

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2


Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100111-2

Secret



25X1


DPSD



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Prospects for the 26th UN General Assembly



25X1

Secret

16 September 1971
No. 2069/71

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 September 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Prospects for the 26th UN General Assembly

Introduction

The Assembly opening on 21 September may mark a turning point for the UN, given Peking's reasonably good prospects for admission and the present likelihood that a new secretary general will be selected before the meeting ends.* Moreover, the international community appears ready for extended, acrimonious debate on various facets of the Middle East problem, the Korean question, several African issues, budgetary problems and, possibly, certain arms control subjects. This memorandum examines these and other matters of particular interest to the US.

25X1

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Background

1. The same Assembly meeting last fall was not altogether favorable to our interests. The Albanian Resolution to seat Peking and expel Taipei received a majority--51-49--for the first time and was defeated only because the US again secured a majority ruling--66-52--that any change in Chinese representation is an Important Question requiring a two-thirds vote. On Middle East issues, the Arabs--frustrated in their attempts to obtain redress in the Security Council--turned to the Assembly and won adoption of a contentious resolution. The voting tended to isolate the US on the Israeli side. On the other hand, the US was able to win Assembly endorsement of the seabeds demilitarization treaty and of the proposal for a Law of the Sea conference in 1973.

Chinese Representation

2. The international status of Peking has improved since the 1970 voting; about as many UN members now recognize mainland China as recognize Taiwan. In response to the changed situation, the US last month opted for a dual representation approach to the China issue. This was tied to a modified Important Question resolution that would make only the expulsion of Taipei subject to a two-thirds vote. The draft dual representation resolution has recently been amended to concede the China seat in the Security Council to Peking, but it does not deal with the conflicting claims of Peking and Taipei to represent all of China.

3. Rounding up co-sponsors for the new strategy has proved difficult, in part because a number of governments are still not convinced that the US itself plans an all-out fight to preserve Taipei's status. Under the assumption that the Communists would not enter the UN while Taipei retained membership, the Nationalists had reluctantly accepted dual representation as a tactic when the resolution did not initially give the Security Council seat to

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Peking. Now that it has been amended to concede the seat, Taipei will probably not only denounce the proposal when it is made public, but will be unwilling to instruct its representatives to continue privately seeking its allies' votes for dual representation.

4. The Albanian Resolution was amended this year to specify that the Communists get the Council seat. The pro-Peking camp placed it on the Assembly's tentative agenda well before the US submitted its item for inscription last month. Peking has officially denounced the US initiative, maintaining firmly that its acceptance would result in the mainland's continued exclusion. The Soviets have made some low-key remarks in support of the Albanian Resolution and against dual representation, but they are believed to be apprehensive over what China's presence at the UN means for them.

5. The Chinese representation issue this year is certain to provoke an unprecedented amount of parliamentary maneuvering of great complexity. The US hopes to secure priority consideration for its Important Question resolution and to have it adopted by the requisite simple majority. Should that tactic be approved, the Albanian Resolution would need to garner two-thirds support. The pro-Peking camp is, of course, seeking priority consideration for the Albanian Resolution without the Important Question hurdle, and should it succeed in its endeavor, adoption of the Albanian Resolution would be certain. Peking's friends may also opt to raise the matter early in the session by challenging Taipei in the credentials committee. Peking, however, would prefer to have the issue settled in the plenary.

The Middle East and Peace-keeping

25X1
6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The resolution which the Arabs pushed through last year amounted to a highly selective interpretation of the 1967 Council resolution on how peace might be achieved. Hoping this

25X1

-3-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

year to pick up US support, the Arabs may settle for a more moderate text that would concentrate on subjects on which the US and Israel apparently disagree. Such a resolution could, for example, call for a positive Israeli response to the suggestions of UN mediator Gunnar Jarring for interim steps toward a definitive settlement, and condemn Israeli actions in Jerusalem. The Israelis in turn surely would seek to exacerbate intra-Arab tensions by raising the subject of the continuing clashes between Jordan and the fedayeen.

7. Although peace-keeping mechanisms would be an essential part of any Middle East accord, the Assembly is not likely to make any substantial progress toward breaking the lengthy impasse over guidelines for UN peace-keeping missions. Moscow's recent reply to the US proposals of 1970 was a rehash of the Soviet view that any mission should be fully under the control of the Security Council, where permanent members may exercise a veto. The Soviets will probably adhere to this view in spite of occasional hints that they would like to achieve some sort of an accommodation before Peking assumes a seat in the UN.

8. Troubled by the continuing deadlock, other UN members, especially Canada, may seek Assembly approval of at least some interim measures on peace-keeping. The most promising of these would set up a roster of troops and facilities that member states are willing to provide. Although the Soviets favor the roster concept, they have in the past insisted that it be part of a total package of peace-keeping arrangements. Action on the interim steps would be important in that it would demonstrate the strong commitment of the members in an area envisaged by the Charter as one of the UN's key functions.

9. The mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency, which provides assistance in the Middle East refugee areas, expires next June. The Assembly is not likely to terminate the agency's existence, but it may be forced to make substantial reductions

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

25X1

in food and educational programs in view of the agency's perennial budgetary problems. The Jordanians and Lebanese claim any cuts would facilitate fedayeen recruitment among refugee teenagers. Egypt has already protested to Secretary General Thant the recent destruction of housing and resettlement of some refugees and agency employees in Gaza and will no doubt raise the issue again when the item is considered by the Assembly.

Other Security Issues

10. India and Pakistan have been leveling charges against each other in UN forums for several months, and Assembly delegates are likely to be subjected to further harangues. The South Asian crisis could become even more pressing should the fighting heat up or should famine conditions develop despite the relief efforts of the international community. The Security Council has so far not formally considered the India-Pakistan issue, but Islamabad is talking about introducing it in October, when it expects that Peking will be occupying the China seat.

11. The Turkish and Greek foreign ministers are scheduled to discuss Cyprus privately on 1 October during their visits to the Assembly. The prospect troubles Cypriot President Makarios, who resists any attempt to impose a settlement of intercommunal differences on the island. To head off this possibility, he appears to be angling for a Secretariat, and possibly an Assembly, declaration of support for Cyprus' sovereignty. The UN force in Cyprus is having its usual fiscal and manpower problems, and these are certain to receive considerable attention when the renewal of its mandate comes before the Council in December.

12. Ireland has given no indication that it will seek Assembly action on the crisis in Ulster, but it could well raise the issue unless tensions soon abate. The UK probably can defeat any Irish bid by warning the members, as it did two years ago, of the risks of UN involvement.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Arms Control

13. The Assembly is likely to review the US-Soviet draft convention curbing biological weapons that is expected to be endorsed soon at the 25-nation Geneva disarmament conference. Nonaligned members would have preferred a convention dealing with chemical weapons as well, and they may seek a firmer commitment from the superpowers to negotiate an agreement in that area. Approval of the biological weapons convention by the Assembly could be jeopardized if there should be a push for language that would challenge the US contention that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 does not ban the use of tear gas and herbicides in war.

14. The question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should receive considerable attention in the Assembly, especially if the US--despite Tokyo's and Ottawa's objections on environmental grounds--goes ahead with its plans for a high-yield underground test in the Aleutians next month. Many nonnuclear countries also believe that such a ban would limit further improvements in strategic weaponry of the nuclear powers, and thus enhance the chances of success in the strategic arms limitation talks. There have been inconclusive indications that Moscow may be preparing an initiative to capitalize on this interest of the nonnuclear states and carry a step further the "disarmament offensive" launched by Brezhnev in March. Such a proposal would probably call for verification of compliance by an international "nuclear detection club" using seismic data exchanges.

15. The Assembly's annual review of the Geneva talks probably will conclude satisfactorily since the draft biological weapons convention meets the Assembly's informal criteria that some progress be recorded each year in the disarmament arena. The recent Soviet call for consideration of a world disarmament conference is not likely to make any headway this fall. There has been little pressure

25X1

SECRET

25X1

for an all-states approach from UN members in recent years, but the concept in the future could gain more backing if the Geneva conferees were to appear incapable of achieving further substantive agreements.

Perennial Issues

16. The Assembly may also be seized with the South-West Africa question. The Africans have tentatively scheduled a Security Council meeting on the topic for later this month when senior representatives should be on hand. Their purpose is to seek support for further measures against South Africa--perhaps even its expulsion--as a result of the June advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that upheld the Assembly's termination five years ago of Pretoria's mandate over the territory. If, as is likely, their proposals are vetoed by the Western powers in the Council, the Africans will probably take the issue to the Assembly.

17. Rhodesia is another preoccupation of the Africans, but probably they will largely confine their efforts against Salisbury to the Council, which must enforce the UN's sanctions program. The Portuguese territories are more likely to be considered in the Assembly. There, the West will be hard pressed to defeat an expected African demand that the various liberation movements be represented on the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

18. The West had hoped to avoid debate on the Korean question this year, but the Communists have again put forward their proposals for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the peninsula and the dissolution of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. The Communists will also seek an unconditional invitation for Pyongyang to participate in the debate, but Seoul's allies can probably again secure adoption of a resolution that would effectively require the North Koreans to accept the UN's authority. This outcome is less certain than in the past, because of reverberations from the Chinese representation issue.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

19. The UN budget, a source of controversy for years, will be heatedly debated again this year as the major donor nations seek to rein in the generally accelerating costs of the organization and the demands of the less developed nations for economic assistance. Aggravating the budgetary problem is the threat of the UN's staff employees to resort to strike action next month if their demands for a 15 percent pay boost are not met by the Assembly.

Other Subjects

20. Membership questions in addition to the China issue include the applications of Bhutan and Bahrain. The admission of both is certain to be approved, raising the UN membership to 129. The Assembly probably will also consider the candidacies of Oman, whose application had been delayed by the Council, and Qatar, which recently became independent. The Soviets will strongly support Pankow's bid to gain the status in UN agencies that Bonn now enjoys. They could threaten to boycott or downgrade important UN events, such as the environmental conference scheduled for Stockholm next year, unless the East and West Germans are placed on an equal footing.

21. States such as Brazil may ask the Assembly to postpone the Law of the Sea conference beyond 1973 so that they will have more time to drum up support for their claims to extensive territorial waters. The US and the USSR share an interest in narrower limits and firmer rights of passage through international straits, and they probably have the votes this fall to defeat any delaying move.

22. Two topics dealing with outer space are likely to receive some attention by the Assembly. The members almost certainly will endorse and open for signature the liability convention designed to provide compensation for damage caused by errant space vehicles. Mutual concessions by the East and West early this summer broke the three-year impasse over the terms of the convention. A draft

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

treaty on the moon ballyhooed by the Soviets last spring may be brought before the Assembly, but most delegations appear to share the US view that it offers virtually nothing not already contained in the Outer Space Treaty of 1966.

23. The UN has long been a forum for the airing of concerns about human rights, and this year should prove no exception. The Israeli-occupied territories, the South Asian imbroglio, and the white redoubts of Africa will all receive attention. There will also probably be considerable East-West conflict over the proposal, backed by the US since 1965, that the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights be established. The Soviets clearly fear that the potentially broad powers of such an office could be used to focus unwanted attention on their internal affairs.

24. A thorough revamping of the cumbersome Assembly structure was a key goal of the US and Canada last fall, and a committee of 31 was established to study the situation. The committee will offer only a few minor proposals this year. Most members seem still to prefer the status quo, which gives the smaller states many opportunities to express their views and to hold chairmanships, to a more efficient organization composed of fewer, more specialized committees.

25. More likely to be altered in a significant way by Assembly action is the UN's Economic and Social Council. The Assembly probably will approve a resolution to double the size of the Council from 27 to 54 members, although some nonaligned nations, especially Yugoslavia and Brazil, consider the increase inadequate. The US is supporting the measure in return for the establishment of more efficient procedures for the Council to deal with scientific questions and UN aid programs.

26. The Soviets have again placed on the Assembly agenda their proposal to "strengthen international security," which was first outlined by Foreign Minister Gromyko in a speech two years ago.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Moscow apparently intends to use the proposal as a vehicle to propagandize the Brezhnev "peace offensive" and to push for a conference on European security. Only 22 of the 127 UN members replied to Secretary General Thant's request for comments on the subject, however, indicating that most UN members remain apathetic. The Yugoslavs, moreover, hope to amend any such Soviet-sponsored resolution to call for scrupulous respect for national independence. Such a text could be construed as a condemnation of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Conclusions

27. The UN may well be entering a new phase of its development. Peking's entry would not necessarily pose insuperable problems, and it would clearly make the UN more representative of the existing world situation and its changing power relationships. New faces in the secretariat appear likely, and the international community should profit from that change. The Assembly session will almost certainly again demonstrate its utility as a forum for the airing and, in some cases, easing of grievances. In certain areas, such as the Middle East and South Asia, UN discussions may exacerbate immediate problems, but prospects are that the session will show once more that there are still international concerns that the UN alone is equipped to address.

-10-

SECRET

25X1