

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0

CIA/OCI/IM - 0525/70


Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0

D/CRS

Secret



25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Chile's Election--the Candidates and Their Programs

Secret

6 July 1970
No. 0525/70

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 July 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Chile's Election--The Candidates And Their ProgramsSummary

Chileans will go to the polls on 4 September to elect a new president. The three candidates presently in the race are: Jorge Alessandri, an independent conservative; Salvador Allende, who is supported by the extreme left; and Radomiro Tomic, a Christian Democrat. Alessandri is stressing the benefits of his previous term as president (1958-64) and of "reform with tranquility." He gives comfort to those conservatives who dislike the direction in which Chile now is moving, but he has no consistent ideological program. Allende's program leans heavily on Marxist and Eastern European models, and he is a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro. Although he personally does not believe that violent revolution is the solution to Chile's problems, many in his party do. Tomic has not moved to claim the political center; in fact, his program is in many respects identical to that of Allende. He praises the record of the past six years of Christian Democratic government but, like President Frei in 1964, claims that his social and economic reforms will be instituted under a non-capitalist system. The armed forces have gone out of their way to emphasize support for Chilean democracy; so it seems likely that one of these three men will be inaugurated president in November, particularly if the two are close in voting strength.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Central Reference Service, the Office of National Estimates, and the Directorate for Plans.

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

Introduction

1. A crucial element in the presidential election is the constitutional provision for a congressional run-off if no candidate wins an absolute majority of the popular vote. In such an event, congress, meeting in joint session, will elect the president from the top two contenders. Congress traditionally has elected the candidate with the plurality, but there is no certainty that this tradition will be followed this year.

2. The Chilean armed forces remained largely apolitical from the 1930s until 1969, when low pay and lack of equipment led some officers to resort to political pressures. Last month the commander in chief of the army, General Rene Schneider, said the armed forces would support the right of the congress to elect the presidential candidate with the second largest vote. Although Schneider said he was merely emphasizing that the military would uphold the constitution, this statement was interpreted as support for Tomic and a blow to Alessandri, who is generally considered to be the front runner. Schneider stirred up some adverse comment within the air force and the navy for implying that he spoke for all the armed forces.

3. The campaign this year so far lacks the sharp left-right polarization that existed in 1964 when Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei was elected president by a majority of the popular vote. The 74-year-old Alessandri, who was president from 1958 through 1964, has the support of the conservative National Party and many independents. Salvador Allende, a Socialist senator and a three-time presidential loser, is supported by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Radical Party, and an assortment of other leftist groups, including the ex-Christian Democrats who left the party in 1959. After an unsuccessful bid for Communist support, Radomiro Tomic is running with only the backing of his own Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

4. Jorge Alessandri is viewed by many conservatives as Chile's only hope for salvation from the leftism of Tomic and Allende. These conservatives are disillusioned by the unsettling economic and social reforms of President Frei, for whom many of them voted in 1964 as the only alternative to Allende's radicalism. Alessandri has endeavored, however, to avoid becoming tarnished by association with the extreme right. He is running as an independent, although he has the official support of the conservative National Party (PN). Indeed, it was his association in the public mind with the PN that helped that party to run second in the congressional elections of March 1969. His campaign is being supported by various other independent groups [redacted]



JORGE ALESSANDRI

25X1

[redacted] This mixture is inherently unwieldy, and Alessandri's chances have been weakened by bickering among his backers.

25X1

Alessandri's Background

5. Alessandri's father was President of Chile twice. In 1924 he was ousted by conservatives but the next year was recalled by a liberal junta to serve out the rest of his term. This background has given Jorge a strong sense of national pride and of personal responsibility.

6. Some of Alessandri's political appeal undoubtedly comes from his name; his father, Arturo Alessandri, is one of the national heroes of Chile. He professes to view himself as a national leader above party politics. Although he has few close friends, he is able to establish a rapport with

SECRET

25X1

crowds, particularly the lower classes, from whom he receives much of his support.

7. Alessandri received a degree in civil engineering from the University of Chile in 1919. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1925. In 1927, his father's government was overthrown and the family was exiled to Argentina. Jorge served as minister of finance from 1947 to 1950, and in 1957 was elected to the Senate. His popular vote margin over Salvador Allende in the presidential election of 1958 was extremely slim, and during his administration inflation continued to be a serious problem.

8. A major question in the 1970 election is that of the 74-year-old Alessandri's health. Although he has seemed vigorous through much of the campaign, in a recent television program he appeared old and feeble. His hands shook, his voice quavered, and backers of Tomic and Allende were greatly encouraged. If he can project a strong appearance through the rest of the campaign, however, he should be able to reassure the voters.

Alessandri's Program

9. Unlike Tomic and Allende, Alessandri has no formal program. He is said to believe that projecting his image is the important thing and that he will worry about his program after he is elected. His speeches combine praise of his former administration with promises to improve the economic situation. Alessandri has supported copper agreements drawn up last year under the Frei government and has said that if "national circumstances" and world copper prices permit, he will exercise the option to buy the remaining 49 percent of the Anaconda Company operations sometime after January 1972. Despite his commitment to private enterprise, however, Alessandri probably would not veto nationalization legislation if it were passed by congress.

10. There is some evidence that Alessandri is bitter toward the US, but he certainly would be friendlier than Allende. Some of his backers have been hurt by programs of the Alliance for Progress.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Alessandri has said that he was forced into breaking relations with Cuba in 1964, and he probably would not stop the small agricultural shipments to Cuba that were recently resumed. Like his opponents, Alessandri has criticized the present constitutional structure of Chile, suggesting in particular that the president be given more power over the budget.

Alessandri's Campaign

11. Early in 1969 most observers concluded that Alessandri planned to run for president in 1970. It was generally believed, however, that he would delay an official announcement until a groundswell of popular opinion once again "called" him to the political arena. A mutiny by an army regiment in October 1969 and pressure from his advisers caused him to advance his timing. Even before he had made his entry official, Alessandri was considered to be well ahead of any rivals. His campaign may have peaked too early, however, and his appeal may decrease as the election nears.

12. Alessandri appears to have little control over his own campaign. Although he stresses that he does not want to turn back the clock, some of his advisers are drawn from the most reactionary sectors of society. He has failed to rely on the National Party's existing organization, working instead through the individual independent groups. An additional complicating factor is the support of old-guard Radicals who refuse to back their party leaders, who support Allende. Alessandri's backers are already quarreling over the division of cabinet posts and other patronage, and some of his advisers seem to believe that simply invoking his name is enough to win the elections.

Alessandri and the Military

13. The military's attitude toward Alessandri is somewhat ambivalent, although he claims to have close relations with armed forces leaders. High-ranking conservative officers probably believe he is the person best suited to lead the country at

SECRET

25X1

this time.

25X1

25X1

Outlook

14. At present, the crucial questions confronting the Alessandri campaign are the candidate's health and his backers' organization. If Alessandri can project a vigorous image throughout the rest of the campaign, he will have a good chance of being elected president. More bickering among his supporters, however, could cause such chaos in his campaign that he would be unable to overcome it simply by force of personality. Alessandri must win a plurality in order to be elected. If he comes in second, he could not get enough congressional support to be elected. Moreover, running second in the popular vote probably would be such a blow to his pride that he would not want to try to break the tradition that congress elects the person with the highest popular vote.

15. Senator Salvador Allende is running for the presidency for the fourth time. He is a member of the Socialist Party (PS), which advocates armed revolution, and is supported by the Communist Party (PCCh), but many political moderates in Chile will vote for him because they do not consider him a violence-oriented leftist--as indeed he is not. Allende's lengthy exposure to national politics has given his candidacy a bourgeois "old-shoe" cast. This familiarity is a two-edged sword, however, and in the 1970 campaign Allende has fought to overcome the image of a three-time loser.



SALVADOR ALLENDE

SECRET

25X1

16. At the beginning of the campaign, Allende appeared to be running a strong second to Jorge Alessandri. His unstable coalition, however, failed to coalesce, and this campaign at times seemed un-directed despite the organizational strength of the Communists. By the beginning of June, many reports discounted the possibility that he could finish second. On 2 June, however, his campaign received a shot in the arm when a rally in downtown Santiago drew between 60,000 and 100,000 people. Initial assessments indicate that the rally may have stimulated strong popular enthusiasm for Allende in the Santiago area, cutting into Tomic and Alessandri strength. If Allende can capitalize on this new momentum, he may be able to turn the election once again into a close three-man contest.

Allende's Background

17. Allende is 61 years old and has been active in the Socialist Party since the 1930s. Most of his early career was spent working as a lawyer, but he received a degree in medicine from the University of Chile in 1932. In 1937 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies from Valparaiso, and he served as minister of public health from 1939 through 1942.

18. The PS has suffered innumerable schisms and reunifications, the most recent in 1967. Allende has been involved in the splits, but he has always remained prominent in some identifiable political group. As a result of the political maneuvering of the last 35 years, he has made a number of enemies on the left. Important members of the present Socialist Party believe that he is too much a member of the political establishment to be an effective leader of the revolution they deem necessary. He was by no means certain of the presidential nomination of the Socialist Party, although the Communists had virtually promised him their backing. His Popular Unity (UP) coalition has been hammered together by the Communists and is unstable at best. Allende remains, however, the Marxist most able to run a strong campaign in a free democratic election.

25X1

Allende's Program

19. In December 1969, before the official designation of Allende as standard-bearer for the UP, a Popular Unity Program was adopted by the Communists, Socialists, Radicals, and assorted leftist splinter groups. Allende has ignored portions of the program, especially those that might frighten or alienate large numbers of uncommitted voters. On 2 June, however, he enunciated a program of "Forty Points," which, he claims, will be enacted as soon as he takes office. His program ranges from such bread-and-butter issues as ending sales taxes and freezing mortgage interest rates to imposition of stiff penalties for "economic crimes." In a special jab at Alessandri, Allende promised that the holdings of wealthy families, including those of the Alessandris, would be turned over to the state. Allende plans to nationalize basic resources now in the hands of "domestic and foreign monopoly interests"--the large copper companies; the iron, nitrate, iodine, and coal industries; private industrial monopolies and other large companies; and enterprises that affect economic and social development, such as electric power, transportation, communications, petroleum and liquid gas, steel, cement, petrochemicals, cellulose, and paper.

20. Allende's program calls for a number of revisions in the Chilean political system. Like Tomic, he proposes the creation of a unicameral legislature. Although the program itself includes a restructuring of the judicial system, Allende has ignored this aspect. A Socialist senator caused some consternation by stating that after Allende's victory, "paredones," or execution walls, would be used to eliminate the exploiting classes. Allende has been quick to "explain" that this was only a figure of speech.

21. As expected, Allende has emphasized foreign-policy issues. He calls for closer relations with Socialist countries, denounces the OAS as a tool of US imperialism, and says he will revise or denounce treaties that "compromise" Chilean sovereignty. His direct attacks on the US have been muted, however, probably in order to avoid the situation that

SECRET

25X1

occurred in 1964 when he was cast as the villain in a struggle between Communism and democracy.

Allende's Campaign

22. Allende's campaign so far has been an uneasy combination of Socialist rhetoric and Communist organization. Allende, who himself does not advocate violent revolution, has at times been put on the defensive by his extremist Socialist supporters. The Chilean Communist Party leaders, on the other hand, are strong advocates of peaceful revolution, and a strong showing by Allende is imperative if the PCCh is to retain its attractiveness to young leftists. Therefore the Communists, despite grumbling about the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Socialists, are mustering all their forces behind Allende.

23. Early in May, Allende's campaign received a setback when it was rumored that he had suffered a heart attack. He appeared on television shortly thereafter, however, and claimed that his illness was merely a severe case of the grippe and accompanying heart difficulties. Since then he has campaigned vigorously and has not presented the image of an ill man, although he apparently does have some severe medical problems.

24. Because the Socialist Party espouses violent revolution, Allende has been placed on the defensive on the "law-and-order" issue. Violence in the countryside over the agrarian reform program and even bank robberies have become associated in the popular mind with Allende's Socialist supporters. Alessandri in particular is hammering at this theme. The discovery last month of a guerrilla training camp in southern Chile has intensified public apprehension. Three of the six persons arrested have been identified as Socialists, and Allende has already been forced to answer questions about their connection with the party. Allende and members of the UP have complained bitterly about what they refer to as a "campaign of terror" against them that seeks to emphasize leftist violence and differences within the UP.

SECRET

25X1

Outlook

25. Allende's campaign got off to a good start, and he was considered by most to be running well ahead of Tomic. He entered a slump about a month ago, but his rally on 2 June has provided renewed momentum, and the Communists' organizational ability is bound to produce results. If he should finish a strong second to Alessandri, the vote of the Christian Democrats in congress would be crucial. All the votes of the UP and a significant portion of the PDC would be enough to ensure him the presidency. If Alessandri received much more than 40 percent of the popular vote, he probably would be elected, but if the candidates are closer, Allende will be strongly tempted to try to strike a deal with those leftist Christian Democrats he might be able to woo.

26. Radomiro Tomic is the presidential candidate of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Eduardo Frei, a founder of the party, has been president of Chile since 1964. He cannot succeed himself, and Tomic, who served as ambassador to the US from 1965 until 1958, hopes to continue Christian Democratic control of the government. When Tomic was nominated



RADOMIRO TOMIC WITH FAMILY

late in 1969, he was generally considered to be running a poor third behind Alessandri and Allende. Despite his initially poor prospects, Tomic's campaign has been gathering momentum during the past months.

SECRET

25X1

Tomic's Background

27. Radomiro Tomic, 56 years old, is a self-made man who has played an important role in the development of the Christian Democratic Party. He received a law degree in 1941 from the Catholic University in Santiago and was elected to the Chamber of Deputies the same year. He worked with Eduardo Frei to change the National Falange from the reform-oriented youth group of the Conservative Party to the Christian Democratic Party, which was able to elect a president the second time it entered a candidate.

28. Some of Tomic's social and economic ideas undoubtedly are a result of the relative poverty in which he spent his youthful years. His father was an immigrant Yugoslav, which probably explains Tomic's admiration for Tito and the Yugoslav system.

29. Tomic is ambitious, and for years he has been regarded as Frei's chief competitor within the PDC and as his successor as president. Nevertheless, he had to wage a battle for the party's nomination and at one point last year withdrew his name from consideration. His attempts to woo the Communist Party were probably made only partly because he saw an ideological affinity--he is well aware of the organizational power of the Communists.

30. One of the chief drawbacks to Tomic's campaign has been his own personality. Many Chileans refer to him as "Mister Blah-Blah" because of his non-stop volubility. But non-Christian Democrats are attracted to him because of his association with Frei and the fact that he offers a non-Marxist alternative to the conservatism of Alessandri.

Tomic's Program

31. In May the PDC Plenary Council, which has 128 members including the National Council, PDC members of congress, and provincial chiefs, adopted a platform for Tomic's presidential candidacy. The thrust of the program is socialist and statist, with heavy reliance on Christian Democratic "communitarian" ideas. Known as the Cartagena Document, the program

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

is very much in line with the philosophy Tomic has expressed privately and publicly for the past several years. It stresses "the new economy," a Tomic concept that foresees the coexistence of private and of "popular" enterprises carried on by the state, small individual producers, cooperatives, and workers.

32. An important part of Tomic's program that is echoed in the Cartagena Document calls for the immediate nationalization of the large US-based copper companies. Although Tomic has praised Frei's "Chileanization" program, he has left no doubt that as president he would support nationalization legislation. An acceptable form of compensation probably could be worked out, however.

33. Tomic, along with Frei, Allende and Alessandri, has criticized the present constitutional arrangements. Like Allende, he would like to see a unicameral legislature so that legislation would not be stalemated in congress, as it has often been during President Frei's administration. Tomic has stated that "in order to get laws passed more rapidly, the Senate will be abolished."

34. Tomic has criticized the Frei administration for not moving fast enough in certain phases of economic and social reform. Recently, however, he has changed his line. He is now emphasizing the achievements of the past six years and is promising to build on this foundation to bring even greater benefits to the Chilean people. His relationship with Frei has been strained; the President has disapproved of Tomic's desire to negotiate for Communist support. Within the last two months, however, Frei has begun a concerted effort to transfer some of his popularity to Tomic. In his annual message to Congress last month, Frei indirectly endorsed Tomic's candidacy, although at the same time opposing complete nationalization of copper and PDC unity with the left. Following the speech, Tomic and Frei appeared together at a PDC celebration. Tomic apparently has given up on his attempt to gain support for his presidential candidacy from the Communists and other leftists, and he may try to move more closely to the center of the political spectrum in the expectation of picking up moderates from both camps.

-12-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Tomic and the Left

35. When Tomic returned from the US and began his pre-campaign, he hoped to split the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) from its Socialist partners and run for president with Communist support. The PCCh itself received nearly 16 percent of the total vote in congressional elections last year. This strength is firm as the party can mobilize its adherents in a relatively solid bloc behind the candidates it endorses. Tomic believed that he could use the Communists' voting strength and organization, while maintaining his independence after the election.

36. The Communists, however, refused to go along with Tomic. They may have been motivated in part by a belief that he would be less malleable than Allende. In addition, they probably believed that prospects for Allende's election in 1970 were excellent, and they were reluctant to pass up the opportunity. Furthermore, cooperating with the PDC would have laid the PCCh open even further to attacks by extremists from the Socialist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left on the party's "revolutionary zeal."

37. Tomic seems finally to have reconciled himself to a campaign without the Communists, and indeed has begun to attack the Communist-Socialist-Radical coalition. He is now stressing the theme that when those parties last controlled the Chilean Government (1938-1948), they accomplished little. This shift probably has helped his political rapprochement with Frei.

38. Tomic is campaigning without the Communists, but he probably is still counting on their support in Congress should he run second to Alessandri. Although in such a case some leftists might boycott the election or even vote for Alessandri--hoping, thereby, to send the country into chaos from which the left could then rescue it--Tomic is optimistic that he can strike a deal with the more pragmatic Communists. As in the case of Allende, the combined votes of the PCCh and the PDC would suffice to give him the presidency. If Alessandri received much more than 40 percent

-13-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

of the popular vote, he probably would be elected president in any event. If the three candidates are closer, however, the political logrolling in Congress is likely to be intense.

Outlook

39. After a faltering start, Tomic's campaign now is swinging into high gear. It is widely acknowledged that he is running the best campaign of the three candidates. He has access to substantial government funds and the support of most of the government apparatus, and is using modern campaign techniques of radio, television, and newspaper publicity. Experienced PDC politicians who have been working in the government since 1964 now are returning to party affairs to help his campaign. For example, PDC workers claim to have enrolled 60,000 new voters in the countryside, using the facilities of the agrarian reform program.

40. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Tomic could be the leader in the election, especially if the health problems of Allende and Alessandri become more pronounced before September. If he runs a strong second, he will be under great temptation to strike a deal with the Communists, hoping to ensure himself of the presidency.

SECRET

25X1