise in US imports, the USSR will have no difficulty in paying for its purchases, given the dramatic turnaround in its hard currency trade balance.

US-USSR Trade 1971-74<sup>1</sup>

				Million US \$
	1971	1972	1973	1974 <sup>2</sup>
US exports	162	547	1,187	600-700
Grain	14	369	837	300
Soybeans	••••	52	67	
Machinery and transport equipment	63	62	204	200-300
Chemicals	38	21	17	30
Iron and steel	2	****	14	10
Other	45	43	48	60
US imports	57	96	215	400
Oil and oil products	1	7	76	150
Platinum group metals	20	45	75	150
Diamonds and other precious stones	11	13	17	15
Chrome ore	11	14	6	10
Nonferrous base metals	2	2	18	45
Other	12	15	22	30
Net exports	105	451	972	200-300

<sup>1.</sup> US Department of Commerce statistics, except for 1974 estimates, by CIA.

The current suspension of Eximbank credit thus far has not affected the level of US-Soviet trade. Indeed, the Soviets have concluded two major contracts with US firms since the suspension, including a \$100 million cash purchase of International Harvester earthmoving equipment. Delays are being encountered, however, in placing a \$35 million contract for the Cheboksary Tractor Plant and in concluding an agreement on the Yakutsk oil exploration project. So far in 1974 US firms have signed almost \$700 million in equipment contracts with the USSR out of a total of \$3 billion placed with Western firms. Both are record totals.

The major potential for growth in US-Soviet trade lies in the exports and imports generated by large Soviet development projects, principally in Siberia. Japan and West Germany will supply most of the \$3-1/2 billion in equipment and technology for coal, timber, and infrastructure projects already begun or negotiated. At least \$10 billion in foreign investment over the next few years will be needed for proposed projects involving oil, LNG, and nonferrous metals. US firms negotiating on some of these projects are Gulf (Sakhalin offshore oil); Texas Eastern, El Paso, Tenneco, and Brown and Root (LNG); and Kaiser (aluminum).

25X1

\* \* \* \*

<sup>2.</sup> Estimated.

#### Notes

### Saudis, West Germans Agree on Economic Commission

A Saudi-West German economic cooperation commission to focus on FRG technical assistance was agreed to last week during a visit to Riyadh by West German officials. The joint commission will boost West German chances to participate in the \$60 billion 1975-80 Saudi development plan. For their part, the Saudis would gain access to German economic and industrial expertise, diluting their dependence on the United States. Saudi oil supplies for West Germany and Saudi investments in the FRG economy appear to be beyond the purview of the commission.

25X1

### Arab League to Speed Up African Aid

At the recent summit in Rabat, the Arab League began making amends for its neglect of African needs by agreeing to

- renew the original capital of the Arab Economic Aid Fund for Africa to maintain available funds at \$200 million,
- increase the capitalization of the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance for Africa from \$15 million to \$25 million,
- establish quickly an Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, to be located in Khartoum, with a minimum capital of \$230 million,

•	continue disbursements of \$80 million in OAPEC funds to the six poorest
	Arab states, which include three African nations.

25X1

### French and US Computer Firms to Merge?

The French government is considering a merger of the French computer firm Compagnie International pour l'Informatique (CII) with the US-controlled Honeywell Bull, according to CII sources. A successful nierger could salvage financially troubled CII and strengthen the ability of Unidata — a consortium of CII, Siemens (West Germany), and Philips (Netherlands) — to compete with US computer firms in the West European market.

25X1

25X1

13

Approved For Release 2009/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150050-1

Venezuela:	Financina	Higher	Coffee	Drices
venezucia.	rinancing	riigher	Conce	Prices

A Venezuelan offer of \$80 million to finance coffee stockpiling by several Central American countries is the first use of oil revenues to boost prices of other primary commodities. Past cooperative efforts among coffee exporters to withhold coffee have foundered partly because small exporters could not afford to sacrifice current export income.	
Iron Ore Exporters in Disarray	25 <b>X</b> 1
Australia was able, with the support of Brazil, to defuse a drive led by Algeria and Peru last week to establish an iron ore producers' cartel. Canberra insisted on representation of the views of importing countries at the recent meeting of producers in Geneva. India and Venezuela early proponents of a cartel came out in favor of a looser, OPEC-like organization. The 13 nations agreed to meet in New Delhi in January to hammer out a proposal to be considered at a ministerial-level meeting in the spring.	
	25 <b>X</b> 1
Publication of Interest*	
The Economic Situation in South Vietnam, October 1974 (ER IR 74-28, October 1974,  This month's report discusses (1) the relative calm in Saigon markets despite sporadic political unrest, (2) price trends outside Saigon, (3) a falloff in export receipts, (4) case studies of export development, (5) unemployment relief in the Saigon area, and (6) a promising oil discovery.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	25 <b>V</b> 1

14

# INTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS

GNP* Constant Market Prices				Average Ann Growth Rate S	
	Latest	Percent Char From Previou	ıs	1 Year	Previous
United States	Quarter   74	Quarter I -0.5	1970 1 3.2	Earlier 1 -2.2	Quarter 1 -2.1
Japan	74 11	0.6	5.7	-3.3	2.4
West Germany	74 11	- 0.7	3.1	1.1	- 2.9
France	73 IV	1.7	3.6	6.0	7.0
United Kingdom	74 111	1.0	2.7	0.6	4.2
Italy	73 IV	1.9	3.7	5.3	7.7
Canada	74 11	l 0	5.7	i 4.9	0

WHOLESALE Industrial	PRICES			Average Ann rowth Rate S	
		ercent Chai	ıg <del>e</del>		
	+	Irom Previol	IS	1 Year	3 Months
	. Month	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier
United States	Oct 74	1.2	9.9	28.2	19.0
Japan	Oct 74	0.4	11.0	28.7	6.6
West Germany	Sep 74	0.2	6.8	14.6	6.9
France	Sop 74	-1.0	11.8	27.9	7.1
United Kingdom	Sep 74	1.5	11.5	25.7	19.9
Italy	Aug 74	0.5	16.1	45.9	23.5
Canada	j Jul 74	2.0	11.2	24.8	12.2

INDUS	STRIAL	PRODU	CTION.
-------	--------	-------	--------

		Average Ann rowth Rate S			
	Latest Month	Percent Chan from Previous Month		1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier **
United States	Oct 74	-0.6	3.8	1 -1.7	-1.6
Japan	Sep 74	0.2	5.2	-6.9	-13.5
West Germany	Aug 74	c	2.5	-3.8	-7.9
France	Aug 74	0	6.2	4.1	12.4
United Kingdom	Sep 74	-1.8	2.2	-1.6	4.1
Italy	Sep 74	1.7	4.0	-1.6	-13.4
Canada	lAug 74	0.4	5.8	5.3	- 3.6

CONSUMER	PRICES				
				iverage Ann	
				owth Rate S	Since
		Percent Char			
	Latest	from Previou	IS	1 Year	3 Months
	Month	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier
United States	Sep 74	1.1	6.6	12.1	13.7
Japan	Sep 74	1.6	11.7	23.8	19.1
West Germany	Oct 74	0.5	6.1	7.1	4.1
France	Sep 74	1.1	8.3	14.7	13.3
United Kingdom	Sep 74	1.1	10.4	17.1	8.7
Italy	Sep 74	3.3	10.9	24.6	35.8
Canada	Sep 74	0.6	6.7	10.9	9.7

RETAIL SALES* Current Prices				Average Ann rowth Rate S	
		ercent Chan rom Previou Month		1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier**
United States	Oct 74	-0.4	9.4	6.8	1 9.3
Japan	Jun 74	2.7	13.4	16.4	6.2
West Germany	Jul 74	5.9	9.3	10.0	7.0
France	May 74	6.2	8.5	18.1	1.3
United Kingdom	Aug 74	2.8	12.8	17.8	24.9
Italy	Jun 74	6.6	17.1	31.0	1.7

			Gr	verage Ann owth Rate S	
		ercent Chan			
	Latest	rom Previou	IS	1 Year	3 Months
	_Month	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier **
United States	Oct 74	0.4	5.8	5.7	2.2
Japan	Jul 74	-2.9	16.7	13.0	15.0
West Germany	Aug 74	0.8	9.1	9.6	10.9
France	Jun 74	1.4	12.6	8.7	16.2
United Kingdom	Sep 74	-0.3	8.3	1.9	5.0
Italy	Jan 74	0.1	20.6	20.5	19.6
Canada	Sep 74	- 0.7	11.8	6.6	-6.1

### MONEY-MARKET RATES

Canada

		Percent Rate of Intere				št .	
	Representative Rates	Late	est Date	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier	1 Month Earlier	
United States	Dealer-placed finance paper	Nov 6	9.00	7.50	11.68	10.13	
Japan	Call money	Oct 23	12.50	8.75	13.50	13.00	
West Germany	Interbank loans (3 Months)	Nev 6	9.43	14.19	9.50	9.66	
France	Call money	Oct 9	13.13	11.13	14.00	13.75	
United Kingdom	Sterling interbank loan (3 mg)	Nov 6	11.48	12.44	12.70	11.63	
Canada	Finance paper	Nov 6	10.65	9.13	11.63	11.23	
Euro-Dollars	Three-month deposits	Nov 6	1 10.00	9.39	13.19	11.64	

<sup>&</sup>quot;Seasonally adjusted.
""Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.

20 November 1974 Office of Economic Research/CIA

Note: US data provided by US government agencies

# EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS

### **EXPORTS\***

f.o.b.

			Comulative		
	Latest	Month			
				ı US \$	Percent
		Million US \$	1974	1973	Change
United States	Sep 74	8,286	71.575	50,428	41.9
Japan	Oct 74	5,299	44,157	29,036	52.1
West Germany	Sep 74	7.220	65,806	48,788	34.9
France	Sep 74	4,007	34,305	26,950	27.3
United Kingdom	Oct 74	3.081	29,693	23,219	27.9
Italy	Sep 74	2,859	21,689	15,589	39.1
Canada	Sep 74	2,808	23,829	18,445	29.2

### **EXPORT PRICES**

US\$			Average Annual Growth Rate Sinca				
	P	urcent Chan	ge				
	Latest f	rom Previou	S	1 Year	3 Months		
	Month	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier		
United States	Sep 74	0.7	1 12.8	29.9	1 30.7		
Japan	Sep 74	-0.9	15.9	23.7	-3.9		
West Germany	Aug 74	-0.7	14.8	13.3	-3.0		
France	Jun 74	2.5	14.7	11.5	33.5		
United Kingdom	Jul 74	1.5	13.5	25.1	29.5		
Italy	Jul 74	4.8	14.6	28.6	35.7		
Canada	Jul 74	0.7	14.3	41.5	9.4		

Jul 74

Jul 74

# IMPORTS'

				Cumulative	
	Lates	l Month			
			Million	1 US \$	Percent
		Million US \$	1974	1973	Change
United States	Sep 74	8,520	73,922	50,491	Change 46.4
Japan	Oct 74	4,416	43.891	25,811	70.0
West Germany	Sep 74	5,354	47,760	37,069	28.8
France	Sep 74	4.221	37,397	25,709	45.5
United Kingdom	Oct 74	4,105	39,709	27,622	43.8
Italy	Sep 74	3.078	27,412	17,584	55.9
Canada	Sep 74	2,799	23,389	16,863	38.7

### **EXPORT PRICES**

**National Currency** 

**United States** 

West Germany

Japan

France United Kingdom

Canada

Italy

	Average Annual Growth Rate Since						
Latest	Percent Chan Irom Previous		1 ٧	2.44			
Month Sep 74	Month 1 0.7	1970 1 12.8	1 Year Earlier t 29.9	3 Months Earlier 1 30,7			
Sep 74	-0.4	11.0	39.7	23.8			
Aug 74	2.0	5.8	22.6	24.8			
Jun 74	3.3	11.1	28.5	42.5			
Jul 74	1.8	13.6	33.2	29.6			

15.4

12.4

### TRADE BALANCE\*

f.o.b./f.o.b.

	Latest Month		Cumula	Cumulative (Million US S)		
		Million US \$	1974	1973	Change	
United States	Sep 74	-233	-2,347	-63	-2,284	
Japan	Oct 74	882	266	3,225	-2,959	
West Germany	Sep 74	1.866	18,046	11,699	6,347	
France	Sep 74	-214	-3,092	1,241	-4,333	
United Kingdom	Oct 74	-1,023	-10,016	-4,403	-5,613	
italy	Sep 74	-418	-5.722	-1.995	-3,735	
Canada	Sep 74	1 9	441	1,582	-1.142	

### IMPORT PRICES **National Currency**

3.9

1.7

Average Annual Growth Rate Since

42.8

38.3

43.4

13.5

	G. GAART TEBLE GIVEE				
		rcent Chan			
	Latest fi	om Previou	5	† Year	3 Months
	Month	Month	1970	Earlier	Earlier
United States	Sep 74	-0.2	19.4	54.3	22.0
Japan	Sep 74	-0.5	16.8	75.6	4.3
West Germany	Aug /4	3.1	7.5	35.3	23.0
France	Jun 74	0	15.6	61.5	37.0
United Kingdom	Jul 74	0.5	21.3	55.9	18.3
Italy	Jul 74	- 2.4	24.8	68.5	7.3
Canada	Jul 74	- 1.8	11.6	32.5	39.7

# BASIC BALANCE"

Current and	Long-Term-Capital	Tran	58	ctio	ns

	Laies	Lalest Period		itive (Millio	n US \$)
		Million US \$	1974	1973	Change
United States*	74	-2.740	-954	-2.164	1,210
Japan	Oct 74	400	-8,669	-6,978	-1.691
West Germany	Sep 74	503	5,058	6,774	-1,716
France	73 IV	-475	NA.	-2,472	N.A.
United Kingdom	74 11	-1,297	-2,951	-868	-2.083
Italy	741	- 2.037	- 2,037	- 872	-1,184
Canada	74 11	-445	-613	-6	-608

### **EXCHANGE RATES** Spot Rate

As of 15 Nov 74		Percent Change from				
Japan (Yen) West Germany France (Franc) United Kingdom (Sterling) Italy (Lira) Canada (Dollar)	US S Per Unit 0.0033 0.4015 0.2134 2.3130 0.0015 1.0119	Dec 66 20.80 59.71 5.70 -17.11 -6.00 9.70	18 Dec 1971 2.65 29.39 8.38 -11.23 -12.50 1.41	19 Mar 1973   -12.36   13.39   -3.18   -6.01   -14.97   1.42	8 Nov 1974 -0.06 2.40 -0.19 -1.07 0.27 0.09	
į				i	i	

### OFFICIAL RESERVES

UTTIGIAL	HE9EHAE9

	Inter	Month		Billion US S			
	End of	Billion US \$	Jun 1970	1 Year Earlier	3 Months Earlier		
United States	Sep 74	1 15.9	14.5	12.9	1 14.9		
Japan	Oct 74	135	41	14.0	13.2		
West Germany	Oct 74	33.7	8.8	35.0	33.9		
France	Sep 74	8.5	4.4	11.2	8.2		
United Kingdom	Oct 74	7.5	2.8	6.8	6.7		
Italy	Sep 74	7.6	4.7	6.5	5.3		
Canada	Oct 74	5.8	4.3	5.8	6.0		

### TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATES\*\*\*

As of 15 Nov 74	Percent Change from					
	n	18 Dec	19 Mar	8 Nov		
	Dec 66	1971	1973	1974		
United States	į <b>-14.90</b>	-5.58	1.03	1 -0.38		
Japan	12.10	-1.41	-13.23	-0.33		
West Germany	33.77	18.60	11.51	1.79		
France	-17,94	-4.50	-6.96	-1.40		
United Kingdom	-37.59	-23.18	-8.68	-1.83		
Italy	-29.77	-28.35	-21.36	-0.73		
Canada	7.18	0.59	2.23	0.05		


<sup>&</sup>quot;Seasonally adjusted.
""Converted into US deliers at current market rates of exchange.


<sup>20</sup> November 1974


<sup>\*\*\*</sup>Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized countries to reflect the competitive impact of exchange-rate variations a rong the major currencies.


# **METAL PRICES**


(Monthly Average Price)














Nov 73

Average

CO	M	MO	DI.	TIES
----	---	----	-----	------

	18 Nov	Week Ago	Oct 74 Average
Copper-LME (¢ per pound)	66.1	66.5	63.4
Copper-US (¢ pe; pound)	75.6	75.6	77.5
Lead-LME (¢ per pound)	23.9	24.2	24.2
Lead- US (¢ per pound)	24.5	24.5	24.5
Zinc-LME (¢ per pound)	35.4	35.9	37.4
Zinc-US (¢ per pound)	38.0	38.0	38.0
Tin-LME (¢ per pound)	343,6	335.8	333.4
Tin-US (¢ per pound)	384.0	373.2	365.0
Steel scrap (\$ per long ton)	N.A.	107.8	າ 19.0
Platinum <sup>4</sup> US dealer (\$ per troy ounce)	176.5	192.5	183.1
Platinum-US producer (\$ per troy ounce)	190.0	190.0	190.0

66.1	66.5	63.4	101.1
75.6	75.6	77.5	59.5
23.9	24.2	24.2	21.7
24.5	24.5	24.5	16.5
35.4	35.9	37.4	72.3
38.0	38.0	38.0	20.4
343.6	335.8	333.4	250.0
384.0	373.2	365.0	262.4
N.A.	107.8	119.0	79.3
	192.5	183.1	158.9
176.5	102.0		158.0
190.0	190.0	190.0	158.0

Cash Prices


<sup>\*</sup>Approximates world market price frequently used by major world producers and traders, although only small quantities of these metals are actually traded on the LME.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Producers' price, covers most primary metals sold in the United States.

<sup>†</sup> Quoted on New York market. †† Composite price for Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.

# AGRICULTURAL PRICES

(Monthly Average Price)



\* This is a compiled index by the <u>Economist</u> for 16 food commodities which enter international trade. Commodities are weighted by 3-year moving averages of imports into industrialized countries.

COMMODITIES	Cash Prices			
	18 Nov	Week Ago	Oct 74 Average	Nov 73 Average
Wheat-Kansas City #2 Hard Winter (\$ perbushel)	4.60	5.05	4.96	4.78
Corn-Chicago #2 Yellow (\$ per bushel)	3.44	3.65	3.71	2.50
Soybeans-Chicago #1 Yellow (\$ per bushel)	7.38	8.21	8.36	5.65
Sugar-World Raw New York #11 (¢ per pound)	61.00	56.50	39.60	10.02
Cotton-Memphis 11/16' (\$ per pound)	0.3705	0.4335	0.4640	0.6310

564618 11-74